Stay‑Induced Delay as an Independent Article 21 Ground for Bail under UAPA

Case: Muhammed Bilal v. Union of India (2025 KER 61965)

Court: High Court of Kerala (Division Bench)

Bench: Raja Vijayaraghavan V, J. and K. V. Jayakumar, J.

Date: 19 August 2025

Procedural Posture: Criminal Appeals under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (Crl. A. Nos. 1248/2025 & 1253/2025) against the Special Court’s refusal of bail in S.C. No. 02/2023 (NIA).

Introduction

This decision arises out of the NIA’s investigation into alleged activities of the Popular Front of India (PFI) and affiliated outfits in Kerala, including their supposed “India 2047” agenda to establish Islamic rule and a structured conspiracy apparatus comprising a “Reporters Wing,” “Physical and Arms Training Wing,” and “Service Wing/Hit teams.” The four appellants—Muhammed Bilal (A‑22), Riyasudheen (A‑24), Ansar K. P. (A‑23), and Saheer K. V. (A‑60)—were accused as part of a “defence team” allegedly tasked with reconnaissance, logistics, and armed overwatch in connection with the murder of Sreenivasan, a BJP activist, in Palakkad on 16 April 2022 (originally Crime No. 318/2022, later taken over by NIA and clubbed with RC‑02/2022/NIA/KOC).

The appellants challenged the Special Court’s orders denying bail. They argued that the prosecution had re-characterized a political murder as a communal/terrorist act to attract UAPA, that their roles were peripheral (as “defence team” members), that the record is voluminous (over 1,000 witnesses, 1,688 documents, 696 MOs, and 10 TB of FSL material), and—critically—that the Supreme Court’s stay on framing of charges in SLP (Crl.) No. 3658/2024 had rendered a timely trial impossible, violating Article 21. The NIA countered that there was an “excellent prima facie case,” the appellants were part of a terrorist gang with training and active roles on the day of the incident, and delay alone cannot justify bail under UAPA.

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court set aside the Special Court’s denial of bail and allowed both appeals, granting bail to all four appellants with stringent conditions. The Court anchored its decision in Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and the Supreme Court’s line of authorities (notably Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb) holding that prolonged incarceration and lack of a realistic prospect of an early trial permit constitutional courts to grant bail notwithstanding the UAPA Section 43D(5) restrictions.

Key factual pivots were:

• Lengthy pre-trial detention: A‑22 and A‑24 had spent over three years and three months in custody; A‑23 for more than two years and eight months; A‑60 for two years and three months.
• A continuing Supreme Court stay specifically interdicting the framing of charges.
• Exceptional breadth of the prosecution’s case file (witnesses, documents, MOs, digital evidence) foreclosing a near-term trial even if the stay were vacated.
• Parity: a substantial number of co-accused (49 of the total accused) had already been enlarged on bail by the High Court or the Supreme Court.

To manage risk, the Court imposed conditions including permission to leave the Ernakulam Revenue District, surrender of passports, “single mobile number” accessibility, periodic reporting, and non-tampering/non-repetition covenants, with liberty to the Special Court to add further conditions and the prosecution to seek cancellation upon breach.

Issues Before the Court

• Whether, despite the UAPA Section 43D(5) embargo on bail, the appellants’ prolonged incarceration and the Supreme Court’s stay on framing of charges—resulting in an indefinite trial horizon—warranted bail under Article 21.
• How parity with similarly placed co-accused already on bail should factor into the decision.
• What conditions could sufficiently mitigate risks identified by the NIA given the gravity of allegations.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713:
  • Held that constitutional courts can grant bail on Article 21 grounds even in the face of UAPA Section 43D(5) when trial is unlikely within a reasonable time and incarceration has already consumed a substantial portion of the likely sentence.
  • Clarified that UAPA Section 43D(5) is “less stringent” than NDPS Section 37 and should not be the sole metric for denying bail; constitutional rights must be harmonized with statutory policy.
• Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024) 8 SCC 293:
  • Reaffirmed Article 21’s primacy: restrictive bail clauses do not disable constitutional courts from granting bail where fundamental rights are infringed.
  • Emphasized that even under stringent penal statutes, courts must lean toward constitutionalism and liberty.
• Javed Gulam Nabi Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813; Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1109; Athar Parwez v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762:
  • Underscored that prolonged incarceration and denial of a speedy trial justify bail even under special statutes with rigorous bail fetters.
• Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India (1996) 2 SCC 616:
  • Adopted a pragmatic, constitutionally sensitive approach where undertrials face extended deprivation of liberty without a reasonable prospect of early trial, especially where accused are not directly charged with terrorist acts but with conspiracy or possession-related offences.

The High Court not only invoked these decisions but applied them to the distinctive posture here: a Supreme Court stay directly preventing even the framing of charges, compounded by an extraordinarily voluminous record.

Legal Reasoning

1) Article 21 as a trump in the face of UAPA Section 43D(5)

The Bench reiterated that statutory restrictions like UAPA’s Section 43D(5) do not oust the constitutional power to grant bail where Part III rights are violated. Drawing from Najeeb, the Court reasoned that the legislative policy against bail must be respected at the outset, but the “rigours” of Section 43D(5) “melt down” when:

• There is no reasonable likelihood of trial commencing or completing within a reasonable time; and
• The period of incarceration has already exceeded a substantial part of the likely sentence if convicted.

That exact constellation was found present here: the Supreme Court’s order dated 06.05.2024 specifically interdicting framing of charges remained in force; even absent the stay, the record’s size made an early trial unrealistic.

2) The significance of the Supreme Court’s stay

What is noteworthy in this ruling is the Court’s express reliance on a higher-court stay as an objective driver of delay. The Bench treated this “stay-induced delay” as a legally cognizable ground under Article 21. In doing so, it extends and adapts Najeeb’s ratio to a scenario where the stall in progress is not attributable to the defence or ordinary systemic backlog alone but to an interdict by the apex court. The message is clear: regardless of the source of delay, the State cannot ask for continued incarceration under UAPA while the trial is frozen.

3) Trial magnitude and realistic timelines

The Court took judicially cognizable notice of the prosecution’s case magnitude—1014+ witnesses, 1688 documents, 696 material objects, and 10 terabytes of FSL material. Even if the stay were lifted, the Court considered it evident that a multi-year trial was inevitable. That factual assessment fed directly into the Article 21 analysis.

4) Parity with co-accused

Another axis of reasoning was parity: a large cohort of co-accused (49) had already secured bail. While there was prosecutorial emphasis on the appellants’ supposed higher culpability than other bailed accused, the Bench did not find a principled basis to withhold liberty when the systemic delays and stay applied equally, and when the appellants’ continued incarceration could not be justified on a constitutional balance in the present posture.

5) Gravity acknowledged, but managed through conditions

Importantly, the Court did not trivialize the gravity of the allegations (training, reconnaissance, presence at the scene as “defence team,” post-offence concealment). It accepted that, at the threshold, the case might have been different. But gravity alone could not eclipse the compounded Article 21 violation in the present circumstances. The Bench used robust conditions to address the NIA’s risk concerns (e.g., movement controls, single phone number, fortnightly reporting, witness non-tampering, and a clear pathway to cancellation of bail upon breach).

Impact and Implications

• Doctrinal refinement: This judgment explicitly recognizes “stay-induced delay” as a standalone manifestation of Article 21 infringement sufficient to overcome UAPA Section 43D(5). While Najeeb already allowed constitutional courts to “harmonize” statutory rigour with fundamental rights, this case squarely applies that harmonization where the delay owes to a superior court’s stay on framing charges.
• Operational signal to investigating/prosecuting agencies: If the State seeks or benefits from a stay that stymies trial progress, it cannot simultaneously insist on continued incarceration under UAPA purely on gravity. The cost of a prolonged freeze may be bail, not indefinite detention.
• Parity strengthens Article 21 claims: Where many similarly placed co-accused have bail, holding back a few on identical or near-identical fact matrices grows harder, especially amidst systemic or stay-induced delays.
• Conditions as constitutional balancing tools: The structured conditions—movement restrictions (needing leave to exit Ernakulam district), passport surrender, single mobile number transparency, and routine reporting—illustrate how courts can tailor bail to minimize flight risk or interference without sacrificing liberty.
• PFI-linked prosecutions: Given the multiplicity of accused and cases, this decision may catalyze additional Article 21–based bail motions from “non-assault team” actors or those with prolonged custody, unless trials are meaningfully un-stayed and expedited.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• UAPA Section 43D(5): A “rigour” clause making bail difficult if the court finds reasonable grounds to believe the accusation is prima facie true. It does not, however, strip constitutional courts of the power to grant bail for Article 21 violations.
• Article 21, Constitution of India: Protects life and personal liberty, including the right to a speedy trial. Prolonged pre-trial incarceration when trial cannot realistically proceed is treated as a violation.
• NIA Act, Section 8 (connected offences): Allows NIA to investigate offences connected with its primary scheduled offences, enabling consolidation (here, the Palakkad murder case with the larger conspiracy case).
• Parity in bail: The principle that similarly placed accused should receive similar bail treatment unless there are distinguishing features. It promotes non-discrimination and consistency.
• “Assault team” vs “Defence team” (as per prosecution case theory): Prosecution distinguished between those who allegedly executed the killing (assault) and those who provided armed overwatch/logistics/reconnaissance (defence). The Court acknowledged the allegation but granted bail on constitutional delay grounds rather than on a comparative merits assessment of roles.
• Stay on framing of charges: An order (here, by the Supreme Court) preventing even the commencement of the trial’s formal stage of charge framing. Such a stay can dramatically prolong detention, raising Article 21 concerns.

Bail Conditions in Brief

To reconcile liberty with security, the High Court directed that each appellant:

• Obtain prior permission from the Special Court to leave the Revenue District of Ernakulam.
• Surrender any passport(s) to the Special Court.
• Furnish and keep updated their current residential address with the NIA Investigating Officer.
• Use only one mobile number (to be communicated to the IO), remain reachable on it, and not discard/switch the device without prior intimation.
• Report to the jurisdictional Station House Officer once every fortnight.
• Not tamper with evidence or influence/threaten witnesses.
• Not engage in activities similar to the alleged offence or commit any offence while on bail.

The Special Court may add conditions, and any breach empowers the prosecution to seek cancellation of bail.

Observations on the Record

• The judgment notes varying tallies of accused (66 vs. a submission referring to 71). This numerical imprecision did not affect the Court’s reasoning on Article 21 and delay.
• The prosecution case includes references to arms training, reconnaissance, CCTV material, and post-offence concealment; however, the Court explicitly chose not to adjudicate merits at this stage, grounding its ruling in constitutional delay.

Conclusion

This decision is a significant articulation of the constitutional limits on pre-trial detention under the UAPA. The Kerala High Court has reaffirmed and refined the Najeeb doctrine by squarely recognizing that a stay on the very initiation of trial (framing of charges) creates “stay-induced delay,” which—when compounded by prolonged incarceration and an exceptionally voluminous prosecution record—triggers Article 21 protection. In such circumstances, the rigour of Section 43D(5) of UAPA must yield. The Court’s rigorous suite of bail conditions exemplifies how liberty and security can be balanced without converting undertrial detention into a de facto punishment.

Key takeaways:

• Article 21 trumps UAPA Section 43D(5) where trial cannot reasonably commence or conclude, including due to superior-court stays.
• Magnitude of the record and parity with bailed co-accused bolster the constitutional case for bail.
• Gravity is managed through tailored conditions; bail here is not an appraisal of innocence, nor a comment on the merits.

Going forward, this judgment will likely serve as persuasive authority in UAPA prosecutions where systemic or stay-driven delays threaten to convert preventive detention into prolonged punitive incarceration. It underscores a core constitutional commitment: even under the most stringent statutes, personal liberty cannot be eclipsed by indefinite delay.