Rule 21 confined to merit-list preparation: Vocational-subject marks count toward eligibility; termination on a new ground without fresh notice violates natural justice

Introduction

This reportable judgment resolves two recurring issues in public recruitment to elementary teaching posts in Jharkhand: how to compute the intermediate (Class XII) percentage for eligibility, and when administrative authorities must issue a fresh show-cause notice before terminating a public servant.

The appellants—appointed as Intermediate Trained Teachers (Classes I–V) against Advertisement No. 10/2015 by the District Education Superintendent, Dhanbad—were terminated in October 2016 on two grounds: (i) that their graduation certificates were invalid, and (ii) that they had not secured the minimum intermediate percentage required for eligibility (40% for Scheduled Tribe candidates). A central controversy was whether “vocational subject” marks endorsed on the reverse of the mark-sheet could be considered to compute the overall percentage for eligibility. A Single Judge quashed the terminations; a Division Bench reversed. The Supreme Court restores the Single Judge’s ultimate conclusion (while refining the reasoning), clarifying the correct legal position and granting consequential relief.

Summary of the Judgment

• Rule 21 of the Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 (“2012 Rules”) applies only to merit-list preparation for appointment. It cannot be used to determine minimum educational eligibility to appear in the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET), which is governed by Rule 4.
• Vocational-subject marks (as per the examination board’s mark-sheet instructions) are includible to compute the intermediate percentage for eligibility under Rule 4, in the absence of any statutory bar. The Department’s exclusion of such marks conflated the distinct regimes of eligibility and appointment.
• Natural justice was violated. The termination orders rested on a ground (failure to secure 40% after excluding vocational marks) that was not put in the show-cause notices (which alleged shortfall against 45%). Having changed the basis, the Department was bound to issue a fresh notice; its failure vitiates the termination.
• Validity of degrees from Hindi Vidyapeeth, Deoghar: In light of the Jharkhand High Court’s decision in Vijoy Kumar (10 May 2022) and a subsequent State policy letter (15 June 2023), degrees awarded prior to 26 February 2015 are valid. That ground of termination therefore collapses.
• Relief:
  • For Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom: continuity of service from initial appointment in December 2015, with full arrears and seniority; however, non-working period will not count toward “experience” for promotion.
  • For Surendra Munda (deceased): termination quashed; his heirs receive full arrears from termination till death and are entitled to be considered under any “died-in-harness” compassionate appointment scheme.

Detailed Analysis

I. Statutory Framework and Issues

The 2012 Rules, framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, contain a two-chapter architecture:

• Chapter 2 (Rule 4): Prescribes eligibility to appear in the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET), including minimum educational qualifications and the relaxation of 5% for SC/ST/Persons with Disabilities (reducing the 45% threshold to 40% for the relevant pathway).
• Chapter 3 (Rule 21): Prescribes the method for preparing the merit list for appointment, including how to compute “educational merit points” and the treatment of marks in “additional subjects” (excluded for the educational merit point computation).

Central questions before the Court:

1. Is Rule 21’s exclusion of “additional subject” marks relevant to assessing basic eligibility under Rule 4? If not, how is the intermediate percentage to be computed?
2. Did the Department violate natural justice by terminating services on a ground not contained in the original show-cause notices?
3. What relief is warranted, in light of subsequent developments (recognition of Hindi Vidyapeeth degrees; fresh appointments; death of one appellant)?

II. Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division (2004) 4 SCC 281: Cited by the Division Bench to invoke the “no prejudice/useless formality” exception to natural justice. The Supreme Court holds this reliance to be misplaced because, once Rule 21 is correctly confined to merit-list preparation, the factual and legal basis for bypassing natural justice disappears; a fresh notice could have altered the outcome by allowing the appellants to demonstrate the propriety of including vocational marks.
• Vijoy Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, Jharkhand High Court (10 May 2022): Settled that degrees awarded by Hindi Vidyapeeth, Deoghar, prior to 26 February 2015 are valid. The State formalised this via letter No. 15/Policy Ni.-07-03/2022 Ka.-3475 dated 15 June 2023. The Supreme Court notes this to neutralise the degree-validity ground of termination.

III. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Distinct Domains: Rule 4 (Eligibility/TET) versus Rule 21 (Merit List/Appointment)

• Rule 4 controls who may appear for the TET. It does not exclude marks in vocational subjects. Eligibility for TET is a threshold question and must be assessed on the candidate’s educational record as computed by the examining authority unless a statute provides otherwise.
• Rule 21 controls how to rank eligible candidates for appointment. Its exclusion of “additional subject” marks applies to the computation of “educational merit points” for merit-list preparation, not to determining whether a candidate is eligible in the first place to sit for the TET or to be considered for appointment.
• Error corrected: The Department and the Division Bench erroneously transplanted Rule 21’s exclusionary formula into the eligibility terrain, thereby distorting the statutory scheme’s two-stage design.

2. How to Compute Intermediate Percentage for Eligibility

• The appellants’ mark-sheets contained express instructions that bonus marks in the vocational subject (i.e., marks in excess of the pass mark, theory and practical taken together) “will be added in aggregate to improve [the] result and determine division,” provided both theory and practical were taken.
• Absent any statutory prohibition, the Board’s prescribed method of result computation governs. The Court holds that vocational-subject bonus marks must be added to the aggregate for computing the overall intermediate percentage for eligibility under Rule 4.
• Illustration (Prem Lal/Premlal Hembrom): Excluding vocational marks, his aggregate was 358/900 (~39.77%). Adding the 4 vocational bonus marks (39 secured against a 35 pass mark) raises the aggregate to 362/900 (~40.22%), clearing the 40% eligibility threshold for ST candidates.

3. Natural Justice: Fresh Notice Required When Basis Changes

• The show-cause notices alleged failure to meet a 45% benchmark (without reference to vocational-mark exclusion) and questioned graduation certificates. The appellants’ replies cogently demonstrated that, as ST candidates, they needed 40%, not 45%, and that their graduation certificates were irrelevant for Class I–V posts.
• Termination shifted the goalposts by newly computing the percentage after excluding vocational marks—an allegation never put to the appellants. This violated audi alteram partem because the appellants were not afforded an opportunity to meet the altered case against them.
• Escorts Farms distinguished: This was not a case where facts were undisputed or where a fresh notice would be a useless formality. A fresh notice could have led to a different decision, particularly because the Department’s exclusion relied on a misapplication of Rule 21.

4. Validity of Hindi Vidyapeeth Degrees

• Given the High Court’s pronouncement and the State’s policy letter, degrees awarded prior to 26 February 2015 are valid. The Court notes that the appellants’ degrees pre-date this cut-off. In any case, a graduation degree was not a requirement for Class I–V appointment; the issue was ancillary.

IV. Relief and Remedial Architecture

• Quashing of termination orders and setting aside Division Bench judgments.
• Continuity of service for Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom from the original appointment dates (December 2015) “as if their services were never terminated,” with:
  • Full arrears of pay and seniority from initial appointment; arrears to be released within three months.
  • Experience exclusion: The non-working period will not count toward the experience criterion for promotion, recognising that experience accrues through actual teaching.
• For the deceased appellant, Surendra Munda:
  • Termination order set aside; heirs entitled to full arrears from termination till death, disbursable within three months upon verification.
  • He is deemed to have died-in-harness, with liberty to his heirs to seek compassionate appointment where a scheme exists; the Department must consider any application on its own merits.

Impact and Implications

• Clear demarcation of statutory domains: The Court’s ratio ring-fences eligibility (Rule 4) from merit-list preparation (Rule 21). Administrations cannot conflate these stages or import merit-list formulas into eligibility assessments.
• Board result-computation prevails for eligibility: Where the examination authority prescribes how aggregates/divisions are computed (e.g., vocational bonus marks), that method governs eligibility percentage absent a contrary statutory directive. This has practical significance for candidates who opt for vocational subjects to improve aggregate scores.
• Natural justice reaffirmed and refined: If the State shifts its grounds—from “45% deficiency” to “below 40% by excluding vocational marks,” for instance—a fresh show-cause notice is mandatory. The “useless formality” exception is narrow and inapplicable where the factual or legal premise is contestable.
• Administrative guidance for recruitments:
  • Adopt a two-stage scrutiny: (1) eligibility under Rule 4 (using Board-prescribed computation), and (2) merit-list preparation under Rule 21 (excluding “additional subject” marks only for educational merit points).
  • Ensure show-cause notices exhaustively set out the exact grounds and computation method proposed; any material variation requires a fresh notice.
  • Align practice with subsequently clarified degree-validity policies (e.g., Hindi Vidyapeeth pre–26 Feb 2015).
• Remedial template: The grant of full arrears with continuity, while carving out experience credit for time not worked, may guide future relief crafting in illegal termination cases—balancing compensation with the realities of on-the-job experience.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Teacher Eligibility Test (TET): A qualifying examination establishing a candidate’s threshold eligibility for consideration as a teacher; passing TET does not by itself confer a right to appointment.
• Eligibility vs Merit List: Eligibility is the baseline qualification to enter the selection pool; the merit list ranks eligible candidates for appointment. The former is governed by Rule 4; the latter by Rule 21.
• Vocational Subject Bonus Marks: Where the Board’s mark-sheet states that marks above the pass threshold in a vocational subject (theory and practical combined) are added to the aggregate to determine result/division, those extra marks are included in aggregate percentage computation.
• “Additional Subject” under Rule 21: For the limited purpose of computing “educational merit points” when preparing the merit list, marks in an “additional subject” are excluded. This exclusion does not extend to eligibility computations under Rule 4.
• Letters Patent Appeal (LPA): An intra-court appeal from a Single Judge to a Division Bench within the same High Court.
• Article 309 Rules: Service rules framed by the Governor under the proviso to Article 309 have statutory force and govern recruitment and service conditions.
• Principles of Natural Justice: Core procedural fairness norms—especially the right to prior notice of the case to be met and an opportunity to respond—are breached when termination relies on a new unstated ground without a fresh notice.
• Died-in-Harness and Compassionate Appointment: A policy mechanism allowing dependents of an employee who dies while in service to be considered for appointment to alleviate immediate hardship.

Why the Division Bench Erred

• Misapplication of Rule 21: It imported a merit-list exclusion (additional subject marks not counted) into the eligibility inquiry, contrary to the text, structure, and placement of the rules (Rule 4 in Chapter 2; Rule 21 in Chapter 3).
• Overbroad reliance on Escorts Farms: The “no prejudice” exception cannot justify skipping a fresh notice when the dispositive fact (how to compute percentage) is debatable and outcome-affecting.

Practical Guidance

• For Departments/Recruiting Authorities:
  • At the eligibility stage, compute the aggregate percentage strictly per the examining board’s instructions (e.g., vocational bonus marks), unless a statutory rule expressly provides otherwise.
  • Use Rule 21’s exclusion of additional-subject marks only when calculating educational merit points for the merit list—not at eligibility screening.
  • If, after receiving a reply to a show cause, you intend to rely on a materially different ground or computation method, issue a fresh show-cause notice.
  • When prior litigation clarifies degree validity (e.g., Hindi Vidyapeeth pre–26.02.2015), align actions accordingly to avoid needless disputes.
• For Candidates/Counsel:
  • Preserve mark-sheet instructions and board regulations; they can decisively govern eligibility computations.
  • Insist on strict compliance with natural justice when grounds of action mutate between show-cause and final orders.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in 2025 INSC 1212 lays down two important propositions with systemic consequences for public recruitment in Jharkhand (and persuasive value elsewhere):

1. Rule 21 of the 2012 Rules is confined to merit-list preparation. Eligibility to sit the TET and to be considered for appointment is governed by Rule 4; in computing the intermediate percentage for eligibility, the examination board’s method (including vocational bonus marks) must be applied unless a statute dictates otherwise.
2. Fresh notice is indispensable when the basis of termination shifts. Terminating an employee on a new ground not contained in the show-cause notice violates natural justice; the “useless formality” exception does not apply where the dispute is material and potentially outcome-determinative.

By restoring the primacy of the statutory scheme’s two-stage design and by robustly enforcing procedural fairness, the Court not only corrects the appellants’ individual injustice but also sets a clear operational template for future recruitments. The tailored relief—continuity with full arrears yet excluding non-working time from experience for promotion—balances compensation with service realities, and the humane directions for the deceased appellant’s heirs underscore the Court’s equitable oversight. This judgment will likely influence how educational boards’ result-computation interacts with service eligibility and how departments structure and prosecute disciplinary or termination actions going forward.