SIT Exoneration Does Not Fetter Section 319 CrPC: Primacy of In‑Court Eyewitness Testimony and Limited High Court Interference

Introduction

In Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi alias Lakhwinder Singh & Anr. etc., 2025 INSC 420 (decided on 26 March 2025), a Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India (Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.) revisited the scope of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)—the power of a criminal court to proceed against persons appearing to be guilty of an offence, though not originally arraigned as accused.

The appeal arose from a judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana which had set aside the Trial Court’s order summoning certain private respondents under Section 319 CrPC in connection with FIR No. 50 of 2020 (Police Station Passiana, District Patiala). The underlying case concerns the brutal murder of the complainant’s brother. The complainant claimed to have identified 24 assailants (including the private respondents) who allegedly arrived in three vehicles, pulled the deceased from a car, and killed him. At trial, two close relatives—the complainant (PW-1) and another brother (PW-2)—gave ocular accounts implicating the respondents. However, a Special Investigation Team (SIT) had earlier opined that the respondents were innocent, citing alibi witnesses and CCTV footage.

The core issues before the Supreme Court were:

Whether a Trial Court can summon additional accused under Section 319 CrPC based on examination-in-chief of eyewitnesses, despite an SIT’s investigative exoneration (including electronic evidence like CCTV) pointing the other way; and
Whether the High Court was justified in interdicting the Trial Court’s Section 319 order at such a preliminary stage, given the settled threshold for invoking Section 319.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s order dated 18.07.2024, and restored the Trial Court’s decision to summon the private respondents under Section 319 CrPC, directing fresh summons to issue.
Reiterating the controlling principles from Hardeep Singh (Constitution Bench), Brijendra Singh, and Sukhpal Singh Khaira (Constitution Bench), the Court reaffirmed that:
- Section 319 is a discretionary, extraordinary power to be used sparingly; the threshold is “more than prima facie” (at the stage of framing of charge) yet short of “likely to convict” if unrebutted.
- Examination-in-chief can suffice to invoke Section 319; cross-examination need not be awaited.
- Persons not named in the FIR, not charge-sheeted, or placed in Column 2 may be summoned; if previously discharged, Section 300(5) read with Section 398 must be complied with.
The existence of an SIT report or investigative exoneration—including alibi evidence and CCTV—does not fetter the Trial Court’s power under Section 319 when in-court eyewitness testimony implicates the person; such material may be weighed but cannot, by itself, preclude summoning.
On prejudice and trial management, the Court observed that failing to summon at the earliest may cause greater hardship later (necessitating de novo proceedings), whereas summoning preserves the accused’s full rights (including cross-examination) under Section 319(4).
The Court criticized the State for non-appearance despite service and directed its judgment to be sent to the Legal Remembrancer and Principal Secretary, Department of Legal and Legislative Affairs, Government of Punjab, for remedial steps.
The Court noted the Trial Court’s order could have been better reasoned, invoking the duty to give reasons (Ramkrishna Forgings), but found the discretion sound in substance given the depositions on record; hence, High Court interference was unwarranted.

Detailed Analysis

Procedural posture and factual matrix

FIR No. 50 of 2020 alleged a mob assault resulting in murder, with the complainant asserting the identity of assailants was discernible (car headlights at around 8:30 p.m.).
At trial, PW-1 (complainant) and PW-2 (brother) gave examination-in-chief implicating respondents as present at the scene; the respondents challenged consistency and plausibility (24 persons in three vehicles; changes in who was inside the car).
An SIT was constituted given the sensitive nature of the incident (the deceased was a sitting Sarpanch). The SIT opined the respondents were not present at the occurrence, relying on supporting witnesses and CCTV footage.
The Trial Court, relying on in-court depositions, summoned the private respondents under Section 319 CrPC. The High Court set aside the summoning order. The Supreme Court, after granting leave and taking up the matter de novo, restored the Trial Court’s summons.

The statutory framework: Section 319 CrPC

Section 319 empowers a court, in the course of any inquiry or trial, to proceed against a person who appears from the evidence to have committed an offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused. Key features include:

Power belongs to the court (not to the police/investigative agency) and is exercisable post-cognizance based on material before the court.
If exercised, proceedings against the newly added accused commence afresh and witnesses are re-heard (Section 319(4)).
The provision aims to ensure that real offenders do not escape trial due to investigative lapses or manipulation (judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur).

Precedents cited and their influence

1) Hardeep Singh v. State Of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 (Constitution Bench)

Nature and threshold: Section 319 is extraordinary and discretionary; invoked sparingly on “strong and cogent” evidence; the test is “more than prima facie” (para 105–106), but short of reaching guilt on merits.
What counts as evidence: “Evidence” includes examination-in-chief; courts need not await cross-examination (paras 89–92, 117.4). Material gathered by the court can corroborate.
Who can be summoned: Persons not accused, persons in Column 2, or even those not investigated can be summoned; if discharged, comply with Section 300(5) read with Section 398 (paras 116–117.6).
Timing: Power can be exercised after commencement of evidence and before conclusion of trial (paras 55, 83–84).

2) Brijendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2017) 7 SCC 706

Reinforced sparing use on strong, cogent evidence; the degree of satisfaction is higher than at charge framing.
Where investigative material contradicts in-court accounts, the trial court must at least look into such material when forming its prima facie view (para 15).
In the present case, the Supreme Court acknowledged the SIT’s contrary material but clarified it does not, by itself, bar Section 319 if in-court testimony implicates the person; the trial court’s reasons should ideally engage with such material, but absence of elaborate reasons did not render the decision arbitrary here.

3) Ramesh Chandra Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 12 SCC 608

Reiterated Hardeep Singh: the Section 319 threshold is “more than prima facie”; the power cannot be exercised casually or cavalierly.

4) Sukhpal Singh Khaira v. State of Punjab, (2023) 1 SCC 289 (Constitution Bench)

Timing and mechanics: Section 319 must be invoked before conclusion of trial (i.e., before pronouncing judgment/sentence).
When summoned, court must decide joint versus separate trial; if joint, evidence must be re-recorded vis-à-vis the newly added accused in their presence (Sections 273, 319(4)).
Laid detailed guidelines (para 41) on pausing trial, sequencing orders, and avoiding post-judgment invocation except as part of directions relating back under revisional orders (see below).

5) JAMIN v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 506

Clarified procedural nuances when Section 319 is dealt with pursuant to High Court’s revisional directions: such orders may “relate back” to the date of the original order (affecting the conclusion-of-trial bar).
Distinguished here on facts: in Jamin, the persons summoned were still under investigation; in the present case, the Court emphasised that in-trial eyewitness testimony justified prompt summoning.

6) Shishupal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 8 SCC 682; Yashodhan Singh v. State Of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 9 SCC 108

Both decisions underscore caution against casual use of Section 319 and the need for strong material, aligning with Hardeep Singh.

7) Ramkrishna Forgings Ltd. v. Ravindra Loonkar, (2024) 2 SCC 122

Reasons are the “heartbeat” of every judicial conclusion; even while upholding the Trial Court’s Section 319 order on substance, the Supreme Court reminded trial courts to articulate clear reasons.

Legal reasoning in Yadwinder Singh

1) Evidentiary threshold and primacy of in-court testimony

Applying Hardeep Singh, the Court affirmed that examination-in-chief of eyewitnesses, if credible at first blush, can cross the “more than prima facie” threshold for Section 319, without waiting for cross-examination.
Here, PW-1 and PW-2 named the private respondents as present at the occurrence; that sufficed to justify a tentative, summoning-stage satisfaction.

2) Investigative exoneration (SIT/CCTV) does not fetter Section 319

The SIT’s conclusion and supporting CCTV/alibi evidence did not bar the Trial Court from summoning under Section 319. While Brijendra Singh requires courts to “look into” such contrary material, its existence is not dispositive at the summoning stage.
The Supreme Court’s rationale is rooted in the structure of Section 319(4): once summoned, the person will face a fresh trial process with full rights of cross-examination and defence. The trial—not the Section 319 stage—is the forum to test the strength of exonerative material.

3) Prejudice calculus and trial management

The Court expressly articulated a prejudice-sensitive approach: the hardship is greater if non-summoning forces the court to regress later (causing delay and duplication), as opposed to summoning now and allowing the accused all protections in a de novo process.
This pragmatic lens complements Sukhpal Singh Khaira’s guidance: decide Section 319 before judgment; choose joint or separate trial; re-record evidence appropriately.

4) Appellate restraint and revisional control

The High Court erred in interdicting the Trial Court’s tentative, reasons-supported exercise at an early stage. Section 319 determinations are context-specific; unless the discretion is capricious or mechanical, interference should be sparing.
The Supreme Court recognized that the Trial Court’s reasoning could have been clearer but found the exercise not arbitrary; thus, the High Court’s setting aside was unsustainable.

5) Duty of the State and reasoned orders

The Court admonished the State of Punjab for non-appearance despite service, reminding that the State is both investigator and prosecutor and must assist courts when called upon.
On reasons, the Court reiterated the obligation to record clear, cogent reasons when invoking Section 319, particularly where contrary investigative material exists.

Impact and implications

For Trial Courts

In-court eyewitness examination-in-chief that implicates non-accused can justify Section 319 summons even if an SIT or police investigation suggests exoneration.
When contrary investigative material exists (e.g., CCTV, alibi), trial courts should:
- Acknowledge and briefly assess it at the summoning stage (per Brijendra Singh),
- Explain why, despite such material, the in-court evidence meets the higher-than-prima-facie threshold, and
- Record a clear route-map on joint/separate trial and the need to re-examine witnesses in the presence of the newly added accused (per Sukhpal Singh Khaira).

For High Courts (revisional/supervisory jurisdiction)

Interference with Section 319 orders should be rare, reserved for cases of patent illegality, mechanical exercise, or applications falling demonstrably short of the Hardeep Singh threshold.
Where a trial court has considered in-court testimony and applied the correct test—even if tersely—the order should ordinarily stand.

For Investigation Agencies/SITs

SIT findings—however robust—do not foreclose the court’s Section 319 power. Investigative agencies should ensure that alibi and electronic evidence are placed before the court promptly so that trial courts can meaningfully “look into” such material when Section 319 is invoked.

For Defence and Prosecution

Defence: A Section 319 summons is not a finding of guilt. Robust cross-examination and the presentation of alibi/electronic evidence at the trial stage remain decisive. Consider seeking separate trial where appropriate.
Prosecution: Move Section 319 promptly upon in-court implication; ensure compliance with Sukhpal Singh Khaira’s sequencing; assist the court with a concise engagement with any contrary investigative material.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 319 CrPC: Lets the court add new accused during trial/inquiry if the court’s evidence suggests their involvement. It is court-centric, not police-centric.
“More than prima facie” test: A higher bar than merely raising suspicion (used at charge framing), but lower than being sure the person will be convicted. The court asks: does the in-court evidence strongly and cogently point to involvement?
Examination-in-chief vs. cross-examination: Examination-in-chief is a witness’s first account in court. For Section 319, the court may rely on it without awaiting cross-examination. The newly added accused later gets a full chance to cross-examine when the case is tried afresh (Section 319(4)).
Investigative exoneration (SIT/CCTV): Material collected by the police (including electronic evidence) can be contrary to in-court testimony. Courts should consider it but it does not, by itself, block Section 319.
“Column 2” of chargesheet: Persons named by police as not being sent up for trial (often “not found sufficient evidence”). Such persons can still be summoned under Section 319 if in-court evidence implicates them.
Timing and “conclusion of trial”: Per Sukhpal Singh Khaira, Section 319 must be invoked before judgment/sentence. If invoked, the court decides joint vs. separate trial and ensures evidence is re-recorded in the presence of the added accused.
Discharged accused: If a person was discharged in the same case, the court must follow Section 300(5) read with Section 398 CrPC before summoning under Section 319.

Conclusion

Yadwinder Singh v. Lakhi alias Lakhwinder Singh crystallizes a practical, evidence-led approach to Section 319 CrPC. It reaffirms that:

In-court eyewitness examination-in-chief can, by itself, justify summoning additional accused under Section 319, provided the “more than prima facie” threshold is met.
Investigative exoneration—including sophisticated electronic evidence like CCTV—does not fetter the court’s power to summon; it is a factor to consider, not a veto. The trial is where such material is fully tested.
High Courts should be chary of quashing Section 319 orders at nascent stages absent clear illegality; trial management and prejudice minimization favor early summoning when warranted.
Trial courts must provide succinct, reasoned orders engaging with contrary material where relevant and strictly follow the procedural roadmap laid down in Sukhpal Singh Khaira.
The State’s prosecutorial duty to assist courts is non-negotiable; non-appearance attracts censure and corrective directions.

The decision will influence future Section 319 applications by reinforcing the primacy of sworn, in-court testimony over pre-trial investigative assessments, while maintaining the high threshold and sparing use mandated by the Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh. It thereby balances the imperative that “no guilty should go scot-free” with the procedural safeguards that ensure the newly added accused receive a full, fair, and fresh opportunity to contest the case.