Sentencing Discretion under Section 326A IPC and Non-mandatory Status of Acid-Attack SOPs:
A Detailed Commentary on Hakim v. State of NCT of Delhi (2025 INSC 728)

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Hakim v. State of NCT of Delhi (2025 INSC 728) marks a significant clarification in two areas of criminal jurisprudence:

1. Sentencing under Section 326A IPC (acid attacks)—the Court explains when life imprisonment may be reduced, stressing comparative culpability, advanced age, serious ailments and parity among co-accused.
2. Evidentiary & procedural standards—the Court rules that failure to trace or seize the chemical and non-compliance with “Standard Operating Procedures” (SOPs) for acid-attack investigation do not ipso facto vitiate conviction if medical and ocular evidence convincingly prove a chemical burn assault.

The case arose from a 2014 acid attack in Mathura. The Trial Court sentenced two main accused (Hakim and his son Umesh) to life imprisonment. The Delhi High Court upheld both convictions and sentences. On further appeal, the Supreme Court:

• Upheld both convictions.
• Maintained Umesh’s life sentence (he poured the acid).
• Reduced Hakim’s sentence from life to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment, aligning it with a third accused (Gyani) who only restrained the victim.

This commentary dissects the judgment’s reasoning, precedential matrix, and broader impact on criminal law.

2. Summary of the Judgment

1. Conviction affirmed. The Court refused to disturb concurrent findings of guilt under Section 326A/34 IPC, reiterating the narrow scope of interference under Article 136 when lower courts have marshalled evidence properly.

2. SOPs not mandatory. Investigation guidelines for acid-attack cases, unlike statutory commands, are directory; non-compliance is not fatal if overall investigation is fair and evidence cogent.

3. No need to recover acid. Where medical experts unanimously confirm chemical burns and there is credible ocular evidence, conviction can be sustained even without seizure, source-tracking or forensic analysis of the acid.

4. Sentence re-tailored. Applying the principles in Gurmukh Singh and Jameel, the Court distinguished between:

• Umesh – principal assailant; life imprisonment justified.
• Hakim – 73-year-old father who held the victim; numerous co-morbidities; role identical to Gyani (already serving 10 years). Sentence reduced to 10 years + ₹50,000 fine.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

1. Mst Dalbir Kaur (1976) & Pritam Singh (1950)—laid down limits of Supreme Court interference with concurrent findings.
2. Bharwada Bhoginbhai (1983)—minor discrepancies do not dilute truthful testimony.
3. Murugan (2018)—Article 136 review confined to perversity or patent illegality.
4. Defence citations (Wasif Haider, Kailash Gour, Sunil Kundu, etc.)—relied on by appellants to emphasise prosecution lapses; Court found them distinguishable.
5. Noor Aga (2008)—mandatory compliance with NDPS procedures; used by defence to equate SOPs, but Court clarified NDPS statutory commands differ from executive guidelines.
6. Gurmukh Singh (2009) & Jameel (2010)—catalogue of sentencing factors; heavily relied on for reduction.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s logic unfolds in two concentric layers:

1. Conviction layer
   • Seven doctors (PW-5, 8–12, 14) proved 90 % vision loss, facial disfigurement and deep chemical burns.
   • Aadhaar photograph pre-incident refuted the defence theory of pre-existing eye defect.
   • Recovery of acid not indispensable; immediate flight, railway-crossing location and lapse of time rendered seizure improbable.
   • Delay in recording witness statements sufficiently explained—victim’s hospitalisation, family’s flight due to threats.
   • SOP breach: guidelines directory, unlike NDPS statutory procedure.
   • Age of Hakim no bar to participation; eyewitnesses placed him at scene restraining the victim.
2. Sentencing layer
   • Section 326A prescribes either life imprisonment or minimum 10 years; discretion left to court.
   • Comparative culpability principle: Person who poured acid (Umesh) deserved sterner punishment.
   • Parity: Hakim’s role mirrored Gyani (already reduced by HC to 10 years). Denying parity would be arbitrary.
   • Individualised sentencing: Hakim’s advanced age (73), multiple chronic diseases, status as “seriously sick prisoner” warranted lesser imprisonment, without compromising societal denunciation.
   • Maintaining meaningful punishment: Sentence not slashed below statutory minimum (10 years) ensuring proportionality.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

1. Clarifies discretionary spectrum under Section 326A. Courts may impose less than life imprisonment when:
   • (i) Accused played a secondary role,
   • (ii) co-accused with identical role received lesser sentence,
   • (iii) compelling humanitarian factors (age/health) exist.
2. Adopts flexible approach to investigative SOPs. Acquittal cannot be sought solely on technical breach of police manuals unless prejudice is shown.
3. Re-affirms limited Article 136 review. Strengthens finality of concurrent convictions, fostering trial-court responsibility.
4. Victim compensation reaffirmed. High Court-directed compensation of ₹5 lakh (shortfall to be paid by State) remains intact, encouraging state accountability where convict is indigent.
5. Guidance for future acid-attack trials. Emphasises reliability of medical-expert testimony and photographic proof over physical recovery of corrosive substance.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Section 326A IPC: Introduced in 2013 after public outrage over acid attacks. Punishes causing “grevious hurt” through acid or similar substances with minimum 10 years imprisonment which may extend to life.
• Article 136 (Special Leave): A discretionary gateway allowing the Supreme Court to hear appeals against any order; but the Court self-restrains from re-evaluating facts when two lower courts concur unless findings are “perverse”.
• “Perverse finding”: A conclusion no reasonable person could reach, or one arrived at ignoring vital evidence or relying on inadmissible evidence.
• Standard Operating Procedure (SOP): Executive/ departmental guidelines to help police handle specific crimes. Unless incorporated in statute or rules, breach does not automatically void a trial.
• Rigorous vs. Simple Imprisonment: In rigorous imprisonment, convict is obliged to do hard labour; in simple, no such obligation.
• Benefit of Section 428 CrPC: Sets off the period spent in custody during investigation/trial against sentence after conviction.

5. Conclusion

Hakim v. State of NCT of Delhi cements two critical propositions:

1. Sentencing under Section 326A is context-sensitive. Life imprisonment is not automatic; courts must calibrate punishment to the accused’s specific role, health and parity considerations, provided the statutory floor of 10 years is respected.
2. Procedural lapses must cause prejudice to matter. Failure to seize acid or adhere to SOPs is insufficient to upend conviction where medical and eyewitness testimony is convincing and investigation fundamentally fair.

For trial courts, the judgment underscores meticulous fact-finding and reasoned sentencing orders. For appellate courts, it epitomises restrained interference under Article 136, intervening only when perversity, illegality or gross injustice is demonstrated. Lastly, for victims of acid violence, it re-affirms the law’s commitment to assure both conviction of offenders and meaningful compensation.