Sanction Mandate Under Section 197 CrPC: A New Judicial Clarification

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in SUNEETI TOTEJA v. STATE OF U.P. (2025 INSC 267) addresses a crucial legal question concerning the requirement of sanction before prosecuting a public servant under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

The appellant, an employee of the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS), was summoned to face criminal charges allegedly committed while discharging her official duties at the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) on deputation. The case was initiated by the complainant who had filed a First Information Report (FIR) against other persons for sexual harassment and other alleged offenses. Although the FIR did not name the appellant originally, she was brought into the proceedings later. The significant legal controversy concerned whether the Magistrate could take cognizance of the charges without obtaining the requisite sanction to prosecute a public servant.

The decision has broad ramifications for the principle of “sanction” under Section 197 CrPC, the concept of “deemed sanction” advanced by some respondents, and the protection accorded to public servants performing official duties. This commentary will break down the facts, judicial findings, legal reasoning, precedents, and the prospective impact of the judgment.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court quashed the chargesheet and summoning order against the appellant, ultimately concluding that proper sanction under Section 197 CrPC was required—and was never validly granted—before the courts could take cognizance. Specifically, the Court found:

• The appellant, a permanent employee of BIS on deputation to FSSAI, was acting in her official capacity as Presiding Officer of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC).
• The basis of the charges against her was primarily the filing of a counter affidavit and alleged statements made to the complainant. All of these were connected to her official functions.
• Under Section 197 CrPC, a court cannot take cognizance of offenses alleged to have been committed by a public servant in the discharge of official duty without obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority.
• The competent authority—BIS—had expressly refused sanction for prosecution after examining relevant documents. Therefore, the Magistrate’s cognizance and issuance of summons to the appellant were deemed invalid and contrary to law.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

In arriving at the conclusion, the Supreme Court discussed several notable decisions that define the boundaries and requirements of sanction under Section 197 CrPC:

1. Vineet Narain v. Union of India (AIR 1998 SC 889): The State and the complainant invoked this case to argue that a failure to grant sanction within a certain time automatically results in “deemed sanction.” However, the Supreme Court clarified that Vineet Narain dealt with corruption cases under different statutory frameworks and did not create a principle of “deemed sanction” for Section 197 CrPC.
2. Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh (2012) 3 SCC 64: This case likewise addressed corruption issues under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and included observations about suggested timelines for granting or refusing sanction. The Supreme Court noted that Parliament has not enacted any statutory provision permitting “deemed sanction” in the context of Section 197 CrPC.
3. Amrik Singh v. State of PEPSU (AIR 1955 SC 309): The Court reiterated that sanction is required only if the alleged offense is committed while acting or purporting to act in an official capacity. Where a public servant’s conduct is reasonably connected with official functions, prior sanction is a condition precedent for prosecuting him or her.
4. Amod Kumar Kanth v. Association of Victim of Uphaar Tragedy (2023 SCC Online SC 578): The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Section 197 CrPC protects officers acting in furtherance of official duty, urging courts to carefully assess whether the individual was indeed carrying out official duties before taking cognizance.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The crux of the Supreme Court’s legal reasoning revolved around:

• Scope of Official Duty: The Court emphasized that if an act is reasonably connected with a public servant’s official duty, sanction from the relevant authority is mandatory. In this case, the appellant’s involvement in filing affidavits and handling disciplinary proceedings clearly fell within her scope of duty as Presiding Officer for the ICC at FSSAI.
• Requirement of Prior Sanction: Section 197 CrPC explicitly requires prior sanction for offenses alleged to have been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duties. Since the Magistrate had proceeded without sanction from BIS (the appellant’s parent organization), the Court deemed the proceedings void.
  Moreover, the Court definitively rejected the notion that a lack of timely response from the competent authority translates into “deemed sanction” under Section 197 CrPC. It clarified that neither Vineet Narain nor Subramanian Swamy overrides the express wording of the statute.
• Findings on Facts: The accusations against the appellant were tied to her official actions in filing a counter affidavit (initially on behalf of FSSAI and the complainant) and allegedly pressuring the complainant during official interactions. Even if those allegations were to be tested, the threshold question remained: were these official acts requiring sanction? The Court deemed them to be so.
• Refusal of Sanction: BIS explicitly denied sanction for prosecution upon receiving the relevant FIR and chargesheet. This denial—once validly communicated—bars the court from prosecuting the appellant for any offense connected with her official duty.

3.3 Impact

The judgment has far-reaching consequences concerning the prosecution of public servants:

• Clarity on “Deemed Sanction”: By rejecting the argument that silence or delay automatically implies “deemed sanction,” the Court preserves a strict reading of Section 197 CrPC. Future litigants and investigating agencies must secure explicit sanction before proceeding against a public servant acting in an official capacity.
• Heightened Diligence in Investigation: Police and prosecuting authorities must ensure correct and timely communication with the appropriate sanctioning body. Where multiple bodies are involved (as in the case of a deputation), investigating officers must carefully notify the specific department actually empowered to grant or deny sanction.
• Protection of Public Servants: This ruling serves as an affirmation that Section 197 CrPC is intended to protect honest officials from frivolous or unjustified prosecution for acts undertaken within the legitimate scope of their duties. However, it does not grant blanket immunity for malafide acts outside official functions.
• Guidance for Courts: Courts at all levels are reminded to ascertain the necessity of sanction before taking cognizance of a criminal complaint against a public servant. If the alleged act appears connected with official duty, the judiciary must pause until the statutory requirement of sanction is satisfied.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Sanction Under Section 197 CrPC: This is an authorization that a government department or competent authority must give before a court can take action against a public official for alleged crimes connected to that official’s duties. The rationale is to protect officials who perform public tasks from burdensome legal proceedings based solely on accusations.

Internal Complaints Committee (ICC): Under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, every organization must constitute such a committee to inquire into complaints of sexual harassment. The appellant served as the Presiding Officer of this committee, meaning she chaired the body tasked with investigating harassment complaints within the FSSAI.

Deputation: When a government employee (the “deputy”) is temporarily assigned official duties in a different department or organization while retaining the nominal employment with the original department.

“Deemed Sanction” Argument: This was the claim that if the competent authority fails to respond within a certain time window, sanction for prosecution would be presumed automatically. The Supreme Court refuted the existence of any statutory basis for this concept under Section 197 CrPC.

5. Conclusion

The SUNEETI TOTEJA v. STATE OF U.P. decision underscores the strict requirements of Section 197 CrPC. It clarifies that Indian law does not permit a “deemed sanction” scenario absent explicit statutory authority. Courts must ensure that a competent authority explicitly grants or denies sanction before proceeding on charges against any public servant allegedly acting in the course of duty. In this case, the Supreme Court quashed proceedings against the appellant since BIS, found to be the appropriate sanctioning body, had formally refused to grant sanction upon reviewing the allegations.

This authoritative ruling reaffirms legislative intent that public servants, acting lawfully in administrative or executive capacities, deserve protection from criminal litigation unless procedural safeguards—especially sanction—have been clearly observed. The judgment thus serves as a significant precedent on maintaining the balance between shielding public officials from frivolous litigation and ensuring accountability when misconduct is genuinely outside the scope of official duty.