Status-Neutral Joint Trials and Procedural Fairness: Supreme Court bars segregation of MLA’s case solely for expedition; Ashwini Upadhyay directions do not override CrPC joinder rules

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Supreme Court of India’s decision in Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana, 2025 INSC 1113 (Criminal Appeal Nos. 4002–4003 of 2025), decided on 12 September 2025 by a Bench comprising J.B. Pardiwala, J. and R. Mahadevan, J. The appeals arose out of two orders of the Additional Sessions Judge, Nuh (dated 28.08.2024 and 02.09.2024), subsequently upheld by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana (12.12.2024), which directed the investigating agency to file separate charge-sheets against the appellant (a sitting MLA) and segregated his trial from the trials of multiple co-accused in cases arising from the communal violence in Nuh on 31 July 2023 (FIR Nos. 149 and 150 of 2023).

The central issue was whether a trial court can, solely on account of an accused being a sitting legislator and by invoking this Court’s directions in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India (2024) 1 SCC 185 (regarding prioritization of cases against MPs/MLAs), direct a separate charge-sheet and segregated trial where the allegations arise out of the same transaction and are based on common evidence. The appellant confined his prayer to setting aside segregation and sought a joint trial with co-accused. The State defended the segregation on grounds of judicial efficiency and expedition.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the orders of the trial court and the High Court, and directed a joint trial of the appellant along with the co-accused. The Court held:

Segregation solely because the appellant is a sitting MLA misapplies Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay and violates the equality mandate under Article 14 and the fair trial guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Where allegations arise from the same transaction and rely on common, interlinked evidence and witnesses, Sections 218–223 CrPC (especially Section 223(d)) favor a joint trial unless cogent reasons grounded in prejudice or delay justify separation; none existed here.
The trial court acted without notice to the appellant and without an application from the prosecution, thereby breaching natural justice; expediency cannot trump procedural fairness.
A court cannot direct the investigating agency to file a separate charge-sheet; that discretion lies with the investigation, though even multiple charge-sheets do not dictate separate trials if the same transaction test is met.
Faced with non-appearance or abscondence of some accused, the correct course is to segregate the defaulting accused, not a regularly appearing accused.
Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay mandates prioritization and administrative allocation for speedy trials of MPs/MLAs but does not authorize deviation from statutory joinder rules or confer procedural disadvantage or preferential treatment to legislators.

The matter was remitted to the trial court to conduct a joint trial, with liberty to schedule proceedings for expeditious disposal while preserving procedural safeguards and after hearing all parties.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court anchored its analysis in the joinder framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), particularly Sections 218–223. It revisited the jurisprudence through:

State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1850:
- While “separate trial is the normal rule and joint trial the exception,” the Court underscored that when several persons commit offences forming part of the same transaction, a joint trial is generally preferable to prevent multiplicity, inconvenience, and waste. Separate trials are justified only where joint trial causes “embarrassment or difficulty” in the defence.
Chandra Bhal v. State of U.P., (1971) 3 SCC 983:
- A separate trial is not per se contrary to law even if a joint trial is permissible. The decision is to be made at the outset, not retrospectively, and the determinative test is prejudice: a retrial is warranted only if separate/joint trial caused failure of justice.
Essar Teleholdings Ltd. v. CBI, (2015) 10 SCC 562:
- Even where Section 223 conditions are met, a joint trial may be declined if it would prolong proceedings, waste judicial time, or confuse/prejudice an accused involved only peripherally.
Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 94:
- Synthesizes principles: Sections 218–223 permit judicial discretion; the two-pronged test considers (i) prejudice to the accused, and (ii) judicial delay/wastage. The validity of joint/separate trials is judged by actual prejudice or miscarriage of justice.
R. Dinesh Kumar v. State, (2015) 7 SCC 497:
- Cited by the appellant to emphasize joint trials where appropriate to avoid multiplicity, prejudice, and delay in same-transaction cases.
Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India, (2024) 1 SCC 185:
- Directs prioritization and administrative streamlining for cases against MPs/MLAs. The Supreme Court clarified that these directions do not authorize courts to depart from statutory joinder rules or to impose status-based procedural deviations.

Collectively, these precedents informed the Court’s insistence that separation must be reasoned, status-neutral, compliant with the CrPC’s joinder schema, and tested against prejudice/delay—not convenience or perceived urgency alone.

Legal Reasoning: Why Segregation Failed

Unified factual matrix and common evidence: The prosecution alleged an overarching conspiracy in the Nuh violence, with interlinked evidence: CDRs, electronic communications, video footage, witness statements, forensic reports, and substantially common witnesses. This aligns squarely with Section 223(d) CrPC—“different offences committed in the course of the same transaction.”
Status-based segregation is impermissible: The trial court’s explicit reason was the appellant’s status as an MLA and a desire for day-to-day hearing under Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay. The Supreme Court held that prioritization for expedition cannot translate into a procedural disadvantage or preferential treatment. Article 14 demands equal application of procedural law; Article 21 protects fair trial. Status alone is not a lawful ground for segregating an accused.
Natural justice violated: Segregation was ordered suo motu without prior notice to the appellant and without a prosecution application. Mere presence of counsel is not a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Any departure from the default procedural scheme must follow audi alteram partem.
Wrong target of segregation: The trial court cited non-appearance of some co-accused as causing delay. The correct remedy was to segregate absconding/defaulting accused, not a regularly appearing accused. Bifurcating the compliant accused inverted the CrPC’s logic and aggravated risks of duplication and inconsistency.
Jurisdictional overreach on charge-sheet direction: The court cannot direct the police to file a separate charge-sheet; charging decisions rest with the investigating agency. Even if multiple charge-sheets exist, the trial court still must test joinder under Sections 218–223 and conduct a joint trial when the “same transaction” criteria are met.
Speed cannot cure illegality: Progress in the segregated case (framing of charges and commencement of evidence) could not retrospectively validate a fundamentally unfair and unlawful segregation order. Expediency operates within, not outside, the bounds of fairness and statutory compliance.
Prejudice and inefficiency from bifurcation: Separate trials would force recalling common witnesses, duplicating proceedings, and risking inconsistent findings—precisely the harms Sections 219–223 seek to avoid.

Impact and Prospective Significance

This judgment has material repercussions for trial management in multi-accused cases, especially those involving public representatives and mass-violence episodes:

Clarifies the reach of Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay: Administrative prioritization for MPs/MLAs is a docket-management directive, not a license to circumvent or dilute CrPC joinder rules. Courts must achieve speed through scheduling, allocation, and case management—not by status-based procedural short-cuts.
Status neutrality entrenched: The decision reaffirms that equality before law (Article 14) is procedural as much as substantive. Neither preferential segmentation for legislators nor discriminatory hurdles can be imposed absent legal justification.
Reinforces the prejudice/delay test: Trial courts must record cogent reasons grounded in (i) prejudice to the accused, or (ii) judicial delay/wastage before ordering joint or separate trials. Convenience is insufficient.
Investigative autonomy respected: Courts may not direct the filing of a separate charge-sheet. Investigative discretion is preserved; courts police legality at post-cognizance stages via the joinder provisions and fair-trial guarantees.
Template for managing large dockets: In multi-accused or riot cases, the proper management tool is to segregate absconders or persistent defaulters, or to cluster accused sensibly when transactions are distinct—not to sever an accused based on public office or perceived urgency.
Reduces risks of inconsistent verdicts: By insisting on joint trials where evidence and witnesses are common, the Court curbs the systemic risk of conflicting factual findings across parallel trials.
Transitional code continuity: Although the petitions were under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC), the Court’s analysis under Sections 218–223 CrPC maps onto substantially similar joinder concepts under the BNSS. The doctrinal continuity remains intact.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Charge-sheet: A police report under Section 173 CrPC laying out the results of the investigation, evidence gathered, and the offences alleged. Filing a separate charge-sheet for one accused does not automatically require or justify a separate trial where the same transaction is involved; the court must still apply the joinder rules.
Joint trial vs. separate trial:
- Section 218 CrPC sets the general rule: separate charges for distinct offences, tried separately.
- Sections 219–223 carve out exceptions to prevent multiplicity where offences are connected by time, place, purpose, or continuity of action, or where persons are charged with offences in the same transaction.
- Section 223(d) specifically allows persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction to be tried together.
“Same transaction” test: Courts look at proximity of time, unity of place, continuity of action, and community of purpose or design. No single factor is decisive; the overarching question is whether the acts are so connected that it is reasonable to try them together. In this case, allegations of a single conspiracy and common evidentiary threads satisfied this test.
Suo motu segregation: A court-initiated order to split trials without an application from either side. Permissible in principle, but must be preceded by notice and a fair opportunity to be heard, and must conform to statutory criteria. Here, the absence of notice and reliance on status alone made the segregation unlawful.
Natural justice: Procedural fairness norms, notably audi alteram partem (hear the other side). Any order affecting substantive procedural rights—like joinder/separation of trials—should be preceded by a chance to object.
Article 14 (equality) and Article 21 (fair trial and speedy trial): Equality requires status-neutral application of procedure; fair trial requires adherence to the CrPC and natural justice. Speed is an important component of fairness but cannot be pursued through measures that compromise due process or create arbitrary classifications.
Double jeopardy (Article 20(2)) vs. multiplicity: The appellant raised double jeopardy concerns. The Court resolved the case on statutory and fairness grounds and did not rest its ruling on Article 20(2). While multiple trials from the same transaction do not automatically offend double jeopardy, they can cause prejudice, duplication, and risk inconsistent verdicts—harms the joinder provisions aim to avoid.

Key Takeaways

Courts cannot segregate an accused’s trial or compel a separate charge-sheet solely because the accused is a legislator or to meet expedition goals for MPs/MLAs cases.
Sections 218–223 CrPC require that joint trials be favored where offences arise from the same transaction and evidence/witnesses are common, unless separation is justified by concrete findings on prejudice or delay.
Segregation orders must be preceded by notice and an opportunity to be heard; mere presence of counsel at a hearing where segregation is not on the agenda does not satisfy natural justice.
Investigative autonomy is preserved: the decision to file charge-sheets rests with the investigating agency; courts manage joinder/severance at the trial stage under the CrPC.
When delay is caused by absconding or defaulting accused, the appropriate remedy is to sever the defaulting accused—not to isolate a compliant accused.
Administrative prioritization for MPs/MLAs per Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay is about docket management and expeditious scheduling; it does not authorize departures from statutory procedure or status-based classifications.

Conclusion

Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana powerfully reasserts that procedural fairness and equality are non-negotiable cornerstones of criminal justice. The Supreme Court’s intervention corrects a misapplication of the Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay directions and restores the primacy of the CrPC’s joinder architecture. The decision delineates a clear, status-neutral approach: where offences form part of the same transaction and rest on common evidence, joint trials should proceed unless separation is justified by demonstrable prejudice or avoidance of delay, and only after hearing the affected parties. Courts must resist the temptation to conflate administrative urgency with procedural shortcuts, particularly when handling politically sensitive cases.

By quashing the segregation and remitting the matter for a joint trial, the Court safeguards against duplication and inconsistent verdicts, ensures economical use of judicial resources, and reinforces the constitutional balance between a speedy trial and a fair trial. Going forward, trial courts have been given a precise compass: expedite, yes—but within the law’s procedural guardrails and without status-based deviations. This judgment will likely serve as a leading authority on joinder/severance decisions in mass-accused prosecutions and in cases involving elected representatives.