Solitary Sexual Offence Against a Child as Sufficient Ground for Preventive Detention under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982

1. Introduction

The decision in C. Kayalvizhi v. State of Tamil Nadu, H.C.P.(MD) No.593 of 2025, decided on 01.12.2025 by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court (Coram: G.K. Ilanthiraiyan, J. and R. Poornima, J.), is a significant addition to the jurisprudence on preventive detention of “sexual offenders” under the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982.

The case arose from a challenge to a detention order passed against one Kannan, who was branded as a “Sexual Offender” under Section 2(ggg) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Cyber law offenders, Drug-offenders, Forest offenders, Goondas, Immoral traffic offenders, Sand offenders, Sexual Offenders, Slum-grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (hereafter, “Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982” or “the Act”).

The judgment is notable for three main clarifications:

1. That delay between arrest and the detention order (here, 35 days) is not, by itself, fatal to the detention if the detaining authority can provide a reasonable explanation.
2. That non-supply of a translated copy of a document not relied upon for detention does not vitiate the order.
3. That even a single, grave incident of sexual abuse of a minor child can justify preventive detention as a “sexual offender” on the footing that it constitutes an offence against society and a disturbance to public order.

Taken together, these findings reinforce the wide amplitude of preventive detention powers, particularly in cases involving sexual offences against children under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO).

2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 Parties

• Petitioner: C. Kayalvizhi, sister of the detenu Kannan.
• Detenu: Kannan, aged 38 years, son of Chinnaswamy.
• Respondents:
  1. The State of Tamil Nadu, represented by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home, Prohibition and Excise Department.
  2. The District Collector and District Magistrate, Thanjavur District (the Detaining Authority).
  3. The Superintendent, Central Prison, Tiruchirapalli.

2.2 Criminal Case Leading to Detention

The detenu was implicated in Crime No.11 of 2025 registered by the All Women Police Station, Vallam, Thanjavur District for the following offences:

• Sections 5(l) and 5(m) read with 6(1) of the POCSO Act, 2012, which relate to aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a child.
• Section 87 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) (the successor to the Indian Penal Code), a penal provision invoked along with POCSO.

The alleged victim was a minor girl aged 8 years, a fact that heavily influenced the Court’s assessment of the gravity of the offence.

2.3 Arrest and Preventive Detention

• The detenu was arrested on 12.03.2025 and remanded to judicial custody.
• Subsequently, the second respondent (District Magistrate, Thanjavur) passed a preventive detention order in P.D. No.19 of 2025 dated 17.04.2025, categorising the detenu as a “Sexual Offender” under Section 2(ggg) of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982.

The petitioner, invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India, filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging this preventive detention.

3. Issues Before the Court

Although the judgment is concise, the following legal issues clearly emerge from the arguments and reasoning:

1. Delay / “Live and Proximate Link”
   Whether the detention order passed 35 days after the arrest (12.03.2025 to 17.04.2025) broke the necessary “proximate and live link” between the prejudicial activity and the detention, rendering the order illegal.
2. Use of a “similar case” and likelihood of bail
   Whether the detaining authority could reasonably rely on a similar case where the accused obtained default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC, in order to conclude that the present detenu was likely to be released on bail, especially when:
   • the detenu’s only bail application had already been dismissed, and
   • no fresh bail application was pending on the date of the detention order.
3. Non-supply of translated copy of Accident Register
   Whether failure to supply an English translation of the accident register (medical record), which was in Tamil, violated the detenu’s constitutional rights by depriving him of an effective opportunity to make a representation.
4. Solitary incident and jurisdiction under Act 14 of 1982
   Whether a solitary criminal incident, albeit of a serious sexual offence under POCSO, justified preventive detention as a “sexual offender” under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982, particularly on the ground that it disturbed public order as opposed to merely affecting law and order.

4. Summary of the Judgment

The Madras High Court dismissed the Habeas Corpus Petition and upheld the detention, holding:

1. Delay not fatal: The 35-day gap between arrest and detention did not by itself vitiate the detention. Relying on the Division Bench judgment in H.C.P.(MD) No.1389 of 2022, Susamma Baby v. Principal Secretary to Government, the Court held that:
   • Neither the Constitution nor Act 14 of 1982 prescribes a fixed time limit to pass a detention order.
   • Even after release on bail, detention can be ordered.
   • Delay is not ipso facto fatal if satisfactorily explained and if it remains reasonable.
   The explanation regarding processing of the remand and the Government’s approval was accepted as sufficient.
2. Accident register not relied upon: Although an accident register (medical record) was supplied in Tamil, the Court held that:
   • The detaining authority had not relied upon the accident register to pass the detention order.
   • The document contained the injury details and address in English, and only the statement of the person who brought the victim was in Tamil.
   Hence, no prejudice was caused, and non-supply of a translated copy did not invalidate the detention.
3. Solitary POCSO incident sufficient for detention: The Court rejected the contention that a solitary incident cannot justify preventive detention. Since the detenu had allegedly committed a grave sexual offence against an 8-year-old girl, it was held to be:
   • an offence against society, and
   • a serious and heinous act sufficient, even by itself, to invoke preventive detention as a “sexual offender”.
4. Non-application of mind allegation rejected: Although the petitioner argued that the detaining authority wrongly assumed a likelihood of bail and relied on an unrelated default bail order, the Court did not find sufficient non-application of mind to warrant quashing the detention, and sustained the order.

Consequently, the Habeas Corpus Petition was dismissed and the detention order affirmed.

5. Legal and Doctrinal Analysis

5.1 Constitutional and Statutory Framework

5.1.1 Preventive Detention under the Constitution

The case is situated at the intersection of:

• Article 21 – guaranteeing protection of life and personal liberty, which can be curtailed only by “procedure established by law”.
• Article 22 – specifically managing safeguards and exceptions in cases of preventive detention, allowing legislatures to enact laws providing for detention with limited procedural rights.
• Article 226 – empowering High Courts to issue writs, including the Writ of Habeas Corpus, to protect personal liberty and examine the legality of detention orders.

Preventive detention is distinct from punitive detention: it is not imposed as punishment for past conduct but to prevent allegedly anticipated future prejudicial acts. However, the assessment of future danger is often based upon past acts, which makes scrutiny of timing, evidence, and application of mind crucial.

5.1.2 Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 and “Sexual Offender”

The Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 authorizes preventive detention of various categories of persons (bootleggers, drug offenders, goondas, sexual offenders, etc.) to prevent activities prejudicial to “maintenance of public order”.

Section 2(ggg) defines a “Sexual Offender” (definition not set out in the judgment, but contextually, it includes persons involved in serious sexual offences, including those under POCSO). Once a person falls within such a defined category, and the detaining authority is subjectively satisfied that detention is necessary to prevent further prejudicial acts, a preventive detention order may be passed.

5.1.3 POCSO Act and BNS

The substantive allegations centre on offences under the POCSO Act, 2012:

• Section 5(l) and 5(m): Define circumstances of aggravated penetrative sexual assault, including where the victim is a particularly young child or where a position of trust or authority is abused.
• Section 6(1): Provides for punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault, which is stringent and reflects the gravity of such offences.

In addition, Section 87 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is invoked, indicating that the conduct also constitutes an offence under the general penal law, though the exact content of Section 87 need not be elaborated for present purposes. The combination of POCSO and BNS provisions underscores the seriousness attributed to the alleged act.

5.2 Delay and the “Proximate and Live Link” Requirement

5.2.1 Petitioner’s Argument

The petitioner’s foundational submission on delay was that:

• The detenu was arrested on 12.03.2025 and detained on 17.04.2025, a gap of approximately 35 days.
• This delay snapped the necessary “live and proximate link” between the alleged prejudicial act and the need for preventive detention.
• In preventive detention jurisprudence, undue delay in either passing the detention order or executing it is often treated as indicative that the situation is not so emergent or imminent as to justify such extraordinary curtailment of liberty.

5.2.2 State’s Explanation and Court’s Acceptance

In the counter and in submissions, the State pointed out that:

• The detenu was arrested and remanded on 12.03.2025.
• The detention order was passed on 17.04.2025.
• A remand extension report was submitted to the Government on 19.04.2025.
• The Government’s approval followed on 28.04.2025, and the matter was placed before the Advisory Board on 15.05.2025.

The Court, relying heavily on Susamma Baby v. Principal Secretary to Government, a Division Bench decision in H.C.P.(MD) No.1389 of 2022 decided on 11.04.2023, reiterated:

• Neither the Constitution nor Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 prescribes a rigid time limit to pass a detention order.
• A detention order can validly be passed even after the accused is released on bail.
• Mere delay from the date of arrest in passing a detention order is not, in itself, a sufficient ground to quash the detention; what matters is whether:
  • the explanation for delay is acceptable, and
  • the delay remains reasonable in the facts of the case.

In this case, the Court found the sequence of remand, administrative processing, and approval to be adequately explained and held that the 35-day gap did not, in the circumstances, invalidate the detention.

5.2.3 Doctrinal Significance

The “live and proximate link” requirement flows from broader Supreme Court jurisprudence on preventive detention. The idea is that:

• Preventive detention is justified only if the preventive purpose is current and urgent, and not a belated reaction to a past event.
• If there is undue delay in taking detention action, it suggests that the threat may no longer be immediate or real.

This judgment, by endorsing Susamma Baby and accepting a 35-day delay with explanation, indicates that:

• The courts will look at contextual reasonableness, not mere arithmetic of days.
• Where serious offences like aggravated sexual assault on a child are concerned, the threshold for “reasonable” delay may be more flexible.

5.3 Bail, Default Bail and the “Real Possibility of Release”

5.3.1 Petitioner’s Objections

The petitioner raised two connected points:

1. Reliance on a “similar case” granting default bail:
   The detaining authority had relied upon a previous case, Crime No.3 of 2020, Thiruvaiyaru All Women Police Station, involving offences under POCSO and Section 506(i) IPC, where the accused had been granted default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC. The petitioner argued that:
   • Default bail is granted on the ground of procedural delay/failure of the prosecution (non-filing of charge sheet within the statutory time), and not on the merits or similarity of facts.
   • Such a case is therefore not a proper precedent to infer that the present detenu was likely to obtain bail.
2. No pending or fresh bail application:
   On the date of the detention order:
   • The detenu’s earlier bail application had already been dismissed.
   • No fresh bail application was pending or filed.
   The petitioner argued that, in the absence of any concrete move for bail, there was no “real and imminent” possibility of release on bail, and hence no necessity for preventive detention.

5.3.2 Court’s Treatment

The Court does not engage in great detail with these bail-related arguments in the text of the judgment. It primarily:

• Notes the submissions of the petitioner (para 5 and 6).
• Rejects, in general terms, the contention of non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority.
• Upholds the detention order, particularly emphasizing the gravity of the offence and the categorisation of the detenu as a “sexual offender”.

Thus, although the issue of “real possibility of bail” is implicitly in play, the judgment’s express reasoning focuses more on:

• Delay and explanation, and
• Gravity and societal impact of the offence.

5.3.3 Doctrinal Note

In preventive detention jurisprudence, the likelihood of the detenu being released on bail is a crucial factor when the person is already in custody. The usual test (as evolved by higher courts) is whether:

• There is a real possibility (not a mere speculative chance) that the detenu may be released on bail; and
• Upon release, he is likely to engage in prejudicial activities which justify detention.

In this case, while the petitioner strongly attacked the reliance on a default-bail precedent and absence of any bail application, the Court chose not to overturn the detention on this ground, implicitly giving deference to the detaining authority’s subjective satisfaction, given the extraordinary gravity of the alleged act.

5.4 Non-supply of Translated Accident Register

5.4.1 Petitioner’s Grievance

The petitioner argued:

• The accident register (a medical record often used to corroborate injuries and history of assault) was in Tamil.
• The detenu had requested a translated copy but was not provided with one.
• This impaired his constitutional right to make an effective representation against the detention, as guaranteed in preventive detention cases.

5.4.2 Court’s Reasoning

The Court’s response was twofold:

1. Accident register not a “relied upon” document:
   It was specifically noted that:
   • The detaining authority had furnished a copy of the accident register to the detenu.
   • However, the authority had not relied upon the accident register for passing the detention order (para 10).
   Under established preventive detention jurisprudence, documents that form the “basis or foundation” of the detention (i.e., relied upon documents) must be supplied. Mere referred but not relied documents do not always attract the same rigour.
2. Language and prejudice:
   On examining the accident register, the Court found (para 11):
   • The statement of the person who brought the victim (history portion) was in Tamil.
   • The address and injury details were recorded in English.
   The Court held that this did not cause prejudice to the detenu. Given that the core contents relevant to medical evidence (injury details) were accessible, and the document was not a relied-upon foundational document, the non-supply of a full English translation did not amount to a fatal infirmity.

Accordingly, the detention was not interfered with on this ground.

5.4.3 Conceptual Clarification

This reasoning aligns with the broader doctrine that:

• All material documents relied upon for detention must be supplied to the detenu in a language he understands, to enable an effective representation.
• If a document is only incidentally referred to, or not a basis for the subjective satisfaction, failure to translate it may not automatically vitiate the detention, especially in the absence of demonstrable prejudice.

The judgment therefore reinforces a fairly strict but not absolute approach to the language/translation requirement, focusing on reliance and prejudice.

5.5 Solitary Incident, Public Order and the “Sexual Offender” Category

5.5.1 Petitioner’s Contention

The petitioner advanced a substantive argument on jurisdiction and scope:

• The detention under Act 14 of 1982 was based on a single criminal case (Crime No.11 of 2025).
• Preventive detention under the Act, she argued, is meant for habitual or repeated offenders whose continuing activities endanger public order, not one-off incidents.
• The alleged act, though serious, did not have such a broad or generalized impact on public order as distinct from mere law and order; hence, preventive detention jurisdiction was not properly invoked.

5.5.2 Court’s Rejection of the Argument

The Court emphatically rejected this submission (para 12), reasoning that:

• The detenu was accused of committing a sexual offence against a minor victim girl aged 8 years.
• Such an offence was described as:
  • an offence against society, and
  • a serious and heinous act.
• Even a solitary incident of this nature can be considered sufficient for passing a preventive detention order under Act 14 of 1982.

Thus, the Court interpreted the expression “sexual offender” and the concept of “public order” broadly to cover even a single, but exceptionally grave, POCSO offence involving a young child.

5.5.3 Public Order vs Law and Order

While the judgment does not expound at length on this distinction, it operates within a well-known framework:

• Law and Order refers to ordinary breaches of peace affecting specific individuals or groups.
• Public Order is affected when the act has a wider impact on the community, creating a general disturbance of public tranquillity, a sense of insecurity or widespread fear.

By characterizing the offence as an “offence against society”, the Court effectively held that:

• Certain crimes, by their very nature (especially sexual offences against children), can themselves disturb public order even if arising from a single incident.
• The moral shock and fear generated in the community, particularly among parents and children, justify preventive detention under the “public order” head.

This portion of the judgment is arguably the most precedent-setting or clarificatory aspect: it affirms that habituality is not an indispensable precondition for preventive detention under the “sexual offender” category if the solitary incident is egregious enough.

5.6 Standard of Judicial Review in Habeas Corpus against Preventive Detention

This judgment also exemplifies the relatively limited scope of judicial review in preventive detention cases:

• The Court examines whether:
  • Procedural safeguards (such as approval, reference to Advisory Board, supply of relevant documents) have been observed.
  • The order suffers from non-application of mind or is based on irrelevant considerations.
  • There is any patent illegality or infirmity undermining the detention.
• However, the Court does not sit in appeal on the merits of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, particularly where:
  • The underlying offences are grave and established by prima facie material.
  • No major procedural lapses are shown.

In C. Kayalvizhi, this deference is visible in the Court’s:

• Acceptance of the delay explanation by relying on earlier precedent.
• Rejection of the argument about translation of the accident register on the reliance and prejudice test.
• Affirmation that a single grave incident could suffice for detention as a “sexual offender”.

6. Precedent Relied Upon: Susamma Baby v. Principal Secretary to Government

The Division Bench decision in H.C.P.(MD) No.1389 of 2022, Susamma Baby v. Principal Secretary to Government, decided on 11.04.2023, is central to the reasoning on delay.

From the manner in which it is quoted and applied, the following principles emerge:

• No fixed statutory or constitutional timeframe exists in Act 14 of 1982 or under the Constitution for initiating detention after the occurrence of prejudicial activities.
• Even after an accused has been released on bail, a detention order can validly be passed.
• Delay is not per se fatal. It becomes a ground for quashing detention only when:
  • It is unexplained, or
  • Although explained, it is so unreasonable that the “live and proximate link” between the prejudicial act and the necessity for detention is broken.

By holding that Susamma Baby “squarely applies” to the present case, the Court reinforces this standard and applies it in the specific context of a POCSO-based detention of a “sexual offender”.

7. Impact and Future Implications

7.1 For Preventive Detention Practice under Act 14 of 1982

This judgment contributes to the body of case law affirming a broad and robust use of preventive detention powers in Tamil Nadu, particularly in:

• Cases of sexual offences against children under POCSO.
• Situations where the detenu is already in judicial custody but suspected to be potentially dangerous if released on bail.

Key implications:

• Solitary POCSO incidents can now clearly be cited as a valid basis for preventive detention as “sexual offenders”, especially where the victim is a young child.
• Authorities may feel emboldened to invoke Act 14 of 1982 more frequently in such cases, treating them as threats to public order.

7.2 On the Public Order–Law and Order Distinction

By treating a single incident of aggravated sexual assault of an 8-year-old as affecting public order, the Court underscores that:

• The social and psychological impact of child sexual abuse can be viewed as causing widespread fear and insecurity among the public.
• Therefore, not all “single incidents” are alike; some offences, by their inherent gravity and context, may justify being treated as public order concerns.

This may influence future cases involving:

• Sexual offences in schools, neighbourhoods or other community spaces.
• Other single but exceptionally grave offences (e.g., certain forms of violent crimes) being argued as public order issues.

7.3 On Procedural Safeguards and Translation of Documents

The decision signals to both detaining authorities and defence counsel that:

• Courts will scrutinize whether a document was relied upon or merely mentioned, before invalidating a detention order on the ground of non-supply or language issues.
• Claims of prejudice must be substantiated; where core content is accessible in a language understood by the detenu, and the document is not foundational, the Court may uphold the detention.

7.4 Liberty vs Security Balance

Substantively, the decision reflects a judicial tilt towards:

• Placing public safety and protection of children at a very high premium.
• Permitting strong preventive action where the alleged conduct is morally and legally egregious, even at the expense of expanding preventive detention’s scope.

At the same time, the judgment’s limited engagement with the bail likelihood argument may invite debate among scholars and practitioners on how rigorously courts should test the “real possibility of bail” requirement when upholding preventive detention.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

8.1 Preventive Detention vs Punitive Detention

• Punitive Detention:
  • Imposed as punishment after finding a person guilty of a crime.
  • Follows a full trial with evidence and defence.
• Preventive Detention:
  • Imposed to prevent future acts considered dangerous to public order.
  • Based on anticipation, often inferred from past acts.
  • Subject to limited judicial review and special procedural safeguards (Advisory Board, etc.).

8.2 “Public Order” vs “Law and Order”

• Law and Order: Ordinary disturbances that affect specific individuals or small groups (e.g., a fight between two people).
• Public Order: Disturbances with a broader community impact—creating widespread fear, insecurity, or disruption of normal public life.

In this case, the Court treats sexual abuse of an 8-year-old child as an offence that shakes the conscience and security of society at large, justifying its classification as a public order issue.

8.3 “Live and Proximate Link”

This phrase means:

• The detention order must follow the prejudicial act within a reasonable and explained timeframe.
• If the State takes too long, and cannot explain the delay, it suggests that the need to detain is no longer urgent or real, and the detention may be quashed.

8.4 Default Bail under Section 167(2) CrPC

Default bail is not based on the merits of the case but on procedural failure:

• The police/prosecution must file a charge sheet within a statutory time limit (commonly 60 or 90 days, depending on the offence).
• If they fail to do so, and the accused applies for bail, the court must grant bail as of right, regardless of the evidence.

In this case, the petitioner objected to using a default bail order from another case as a “similar case” to predict that the present detenu would get regular bail, arguing that default bail is a different concept altogether.

8.5 “Relied upon” vs “Referred to” Documents

• Relied upon documents: Form the foundation of the detention; must be supplied in a language the detenu understands.
• Referred to documents: Mentioned but not the basis of subjective satisfaction; failure to supply them or translate them is not always fatal unless prejudice is shown.

The accident register, according to the Court, fell into the second category in this case.

9. Conclusion

The judgment in C. Kayalvizhi v. State of Tamil Nadu stands as an important pronouncement in the preventive detention jurisprudence of Tamil Nadu, particularly in the context of sexual offences against children.

Its key contributions are:

• Affirming that a single, extremely grave POCSO offence against a minor child can justify preventive detention as a “sexual offender” under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982, on the ground that it constitutes an offence against society and impinges upon public order.
• Reinforcing, through reliance on Susamma Baby, that delay between arrest and detention is not per se fatal; what matters is an acceptable explanation and preservation of a “live and proximate link”.
• Clarifying that non-supply of a translated copy of a document will not automatically vitiate detention where the document is not relied upon and where no real prejudice is shown.

At a deeper level, the decision reflects a judicial willingness to:

• Grant broad latitude to the executive in using preventive detention to respond to heinous sexual offences against children, and
• Prioritize collective security and societal outrage in balancing individual liberty under Article 21.

For practitioners, the judgment underscores the importance of:

• Focusing on demonstrable procedural lapses or clear non-application of mind when challenging preventive detention orders.
• Recognizing that in POCSO-based detentions, courts may treat the gravity and societal impact of the offence as a decisive factor in upholding detention, even in the face of arguments on delay, solitary incident, or minor document lapses.

In sum, C. Kayalvizhi consolidates a robust approach to preventive detention of “sexual offenders” in Tamil Nadu, particularly where child victims are involved, and will likely be cited in future cases to sustain detention orders based on solitary but egregious POCSO incidents.