Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal (2025 INSC 734): High Courts May Invoke § 482 CrPC / § 528 BNSS to Quash Applications under § 12 of the Domestic-Violence Act

1. Introduction

In Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal the Supreme Court of India resolved a long-standing conflict among High Courts on a pivotal procedural issue: Can a High Court exercise its inherent criminal jurisdiction to quash proceedings initiated under § 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”)?

The Court—speaking through Justice Abhay S. Oka, joined by Justice Ujjal Bhuyan—held that such power does exist under § 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) (or the corresponding § 528 of the forthcoming Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”)), albeit to be used sparingly and with “caution and circumspection”.

The ruling arose from matrimonial disputes in which the wife (respondent) filed a DV-Act application seeking residence, protection, monetary and custody orders. The husbands’ family sought quashing of that application; the Madhya Pradesh High Court refused, holding that DV-Act proceedings are civil in nature and thus beyond § 482. The Supreme Court has now overturned that view, reinstating the quash petitions for fresh consideration.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: High Courts possess inherent power under § 482 CrPC / § 528 BNSS to quash or otherwise interfere with proceedings that emanate from an application under § 12 of the DV Act. Previous High-Court decisions denying such jurisdiction are incorrect.
• Standard for Interference: Because the DV Act is a welfare legislation aimed at protecting women, interference should be exceptional—permissible only in cases of “gross illegality, manifest injustice, or abuse of process”.
• Dispositive Order: The Supreme Court quashed the impugned High-Court order, revived the quash petitions, and remanded them for fresh adjudication consistent with the new legal standard.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

a) Supportive of Inherent Jurisdiction

• Devendra Agarwal v. State of U.P. (Allahabad HC, 2024) and Nandkishor Vyawahare v. Mangala (Bombay HC, 2018) – recognised maintainability of § 482 petitions against DV-Act orders.

b) Contrary View (Now Overruled)

• Several High-Court rulings (including Justice Oka’s own 2016 Bombay judgment) had barred § 482 intervention, largely because DV-Act proceedings were labelled “civil”. These are impliedly overruled.
• Kunapareddy v. Swarna Kumari (SC, 2016) and Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi (SC, 2022) – cited for describing DV-Act proceedings as “predominantly civil”; yet the Supreme Court clarifies that this civil character does not oust criminal-procedural safeguards.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Reading of § 482 CrPC. • The second limb of § 482 saves High-Court power “to prevent abuse of the process of any Court”. • A Magistrate dealing with a § 12 DV-Act application is indisputably a “Criminal Court” under § 6 CrPC/BNSS. • Therefore, proceedings before such a Magistrate fall within the phrase “any Court” in § 482.
2. Nature of a § 12 Application. • Though “predominantly civil”, § 12 proceedings are not complaints under § 200 CrPC; they follow a sui-generis statutory procedure (notice, hearing, possibility of ex-parte interim orders). • Consequently, characterisation as civil does not preclude the supervisory criminal jurisdiction of the High Court.
3. Legislative Scheme. • § 28 DV Act adopts CrPC procedure “save as otherwise provided”, yet also allows the court to design its own procedure; this hybrid nature supports flexible supervisory jurisdiction. • An appeal lies under § 29 DV Act, but that does not bar inherent High-Court powers—analogous to the criminal-law sphere where § 482 co-exists with statutory appeals and revisions.
4. Policy Considerations. • While safeguarding women’s rights is paramount, unfounded or harassing proceedings equally undermine justice. • The High Court, therefore, retains an emergency “safety-valve”, but the bar is deliberately high to avoid frustrating the DV Act’s protective design.

3.3 Anticipated Impact

• Uniformity: Resolves conflicting High-Court jurisprudence; all High Courts must now entertain § 482/§ 528 petitions against DV-Act proceedings.
• Litigation Strategy: Respondents gain a potential—though narrow—avenue to challenge frivolous or jurisdictionally defective DV-Act cases early, possibly reducing multiplicity of litigation.
• Judicial Workload: High-Court criminal-miscellaneous dockets may see an uptick; however, the “hands-off” admonition should filter out most routine challenges.
• Women’s Rights Discourse: The Court’s emphasis on restraint underlines that the judgment is not a licence to derail genuine claims; balanced application is crucial.
• Future Interpretation of BNSS: By expressly tying the reasoning to § 528 BNSS, the Court pre-emptively clarifies continuity once the new code replaces the CrPC.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Inherent Jurisdiction (§ 482 CrPC / § 528 BNSS): A residual power of High Courts to pass any order necessary to (i) enforce a CrPC/B NSS order, or (ii) prevent abuse of process / secure justice, even if no specific statutory provision exists.
• § 12 DV-Act Application: A written request by an “aggrieved woman”, Protection Officer, or any person on her behalf, seeking civil-style reliefs (residence, protection, maintenance, etc.) from a Magistrate. It is not a criminal complaint seeking punishment.
• Predominantly Civil vs. Criminal: Proceedings that aim at protective or compensatory reliefs (civil flavour) but are heard in a criminal court following simplified criminal procedure (hybrid).
• Quash Petition: A plea to the High Court to terminate legal proceedings at the threshold because they are illegal, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal draws a careful equilibrium between two imperatives: availability of an extraordinary judicial corrective for manifestly abusive DV-Act proceedings, and preservation of the statute’s core mission to shield women from domestic violence.

The precedent can be distilled into two guiding propositions:

1. Yes, High Courts can use § 482 CrPC / § 528 BNSS to quash DV-Act applications or orders pending before a Magistrate.
2. They should do so only in rare cases of egregious abuse, lest the remedial architecture built for victims be undermined.

In short, the ruling clarifies procedure without diluting protection—an indispensable clarification that will influence matrimonial and domestic-violence litigation nationwide.