Section 195 CrPC as a Bar at the Cognizance Stage, Not at FIR Stage: Commentary on Daljit Singh Grewal @ Bhola v. State of Punjab and Others

1. Introduction

The decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Daljit Singh Grewal @ Bhola and Others v. State of Punjab and Others (CRM-M-23232-2023, decided on 29 November 2025, by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tribhuvan Dahiya) arises out of a politically sensitive criminal case linked to protests against incidents of religious sacrilege in Punjab. The petitioners, including a municipal councillor and political associates of then-MLA Simarjeet Singh Bains, sought quashing of an FIR and subsequent proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”).

The case presents two principal legal questions:

The effect of a Government-appointed Inquiry Commission’s recommendation to cancel an FIR (on grounds of political vendetta) on the continuation of criminal proceedings against co-accused.
The stage at which the mandatory bar under Section 195 CrPC (requiring a complaint by a public servant before a court can take cognizance of certain offences, including Section 186 IPC) operates, and whether non-compliance can be invoked at the FIR/investigation stage to quash proceedings under Section 482 CrPC.

The High Court dismisses the attempt to quash the FIR at the threshold, clarifying that:

Recommendations of an Inquiry Commission are not binding on the criminal court and, in any case, cannot be stretched beyond their explicit scope (here, they were confined to co-accused MLA Simarjeet Singh Bains).
Section 195 CrPC creates an embargo only at the stage of the court taking cognizance, not at the stage of FIR registration or police investigation. Hence, alleged non-compliance with Section 195 is not a ground to quash an FIR at the pre-cognizance stage, though it can be raised before the trial court at the appropriate time.

2. Background and Facts

2.1 Context: Sacrilege Incidents and Protests

The FIR arises from a turbulent phase in Punjab’s recent history. There were alleged incidents of sacrilege of the Sri Guru Granth Sahib at Bargari Gurdwara and related events at Kotkapura and Behbal Kalan, where police firing on protesters was reported. These events sparked widespread protests across the State.

One such protest took place at Ludhiana on 14.10.2015. The protest, according to the prosecution, was led by then-MLA Simarjeet Singh Bains and accompanied by several municipal councillors, including the present petitioners: Daljit Singh @ Bhola Grewal, Gurpreet Singh @ Gora, Randhir Singh Sibia, and others.

2.2 The FIR and Allegations

On 21.10.2015, an FIR No. 207 was registered at Police Station Division No.7, Ludhiana, under Sections 186, 332, 353, 188, and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”), on the basis of a complaint by an Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), Commissionerate Ludhiana.

The translated narration in the FIR essentially alleges:

The ACP and his police team reached Vishal Mega Mart Road, Chandigarh Road, Ludhiana, for maintaining law and order.
They found MLA Simarjeet Singh Bains, municipal councillors (including Daljit Singh @ Bhola, Gurpreet Singh @ Gora, Randhir Singh Sibia), and 50–60 other persons assembling, allegedly to stage a protest.
Section 144 CrPC prohibitory orders were stated to be in force. The ACP informed Bains and his associates of the restriction and told them they could not proceed.
The MLA allegedly instigated the crowd against the Punjab Government and against the police, interfered with maintenance of public order, and refused to comply with the directions.
When the ACP informed him that he was violating Section 144 CrPC and that he was being arrested, the MLA refused to sit in the government vehicle, sat instead in a black Fortuner (PB-10-BR-1902), and allegedly directed the driver to drive away.
It is alleged that on Bains’ exhortation, the driver drove the vehicle dangerously over the police party to escape arrest. The police personnel reportedly saved themselves with difficulty by jumping aside.
Other associates, including the petitioners, allegedly sat in their respective vehicles, scuffled with the police, and drove away despite attempts to stop them.

On this basis, the offences alleged included:

Section 186 IPC – obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions;
Section 332 IPC – voluntarily causing hurt to deter public servant from duty;
Section 353 IPC – assault or criminal force to deter public servant from duty;
Section 188 IPC – disobedience to order promulgated by a public servant;
Section 149 IPC – every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.

2.3 The Inquiry Commission and Allegation of Political Vendetta

Subsequently, the FIR was alleged by the accused to be a product of political vendetta. In that backdrop:

The Government constituted a Commission of Inquiry headed by a retired High Court Judge, with a retired District and Sessions Judge as member, to inquire into allegedly false cases/FIRs registered over the preceding decade.
FIR No. 207, dated 21.10.2015, was one of the cases examined by this Commission.

The Commission’s key conclusion, as reproduced by the High Court, was:

“We recommend that FIR No.207, dated 21.10.2015 u/s 186, 332, 353, 188, 149 IPC Police Station Division No.7, Ludhiana (Ex.P.1) be cancelled qua Sh. Simarjeet Singh Bains as it is a clear case of political vendetta. Sh. Bains has categorically stated that it was on the asking of the then Home Minister that the then Commissioner of Police, Ludhiana was directed to register [the case] against him.”

On the basis of this report, the investigating agency initially filed a cancellation report under Section 173 CrPC dated 02.12.2017, recommending cancellation of the FIR. From the material reproduced, it appears that the cancellation was framed against all accused, not only against Bains, and was justified as a “false” case and a waste of police and court time.

2.4 Magistrate’s Refusal to Accept Cancellation; Direction for Further Investigation

The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ludhiana, by order dated 06.03.2019, did not accept the cancellation report. Instead, the Magistrate:

Returned the cancellation report;
Directed further investigation in the case; and
Ordered that the police papers be sent back to the investigating agency, while court papers be consigned to the record room pending further action.

In substance, the Magistrate was not satisfied that the evidence justified cancellation of the case at that stage—particularly when even the complainant’s stand and material collected were not fully reconciled with the broad-based cancellation recommended by the police.

2.5 Supplementary Investigation and Charge-Sheet

Pursuant to the Magistrate’s directions:

Further investigation was carried out under Section 173(8) CrPC.
A supplementary charge-sheet (supplementary challan) dated 07.09.2021 was filed.

The supplementary report, as summarized in the judgment, acknowledged that:

The Inquiry Commission’s recommendation was only to cancel the case qua MLA Simarjeet Singh Bains.
Nonetheless, the investigating agency had earlier filed a cancellation report “against all the accused.”
The Magistrate had not accepted that cancellation and had directed reinvestigation.
Upon further investigation, and after examining the statements of witnesses and the evidence, it was concluded that:
- There was material to proceed against several accused, including Simarjeet Singh Bains, Daljit Singh @ Bhola Grewal, Gurpreet Singh @ Gora, Randhir Singh Sibia, and others.
- These accused were placed in Column No.3 of the challan (i.e. as persons to be sent up for trial).
The police also noted that sanction under Section 197 CrPC (for prosecution of public servants) had been routed through the competent authority (as the MLA and councillors are public office-holders), and permission under Section 197 was being/has been obtained.

2.6 The Section 482 CrPC Petition

Aggrieved by:

the registration of FIR No. 207 (Annexure P-1),
the Magistrate’s order dated 06.03.2019 directing further investigation (Annexure P-5), and
the supplementary charge-sheet dated 07.09.2021 (Annexure P-6),

the petitioners invoked the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC to seek quashing of the FIR and consequent proceedings.

Two broad grounds were urged:

Once the Inquiry Commission had recommended cancellation of the FIR as a politically motivated case (and the police themselves had filed a cancellation report), no further proceedings could validly continue, particularly when no fresh or incriminating material was said to have emerged.
Offences under Sections 186, 332, 353 and 188 IPC attract the bar under Section 195 CrPC, which mandates a complaint by the concerned public servant before the court can take cognizance. As this procedure was allegedly not followed, the entire criminal proceeding was asserted to be vitiated, relying in particular on the Supreme Court decision in B.N. John v. State of U.P. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 7, as cited in the judgment).

3. Summary of the Judgment

Justice Tribhuvan Dahiya’s judgment may be summarised in the following key points:

Prima facie case exists: On the face of the FIR and the material collected, there are specific allegations of obstruction, assault and use of criminal force against the police, allegedly at the behest of the petitioners and co-accused MLA during a protest conducted in violation of Section 144 CrPC. A prima facie case is made out under Section 353 IPC (and allied sections), which cannot be brushed aside at the quashing stage.
Inquiry Commission’s recommendation is limited and non-binding: The Commission’s recommendation was only to cancel the FIR qua Simarjeet Singh Bains, on the ground of political vendetta. It did not expressly exonerate the present petitioners. The earlier cancellation report filed “against all accused” therefore went beyond the Commission’s recommendation. The Magistrate’s refusal to accept the cancellation and direction for further investigation were held to be justified.
No quashing on the basis of Commission report: The Commission’s report does not ipso facto nullify the FIR or bind the criminal court. It can at best be a piece of material to be appreciated; the Magistrate remains empowered to order further investigation and the police to file a charge-sheet.
Section 195 CrPC – bar applies only at cognizance stage: Relying heavily on the Supreme Court decision in Devendra Kumar (which in turn examines earlier authorities such as Basir-Ul-Huq, Hemareddy, Raj Singh, and M. Narayandas), the Court reaffirms that:
- Section 195 CrPC bars the court from taking cognizance of certain offences (including Section 186 IPC) except on a complaint in writing by the concerned public servant or his superior.
- This bar does not prevent registration of an FIR or investigation by the police.
- Non-compliance with Section 195 affects the validity of cognizance and trial, not the legality of FIR or investigation.
Prematurity of Section 195 objection: In the present case, the stage of taking cognizance by the Magistrate has not yet arisen in the manner contemplated by Section 195 CrPC (the Magistrate had so far only dealt with cancellation and further investigation). Therefore, the plea based on Section 195 is premature and cannot justify quashing the FIR at this time.
Liberty reserved: The petition under Section 482 CrPC is disposed of by granting liberty to the petitioners to raise the plea of bar under Section 195 CrPC before the trial court at the appropriate stage, i.e., when or if the Magistrate proceeds to take cognizance of the relevant offences.

4. Analysis

4.1 Legal Issues Framed

The judgment implicitly turns on three interconnected legal issues:

Whether, and to what extent, the findings/recommendations of a Government-constituted Inquiry Commission can compel cancellation of an FIR or bind the criminal court.
Whether allegations of political vendetta, where partially accepted by such a Commission, warrant quashing of the FIR under Section 482 CrPC, at least vis-à-vis co-accused.
Whether absence (or alleged absence) of compliance with Section 195 CrPC vitiates the FIR and investigation itself, or whether this bar operates only at the stage of court taking cognizance.

Of these, the third issue—about the stage of operation of Section 195 CrPC— is the central doctrinal point of the judgment and gives the case its enduring precedential value.

4.2 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

4.2.1 The Devendra Kumar Line of Cases on Section 195 CrPC

The High Court explicitly refers to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Devendra Kumar (citation not specified in the text) as having “considered entire law” on Section 195 CrPC, including earlier authorities such as:

Basir-Ul-Huq v. State of West Bengal,
Hemareddy v. State of Karnataka,
Raj Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), and
M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka.

Although the High Court does not reproduce full case details, it draws crucial propositions from the passages (paras 48–51) of Devendra Kumar which it quotes. The key strands from those authorities, as synthesised in the judgment, are:

Nature of the bar: Section 195 CrPC does not bar investigation by the police or registration of an FIR. It bars only the taking of cognizance by a court for the specified offences—such as Section 186 IPC— in the absence of a written complaint by the concerned public servant (or his superior).
Mandatory but timing-sensitive: The requirements of Section 195 are mandatory. Cognizance taken in contravention of Section 195 is void, and the consequent trial and conviction are liable to be set aside as without jurisdiction. However, the obligation to ensure compliance arises only at the time when the court first applies its mind to take cognizance of the offence.
Chapter XIV framework: The Court recalls that Chapter XIV of the CrPC (captioned “Conditions Requisite for Initiation of Proceedings”) begins with Section 190 (power of a Magistrate to take cognizance) and includes provisions like Section 195 that create embargoes on taking cognizance in certain situations.
Section 195(1)(a) CrPC and Section 186 IPC: The text emphasises that for offences under Section 186 IPC, no court can take cognizance “except upon a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.”

The effect of this line of authority is to draw a clear conceptual boundary:

Police powers to investigate and file reports under Section 173 CrPC remain intact; and
Section 195 acts as a jurisdictional control on the court, not on the police, and only at the threshold of taking cognizance.

4.2.2 Earlier Authorities Briefly Noted

While the High Court does not detail each older precedent, their broad principles (as understood in criminal procedure jurisprudence) are:

Basir-Ul-Huq v. State of West Bengal: Recognises that Section 195 is to be strictly construed. It prevents a court from taking cognizance of certain offences on a police report, but does not necessarily bar investigation and also does not bar cognizance of distinct offences not covered by Section 195 even if they arise from the same facts.
Hemareddy v. State of Karnataka: Emphasises that if proceedings are initiated without complying with Section 195, the trial for the barred offences is void, but that does not automatically invalidate trial for other, independent offences.
Raj Singh v. State (Delhi Administration): Underscores that for offences covered under Section 195, the Magistrate must proceed on a proper complaint and cannot circumvent this by treating a police report as the foundational complaint for such specific offences.
M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka: Clarifies that Section 195 CrPC is a restriction on cognizance and does not impede registration of FIR or investigation; it is only when the court is called upon to take cognizance that compliance with Section 195 becomes crucial.

In Daljit Singh Grewal, these cases, via Devendra Kumar, directly influence the High Court’s dismissal of the plea to quash the FIR on the ground of alleged Section 195 non-compliance.

4.2.3 Petitioners’ Reliance on B.N. John v. State of U.P.

The petitioners relied on B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7. Though the High Court text does not analyse that decision in detail, it indicates that the legal position is “well settled” by the Supreme Court and has been revisited in Devendra Kumar. The implication appears to be that, whatever the precise content of B.N. John, the consolidated exposition in Devendra Kumar governs:

Section 195 is a bar on cognizance, not on investigation/FIR; and
Any procedural lapse under Section 195 must be tested at the stage of cognizance, not at FIR registration.

4.3 Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.3.1 On the Effect of the Inquiry Commission’s Report

The petitioners argued that the FIR had been found to be an instance of political vendetta by an Inquiry Commission headed by a retired High Court Judge, and that the police had accordingly filed a cancellation report. This, they contended, left no scope for revival of proceedings, particularly when the co-accused MLA (allegedly the main target) had been specifically recommended for exoneration.

The Court’s reasoning can be unpacked as follows:

Scope of the Commission’s recommendation: The Commission’s recommendation, as recorded, was that the FIR be cancelled only “qua Sh. Simarjeet Singh Bains”, because it was a “clear case of political vendetta” against him.
Excess of cancellation report: The investigating agency, however, went a step further and filed a cancellation report “against all the accused”, effectively extending the Commission’s recommendation beyond its actual terms.
Magistrate’s supervisory role: The Magistrate, examining the cancellation report and the material on record (including the complainant’s statement), declined to accept the blanket cancellation and ordered further investigation. This supervisory role of the Magistrate over police reports under Section 173 CrPC is consistent with settled law.
Non-binding nature of Commission’s findings: The High Court notes that the Commission’s recommendation was neither binding on the Magistrate nor did it compel acceptance of a cancellation report that went beyond the Commission’s limited scope.
Supplementary investigation cured the defect: After further investigation, the police placed the accused, including the petitioners and Bains, in Column No.3 of the supplementary challan, indicating that in their considered view there was sufficient material to proceed against them. The High Court sees no legal infirmity in this course.

The underlying principle is that a Commission of Inquiry is recommendatory, not adjudicatory. Its findings can be:

A relevant factor for the State and police in deciding whether to continue prosecution; and
Persuasive material that an accused might rely on in defence,

but it cannot override the statutory criminal process or the Magistrate’s independent assessment of evidence under the CrPC.

4.3.2 On Prima Facie Case and Limits of Section 482 CrPC

The High Court also underscored the limited scope of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, which is to be exercised sparingly and in the rarest of rare cases to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice.

Given the FIR’s details—alleged violation of prohibitory orders, use of a vehicle to endanger police personnel, scuffle with police, and instigation of the crowd by political leaders—the Court finds that:

There is material giving rise to a prima facie case, particularly under Section 353 IPC (assault or criminal force to deter a public servant).
It is neither appropriate nor permissible at the quashing stage to conduct a meticulous evaluation of the truth or sufficiency of this material; such an assessment is the province of the trial.

Thus, on a straightforward application of the principles laid down in cases such as State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, the Court concludes that the case does not fall into those limited categories where an FIR can be quashed at the threshold.

4.3.3 On Section 195 CrPC: Stage of Operation and Consequences

The most significant doctrinal ruling concerns the interpretation of Section 195 CrPC, raised as a bar to prosecution for offences under Sections 186, 332, 353 and 188 IPC.

The Court’s reasoning, aligned with Devendra Kumar, unfolds across several key propositions:

Textual bar is on taking cognizance: The opening words of Section 195—“No Court shall take cognizance…”— make it clear that the embargo is addressed to the court, not to the police. It restricts the court’s jurisdiction to take cognizance of specified offences (including Section 186 IPC) except on a written complaint by the concerned public servant or his superior.
Investigative process remains unaffected: There is “no bar against the registration of a criminal case or investigation by the police agency or submission of a report by the police upon completion of investigation” (para 51, as quoted). Thus, Section 195 does not preclude:
- lodging of an FIR,
- investigation by police, or
- submission of a charge-sheet/final report under Section 173 CrPC.
Mandatory nature and effect on trial: The Court acknowledges that provisions of Section 195 are “mandatory.” Non-compliance vitiates the prosecution and all consequential proceedings once the court has taken cognizance without the requisite complaint. A conviction in such circumstances is “void ab initio being without jurisdiction.”
Temporal element – when does the bar bite? The stage at which Section 195 comes into play is clarified: “the stage of the law, as aforementioned, is the time of taking cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate, and that stage has not reached as yet” in the present case. Accordingly, any challenge based on Section 195 is premature at the FIR/investigation stage.
Remedy preserved for trial stage: Recognising the mandatory nature of Section 195, the Court does not foreclose the petitioners’ right to challenge the proceedings on this ground. Instead, it holds that they may raise the plea before the trial court at the appropriate stage, where the Magistrate will have to test whether the procedural requirements of Section 195 (proper written complaint, etc.) are met before validly taking cognizance and proceeding to trial on such counts.

In essence, the Court draws a clear doctrinal line:

Section 482 CrPC is not a tool to pre-emptively enforce Section 195 CrPC at the FIR stage.
Instead, Section 195 CrPC is enforced at the cognizance stage by the trial court, and any violation then may vitiate subsequent proceedings or conviction.

4.4 Impact and Broader Significance

4.4.1 On the Use of Inquiry Commissions in Politically Charged Cases

The judgment has important ramifications for the interplay between Inquiry Commissions and the ordinary criminal process:

It underscores that Commissions of Inquiry—even when headed by retired High Court Judges— are fact-finding and recommendatory bodies. They do not displace the jurisdiction of criminal courts or the autonomy of police investigation.
Even where a Commission finds “political vendetta,” its recommendation must be read narrowly and in accordance with its precise scope. Here, the recommendation to cancel FIR No. 207 was specifically limited to MLA Simarjeet Singh Bains, and could not, by implication, be extended to exonerate all co-accused.
Magistrates retain their power and duty to independently assess cancellation reports; they may direct further investigation if not satisfied, irrespective of a Commission’s views.

For future cases, this reinforces the principle that extra-judicial inquiries and political determinations cannot short-circuit the statutory checks and balances under the CrPC. At most, they constitute additional material to be evaluated by the investigative and judicial authorities.

4.4.2 On Section 195 CrPC and FIR Quashing Jurisprudence

The decision significantly clarifies the tactical use of Section 195 CrPC in Section 482 CrPC quashing petitions:

Accused persons frequently invoke Section 195 to argue that since no written complaint by the concerned public servant was filed before the Magistrate, any prosecution for Section 186/188 IPC offences is void and should be quashed ab initio.
Daljit Singh Grewal firmly positions the bar of Section 195 as one that is inapplicable at the FIR/investigation stage. Courts entertaining quashing petitions must resist the invitation to treat Section 195 as a preliminary “shield” against investigation.
At the same time, the judgment preserves the substantive protection of Section 195 by confirming that when the matter reaches the stage of cognizance, the trial court must ensure strict compliance and can declare the proceedings void if the mandatory complaint requirement is bypassed.

This balanced approach:

Prevents a premature halt to investigations in cases involving obstruction or assault on public servants;
Yet safeguards accused persons at the adjudicatory stage, compelling the prosecution to adhere to procedural rigour under Section 195.

4.4.3 On Political Protests and Criminal Liability

On a broader plane, the judgment signals that:

Participation in protests—even in response to grave public grievances like sacrilege—does not immunise individuals, including elected representatives, from criminal liability if allegations of violence or obstruction of public servants are made out.
Conversely, allegations of political vendetta are taken seriously enough for Government to constitute Commissions and for courts to scrutinise their findings, but such allegations do not automatically mandate quashing of all related criminal proceedings.

The decision thus contributes to the jurisprudence on balancing political rights and protest with maintenance of public order and rule of law.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Quashing of FIR under Section 482 CrPC

Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to:

prevent abuse of the process of any court; and
secure the ends of justice.

“Quashing” an FIR means that the High Court terminates the criminal proceedings at the very outset, before trial, on grounds such as:

the FIR does not disclose any cognizable offence;
the allegations are inherently improbable or absurd;
the proceedings are clearly malicious or an abuse of process;
there is a legal bar (like limitation, statutory immunity, etc.).

However, as emphasised in Bhajan Lal and followed here, this power must be sparingly exercised, and factual disputes or contested evidence are not generally adjudicated at this stage.

5.2 Cancellation Report and Supplementary Charge-Sheet

A cancellation report is a final report filed by the police under Section 173(2) CrPC stating that, after investigation, no sufficient evidence is found to proceed against the accused (for example, because the case is false, baseless or untraced).
The Magistrate may:
- Accept the cancellation and close the case;
- Reject it and take cognizance;
- Direct further investigation.
A supplementary charge-sheet under Section 173(8) CrPC is filed when further investigation yields new or additional evidence. It supplements the earlier report and can add or delete accused, or refine charges.

In this case, a cancellation report was initially filed but not accepted; instead, the Magistrate ordered further investigation, leading to a supplementary challan.

5.3 Commission of Inquiry

A Commission of Inquiry (under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, or special orders) is a body set up by the Government to investigate matters of public importance. Key features:

It has no power to convict or acquit persons of criminal offences.
Its findings are recommendatory, not binding on courts or investigative agencies.
Its report may influence policy decisions or be used as material evidence in other proceedings, but cannot replace a criminal trial.

5.4 Section 195 CrPC – Complaint Requirement

Section 195 CrPC restricts courts from taking cognizance of certain offences except on a complaint in writing by a specified authority. Relevant here is Section 195(1)(a), which covers:

Offences under Section 186 IPC (obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions); and
Certain related offences.

To simplify:

A “complaint” under CrPC is a written allegation made to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action, by a person other than a police officer (Section 2(d) CrPC), unless expressly authorised.
A “police report” under Section 173(2) CrPC (like a charge-sheet) is not the same as a “complaint” required by Section 195.

Thus, for an offence under Section 186 IPC, the Magistrate can take cognizance only if a:

written complaint is filed by the public servant concerned (here, the ACP or another officer obstructed), or
by a public servant to whom that officer is administratively subordinate.

However, as this judgment clarifies, this requirement controls the Magistrate’s taking of cognizance, not the police’s power to register and investigate an FIR.

5.5 Cognizance – What Does It Mean?

“Taking cognizance” is a technical term under criminal procedure. A Magistrate is said to take cognizance of an offence when he:

applies his judicial mind to the facts of the case for the purpose of proceeding under the CrPC; and
does so with a view to issuing process (summons/warrants) against the accused or committing the case to a higher court.

Cognizance is different from:

registration of an FIR by the police;
conducting investigation; or
filing of a police report/charge-sheet.

Section 195’s bar is activated at the moment the Magistrate is called upon to take cognizance of the specified offences. If at that stage the necessary complaint is absent, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed on those offences.

5.6 Section 197 CrPC – Sanction for Prosecution of Public Servants

Although not elaborately discussed in the judgment, there are references to sanction under Section 197 CrPC, which requires prior sanction for prosecuting certain public servants for acts done in the discharge of official duty.

In this case, because some accused are public office-holders (MLA, municipal councillors), the police noted that sanction was sought from the competent authority before filing the supplementary challan. The High Court does not, however, adjudicate the validity or necessity of such sanction in detail in this order.

6. Conclusion

The decision in Daljit Singh Grewal @ Bhola v. State of Punjab is significant not because it breaks entirely new doctrinal ground, but because it reaffirms and applies key principles in a sensitive and politically charged context.

The main takeaways are:

Limited effect of Inquiry Commission reports: A Commission’s finding of political vendetta and its recommendation to cancel an FIR, even when headed by a retired High Court Judge, does not bind criminal courts. Its scope must be read as confined to the persons expressly mentioned (here, MLA Simarjeet Singh Bains), and Magistrates retain power to reject cancellation reports and direct further investigation.
Section 482 CrPC – Quashing standards remain high: Where an FIR discloses a prima facie case of offences such as assault/criminal force against public servants during a protest, the High Court will be reluctant to use its inherent powers to quash proceedings at the pre-trial stage.
Section 195 CrPC – Bar on cognizance, not on investigation: The judgment lucidly reiterates that Section 195 CrPC does not prevent the police from registering an FIR, investigating, or submitting a charge-sheet. It only bars the court from taking cognizance of certain offences (including Section 186 IPC) unless a written complaint is made by the concerned public servant or competent authority.
Timing of Section 195 objections: Challenges based on non-compliance with Section 195 are premature at the FIR stage. They must be raised—and will be adjudicated—when the trial court is called upon to take cognizance. If at that stage the statutory requirements are not met, the proceedings and any conviction for such offences would be void.

By disposing of the petition while preserving the petitioners’ right to raise Section 195-based objections before the trial court, the High Court strikes a balance:

It protects the integrity of police investigation and avoids premature foreclosure of criminal process in potentially serious offences; and
It upholds the mandatory procedural safeguards built into the CrPC, particularly the jurisdictional bar under Section 195.

In the broader legal landscape, this decision will serve as a useful precedent for:

Courts confronted with petitions to quash FIRs on Section 195 grounds; and
Cases where Inquiry Commissions’ findings are invoked to shut down or curtail ongoing criminal proceedings.

Ultimately, Daljit Singh Grewal reinforces a core structural message of the CrPC: investigation, cognizance and trial are distinct stages, each governed by its own rules and safeguards. Section 195 protects the last of these stages, but cannot be used to extinguish the first.