K. Rajah Ayyar and S. Ramachandra Ayyar The question is whether the first respondent is liable on the promissory note under section 27 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It states when a principal will be liable on a negotiable instrument executed by his agent and when not. Section 28 states how an agent executing a negotiable instrument should describe himself if he wants to exclude his personal liability on the instrument. The relevant provisions of the Bills of Exchange Act are sections 23 and 26. The importance given to signatures in Bills of Exchange Act does not find a place in the Negotiable Instruments Act, but the instrument has to be read as a whole to find out if a person signs the same as principal or agent. No express statement to the effect that personal liability is excluded is necessary. If the language is clear and unambiguous no extraneous evidence is admissible. But if the language is ambiguous and consistent with the existence as well as exclusion of personal liability then evidence has been allowed to be let in England and in India to find out in which character the maker signed the instrument. The test is, what is the fair interpretation that can be put on the instrument? In Satyanarayana v. Mallayya(1) the Full Bench held that surrounding circumstances could be looked into to find out whether a maker of an instrument intended to exclude his personal liability. Seetharamayya Garu v. Sathiah(2) merely followed Satyanarayana v. Mallayya(1). In Lindus v. Melrose(3), which was an appeal from Lindus v. Melrose(4), in the body of the instrument the words “on account of the company” found a place. The maker added to his signature the word “director”. The surrounding circumstance that was looked into was that it was not a liability of the maker. Alexander v. Sizer(1) followed Lindus v. Melrose(2), Leadbitter v. Farrow(3) dealt only with the liability of an agent and did not deal with the liability of the principal. In Elliott v. Bax-Ironside(4) the addition of the word “director” to signature was held to be one of description and not one which had the effect of excluding personal liability. It was held that extraneous evidence could be looked into. In Macdonald v. Whitfield(5) two persons jointly and severally executed a negotiable instrument and stated therein that the consideration was for another. It was held that the personal liability was not excluded and that the circumstances attending the making and endorsing of a negotiable instrument could be looked into. See also Gerald McDonald & Co. v. Nash & Co.(6); Kettle v. Dunster and Wakefield(7), H.O Brandt & Co. v. H.N Morris & Co.(8) and Univzrsal Steam Navigation Co. v. James McKelvie & Co.(9). In Sadasuk Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Pershad(10) the Privy Council held that the Courts should find out what was the fair interpretation that could be put on the instrument. See also Abdul Majid Khan v. Saraswatibai(11). The wording of the promissory note in the present litigation is substantially the same as the wording of the promissory note in Konetti Naiker v. Gopalaiyar(12). There was difference of opinion between Sundara Ayyar and Sadasiva Ayyar, JJ., and the Full Bench in Koneti Naicker v. Gopala Ayyar(13) finally agreed with the judgment of Sadasiva Ayyar, J. which ignores the distinction in language between section 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and section 26 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882. The judgment of Sundara Ayyar J., completely supports the contentions on behalf of the appellant. The later Full Bench, Satyanarayana v. Malldyya(14), did not refer to Koneti Naicker v. Gopala Ayyar(13). In Satyanarayana v. Mallayya(14) the guardian who executed the promissory note had sufficiently described himself in the body of the promissory note that he was executing the same on behalf of the minor. Under section 26 of the Negotiable Instruments Act a person who has not got the capacity to execute a document cannot execute a negotiable instrument. A minor has no capacity to execute and document. So a guardian could not execute any negotiable instrument on behalf of a minor so as to bind the minor personally. To that extent Satyanarayana v. Mallayya(1) is not correct. Seetharamayya Garu v. Sathiah(2) merely followed Satyanarayana v. Mallayya(1) without realizing the distinction between the liability of the minor on the promissory note and that of the minor under Hindu law. Annamalai v. Muthuswami(3) correctly draws the distinction between the two kinds of liability. Mookan Servai v. Muthayya Servai(4) follows Gadd v. Houghton(5) which is referred to “with approval in Universal Steam Navigation Co. v. James McKelvie & Co.(6). See also Maruthamuthu Naicker v. Kadir Badsha Rowther(7). In Halsburj's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Vol. 2, page 646, the statement of the law as laid down in Elliott v. Bax-Ironside(8) is stated to be correct. The observation of Scrutton L.J in Ariadne Steamship Co. v. James McKelviede Co.(9) about the construction of documents is approved of in Universal Steam Navigation Co. v. James McKelvie & Co.(6). The word “agent” in the body of the promissory note is a word of qualification and not of description.T.S Venkatesa Ayyar for N.C Vijayaraghavachari[Leach C.J—We are agreed that no evidence could be given dehors the promissory note.]In construing the promissory note two principles have to be borne in mind, namely, (i) Lord Ellenborough's dictum that a person who signs a promissory note is primarily liable and (ii) as decided by Lord Sumner in Sadasuk Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Pershad(10), has the executant sufficiently described in the instrument the other person who is to be liable, so that any one looking at the instrument can see clearly that the liability of that other person is expressed? There is no distinction between the rules of interpretation of a vernacular promissory note and a promissory note in English.[Leach, C.J—The point is this: If a person writing a promissory note in Tamil wishes to exclude his personal liability, would he express himself in the way in which he has expressed himself in the suit promissory note?]The view of Sundara Ayyar, J., in Konetti Naiker v. Gopalaiyar(1) was not approved by the Full Bench, but that of Sadasiva Ayyar, J., was followed. In Sri Yerruganti Chinna Venkatanarayanan v. Kota Giri Venkatanarasimha(2) Sadasiva Ayyar, J. followed his own view in Konetti Naiker v. Gopalaiyar(1). If the executant had used the words “as agent” then his personal liability would be excluded, but not when he merely describes himself by using the word “agent”. This aspect is clearly brought out in the judgments in Palaniappa Chettiar v. Shanmugam Chettiar(3) and Subbanna v. Subbarayudu(4). See also Sreenivasayya v. Nagappa(5).[Patanjali Sastri, J.—Lord Sumner pointed out that the word “agent” does not describe a trade or calling and the absence of the word “as” made no difference.]In Universal Steam Navigation Co. v. James McKelvie & Co.(6) the word “as” found a place in the document.[Counsel referred to the following cases of the other High Courts; Shyam Sundar Chakravarty v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co., Ltd.(7), Sreelal Mangtulal v. The Lister, Antiseptic Dressing Co., Ltd.(8), Dhirendra Nath v. Nutbehary Munshi(9), Sitaram Krishna v. Chimandas Fatehchand(10), Damodar v. Ramnath(11), Jhandu Mal and Sons v. Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Company(12) and P.R.M.P.R Chettyar v. Muniyandi Seraw(13).]