Six-Year Delay in Written Statement: Counsel’s Lapse Not a Shield; Limited Cross‑Examination Right Preserved

Introduction

In CM(M) 1961/2025 (with CM APPL. 63525/2025 & 63524/2025), the Delhi High Court, per Justice Girish Kathpalia, on 10 October 2025, affirmed a trial court’s refusal to condone an almost six‑year delay in filing a written statement. The petitioner, Taranjeet Singh Kohli (defendant in the suit), moved two applications — one under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) invoking the court’s inherent powers, and another under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC seeking condonation of delay. Both were dismissed by the trial court, and the petitioner challenged that order in the High Court.

The suit summons were admittedly served on 25 September 2019. The petitioner entered appearance on 1 October 2019 but did not file a written statement (WS) within the statutory period, nor did he seek an extension at the time. Years later, he attributed the default to his previous counsel’s “inadvertent mistake,” and also pointed to a mediation memorandum of understanding (MoU) executed on 2 July 2024.

The High Court refused even to issue notice on the petition, upheld the trial court’s order, and clarified one procedural safeguard: notwithstanding the refusal to take the delayed WS on record, the defendant would retain a limited right to cross‑examine the plaintiff’s witnesses.

Summary of the Judgment

• Summons were served on 25.09.2019; appearance was entered on 01.10.2019; no WS was filed within time and no contemporaneous application for extension was made.
• Nearly six years later, the defendant moved applications under Section 151 CPC and Order VIII Rule 1 CPC to permit and condone the filing of the WS; the trial court dismissed both on 28.07.2025.
• The High Court found no merit to interfere, noting:
  • There is no blanket rule that a litigant will never suffer for counsel’s negligence; the court must examine the facts.
  • The delay was colossal (about six years) and wholly unexplained by any credible or specific facts.
  • The defendant was clearly aware of procedural obligations (he filed a reply to an Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 application and an Order VII Rule 11 application as early as October 2019, and the latter was dismissed on 07.12.2022), yet he still did not file the WS.
  • The applications were cryptic and failed to state when the default was realized or how it continued for years despite clear summons instructions to file a WS within 30 days.
• The High Court upheld the dismissal and, at the petitioner’s request, clarified that the defendant will have a limited right to cross‑examine the plaintiff’s witnesses.

Analysis

Precedents and Doctrinal Backdrop

While the judgment does not explicitly cite authorities, it sits squarely within well‑settled CPC jurisprudence on three interlocking themes:

• Time limits for filing written statements under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC:
  • In non‑commercial suits, the Supreme Court has clarified that the 30‑day period (extendable up to 90 days) is directory, not rigidly mandatory; however, it is not to be diluted casually. Exceptional and well‑explained circumstances are required to accept a WS beyond the outer period. Leading authorities include Kailash v. Nanhku (2005) and Desh Raj v. Balkishan (2020).
  • In commercial disputes, the regime is stricter post the Commercial Courts Act: SCG Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure (2019) holds that beyond 120 days, the court has no power to take the WS on record. Although the present case is not identified as a commercial suit, it underscores that even in non‑commercial litigation, extraordinary delays without cogent cause will not be condoned.
• Counsel’s negligence as “sufficient cause”:
  • Rafiq v. Munshilal (1981) is often invoked for the proposition that a litigant should not suffer for the fault of counsel. However, subsequent jurisprudence cautions against treating this as a blanket exemption. In Salil Dutta v. T.M. and M.C. Pvt. Ltd. (1993) and Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013), the Supreme Court emphasized that negligence or inaction without diligence does not ordinarily constitute “sufficient cause.”
  • The High Court’s articulation — “there is no blanket rule that for negligence or misconduct of the counsel, the litigant would not suffer” — directly aligns with this calibrated approach: the sufficiency of cause is fact‑sensitive and must be convincingly pleaded and proved.
• Consequences of not filing a WS and the right to participate in trial:
  • When a WS is not filed, the court may proceed under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC and/or treat the defence as non‑existent. Nevertheless, Modula India v. Kamakshya Singh Deo (1988) recognizes that even where the defence is struck off or a WS is refused, fairness may require allowing the defendant to put the plaintiff’s case to the test through limited cross‑examination; what is not permitted is setting up an affirmative defence through evidence the defendant failed to plead.
  • The High Court’s express reservation of a “limited right to cross‑examine” coheres with Modula India and with Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan (1999), which cautions that even in the absence of a WS, courts must ensure the plaintiff proves the case and that untested assertions do not automatically translate into decrees.
• Inherent powers under Section 151 CPC:
  • Section 151 preserves the court’s inherent powers to secure the ends of justice, but those powers cannot be exercised to defeat express statutory schemes or to condone indolence. Classic authorities such as Padam Sen v. State of U.P. (1961) and Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal (1962) delineate the boundary: inherent power supplements but does not supplant the Code.
• Article 227 / supervisory jurisdiction:
  • Though not discussed expressly, the CM(M) jurisdiction is rooted in Article 227. The Supreme Court in Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel (2022) reiterated that interference is confined to jurisdictional errors, perversity, or grave injustice — not mere disagreement on discretion. The High Court’s refusal even to issue notice reflects that standard.

Legal Reasoning Applied by the High Court

• Clear knowledge and conduct inconsistent with inadvertence:
  • The summons (in English and Hindi) told the defendant to file a WS within 30 days. The defendant entered appearance promptly, and within weeks filed a reply to the plaintiff’s interim injunction application (Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2) and his own Order VII Rule 11 application. This contemporaneous activity demonstrates awareness of the litigation and procedural demands.
  • After the Order VII Rule 11 application was dismissed on 07.12.2022, the defendant still did not file a WS. These facts undercut the “counsel’s inadvertence” narrative.
• Absence of a reasonable, specific, and believable explanation:
  • The applications were “totally cryptic,” did not explain when the defendant realized the lapse, and did not set out any day‑to‑day or at least period‑wise explanation for how a core pleading remained unfiled for nearly six years. A conclusory allegation of counsel’s mistake cannot meet the standard of “sufficient cause.”
  • Reference to a mediation MoU of 02.07.2024 did not fill the causal gap or explain the multi‑year inaction preceding it. Unless the court had stayed timelines or the parties had obtained appropriate orders, ADR efforts do not suspend CPC time limits.
• No misuse of inherent power:
  • Section 151 cannot be invoked to rewrite statutory timelines or to regularize gross negligence without compelling circumstances. The court’s refusal respects the architecture of Order VIII Rule 1 and the judicially recognized limited discretion to condone delay in non‑commercial suits only on a strong factual foundation.
• Limited procedural safeguard:
  • Even as the High Court upheld the dismissal, it clarified that the defendant would retain “the limited right to cross‑examine” the plaintiff’s witnesses. This balances the sanction for procedural default (no WS, no affirmative defence) with the need to test the plaintiff’s case for reliability and sufficiency of proof.

Impact and Prospective Significance

• Reinforcement of discipline in pleadings:
  • The decision signals a firm stance against strategic or negligent non‑filing of WS. Trial courts in Delhi are likely to cite this ruling to resist belated attempts to regularize extreme delays absent compelling, well‑documented reasons.
• Counsel’s negligence is not a magic wand:
  • While courts remain sympathetic to genuine lapses, the judgment underscores that a bare plea of “advocate’s mistake” — especially from a litigant demonstrably conversant with litigation steps — will not suffice. Expect closer scrutiny of such pleas and a demand for particulars (dates, communications, steps taken, and affidavits).
• Procedural fairness preserved without rewarding default:
  • By preserving a limited right to cross‑examine, the court avoids an untested decree while ensuring that the defendant does not gain the benefits of a substantive defence he failed to plead. Practically, plaintiffs should still be prepared to prove their case through credible evidence capable of withstanding cross‑examination.
• Guidance for ADR stages:
  • Parties engaging in mediation should obtain clear court orders if they intend to suspend or extend pleading timelines. Absent such orders, ADR activity will not collateralize years of inaction on mandatory filings.
• Article 227 petitions on procedural discretion:
  • The refusal even to issue notice reinforces that Article 227 is not an avenue for routine second‑guessing of discretionary orders on condonation; only jurisdictional error or perversity will invite interference.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Written Statement (WS):
  • The defendant’s formal response to the plaint. It must deal with every allegation. Under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC, it should be filed within 30 days from service of summons, extendable (in non‑commercial suits) ordinarily up to 90 days for good cause; beyond that, courts may condone only in exceptional cases with a cogent explanation.
• Order VIII Rule 1 CPC:
  • Sets timelines for filing a WS. Non‑compliance can lead to the defence being treated as non‑existent and can trigger action under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, including pronouncement of judgment based on plaint and evidence.
• Section 151 CPC (Inherent Powers):
  • Allows courts to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. It cannot be used to override explicit statutory mandates or to excuse prolonged negligence without persuasive reasons.
• “Litigant should not suffer for counsel’s mistake”:
  • A sympathetic principle from Rafiq v. Munshilal, but not absolute. Courts balance it against diligence, the length of delay, prejudice, and the need for procedural orderliness. It does not condone every lapse, especially multi‑year, unexplained defaults.
• Limited right to cross‑examine:
  • Even when a WS is refused or the defence is struck off, courts commonly allow the defendant to cross‑examine the plaintiff’s witnesses to test the plaintiff’s case. However, the defendant cannot set up new defences or lead affirmative evidence absent a WS.
• Article 227 / CM(M):
  • Supervisory jurisdiction of High Courts over subordinate courts. It is not an appellate re‑hearing; interference is reserved for glaring illegality, jurisdictional error, or perversity.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s decision in Taranjeet Singh Kohli v. Kawaljeet Kaur Kohli reiterates core procedural discipline: the timelines for filing a written statement cannot be treated as optional, and a bald plea of counsel’s “inadvertence” — especially when the litigant has actively participated in other procedural steps — will not justify condoning a six‑year delay. Section 151 CPC cannot be used to subvert statutory timeframes or to sanitize prolonged inaction without a convincing, specific, and credible explanation.

At the same time, the court preserved the defendant’s limited right to cross‑examine the plaintiff’s witnesses, aligning with the broader principle that decrees should rest on tested evidence. For practitioners, the takeaways are practical and sharp: calendar WS deadlines meticulously; if delay is unavoidable, move a reasoned extension application promptly with particulars and supporting material; do not rely on ADR activity or generalized blame of prior counsel as a substitute for diligence; and remember that Article 227 will not rescue discretionary procedural decisions absent patent error.

In the broader legal context, the ruling fortifies the post‑amendment ethos of expeditious civil adjudication, discourages strategic defaults, and embeds a measured fairness by allowing limited participation to test the plaintiff’s case without rewarding procedural derelictions. It is a clear message that civil process is neither a trap for the unwary nor a playground for delay — it demands attention, timeliness, and candour.