Re‑affirming the Limits of High‑Court Review Under Section 100 CPC and the Post‑Partition Status of Hindu Coparcenary Property

Commentary on Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar & Ors. (2025 INSC 532)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar revisits two perennial themes in Indian civil jurisprudence: the scope of High‑Court interference in second appeals under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), and the demarcation between self‑acquired and ancestral/coparcenary property in Hindu law after a partition.

The litigation began with a suit for partition filed by the respondents (plaintiffs) – the children of Defendant No. 1 – challenging the alienation of agricultural land (Sy. No. 93, 7 acres 20 guntas) to the appellant (Defendant No. 2). The principal controversy was whether the land was:

• self‑acquired property of Defendant No. 1 (thereby freely alienable), or
• ancestral/coparcenary property (thereby requiring the consent of the plaintiffs–coparceners).

The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs; the first appellate court reversed that decree; the High Court, in second appeal, re‑decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court has now set aside the High Court’s judgment and restored the first appellate decree, holding the land to be self‑acquired property and re‑emphasising the narrow compass of Section 100 CPC.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. The Supreme Court ruled that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC by re‑appreciating facts without a legitimate substantial question of law.
2. On merits, it held that:
   • The suit land, though originally a joint‑family asset allotted to C. Thippeswamy in a 1986 partition, became the self‑acquired property of Defendant No. 1 when he purchased it by a registered sale deed dated 16‑10‑1989 using his own funds and a contemporaneous loan.
   • No proof existed that the purchase money came from a joint‑family nucleus capable of purchasing the land.
   • The principles of blending or automatic revival of coparcenary rights were inapplicable in the absence of unequivocal intention or supporting evidence.
   • The plaintiffs failed to seek cancellation of the 1993 sale deed to the appellant, an omission that further weakened their claim.
3. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High‑Court judgment set aside, and the first appellate decree (dismissing the suit) was restored.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Jaichand (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3864 – Re‑states the boundaries of Section 100 CPC; relied upon to fault the High Court for treating questions of fact as substantial questions of law.
• Gurnam Singh v. Lehna Singh (2019) 7 SCC 641 – Cited on the same point: fact‑finding is not permissible in second appeal.
• Murugan v. Kesava Gounder (2019) 20 SCC 633 – Clarifies that a plaintiff seeking partition must specifically pray for cancellation of alienations adverse to the estate.
• Mallesappa v. Desai Mallappa (1961) 3 SCR 779 & Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddi (1964) 2 SCR 172 – Leading authorities on blending; used to show that voluntary intention, not mere permissive use, is required to convert separate property into joint‑family property.
• Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar (1987) 1 SCC 204 – Cited by respondents but distinguished; it concerns the ancestral nature of property devolving by succession, not property re‑purchased after partition.
• Govindbhai Patel (2020) 16 SCC 255, Rohit Chauhan (2013) 9 SCC 419, R. Deivanai Ammal (Mad HC 2004), and other cases were marshalled by the Court to articulate the “nucleus” doctrine and the post‑partition character of property.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdictional Fetters Under Section 100 CPC
   The Court underscored that High‑Court interference is triggered only when:
   • a substantial question of law is properly framed; and
   • the impugned finding is vitiated by ignoring evidence, applying wrong legal principles, or being based on no evidence.
   The High Court, however, merely re‑assessed evidence to reach a different conclusion, which is impermissible.
2. Lack of Presumption of Joint‑Family Property Post‑Partition
   Once partition occurs, each sharer’s allotment is his separate property unless the opposing party proves: (a) existence of a joint‑family nucleus of sufficient worth; and (b) nexus between that nucleus and the subsequent acquisition.
3. Failure to Prove Nucleus
   Plaintiffs’ allegations of (i) Rs 10,000 cash from partition, (ii) help from grandmother, and (iii) income from other lands were unsupported by recitals, accounts, or oral evidence capable of belief. By contrast, defendants produced witnesses (DW‑1 to DW‑4) and documentary evidence showing purchase via personal funds and a loan (later cleared by selling another parcel).
4. Inapplicability of the Doctrine of Blending
   Mere co‑habitation or family usage does not impress separate property with the character of joint‑family property; the owner’s clear intention to surrender dominion is indispensable.
5. Procedural Lapse by Plaintiffs
   They sought partition without praying for cancellation of the 1993 sale deed. Relying on Murugan, the Court treated this omission as fatal.

C. Potential Impact of the Judgment

1. Second‑Appeal Litigation – Reinforces that litigants cannot expect the High Court to re‑open factual matrices; appellate lawyers must now craft bona‑fide, well‑articulated substantial‑question‑of‑law pleadings or risk dismissal.
2. Hindu Joint‑Family Property Transactions – Purchasers dealing with a family member post‑partition may rely on this decision to defend titles, provided they can demonstrate separate funding.
3. Drafting of Partition Suits – Plaintiffs will be cautious to include reliefs for cancellation of adverse alienations.
4. Clarificatory Value – The judgment collates and re‑affirms scattered precedents on:
   • the “nucleus” test,
   • post‑partition property status,
   • the difference between mere ancestral origin and ancestral character vis‑à‑vis descendants, and
   • requirements of the doctrine of blending.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantial Question of Law (S.100 CPC) – A question that (i) directly affects parties’ rights, (ii) is not settled by binding precedent, or (iii) involves application of settled law wrongly. Pure questions of fact do not qualify.
• Ancestral Property – Property inherited from one’s father, grandfather or great‑grandfather; sons, grandsons and great‑grandsons acquire an interest at birth.
• Coparcenary – A sub‑set of the joint family comprising persons who acquire an interest by birth and can demand partition.
• Self‑Acquired Property – Property obtained (a) by individual’s own earnings, (b) through partition allotment, or (c) by gift/will, over which he enjoys absolute control.
• Nucleus Doctrine – When a joint family possesses assets of sufficient value to purchase new property, a presumption can arise that later acquisitions are also family property if the claimant establishes both existence and adequacy of that nucleus.
• Blending – Voluntary and unequivocal intention of a coparcener to waive separate rights and merge his self‑acquired asset into the joint‑family estate.

V. Conclusion

Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar is significant for two reasons. First, it delivers yet another clear admonition to High Courts that Section 100 CPC is not an invitation to re‑litigate facts; only genuine, framed substantial questions of law justify interference. Second, it clarifies that property re‑purchased by a coparcener after a duly effected partition remains his separate property unless strong evidence establishes a joint‑family nucleus or an act of blending. The judgment therefore strengthens certainty in property transactions and offers invaluable guidance to litigants, trial courts, and appellate courts alike.