Shared Parenting Not a Default in High-Conflict Custody Disputes: Commentary on Rajanand Choudhary v. Jyoti

I. Introduction

The judgment of the Jharkhand High Court in F.A. No. 06 of 2023 and F.A. No. 50 of 2023, clubbed and decided on 21 November 2025 by a Division Bench (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. and Arun Kumar Rai, J.), addresses two interconnected matrimonial disputes:

• F.A. No. 06 of 2023: Husband’s appeal against dismissal of his divorce petition under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on the ground of cruelty.
• F.A. No. 50 of 2023: Wife’s appeal against a Family Court order which, while refusing exclusive custody to the father, nonetheless imposed a detailed regime of “shared parenting” under Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.

The case is significant for two distinct reasons:

1. It reaffirms and applies settled Supreme Court jurisprudence on “cruelty” as a ground for divorce and clarifies the scope of appellate interference by invoking the standard of “perversity” in fact-finding.
2. More importantly, it lays down a clear and practical guideline in the Indian custody context: “shared parenting”/joint custody is not an appropriate judicial default in high-conflict matrimonial disputes; the child’s welfare, not parental claims, must determine whether such an arrangement is suitable.

In F.A. No. 06 of 2023, the High Court upheld the Family Court’s refusal to grant divorce, holding that the husband had failed to prove cruelty and that the trial court’s findings were not perverse. In F.A. No. 50 of 2023, the Court quashed the Family Court’s shared parenting arrangement, confirmed the mother’s custody, and instead crafted a structured visitation regime for the father, grounded firmly in the welfare principle under Section 13 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act.

II. Summary of the Judgment

A. F.A. No. 06 of 2023 – Divorce on Ground of Cruelty

The husband, Rajanand (Raja Nand) Choudhary, sought dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, alleging that his wife, Jyoti:

• Was rude, aggressive and quarrelsome from the very beginning of the marriage (2011).
• Abused him and his parents in filthy language.
• Assaulted him with utensils and slapped him.
• Frequently left the matrimonial home, returned late at night, threatened suicide, and humiliated him in front of neighbours.

The Family Court dismissed the divorce suit (Original Suit No. 101 of 2019), holding that:

• The incidents narrated did not exceed the “ordinary wear and tear” of marital life.
• The husband failed to establish cruelty of such gravity as to make cohabitation unsafe or unreasonable.

On appeal, the High Court:

• Reaffirmed the trial court’s appreciation of evidence.
• Held that the conclusions were based on a proper appraisal of pleadings, testimony and documents, and were not perverse.
• Dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree refusing divorce.

B. F.A. No. 50 of 2023 – Custody and Shared Parenting

The husband filed Original Suit No. 71 of 2021 seeking custody of the two minor children:

• Son – Amogh Raj @ Moon (born 23.08.2012).
• Daughter – Anika Choudhary (born 15.09.2017).

The Family Court:

• Recognised that the children were living with their mother in the maternal grandfather’s house in Deoghar.
• Declined to give exclusive custody to the father and recorded that the suit, as framed, lacked a valid cause of action for such relief.
• Yet, paradoxically, ordered an elaborate regime of “shared parenting” – weekly/time-based custody splits, vacation sharing, and joint decision-making on schooling.

The wife appealed. The High Court:

• Held that although the father is the statutory “natural guardian” under Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, this is subject to Section 13 – welfare of the minor is paramount.
• Found that:
  • The father was engaged full-time in his tyre showroom; only aged parents remained at home during the day.
  • He had not paid court-ordered maintenance for the children, indicating lack of serious concern.
  • He produced no cogent proof of “bad atmosphere” in the maternal home; in fact, the maternal grandfather is a retired bank manager and one maternal uncle a bank employee.
  • There were multiple litigations between the parties (about five cases), indicating a high-conflict relationship.
• Held that the Family Court was internally inconsistent in both:
  • Denying exclusive custody and finding no valid cause of action; but
  • Imposing a mandatory shared parenting regime “without cogent reason”.
• Found that in such a high-conflict setting, court-imposed shared parenting could harm the children’s welfare and stability.
• Quashed the shared parenting arrangement (clauses (a) to (g) of Issue No. III) and modified the judgment.
• Confirmed primary custody with the mother but granted the father :
  • Once every fortnight from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., after which the children must be returned to the mother.
  • During summer vacation, visitation on every Saturday from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Thus, the High Court balances exclusive custody with substantial contact, prioritising the children’s stability while recognising their right to maintain a meaningful relationship with both parents.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Principles on Divorce for Cruelty

1. Appellate Interference and “Perverse” Findings

The husband argued that the Family Court’s refusal to find cruelty was “perverse”. The High Court, before addressing cruelty, clarified what “perverse” means under Indian appellate jurisprudence, relying heavily on:

• Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206

Key propositions reaffirmed:

• A finding is “perverse” if:
  • It is based on no evidence; or
  • It ignores relevant evidence or considers irrelevant material; or
  • It outrageously defies logic and is irrational.
• Mere disagreement with appreciation of evidence does not justify interference; the appellate court does not re-try the case unless findings are of this character.

By adopting this standard, the High Court signalled judicial restraint: even in sensitive matrimonial matters, interference is warranted only where the trial court’s fact-finding is qualitatively defective, not where another view is merely possible.

2. “Cruelty” in Matrimonial Law: Supreme Court Framework

The Bench then surveyed leading Supreme Court precedents defining “cruelty” under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act:

• Dr. N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326
  • Cruelty exists where the conduct is such as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the spouse that living with the other would be harmful or injurious.
• Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105
  • No fixed definition of cruelty; context-specific.
  • Cruelty includes conduct relating to matrimonial obligations which adversely affects the spouse; may be physical or mental; intention is not essential.
• V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, (1994) 1 SCC 337
  • False allegations of mental disorder (lunacy, insanity) levelled in pleadings and cross-examination can themselves constitute mental cruelty.
• Vijay Kumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003) 6 SCC 334
  • Allegations of unchastity and extramarital affairs against an educated wife in pleadings amount to cruelty per se.
• Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742
  • Mental cruelty requires conduct that, sustained over time, makes cohabitation unreasonable.
  • Conduct must be “grave” and “weighty”; trivial irritations and normal wear and tear are insufficient.

From these, the High Court distilled two central tests:

1. Whether the conduct causes such mental or physical suffering as to make continued cohabitation unsafe or unreasonable; and
2. Whether the incidents go beyond normal marital friction and reach a threshold of gravity and continuity.

3. Application to the Facts

Key factual features weighed by the High Court:

• The parties lived together for about six years (2011–2017) without major legal intervention, during which:
  • Two children were born.
  • The husband continued to send money to the wife, even from abroad; he himself admitted remitting Rs. 6–7 lakhs via his father (cross-examination, para 23).
• The husband produced only:
  • His mother (P.W.1) and himself (P.W.2) as witnesses.
  • No independent neighbour or third-party witnesses to corroborate allegations of public quarrels, late-night returns, or threats of suicide.
• Crucially, in his earlier suit for restitution of conjugal rights (Original Suit No. 114/2018 under Section 9 HMA), his pleadings (Exhibit B) did not allege cruelty. That petition, filed before the current divorce litigation, in fact implied his desire to resume cohabitation.

The Family Court had already reasoned that:

“...whatever incidents of quarrel and dispute have been said to be occurred between the parties are nothing more than ordinary wear and tear of family life...”

The High Court endorsed this view, emphasising:

• Absence of contemporaneous complaints by the husband before 2019.
• Continuing social interactions – e.g., he himself brought wife and children to his showroom inauguration in October 2021, even after filing the divorce suit.

Given this background, the allegations, even if partly true, did not meet the threshold of “grave and weighty” cruelty as defined by the Supreme Court. Nor did the trial court’s evaluation display any of the hallmarks of “perversity” – it neither ignored key evidence nor relied on extraneous material.

Result: Divorce refused; appeal dismissed.

B. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework on Guardianship and Custody

1. Section 6, 9 and 13 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956

The Court accurately restates and applies the key provisions:

• Section 6 – Natural guardians:
  • For a boy or unmarried girl: the father, and after him, the mother, though custody of a child under 5 ordinarily with the mother.
• Section 9 – Testamentary guardians (not directly in issue, but part of the framework).
• Section 13 – Welfare of minor to be paramount:
  • (1) Welfare of the minor is the “paramount consideration” in appointing or declaring a guardian.
  • (2) No person (including the natural guardian) is entitled to guardianship if the court finds that such guardianship will not be for the child’s welfare.

The Court emphasises that the term “after” in Section 6(a) must be construed harmoniously with Section 4 and Section 13 so that:

“...the word ‘after’ can be understood to mean in the absence of, thereby referring to father's absence from the care of the minor's property or person for any reason whatever.”

Crucially, Section 13 overrides the bare text of Section 6. The father’s status as natural guardian does not create an indefeasible right to custody; it is always subordinate to the welfare analysis.

2. Parens Patriae Jurisdiction

The Court reiterates the well-settled principle, echoing Supreme Court dicta (notably Gaurav Nagpal and Nil Ratan Kundu):

• In custody and guardianship matters, the Court acts in its parens patriae capacity – as protector of the child’s interests, rather than as an arbiter of competing parental rights.
• The Court is not rigidly bound by strict rules of procedure, technicalities of personal law, or even precedents, where they conflict with child welfare.

C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Child Welfare and Custody

The High Court synthesises a robust line of Supreme Court judgments, including:

• Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal, (2009) 1 SCC 42
  • “Welfare” in Section 13 must be construed in its widest sense – physical, emotional, moral and ethical dimensions.
  • Court must look beyond technical legal rights and focus on the child’s ordinary contentment, health, education, intellectual development, and favourable surroundings.
• Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu, (2008) 9 SCC 413
  • Custody questions are a human problem, not just legal – require “human touch”.
  • Courts are not bound by strict rules of evidence or precedent; welfare and well-being are paramount.
  • If the child is mature enough, his/her preferences must be considered (though not decisive).
• Yashita Sahu v. State Of Rajasthan, (2020) 3 SCC 67
  • Child of tender years has a basic human right to the love and protection of both parents.
  • Even where custody is with one parent, the other must ordinarily have meaningful visitation, unless there are “extreme circumstances”.
• Gaytri Bajaj v. Jiten Bhalla, (2012) 12 SCC 471
  • It is not the better right of either parent, but the child’s welfare that governs custody.
  • Court must consider desire of the child, environment, and the parent’s ability and means to care for the child.
• SHAZIA AMAN KHAN v. STATE OF ORISSA, (2024) 7 SCC 564
  • Reiterates that in custody disputes, welfare, not parental rights, is controlling.
• Gautam Kumar Das v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 10 SCC 588
  • Again stresses “welfare of the child” as paramount and case-specific.

Collectively, these cases fortify the High Court’s insistence that:

• Custody cannot be determined by mechanical reliance on Section 6 or personal law.
• Shared or joint custody cannot be imposed as a parent-centred compromise; the focus must remain child-centred.

D. The Court’s Approach to “Shared Parenting”

1. The Family Court’s Shared Parenting Order

The Family Court, after:

• Finding the father not entitled to exclusive custody, and
• Holding that the suit, as framed, lacked a valid cause of action,

nonetheless ordered an extensive shared parenting arrangement:

• Children with mother Monday to Saturday 4 p.m.; with father from Saturday 4 p.m. to Sunday 7 p.m., then back to mother.
• First three weekends with this shared regime; last week entirely with the mother.
• Vacation splitting: first half with father, second half with mother.
• Telephone/online access for the non-custodial parent.
• Joint consultation on schooling, particularly if father offers admission to “good school” in Deoghar.

While the Family Court correctly emphasised the value of both parents’ affection, the High Court found the logic self-contradictory: it had denied the relief claimed (exclusive custody) and yet granted a different, intrusive relief (shared parenting) without a proper foundation or reasoning.

2. High Court’s Critique and Reliance on International Perspective

A striking feature of this judgment is its express reference to the US case Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584 (1978), where the New York Court of Appeals opined:

“Joint custody is encouraged primarily as a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion. As a court-ordered arrangement imposed upon already embattled and embittered parents, accusing one another of serious vices and wrongs, it can only enhance familial chaos.”

By invoking this, the Jharkhand High Court aligns with a cautious international approach: joint or shared custody is best suited to cooperative, low-conflict parents. Imposing it in a high-conflict scenario may:

• Intensify disputes.
• Increase instability for the child.
• Heighten risks of parental alienation.

The Court also makes an important practical observation:

• “It is not healthy for a child to move between two homes and a stable, anchored home is the best option in relation to his/her study and other future prospects.”

3. Factual Basis for Rejecting Shared Parenting

The High Court’s rejection of shared parenting was not abstract; it was firmly fact-based:

• High-conflict relationship:
  • At least five litigations between the parties (criminal case under Section 498-A IPC, divorce proceedings, custody suit, maintenance case, etc.).
  • Persistent mutual accusations, including of physical assaults.
• Father’s actual involvement and capacity:
  • He runs an Apollo tyre showroom and is engaged from morning to night, as found by the Family Court itself.
  • At home, only his aged parents would be available to supervise the children; no other female caregiver.
  • He had not been paying court-ordered maintenance to the children in Maintenance Case No. 73/2019 (Rs. 5,000 for son, Rs. 3,000 for daughter), which the High Court read as a serious indicator of his lack of genuine concern.
• Mother’s role and environment:
  • She is a postgraduate in English, teaching children at home and informally at their school.
  • Children are enrolled in Sandipani Public School and living stably with maternal grandparents.
  • The maternal grandfather is a retired co-operative bank manager; one maternal uncle is employed in Punjab National Bank – undermining the father’s unsubstantiated allegation that the grandparents are drug users or bad influences.
• Contradictions in father’s case:
  • He alleged his brothers-in-law were alcoholics but admitted he had not actually seen them drinking regularly (cross-examination, paras 24–27).
  • His mother (P.W.1) admitted she did not even know in which school her grandchildren were studying since 2019, suggesting limited real involvement.

Based on this, the Court concluded that:

• The allegation of “bad atmosphere” in the maternal household was unproved.
• The father’s practical capacity to manage day-to-day care during his custodial slots was doubtful.
• The animosity between parents was high, making cooperative shared parenting unrealistic and potentially harmful.

4. Modified Relief: Exclusive Custody with Structured Visitation

Having rejected shared parenting, the High Court did not exclude the father from the children’s lives. Relying on Yashita Sahu, it stressed that:

“...even if the custody is given to one parent the other parent must have sufficient visitation rights to ensure that the child keeps in touch with the other parent... It is only in extreme circumstances that one parent should be denied contact with the child.”

Accordingly, the Court ordered:

• Primary custody: Continues with the mother (appellant), as de facto caregiver and educational anchor.
• Visitation rights for father (respondent):
  • Once every fortnight: from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., after which the children must be returned to the mother.
  • During summer vacation: every Saturday, 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with similar return conditions.

This structure:

• Preserves continuity and stability of the primary home (with the mother).
• Enables regular, predictable contact with the father.
• Reduces the logistical and emotional upheaval caused by more frequent household shifts.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Perverse” Finding

A finding is “perverse” when:

• It is unsupported by any evidence on record; or
• It ignores important, relevant evidence or relies heavily on irrelevant material; or
• It is so illogical that no reasonable person could have reached that conclusion.

In this case, the High Court held that the Family Court’s refusal to find cruelty was not perverse; it was a plausible view based on the evidence.

2. “Cruelty” in Matrimonial Law

“Cruelty” is not confined to physical violence. It includes:

• Physical cruelty: Beatings, physical assaults, or conduct dangerous to life, limb or health.
• Mental cruelty: Persistent abusive language, humiliation, false allegations (e.g., unchastity, insanity), or conduct that causes deep mental pain and makes it unreasonable for the spouse to continue living with the other.

However:

• Mild quarrels, occasional arguments, or normal marital friction are not enough.
• The conduct must be “grave” and “weighty”, sustained over time, and such that a reasonable person would fear continuing the relationship.

3. Parens Patriae Jurisdiction

“Parens patriae” is a Latin expression meaning “parent of the nation”. In custody disputes, it means:

• The Court steps into the shoes of a parent, with a duty to protect the child’s best interests.
• The Court can override parental agreements or personal law norms if they conflict with the child’s welfare.

4. Welfare Principle under Section 13 of the 1956 Act

Section 13 mandates that:

• Welfare of the minor – including physical, emotional, moral and intellectual well-being – is the paramount consideration.
• No person, not even the “natural guardian” (father), has a right to custody if it is not in the child’s best interests.

5. Shared Parenting / Joint Custody

“Shared parenting” or “joint custody” typically involves:

• Both parents sharing substantial, sometimes roughly equal, physical custody and decision-making responsibility.
• Frequent movement of the child between two homes.

This model works best when:

• Parents are cooperative and communicate reasonably well.
• They live relatively close to each other.
• They can coordinate schooling, healthcare, and routines without conflict.

In high-conflict situations, shared parenting can:

• Increase the child’s exposure to parental fights.
• Create instability and confusion.
• Lead to parental alienation, where one parent pressures the child against the other.

6. Visitation Rights

When one parent has primary custody, the other is ordinarily granted:

• Regular time with the child (weekends, holidays, vacations).
• Sometimes contact through calls or video conferencing.

Visitation:

• Maintains the child’s bond with the non-custodial parent.
• Is restricted or denied only in extreme cases (e.g., abuse, serious risk to the child).

V. Impact and Significance

1. On “Shared Parenting” Jurisprudence in India

This judgment is particularly significant for Family Courts in Jharkhand and potentially persuasive elsewhere because:

• It explicitly recognises that shared parenting is not a default solution, especially where:
  • Parents are “embattled and embittered”.
  • There are multiple ongoing litigations.
  • Cooperation is minimal and conflict is high.
• It rejects the idea that courts can impose shared parenting as a halfway compromise when the claim for exclusive custody fails; the remedy must still be welfare-centric, not parent-centric.
• By citing Braiman v. Braiman, the Court opens Indian discourse to comparative jurisprudence cautioning against court-ordered joint custody in high-conflict situations.

2. Reinforcement of Welfare over Statutory Guardianship

The decision powerfully reiterates:

• The father’s status as natural guardian under Section 6 does not create a presumption in favour of custody, much less joint custody.
• Section 13’s welfare principle is overriding, both textually and jurisprudentially.
• In appropriate cases, a mother can be the sole custodial parent, with father confined to visitation, even when the father asserts financial superiority.

3. Practical Guidance for Family Courts

The judgment implicitly lays down several operational guidelines:

• Before ordering shared parenting, courts should:
  • Assess the level of parental conflict.
  • Examine the practical capacity of each parent (time, support systems, availability).
  • Consider the child’s routine, schooling, and need for stability.
  • Record cogent reasons why shared parenting advances, rather than harms, welfare.
• If shared custody is not suitable, courts should:
  • Clearly identify the primary caregiver and grant custody accordingly.
  • Design detailed, workable visitation schedules for the other parent, to avoid future friction.
• Non-payment of maintenance can be considered a relevant factor in assessing the seriousness of a parent’s welfare claim.

4. Divorce on Ground of Cruelty – Evidentiary Lessons

For matrimonial litigants and practitioners, the dismissal of the husband’s divorce appeal underscores:

• The importance of contemporaneous complaints or corroborating conduct (e.g., police complaints, letters, third-party witnesses) where cruelty is alleged.
• The risk in taking mutually contradictory positions:
  • First seeking restitution of conjugal rights (suggesting desire to resume cohabitation) without pleading cruelty.
  • Later alleging long-standing cruel behaviour as the basis for divorce.
• The appellate court’s reluctance to disturb trial court fact-finding without clear perversity.

VI. Conclusion

The Jharkhand High Court’s decision in Rajanand Choudhary v. Jyoti (F.A. Nos. 06/2023 and 50/2023) stands out in contemporary family law for two principal contributions:

1. It reaffirms a careful, evidence-based approach to cruelty as a ground for divorce, reminding appellate courts and litigants that:
   • Normal marital friction, uncorroborated allegations, and long periods of relatively peaceful cohabitation militate against a finding of cruelty.
   • Absent “perversity”, appellate interference with trial court findings is unwarranted.
2. It provides a clear, welfare-centric corrective to the emerging enthusiasm for shared parenting in custody disputes:
   • Shared parenting is not a universal formula; it may be positively harmful in high-conflict, litigious relationships.
   • Primary custody with one stable caregiver – here, the mother – combined with structured, meaningful visitation for the other parent often better serves the child’s holistic welfare.
   • The father’s status as natural guardian and financial strength cannot override Section 13’s paramount welfare test.

In essence, the judgment reinforces that in family law, the child is not a prize to be divided between parents or a tool to balance their grievances. The child’s welfare — encompassing stability, emotional security, education, and moral development — is the central and controlling consideration, to which all other claims must yield. This principled yet pragmatic stance makes the decision an important precedent on the limits of court-imposed shared parenting in India.