Revisional Restraint under BNSS, 2023 in Section 125 Maintenance: Madras High Court Affirms Award and Reiterates Familial Duty to Maintain Wife/Mother

Introduction

This commentary examines the decision of the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court in R. Ananda Prakash v. A. Malarvizhi (Crl.R.C.(MD) No. 1282 of 2025, decided on 23 September 2025 by Justice Shamim Ahmed). The petitioners—husband (1st petitioner) and two adult sons (2nd and 3rd petitioners)—invoked the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), Sections 438 read with 442, to challenge an order of the Family Court, Madurai in M.C. No. 64 of 2019. The Family Court had awarded monthly maintenance of Rs. 21,000 to the respondent-wife under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.).

The petitioners contended that the respondent had deserted the matrimonial home in 2015, delayed approaching the court until 2019, and possessed sufficient means (including maintaining a car and driver). They also emphasized the husband’s age and ill-health and the sons’ modest incomes. The Family Court had partly allowed the respondent’s composite petition (which also sought recovery of jewelry and money), granting only maintenance. The High Court dismissed the revision at the admission stage, dispensing with notice to the respondent, and upheld the maintenance award.

This decision reiterates two central themes: (a) the narrow compass of revisional interference under BNSS in maintenance orders, and (b) the enduring social-legal duty of a husband—and, in the larger familial context, of adult children—to ensure that the wife/mother is not left destitute. The ruling also implicitly acknowledges the continuity of maintenance jurisprudence from Section 125 Cr.P.C. to the analogous provision in BNSS, while applying established principles to modern cost-of-living realities.

Summary of the Judgment

• The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision at the admission stage, finding no illegality, impropriety, or incorrectness in the Family Court’s order that would warrant interference under the BNSS revisional provisions.
• The Court emphasized that maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a beneficial, social-welfare oriented remedy intended to prevent destitution and vagrancy of wives and mothers.
• On quantum, the Court held that Rs. 21,000 per month cannot be considered excessive in the backdrop of rising prices and higher cost of living.
• The Court underscored the husband’s and adult sons’ moral and legal obligations to maintain the wife/mother, highlighting familial responsibility and societal values.
• Arguments that the respondent-wife had deserted the matrimonial home, delayed filing, and had “sufficient means” (car and driver) did not sufficiently establish any perversity or legal error in the Family Court’s assessment.
• Notice to the respondent was dispensed with as the revision was dismissed at admission; the Family Court was directed to proceed in accordance with law.

Analysis

1) Procedural Setting and Issues

The petitioners approached the High Court in revision under Sections 438 read with 442 of BNSS, 2023, challenging a Family Court order awarding Rs. 21,000 monthly maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The principal issues were:

• Scope of the High Court’s revisional interference over maintenance orders, particularly post-BNSS, 2023.
• Whether the Family Court erred in granting maintenance in light of petitioner’s pleas of desertion (Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.), the wife’s alleged financial means, and the husband’s age/health and sons’ financial constraints.
• Whether the quantum awarded was excessive or disproportionate.

2) Precedents Cited

The judgment does not expressly cite case law. However, its reasoning aligns closely with settled Supreme Court jurisprudence on maintenance and revisional scope. The following authorities illuminate the legal backdrop against which the Court’s conclusions sit:

• Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai (2008) 2 SCC 316:
  The Supreme Court characterized Section 125 Cr.P.C. as a measure of social justice, emphasizing that “sufficient means” includes earning capacity, and that “unable to maintain herself” should not be construed pedantically. The present judgment’s acknowledgment of the beneficial nature of maintenance mirrors Chaturbhuj’s ethos.
• Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena (2015) 6 SCC 353:
  Reiterated that Section 125 is to be interpreted purposively to prevent destitution of women and to ensure prompt relief. The High Court’s deference to the Family Court’s factual evaluation and its insistence on maintenance consonant with dignity echo this approach.
• Rajnesh v. Neha (2020) 12 SCC 415 (citation formats vary):
  Laid down guidelines for determining maintenance (including affidavits of disclosure, factors for quantum, and grant from the date of application). While not directly referenced, the quantum-sensitivity of the present decision—framed in the context of cost-of-living—resonates with Rajnesh’s insistence on realistic awards.
• Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan (2015) 5 SCC 705:
  Cautioned courts against awarding meagre maintenance that reduces relief to a pittance; underscored that maintenance should ensure a life of dignity. The High Court’s observation that Rs. 21,000 is not excessive reflects this jurisprudence.
• Shailja & Anr. v. Khobbanna (2018) 12 SCC 199:
  The mere ability to earn is not a ground to deny maintenance; courts must assess whether the wife can actually maintain herself in a manner commensurate with marital status. The petitioners’ claim that the wife has “means” because she uses a car and driver seems insufficient on this standard, absent proof of independent, adequate income.
• State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri (1999) 2 SCC 452:
  On revisional scope under the Cr.P.C., the Supreme Court held that revisional jurisdiction is narrow, meant to correct glaring illegalities or jurisdictional errors. This principle continues to guide revisional scrutiny post-BNSS; the High Court’s refusal to reappreciate facts aligns with this restraint.
• Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat (1996) 4 SCC 479:
  Clarified the ambit of a “mother” seeking maintenance under Section 125 (including stepmother nuances). Although the respondent here sought maintenance as a “wife,” the High Court’s remarks about adult sons’ obligations broadly align with the law that a mother can independently claim maintenance from her children.

Note: These authorities are not cited in the judgment but are instructive in understanding the principles the Court applied.

3) Legal Reasoning

• Narrow revisional remit under BNSS:
  The Court framed its scrutiny by asking whether there was any “illegality, impropriety or incorrectness” in the impugned order. Finding none, it declined to interfere. This is consistent with classical revisional standards: the High Court does not sit as a court of appeal to reweigh evidence or recalibrate quantum unless there is patent perversity, jurisdictional error, or violation of legal principles.
• Beneficial nature of Section 125 proceedings:
  The Court’s reiteration that Section 125 is a beneficial provision designed to prevent vagrancy and destitution is central. This animating purpose shapes both entitlement and quantum. It informs why arguable factual disputes (e.g., alleged desertion or supposed means) must be backed by credible proof before they can displace maintenance.
• Desertion and Section 125(4):
  The petitioners alleged the wife “deserted” in 2015 and therefore was disentitled. Section 125(4) denies maintenance where the wife, without sufficient reason, refuses to live with her husband (or is living in adultery). The High Court’s refusal to interfere indicates that, on the Family Court’s assessment, either desertion was not established or the wife had “sufficient reason” to reside separately. In revision, absent demonstrable legal or perversity errors, such factual conclusions stand.
• Wife’s alleged means:
  The petitioners urged that the wife has “sufficient means” given her car and driver. As the Supreme Court has clarified, occasional assets or lifestyle markers do not, by themselves, demonstrate steady, sufficient, independent income. What matters is whether the wife can actually maintain herself commensurate with her prior standard of living and the husband’s means. The High Court, noting the general rise in living costs, implicitly found no error in the Family Court’s conclusion that the respondent needed maintenance.
• Husband’s age and ill-health; sons’ incomes:
  While sympathetic considerations, age/illness of the husband or tight finances of adult children do not, without more, negate the statutory obligation to maintain. Section 125 focuses on whether the person from whom maintenance is sought has “sufficient means” and has “neglected or refused” to maintain. The husband’s obligation remains primary in a wife’s claim; the Court’s broader remarks about sons emphasize a concomitant familial duty to support their mother, especially in her old age.
• Quantum and cost-of-living:
  The Court held Rs. 21,000 per month is not excessive given inflation and contemporary living costs. This recognizes that “reasonable” maintenance must be realistic, not tokenistic, and must secure dignity rather than mere survival.
• Procedural posture—ex parte dismissal at admission:
  The High Court dispensed with notice to the respondent because it found the revision meritless and dismissed it at admission. Since the result favored the respondent (i.e., her maintenance order was upheld), the Court could dispose of the matter without delaying relief through additional procedural steps.
• Continuity under BNSS:
  Although the Family Court order arose under Section 125 Cr.P.C., the revision was brought under BNSS, 2023. The Court’s approach reflects continuity of substantive rights and standards across the transition, consistent with the saving provisions and the parallel nature of maintenance remedies.

4) Impact and Prospective Significance

• Reinforcement of revisional restraint:
  Parties seeking to overturn maintenance awards via BNSS revisional jurisdiction must show clear legal error, jurisdictional defect, or perversity. Mere disagreement with quantum or a rehash of factual pleas (desertion, supposed means) is unlikely to suffice.
• Realistic quantum in a high-inflation context:
  The Court’s acceptance of Rs. 21,000 as reasonable underscores a trend toward maintenance awards that reflect actual living costs and dignity. Family Courts may cite this stance when faced with “excessiveness” objections untethered to concrete evidence.
• Clarification on “means” and “inability to maintain”:
  Vague assertions about a wife’s assets or lifestyle are inadequate to defeat maintenance. Concrete proof of independent, adequate income is necessary. Conversely, husbands must candidly disclose income and assets; non-disclosure often prompts courts to infer sufficient means.
• Familial duty of adult children:
  Though a wife’s maintenance claim lies primarily against the husband under Section 125, the Court’s broader observation reiterates that a mother has an independent statutory right to claim maintenance from her children. The moral dimension emphasized here may influence conciliatory resolutions and family-led compliance.
• Streamlined handling of meritless revisions:
  Dismissing meritless revisions at the admission stage—especially where it preserves subsisting relief—promotes judicial economy and prevents dilatory tactics in maintenance matters that directly affect basic subsistence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Section 125 Cr.P.C. (now broadly mirrored in BNSS):
  A quick, summary remedy to prevent destitution by ensuring basic maintenance for wives, children, and parents from those who have sufficient means but neglect or refuse to maintain them. It does not decide all matrimonial property issues; it focuses on subsistence.
• “Beneficial legislation”:
  Laws designed to protect vulnerable persons and secure social justice. Courts interpret such provisions broadly to fulfill their purpose—here, ensuring that dependent family members are not left without support.
• “Sufficient means” and “unable to maintain herself”:
  “Sufficient means” includes not just current salary but earning capacity, assets, and overall financial position. “Unable to maintain herself” does not mean absolute pennilessness; it asks whether the wife can sustain herself with dignity in a manner broadly commensurate with marital status.
• Desertion under Section 125(4):
  A wife may be denied maintenance if she without sufficient reason refuses to live with her husband or is living in adultery. “Sufficient reason” includes cruelty, abuse, dowry-related harassment, or other justifiable causes that make cohabitation unsafe or unreasonable. The burden lies on the husband to show disentitlement under sub-section (4).
• Revisional jurisdiction (BNSS Sections 438 r/w 442):
  A limited supervisory power to correct glaring legal errors, jurisdictional defects, or perversities. It is not a re-trial or an appeal on facts. Where the Family Court’s view is plausible and lawful, revisional courts ordinarily will not substitute their own view.
• Adult children’s duty to maintain parents:
  Independent of a wife’s claim against her husband, the law recognizes that parents may seek maintenance from their children. The Court’s remarks underline this duty, both as a legal obligation and as a social value.

Observations on Party Configuration and Reliefs

An interesting feature is the joinder of the adult sons as co-petitioners in the revision. In a wife’s maintenance claim under Section 125, the primary liability falls on the husband. The Family Court’s order, however, “partly allowed” the composite petition (which also sought recovery of jewelry and money), awarding only monthly maintenance. This indicates that the maintenance relief was granted in the wife’s capacity as “wife,” which typically fastens liability on the husband. The High Court did not dwell on the locus of the sons in challenging that award; instead, it took a broader view of familial duty. This should not be misconstrued as transposing the wife’s Section 125 claim directly onto the sons; rather, it acknowledges parallel legal frameworks through which a mother may seek maintenance from her children.

Key Takeaways

• Revisional courts under BNSS, 2023 will not reappraise facts or recalibrate maintenance unless a clear legal error, jurisdictional flaw, or perversity is demonstrated.
• Section 125 maintenance remains a beneficial remedy tailored to prevent destitution; quantum must be realistic and not merely symbolic, considering inflation and status.
• Allegations of desertion or the wife’s “means” require substantive proof; mere assertions (such as owning/using a car) are inadequate to defeat maintenance.
• The husband’s primary statutory duty to maintain his wife is complemented by the broader familial obligation of adult children to support their mother, though the legal bases differ.
• Courts may summarily dismiss meritless revisions at admission without notice where doing so preserves relief and promotes judicial economy.

Conclusion

R. Ananda Prakash v. A. Malarvizhi reaffirms foundational maintenance jurisprudence while situating it within the BNSS, 2023 revisional framework. The Madras High Court’s decision underscores three enduring themes: (i) the limited scope of revisional interference, (ii) the purposive, welfare-oriented character of maintenance law, and (iii) the imperative that quantum reflect contemporary cost-of-living realities so that the wife’s dignity is preserved. The Court’s emphasis on familial duty—of both the husband and adult children—to ensure that the wife/mother is cared for, while not altering the legal architecture of liability in a Section 125 proceeding, nevertheless sends a strong normative signal that may facilitate consensual compliance and reduce litigation friction.

Practically, the decision signals to litigants that revisions premised on thin factual challenges or generalized hardship are unlikely to succeed. It also nudges trial courts to award maintenance that is viable in the real economy. In the broader legal context, the ruling is a timely confirmation that the transition to BNSS has not disrupted the protective core of maintenance law; rather, it continues to be enforced with revisional restraint and social justice at its center.