Strengthening the “Strong Suspicion” Filter and Guarding Against Criminalisation of Civil Disputes: Commentary on Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. State of West Bengal

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. State of West Bengal, 2025 INSC 1373 (Criminal Appeal No. 5146 of 2025), is a significant development in criminal procedure and in the law governing misuse of criminal process in the backdrop of civil disputes. The Court, speaking through Manmohan, J. (for a Bench also comprising Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.), allowed the accused’s appeal against the Calcutta High Court’s refusal to discharge him in a case involving allegations under Sections 341, 354C and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

At its core, the case arose from an acrimonious property dispute between two brothers, joint co-owners of a house in Salt Lake, Kolkata. One brother’s son (the appellant-accused) was prosecuted on the complaint of a woman who claimed to be a tenant of the other brother. The complaint alleged wrongful restraint, criminal intimidation, and voyeurism. Parallel to this, there existed a subsisting civil injunction directing both co-owners to maintain joint possession and restraining creation of third-party rights in the property.

The Supreme Court’s judgment performs multiple functions:

It reaffirms and consolidates the jurisprudence on discharge under Section 227 CrPC (and by necessary analogy, Section 239 CrPC), emphasising the need for a “strong suspicion” founded on material capable of being evidence at trial.
It clarifies the scope of voyeurism under Section 354C IPC, especially the meaning of “private act” and the requirement of reasonable expectation of privacy.
It delineates the ingredients of criminal intimidation (Section 506 IPC) and wrongful restraint (Sections 339/341 IPC) and applies them rigorously to the facts.
Most importantly, it lays down a strong normative and practical message: police and trial courts must act as “initial filters” and refrain from pushing to trial those criminal cases that lack strong suspicion, particularly where the dispute is, in substance, civil in nature and there is no reasonable prospect of conviction.

This commentary analyses the judgment in detail, situating it within existing precedent, explaining its legal reasoning, clarifying complex concepts, and assessing its impact on criminal law practice in India.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

1. The property dispute

The dispute centres on the property at CF-231, Sector I, Salt Lake, Kolkata. Two brothers, Mr. Bimalendu Biswas and Mr. Amalendu Biswas, were joint owners. A civil suit (Title Suit No. 20 of 2018) was filed by the appellant’s father (Bimalendu) against his brother (Amalendu) to protect his rights.

On 29 November 2018, the Civil Judge granted an injunction:

“Both the parties should maintain a joint possession in the suit property. Both parties are hereby restrained from disturbing the joint possession of the other in the suit property and from alienating the suit property or creating 3rd party interest in the suit property till disposal of the suit…”

This injunction was in force on the date of the alleged criminal incident (18–19 March 2020).

2. The criminal complaint and investigation

On 19 March 2020, Ms. Mamta Agarwal lodged an FIR at Bidhannagar North Police Station (FIR No. 50/2020) alleging offences under Sections 341, 354C, and 506 IPC.
She claimed to be a tenant of co-owner Amalendu Biswas and stated that on 18 March 2020, when she, her friend, and some workmen attempted to enter the premises, the appellant (son of the other co-owner) restrained and intimidated them, clicked her photographs and recorded videos without consent, thereby invading her privacy and outraging her modesty.

The chargesheet dated 16 August 2020:

Recorded that the complainant had expressed unwillingness to make a judicial statement (i.e., no statement under Section 164 CrPC).
Relied essentially on the FIR and the investigation officer’s conclusion to submit a chargesheet under Sections 341, 354C and 506 IPC.
Contained no documentary material supporting the alleged tenancy.

3. Proceedings before the Trial Court and High Court

The appellant filed a discharge application, arguing that:
- The dispute was essentially civil between two co-owners with a subsisting injunction.
- The complainant was not a lawful tenant, and her entry into the property itself was contentious.
- The ingredients of Sections 341, 354C, and 506 IPC were not made out even if the FIR was taken at face value.
The Magistrate dismissed the discharge application on 29 August 2023 and fixed the matter for framing of charge.
A criminal revision before the Calcutta High Court was dismissed on 30 January 2024. Crucially, while the High Court categorically held that the allegations did not disclose an offence under Section 354C IPC, it nonetheless refused to discharge the appellant and directed the Trial Court to frame charge “keeping an eye” on its observation.

4. The appeal before the Supreme Court

Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3002/2024, which was converted into Criminal Appeal No. 5146 of 2025. The key question was whether, on the material available, there was sufficient ground – in the sense of a strong suspicion – to proceed with criminal trial under Sections 341, 354C and 506 IPC.

III. Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court had to address the following core issues:

Scope of discharge under Section 227 CrPC: What is the threshold for discharging an accused at the pre-charge stage, and what is the role of the Court in sifting the material?
Section 354C IPC (voyeurism): Do allegations of clicking photographs and videos of a woman, without more, constitute voyeurism when there is no allegation that she was engaged in a “private act” as defined in the statute?
Section 506 IPC (criminal intimidation): Whether the mere act of clicking photographs, without any specified threat of injury to person, property, or reputation, made with intent to cause alarm, can amount to criminal intimidation?
Section 341 IPC (wrongful restraint) read with Section 339 IPC: Whether preventing entry into a property from which the alleged victim has no established legal right of entry, and where the accused bona fide believes in a lawful right to obstruct (particularly in light of a civil injunction), can amount to wrongful restraint?
Effect of civil disputes on criminal prosecution: To what extent should police and criminal courts be cautious when the dispute emanates from an ongoing civil litigation with an existing injunction, and the complainant refuses to make a judicial statement?

IV. Summary of the Judgment

1. Clarification of the test for discharge

The Court exhaustively restated the legal principles governing discharge at the pre-charge stage (para 14–18) by relying on a line of precedents:

Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4
Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715
P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398
M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. CBI, (2020) 2 SCC 768
Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of U.P., (2024) 10 SCC 651

From these, the Court distilled the principle that at the stage of discharge, a “strong suspicion” founded on material capable of translation into evidence is necessary. A mere suspicion, or an absence of such strong suspicion, justifies discharge.

2. Section 354C IPC (voyeurism) – no offence disclosed

The Court held (para 19–21) that:

Voyeurism under Section 354C IPC requires that the woman be watched or her image captured while she is engaged in a “private act” with a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The FIR and chargesheet contained no allegation that the complainant was doing any such “private act” – her alleged activity was simply attempting to enter a property with others.
Even the High Court had recognised that Section 354C was not attracted, yet failed to discharge the accused under that section.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that no offence under Section 354C IPC was disclosed.

3. Section 506 IPC (criminal intimidation) – ingredients not satisfied

Analysing the definition of criminal intimidation (para 22), the Court found:

There was no specific allegation of any threat to person, property, or reputation.
No words allegedly uttered by the appellant were recorded in the FIR.
The only act alleged was clicking photographs, which by itself was not shown to be coupled with a threat intended to cause alarm.
The complainant refused to make a judicial statement; there were no supporting statements by her friend or workmen.

Even taking the FIR at face value, the Court held that the ingredients of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC were not attracted.

4. Section 341 IPC (wrongful restraint) – not made out

Relying on the definition of wrongful restraint in Section 339 IPC (para 23–24), the Court reasoned:

To constitute wrongful restraint, the complainant must have a right to proceed in the direction from which she was obstructed.
Here, the complainant’s alleged right derived from her status as a “tenant” of co-owner Amalendu Biswas.
The chargesheet contained no document whatsoever supporting her tenancy.
In fact, Amalendu himself stated that she had come merely “to see” the property, indicating she was at best a prospective tenant.
Given the subsisting injunction, inducting a tenant would itself violate the civil court’s order.

Furthermore, the exception to Section 339 IPC applies when a person in good faith believes he has a lawful right to obstruct. Given:

the appellant’s father’s joint co-ownership, and
the civil injunction protecting joint possession and prohibiting third-party interest,

the Court held that all the appellant had done was to enforce what he bona fide believed to be his lawful right in terms of the injunction (para 26). Thus, no offence of wrongful restraint was made out.

5. Strong admonition against criminalising civil disputes and clogging the system

In an important policy pronouncement (para 28–29), the Court emphasised:

Police and criminal courts must be circumspect in property or other disputes that are essentially civil, particularly where a civil suit and injunction already exist.
The decision to file a chargesheet should be based on whether the evidence collected provides a reasonable prospect of conviction.
Both the Investigating Officer (at chargesheet stage) and the Magistrate or Sessions Judge (at charge-framing stage) must act as “initial filters” to ensure that only cases with strong suspicion reach the trial stage.
Filing chargesheets in cases where no strong suspicion exists clogs the judicial system, diverts resources, and undermines the right to a fair process.

6. Final outcome

The Supreme Court:

Allowed the appeal.
Set aside the impugned judgment of the Calcutta High Court and the Trial Court’s order.
Discharged the appellant from G.R. Case No. 223 of 2020 (arising out of FIR No. 50/2020).

V. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents on Discharge: Consolidating the “Strong Suspicion” Standard

The Court’s reasoning is rooted in well-settled precedent but gives that jurisprudence renewed force in the specific context of civil–criminal overlap and misuse of gender-offence provisions.

1. Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia (1989) 1 SCC 715

This case held that the word “ground” in Section 227 CrPC refers to grounds for putting the accused on trial, not grounds for conviction. It clarifies that:

At the discharge stage, the judge does not ask, “Will this end in conviction?”
The judge asks: “Is there enough material to justify subjecting this person to a criminal trial?”

In Tuhin Kumar Biswas, this understanding surfaces in the Court’s observation that while predicting conviction or acquittal at the charge stage is impermissible, absence of a reasonable prospect of conviction should caution the State against prosecuting (para 28).

2. Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979) 3 SCC 4

This early but seminal judgment laid down four key points (para 23 of the present decision):

The judge has power to sift and weigh the evidence to see if a prima facie case exists.
If material discloses grave suspicion and it is not satisfactorily explained, the court should frame a charge.
If two views are equally possible and the material only causes suspicion (not grave suspicion), the accused should be discharged.
The judge is not a mere “post office”; he must consider broad probabilities, total effect of evidence, and basic infirmities, without conducting a mini-trial.

These principles are recited almost verbatim (para 15, 23) and serve as the jurisprudential backbone of the Court’s analysis in Tuhin Kumar Biswas. The Court meticulously applies them to each alleged offence and finds that, at best, only a weak suspicion arises.

3. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala (2010) 2 SCC 398

P. Vijayan reinforces:

The distinction between mere suspicion and “grave suspicion.”
The judge’s role to “sift” the evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether a case for trial is made out.
The principle that if, even assuming the prosecution’s case to be true, the evidence cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there is no sufficient ground for proceeding.

The Supreme Court imports these ideas and applies them concretely:

On Section 354C IPC, even if the allegation of clicking photographs is accepted, there is no allegation of a “private act”; thus, the offence is statutorily not made out.
On Section 506 IPC, even if photographs were taken, the absence of any threat or intention to cause alarm means the legal ingredients cannot be satisfied.
On Section 341 IPC, even if obstruction occurred, the complainant had no established right to enter, and the exception for good faith belief applies.

4. M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. CBI (2020) 2 SCC 768

This decision, quoted at length (para 16), distilled principles that:

Two possible views, one creating only suspicion – discharge is proper.
Judge is not a “post office”; must examine broad probabilities and total effect of evidence.
At the charge stage, court treats prosecution material as true; probative value is not examined.
Nonetheless, there must be some material to justify a strong suspicion.
Defence material is generally not looked at; “record of the case” is confined to prosecution documents and articles.

The Court in Tuhin Kumar Biswas emphasises (para 17–18) that a strong suspicion must be rooted in “some material which can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial.” The absence of:

any Section 164 CrPC statement of the complainant,
any corroborating witnesses (friend, workmen),
any tenancy document, and
any concrete allegation of a “private act” or specific threat,

means such material is simply not present.

5. Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of U.P. (2024) 10 SCC 651

This more recent judgment, cited in para 15, reconfirmed the above principles and is used here as the immediate doctrinal anchor. By aligning with Ram Prakash Chadha, the Court positions Tuhin Kumar Biswas firmly within the contemporary evolution of discharge jurisprudence, while extending it specifically to property disputes dressed up as criminal offences.

B. Application of Discharge Principles to the Facts

Having set out the law, the Court carefully applies it to the factual matrix.

1. Absence of legally tenable material

The Court’s conclusion that no strong suspicion exists is supported by several factual deficiencies:

No judicial statement by the complainant (Section 164 CrPC): the complainant expressly refused to record a judicial statement (para 4, 11), which often serves as a key piece of evidence in sexual or gender-sensitive offences.
No corroborative statements from the complainant’s friend or workmen, despite their alleged presence (para 11).
No tenancy document – no rent agreement, no rent receipts, no written acknowledgment from the alleged landlord is annexed to the chargesheet (para 8, 25).
Contradictory stance of co-owner Amalendu Biswas, who describes the complainant as having come merely to see the property, undercutting her claim of being an existing tenant (para 13, 25).

Given these infirmities, the Court finds that the material cannot legally sustain any of the charged offences, even if taken at face value.

2. The judge’s role as “filter,” not post office

The Court implicitly critiques the approach of both the Magistrate and the High Court:

The Magistrate appears to have treated the filing of the chargesheet as sufficient to frame charges, rather than independently examining whether the legal ingredients of the offences were made out.
The High Court went one step further: even after explicitly holding that Section 354C IPC was not disclosed, it refused to discharge the accused (para 20–21), thereby contradicting its own assessment of the legal ingredients.

In contrast, the Supreme Court implements the correct approach: it sifts the material, aligns it with statutory elements, and where the basic ingredients are absent, it grants discharge.

C. Interpretation of Section 354C IPC (Voyeurism)

Section 354C IPC criminalises voyeurism. The key statutory elements are:

A man who watches or captures the image of a woman,
While she is engaged in a “private act”,
In circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed.

Explanation 1 to the section defines “private act” to include:

Situations where the woman’s genitals, posterior, or breasts are exposed or covered only in underwear,
Use of a lavatory,
Any sexual act not ordinarily done in public.

1. Key finding: mere photographing is not enough

The Court’s holding is narrow but crucial (para 19–21):

The complaint says that the appellant clicked photographs and made videos without consent.
However, there is no allegation whatsoever that the complainant was:
- exposed or semi-nude,
- using a washroom, or
- engaged in any sexual act, or
- in any setting that would reasonably create an expectation of privacy in the legal sense.

Thus, even if clicking photographs might be intrusive or objectionable in a lay sense, it does not fit the statutory definition of voyeurism under Section 354C. The Supreme Court reinforces what the High Court had already recognised: mere capturing of images in a public or semi-public context where no “private act” is involved is not voyeurism.

2. Importance of this clarification

This clarification is significant because:

Section 354C IPC is a gender-protective provision introduced after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 in response to concerns around privacy and sexual harassment.
Its misuse in property or other non-sexual disputes risks trivialising serious sexual offences and undermining the credibility of genuine victims.
The Court’s insistence on adherence to the statutory structure of “private act” and reasonable expectation of privacy ensures that Section 354C is applied only in its intended domain.

D. Criminal Intimidation (Section 506 IPC): Need for a Clear Threat and Intent to Cause Alarm

To constitute criminal intimidation (Sections 503 & 506 IPC), the following must be shown:

A threat to cause injury to person, reputation, or property (or to a person in whom the victim is interested);
The threat must be given with the intention to cause alarm to the victim; or
With the intent to compel the person to do something they are not legally bound to do, or to omit something they are legally entitled to do.

The Court (para 22) finds:

The FIR does not specify any particular words or acts amounting to a threat of injury.
The allegation is only that the appellant “intimidated” by taking photographs; such characterisation without factual detail is too vague to constitute criminal intimidation.
The absence of any statement under Section 164 CrPC, and the lack of supporting witnesses, further undermines any claim of intimidation.

Accordingly, even assuming the FIR is truthful, the legal ingredients of criminal intimidation cannot be satisfied. This is a textbook application of the discharge standard: where even the uncontroverted prosecution case does not map onto the statutory definition, discharge must follow.

E. Wrongful Restraint (Sections 339/341 IPC) and the Good-Faith Exception

1. Elements of wrongful restraint

Section 339 IPC defines wrongful restraint as:

“Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person.”

Two essential elements emerge:

There must be a voluntary obstruction;
The obstruction must prevent the victim from proceeding in a direction in which they have a legal right to proceed.

2. The statutory exception

The exception to Section 339 provides:

“The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this section.”

Thus, even if there is obstruction, no offence is committed if:

The accused bona fide believed he had a lawful right to obstruct; and
The obstruction relates to private ways over land/water (which in practice covers many property-access situations).

3. Why wrongful restraint was not made out here

The Supreme Court (para 24–26) examines:

The complainant’s alleged “right” to enter is derived solely from her claim of being a tenant of co-owner Amalendu.
However:
- No tenancy document is produced with the chargesheet.
- Amalendu’s own statement says she had come merely to see the property, implying she was only a prospective tenant.
- Given the subsisting injunction restraining creation of third-party interest, her induction as tenant would itself have been in violation of a civil court order.

On this footing:

The complainant had no legally established right to enter and proceed into the property on the date of the incident.
The appellant, whose father was a joint co-owner and beneficiary of the injunction, acted in furtherance of what he reasonably and bona fide believed to be a lawful right to prevent unauthorised or injunction-violating entry.

Hence:

Either the complainant lacked a legal right to proceed, which defeats wrongful restraint; or
Even if some right is assumed, the appellant’s conduct falls squarely within the good-faith exception to Section 339 IPC.

The Court thus treats the incident as, at best, giving rise to:

“…a cause of action for filing a suit for injunction and/or an application seeking modification of the interim order already in subsistence or an application for the relief of ingress and egress in the pending suit.” (para 26)

In other words, this was a matter for civil remedies, not criminal prosecution.

F. Policy Guidance: Filtering Weak Cases and Avoiding Criminalisation of Civil Disputes

In paragraphs 28–29, the Court delivers a broader message that goes beyond the immediate case.

1. The “initial filter” role of police and courts

The Court underscores:

In a “society governed by rule of law,” prosecution should not proceed where there is no reasonable prospect of conviction.
Investigating Officers, at the stage of filing the chargesheet, and Criminal Courts, at the stage of framing charge, must act as filters:
- They must check whether the evidence collected can justify a strong suspicion.
- If not, the matter should not be pushed into a full-blown criminal trial.

The Court links this directly to systemic concerns:

Filing chargesheets in weak cases clogs the judicial system.
It diverts judges, staff, and prosecutors from more serious, trial-worthy cases.
It contributes to enormous backlogs and delays.
It undermines the right to a fair process, as citizens are subjected to the ordeal of criminal trial without a sound evidentiary foundation.

2. Civil disputes dressed as criminal cases

The Court specifically warns (para 28–29) that:

Where a civil dispute is already pending (here, a title suit over co-owned property) and an injunction exists,
Police and courts must be especially cautious about allowing the criminal process to be invoked as a parallel pressure tactic.

In this case, the warning is particularly apt:

The criminal complaint was filed by someone connected with one co-owner (Amalendu),
Against the son of the other co-owner (Bimalendu),
At a time when an injunction ensured joint possession and prohibited creation of third-party rights.

The Court implicitly treats the FIR as an attempt to:

Circumvent or undermine the civil injunction, and
Convert a property possession dispute into a criminal law problem.

By discharging the accused and giving this broader guidance, the Supreme Court seeks to reinforce the boundary between civil and criminal remedies.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

For clarity, the key legal concepts used in the judgment can be briefly explained as follows:

1. Discharge under Section 227 CrPC

Occurs at the pre-charge stage, after the chargesheet is filed but before the court frames charges.
The judge examines the prosecution’s material (FIR, statements, documents) to see if there is enough to proceed.
If there is no sufficient ground – meaning no strong suspicion that the accused committed an offence – the judge must discharge the accused.
The judge does not weigh evidence like at trial but can sift it to weed out obvious non-cases.

2. “Strong suspicion” vs mere suspicion

Mere suspicion is a weak sense that something might be wrong, based on speculation or unclear facts.
Strong suspicion is rooted in specific material which, if accepted as true, would make it probable that the accused has committed an offence.
If only mere suspicion exists, discharge is appropriate. If strong suspicion exists, charges may be framed and the case goes to trial.

3. Voyeurism (Section 354C IPC)

Targets the act of secretly watching or recording a woman engaged in a private act – typically involving nudity, use of toilet, or sexual activity.
The woman must reasonably expect not to be seen or recorded in that situation.
Mere taking of photographs in public or semi-public spaces, without any private act or expectation of privacy, is not voyeurism.

4. Wrongful restraint (Sections 339/341 IPC)

Occurs when one person obstructs another from going in a direction in which they have a legal right to go.
If the person obstructed has no legal right to proceed (e.g., a trespasser or someone attempting to violate a court order), wrongful restraint is not made out.
If the person obstructing honestly and reasonably believes he has a lawful right to obstruct (good faith), the act may fall within the exception and cease to be an offence.

5. Criminal intimidation (Sections 503/506 IPC)

It is not enough that someone feels “intimidated” in an ordinary sense.
The law requires:
- a specific threat to cause injury to person, reputation, or property, and
- an intention by the accused to cause alarm or compel the victim to act or abstain from acting in a certain way.
Vague or unspecified claims of being “threatened” without details typically do not meet this standard.

6. Good faith in criminal law

“Good faith” generally means acting with due care and attention, with an honest belief in the legality of one’s conduct.
If a person, after taking reasonable care, honestly believes they have a legal right to obstruct access to property, this can be a defence under the exception to Section 339 IPC.
In this case, the civil injunction in favour of joint possession and against third-party interests provided a strong basis for a good-faith belief that a prospective tenant could be lawfully stopped from entering.

VII. Likely Impact and Significance

1. Strengthening discharge jurisprudence

The decision reinforces that:

Trial courts must meaningfully apply the “strong suspicion” test.
They must not treat the filing of a chargesheet as an automatic warrant for trial.
Their role is to protect individuals from unwarranted criminal trials where the legal ingredients of the offence are not even prima facie satisfied.

This may encourage:

More rigorous scrutiny of charges at the pre-trial stage; and
Greater willingness to discharge in obviously weak or civilly-rooted disputes.

2. Limiting misuse of Section 354C IPC

By insisting on the “private act” requirement, the Court guards against:

Using Section 354C as a generic privacy or harassment tool in non-sexual contexts; and
Its deployment as a pressure tactic in property or other civil disputes.

This clarification helps maintain the integrity of gender-sensitive criminal provisions, ensuring they are available for genuine cases of voyeurism and not diluted through overbroad application.

3. Reinforcing the boundary between civil and criminal remedies

The Court’s remarks on civil disputes and injunctions are of wide relevance:

Parties often resort to criminal complaints to gain leverage in property or commercial disputes.
This judgment equips accused persons to argue, at the discharge stage, that:
- The dispute is essentially civil;
- The criminal complaint and chargesheet lack legally tenable material; and
- Proceeding with trial would be an abuse of process and a drain on judicial resources.

4. Operational guidance for police and prosecutors

The Court explicitly states that:

Chargesheets should not be filed unless there is a reasonable prospect of conviction (para 28).
Police must be alert to civil disputes lurking behind criminal complaints and avoid mechanically sending every such case to trial.

If internalised institutionally, this could:

Improve the quality of investigations;
Lead to more considered decisions on closure reports vs chargesheets; and
Reduce the burden of weak prosecutions on criminal courts.

5. Protection of the right to fair process

By linking the misuse of prosecution in weak cases with the compromise of a citizen’s right to a fair process (para 28), the Court ties procedural safeguards to constitutional values. It signals that:

The State’s power to prosecute is not unfettered;
Subjecting citizens to baseless criminal trials is itself a form of injustice, even if they are ultimately acquitted.

VIII. Conclusion

Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. State of West Bengal is a carefully reasoned judgment that performs multiple important functions simultaneously.

First, it vigorously reasserts the “strong suspicion” standard at the discharge stage, insisting that judges must act as independent filters rather than passive conduits of prosecution decisions. It demonstrates how, even when the prosecution’s allegations are taken at face value, charges must be quashed if the statutory ingredients of the offence are not even prima facie met.

Second, it offers clear doctrinal guidance on:

the scope of voyeurism under Section 354C IPC,
the requirements of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC, and
the structure of wrongful restraint under Sections 339/341 IPC and its good-faith exception.

Third, and perhaps most consequentially, it issues a strong caution against the criminalisation of civil disputes, especially where a civil suit and injunction already exist. The Court’s articulation of the duty of police and trial courts to assess the reasonable prospect of conviction before pushing cases to trial has important systemic implications for backlog, fairness, and the integrity of the criminal justice system.

Finally, by discharging the appellant and setting aside the orders of the Magistrate and High Court, the Supreme Court affirms that criminal law is not a tool for settling property scores or circumventing civil court orders. It reinforces that criminal process must not be used as an instrument of harassment, and that the threshold for subjecting someone to trial is, and must remain, a carefully policed one.

In sum, the judgment stands as a robust precedent on discharge, an important clarification of key IPC provisions, and a principled defence of the proper boundaries of criminal law in a system already stretched by heavy docket burdens.