Review Is Not an Appeal: Supreme Court Reasserts Narrow Limits of Review under Order 47 CPC and Restores CRP Recognising Daughter’s Coparcenary Claim

Introduction

In Malleeswari v. K. Suguna (2025 INSC 1080), the Supreme Court of India has restated, with clarity and emphasis, the narrow compass of review jurisdiction under Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). While the case arises out of a partition suit and the daughter’s assertion of coparcenary rights under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (HSA 2005), the Supreme Court’s dispositive holding is procedural: a court exercising review cannot reappreciate facts, revisit findings, or sit in appeal over its own order. On that basis, the Court set aside a High Court review order that had overturned an earlier Civil Revision Petition (CRP) order, and restored the CRP, thereby reviving recognition of the appellant-daughter’s claim to a one-third share.

The decision is significant for two reasons. First, it consolidates the jurisprudence on review, distinguishing it from appellate scrutiny and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Second, in its practical effect, it reinstates the High Court’s earlier acceptance of the daughter’s coparcenary share in the partition suit and directs expeditious disposal of final decree proceedings.

Background and Parties

The litigation traces back to OS No. 192 of 2000 filed by Subramani (now deceased), son of late Munusamy Naidu, seeking partition of ancestral properties against his father. The appellant, Malleeswari, is the daughter of Munusamy Naidu and was not originally impleaded in the suit. The first respondent, K. Suguna, is a pendente lite transferee of certain suit items from the father (by a sale deed dated 27.12.2004). The second respondent is Subramani’s widow.

Timeline

2000: Suit for partition (OS 192/2000) filed by Subramani against his father, alleging ancestral property.
25.02.2003: Ex parte preliminary decree passed.
27.12.2004: Father executes sale deed in favour of R-1 (K. Suguna) for items 4–7; settlement in favour of appellant for items 1–3 and 8–10. An injunction was operative.
2005/2006: Final decree I.A. filed by R-2 (Subramani’s widow).
23.04.2008: Father executes a Will bequeathing his share to the appellant.
13.05.2011: Father dies; appellant impleaded as legal representative.
2013: R-1 impleaded in final decree proceedings.
2018: Appellant files I.A. No. 1199 of 2018 to amend preliminary decree to reflect her coparcenary share under HSA 2005 (and TN’s Section 29A).
08.03.2019: Trial Court dismisses the I.A.
23.09.2022: High Court (in CRP) sets aside Trial Court order; recognises appellant’s 1/3rd share per Vineeta Sharma and permits court fee payment.
19.10.2024: High Court allows review, sets aside the CRP order, and remands for fresh inquiry allowing R-1 to raise wider defences.
08.09.2025: Supreme Court allows appeal, sets aside review order, and restores CRP order of 23.09.2022.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court confined itself to the legality of the High Court’s exercise of review jurisdiction under Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. Reiterating settled principles, the Court held:

Review is not an appeal. It is confined to correcting an error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new and important matter despite due diligence, or other sufficient reason analogous to these grounds.
The High Court’s review order did not identify an apparent error; it reappreciated facts, recorded fresh findings, and effectively sat in appeal over its own CRP order—impermissible in review.
Accordingly, the review order dated 19.10.2024 was set aside, and the CRP order dated 23.09.2022 was restored.
The Trial Court was directed to dispose of all pending applications expeditiously, preferably within three months.

While the Supreme Court’s ratio concerns review jurisdiction, restoration of the CRP order has the practical effect of reinstating the High Court’s recognition of the appellant-daughter’s 1/3rd coparcenary share (consistent with Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) 9 SCC 1), subject to final decree proceedings.

Analysis

Issues Before the Supreme Court

Whether the High Court, in review, exceeded its jurisdiction by revisiting factual findings and expanding the scope of defences available to a pendente lite transferee, thereby overturning its earlier CRP order.
Consequentially, whether the earlier CRP order (recognising the daughter’s 1/3rd share and permitting amendment of the preliminary decree) ought to be restored.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court anchors its reasoning in a coherent set of authorities distinguishing review from appeal and delineating what constitutes an “error apparent on the face of the record.”

Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170: Review is not an appeal; it is confined to Order 47 Rule 1 grounds.
Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389: Appellate powers enable correction of all errors; review does not.
Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715: A review cannot be used to rehear and correct an erroneous decision; it cannot be an appeal in disguise.
Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224: Review may correct mistakes but cannot substitute one view for another absent statutory basis.
Inderchand Jain v. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC 663: Review court does not sit in appeal over its own order; rehearing is impermissible.
Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909: Review is exceptional, invoked to prevent miscarriage of justice or correct grave and palpable errors.
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104; T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440; Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137: Define “error apparent on the face of the record” as a patent error not requiring elaborate reasoning; a mere erroneous decision on debatable points is not reviewable.
Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC OnLine PC 11 and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526: “Any other sufficient reason” in Order 47 encompasses reasons analogous to discovery of new matter or error apparent.
Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1: Substantive context; daughters are coparceners by birth, with transactions prior to 20.12.2004 protected by the proviso to Section 6 (as amended). The CRP had applied this principle; the Supreme Court’s restoration of the CRP brings that application back into effect.

Cumulatively, these authorities circumscribe the permissible grounds and scope of review. The Supreme Court found the High Court’s review order had crossed those boundaries by recasting issues, reopening defences, and rebalancing equities—steps that belong to appellate or original jurisdiction, not review.

Legal Reasoning

The Court proceeds in two steps:

Restatement of Review Principles
- Review jurisdiction is statutorily conferred and thus limited (Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC).
- Grounds: (a) discovery of new and important matter/evidence despite due diligence; (b) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (c) any other sufficient reason, interpreted ejusdem generis with the first two.
- An “error apparent” is self-evident; if it requires long-drawn reasoning or where two views are reasonably possible, review is not available.
- Review is not a platform to substitute views, rehear the matter, or reappreciate facts.
Application to the Impugned Review Order
- The High Court’s review order did not identify any error apparent or discovery of new evidence. Instead, it reframed the dispute by characterising the appellant’s claim as a “third-party claim,” expanded the horizon of defences available to a pendente lite transferee (including contesting the ancestral character of property), and effectively undid findings recorded in the CRP.
- By allowing a fresh inquiry into issues already concluded at the CRP stage—and doing so without anchoring to review grounds—the High Court exceeded review jurisdiction.
- Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the review order and restored the CRP, while directing expeditious disposal of pending applications in the trial court.

What the Court Did Not Decide (But Contextually Matters)

Validity of the 27.12.2004 sale: Though arguments were advanced that the transaction post-20.12.2004 cut-off is not protected by the proviso to amended Section 6 and that it violated an injunction, the Supreme Court did not adjudicate on the sale’s validity; those issues remain for the trial court in final decree proceedings consistent with the restored CRP.
Limitation and estoppel: Trial court findings on limitation and estoppel (from attestation) were not the subject of the Supreme Court’s ratio; restoration of the CRP implies that these objections, to the extent they underpinned refusal to amend the preliminary decree, cannot defeat the daughter’s legal claim at this stage.
State amendment (Section 29A, TN Amendment, 1989): The appellant invoked both Section 29A (Tamil Nadu) and HSA 2005. The Supreme Court did not pronounce on Section 29A’s application; the CRP had proceeded on HSA 2005 and Vineeta Sharma.

Impact and Implications

The judgment’s principal impact is doctrinal and procedural; its secondary impact is practical in partition suits involving daughters’ coparcenary claims and pendente lite transfers.

Doctrinal:
- Reaffirms that review is a corrective, not a second chance at merits. High Courts must scrupulously avoid converting review into an appeal or a revisit of facts, especially when the earlier order was under Article 227.
- Clarifies that “any other sufficient reason” under Order 47 is not a catch-all; it must be analogous to discovery or error apparent.
Procedural in Partition Matters:
- By restoring the CRP, the Court practically facilitates amendment of preliminary decrees to reflect daughters’ coparcenary rights recognised in Vineeta Sharma, where partition has not attained finality by a final decree. This aligns with the broader line of authority permitting modification of preliminary decrees to accommodate changes in law or supervening rights before final decree.
- Pendente lite transferees continue to be bound by the outcome of the litigation and ordinarily cannot claim higher rights than their transferor. While the Supreme Court did not decide the full contour of such defences here, the restored CRP had constrained those defences.
Litigation Strategy:
- Parties aggrieved by a CRP order should prefer appeal/appropriate challenges rather than seek to expand review jurisdiction.
- Review petitions should be tightly framed to the limited, well-settled grounds; arguments demanding reappreciation of evidence or reshaping the litigation matrix are liable to fail.
- In partition suits, amendments to preliminary decrees to reflect daughters’ rights remain tenable till a final decree is passed, subject to the statutory provisos protecting transactions before 20.12.2004.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Review vs. Appeal:
- An appeal re-examines the entire case on facts and law; a review is a narrow self-correction mechanism for patent errors or new evidence not available earlier despite diligence.
- Review cannot be used to substitute a different view on debatable questions.
Error Apparent on the Face of the Record:
- A clear, self-evident mistake, not requiring deep reasoning. If two views are possible, the error is not “apparent.”
“Any Other Sufficient Reason”:
- Not a free-standing ground; it must be similar in nature to discovery of new evidence or error apparent (per Privy Council and Supreme Court).
Preliminary Decree in Partition:
- Determines shares of parties; the suit continues till final decree. Courts can modify preliminary decrees before final decree to reflect supervening events or changes in law (e.g., recognition of daughters’ coparcenary rights).
Pendente Lite Transferee:
- A person who purchases property during the pendency of litigation takes it subject to the outcome (doctrine of lis pendens, Section 52 TPA). Typically, such a transferee cannot claim better title than the transferor or derail adjudication by raising inconsistent defences.
HSA 2005 and the 20.12.2004 Cut-off:
- HSA 2005 confers coparcenary rights by birth to daughters. Transactions before 20.12.2004 are protected by the proviso to amended Section 6; transactions after that date may not be immune, subject to other legal constraints and case facts.

Why the High Court’s Review Failed the Test

The High Court’s review order did not demonstrate:

Discovery of new and important matter/evidence that, despite due diligence, could not be produced earlier.
An error apparent on the face of the record in the CRP order.
Any “other sufficient reason” analogous to the above two grounds.

Instead, it:

Reframed the nature of the appellant’s claim and enhanced the scope of defences for a pendente lite transferee.
Questioned the ancestral character of the property afresh despite the earlier legal trajectory of the suit and the CRP’s findings.
Remanded for a “fresh inquiry” without anchoring to legitimate review grounds—an appellate move disguised as review.

Practical Effects of Restoring the CRP Order

The appellant-daughter’s claim to a 1/3rd coparcenary share, as recognised by the High Court in CRP applying Vineeta Sharma, stands revived.
The trial court must now proceed to conclude final decree proceedings and dispose of pending applications within the three-month timeline, aligning the decree with the restored share-structure.
While the Supreme Court did not adjudicate on estoppel, limitation, or the validity of the 2004 sale, the restored procedural posture narrows the pendente lite transferee’s scope to defences consistent with the transferor’s position and the CRP’s findings.

Conclusion

Malleeswari v. K. Suguna is a strong reaffirmation that review is a limited, exceptional remedy, not a vehicle for re-litigation. By disallowing an expansive review that sought to rewrite the CRP’s conclusions, the Supreme Court preserves the finality of judicial decisions and the disciplined boundaries between review and appeal. The restoration of the CRP order also concretely advances the legislative promise of gender parity in coparcenary rights by facilitating the incorporation of daughters’ shares into partition decrees where proceedings remain pending.

Key takeaways:

Review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC is confined to patent errors, discovery of new matter despite due diligence, or analogous sufficient reasons; it cannot be used to reargue facts or law.
High Courts must exercise heightened restraint while reviewing orders passed in supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.
In partition suits, preliminary decrees can, and should, be aligned with supervening legal changes (such as HSA 2005), until a final decree is drawn.
Pendente lite transferees are bound by the litigation’s outcome and typically cannot outflank the position of their transferors.

The decision thus fortifies procedural discipline while enabling substantive justice in ongoing partition litigation—an outcome that aligns the mechanics of civil procedure with the egalitarian thrust of modern succession law.