Sentencing Beyond the Statutory Minimum under the NDPS Act:
Supreme Court Clarifies Judicial Discretion in Narayan Das v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025)

1. Introduction

On 17 July 2025, the Supreme Court of India delivered an important order in Narayan Das v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 INSC 872) that addresses sentencing practice under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). The petitioner, Narayan Das, had been convicted under Section 21(c) for possession of 236 cough-syrup vials containing Codeine Phosphate—a “commercial quantity” of a psychotropic substance. The Special Judge imposed 12 years’ rigorous imprisonment (RI) and a fine of ₹1,00,000, which the Chhattisgarh High Court reduced to the statutory minimum of 10 years, reasoning that the trial court had given no “special reasons” as required by Section 32-B of the Act.

Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the conviction and seizure on procedural grounds. Although the Court refused to interfere with conviction or sentence reduction, it seized the opportunity to correct what it termed a “serious misconception of law” in the High Court’s reading of Section 32-B. The ruling therefore crystallises a new interpretive principle: a sentencing court need not expressly justify a punishment that exceeds the minimum by invoking one of the six aggravating factors in Section 32-B(a)–(f); other relevant considerations—such as the sheer quantity of contraband—are legitimate grounds for imposing a higher sentence.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Supreme Court upheld the conviction under Section 21(c) NDPS Act.
• It declined to overturn the High Court’s reduction of sentence from 12 to 10 years, but emphasised that the High Court’s premise—that reasons under Section 32-B(a)–(f) are mandatory—was legally erroneous.
• The Court reaffirmed and elaborated on its earlier decision in Rafiq Qureshi v. NCB (2019) 6 SCC 492, holding that:
  • Section 32-B preserves broad judicial discretion: the listed factors are illustrative, not exhaustive.
  • Quantity of the substance is per se a relevant aggravating factor even though not expressly listed in Section 32-B.
• Consequently, a trial court may impose a sentence above the statutory minimum without enumerating Section 32-B factors, so long as the factor relied upon is relevant and rational.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Rafiq Qureshi v. NCB, Eastern Zonal Unit, (2019) 6 SCC 492
—Established that Section 32-B is enabling, not restrictive; courts may consider “such factors as it may deem fit” in addition to those in clauses (a)–(f).
—Held that possession of 609.6 gm heroin (well above commercial quantity) justified a sentence above the minimum though quantity is not listed in §32-B(a)–(f).

2. Sakshi v. Union Of India, (2004) 5 SCC 518
—Cited for the principle of statutory interpretation: courts should not read words into a statute that the legislature has not used.

3. Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab, (2021) 6 SCC 558
—Reiterated that courts may look at factors they “deem fit” in addition to §32-B factors when enhancing sentence.

B. Legal Reasoning Adopted

1. Textual Analysis of Section 32-B.
   The Court isolated the phrase “in addition to such factors as it may deem fit,” concluding that the legislature preserved sentencing discretion beyond the six enumerated factors. Hence, mandatory reference to clauses (a)–(f) is not required.
2. Consistency with Prior Precedent.
   By quoting extensively from Rafiq Qureshi, the Court demonstrated that requiring trial courts always to cite §32-B factors would contradict binding precedent and upset the carefully balanced sentencing architecture introduced by the 2001 amendment.
3. Purpose of the 2001 Amendment.
   The Statement of Objects and Reasons showed the legislature’s intent to “rationalise the sentencing structure,” giving courts room to tailor punishment to culpability. A rigid rule would thwart that purpose.

C. Impact on Future Jurisprudence

• Eliminates lingering confusion in several High Courts that viewed §32-B(a)–(f) as exhaustive. Those courts must now recognise broader sentencing discretion.
• Empowers trial judges to impose sentences up to the 20-year ceiling without a separate “special reasons” enquiry, provided the factor relied on is relevant and survives appellate scrutiny.
• Raises the evidentiary burden on defence counsel: merely showing absence of §32-B factors will not guarantee reduction to the minimum; counsel must attack the relevance or proportionality of any factor used.
• Potentially leads to more varied sentences across similar fact patterns pending the development of quantitative sentencing guidelines under the NDPS Act.
• Could influence legislative debate on introducing structured sentencing or statutory guidelines similar to those in other jurisdictions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• NDPS Act. Federal law regulating narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, creating severe penalties for possession, trafficking, and other offences.
• Section 21(c). Punishes possession of “commercial quantity” of manufactured drugs or preparations, prescribing 10–20 years’ RI and a fine of ₹1 – 2 lakh.
• Commercial Quantity. A threshold fixed by the Central Government; exceeding it triggers the harsh sentencing range in §21(c).
• Rigorous Imprisonment (RI). Custodial sentence involving mandatory hard labour, as opposed to simple imprisonment.
• Section 32-B. A provision listing six non-exhaustive aggravating factors (violence, public-office abuse, minors, educational premises, organised crime groups, ancillary illegal activity) that a court may consider when awarding above-minimum sentences.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s order in Narayan Das does not alter the petitioner’s fate, but it sets a noteworthy precedent for NDPS sentencing. By explicitly clarifying that Section 32-B is illustrative and not exhaustive, the Court restores full discretionary power to sentencing judges and dissolves the misconception that absence of the six listed factors caps punishment at the statutory minimum.

The ruling ensures consistency with earlier Supreme Court authority, aligns with the legislative intent behind the 2001 amendment, and provides clearer guidance to lower courts. Defence practitioners can no longer rely solely on the non-existence of §32-B(a)–(f) factors; the battleground will shift to demonstrating why any other factor invoked is irrelevant or disproportionate. From a systemic standpoint, the judgment is a step towards nuanced, individualised sentencing under the NDPS Act, even as it underscores the need for comprehensive sentencing guidelines to curtail disparity.

Key Takeaway: Under the NDPS Act, trial courts are free to impose penalties above the statutory minimum so long as they rely on relevant aggravating factors—whether or not those factors are spelled out in Section 32-B(a)–(f). The minimum is not the maximum, and special reasons confined to the statute’s six illustrations are unnecessary.