Relaxed Electronic Evidence Requirements in Matrimonial Cases: Section 14 Family Courts Act vs. Section 65-B Evidence Act in Lumeshwari @ Pinky v. Rajesh Dubey

Relaxed Electronic Evidence Requirements in Matrimonial Cases: Section 14 Family Courts Act vs. Section 65-B Evidence Act in Lumeshwari @ Pinky v. Rajesh Dubey

1. Introduction

The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur in Lumeshwari @ Pinky v. Rajesh Dubey, First Appeal No. 866 of 2021 (2025 MPHC-JBP 56736, decided on 11 November 2025) is a significant contribution to the jurisprudence governing electronic evidence in matrimonial disputes.

The core issue before the Division Bench (Hon’ble Shri Justice Vishal Dhagat and Hon’ble Shri Justice B. P. Sharma) was:

  • Whether in proceedings before a Family Court, electronic photographs allegedly proving adultery can be relied upon without compliance with Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in light of Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

The appellant-wife (Lumeshwari @ Pinky) challenged the decree of divorce granted by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Balaghat in RCS-HM No. 68/2020 (Rajesh Dubey v. Lumeshwari @ Pinki), where the husband had obtained a divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on the ground of adultery, primarily relying on certain photographs.

The wife’s challenge rested almost entirely on an evidentiary objection:

  • The photographs were said to be secondary electronic evidence taken from a mobile phone.
  • No certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act was filed.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, which holds Section 65-B compliance to be mandatory for admitting electronic records.

The High Court rejected the appeal and upheld the decree of divorce. In doing so, it laid down an important clarification: Family Courts, by virtue of Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, are not strictly bound by the technical requirements of the Evidence Act, including Section 65-B, when receiving and relying on electronic material such as photographs, provided such material assists the court in discovering the truth.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Procedural Posture

  • The husband (respondent before the High Court) filed a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, alleging adultery by the wife.
  • The Principal Judge, Family Court, Balaghat decreed the suit and dissolved the marriage solemnized on 13.02.2006.
  • The wife (appellant) filed a First Appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 before the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

2.2 Grounds of Appeal

The sole substantial ground pressed in appeal was evidentiary:

  1. The Family Court had allegedly committed an error of law in relying upon photographs that were:
    • Secondary electronic evidence, and
    • Unaccompanied by a Section 65-B certificate under the Evidence Act.
  2. Therefore, as per Arjun Panditrao Khotkar, the photographs were inadmissible and the decree of divorce based on them was vitiated.

2.3 High Court’s Holdings

The High Court dismissed the appeal, with the following key holdings:

  1. Inapplicability of Arjun Panditrao to Family Court proceedings:
    The Supreme Court decision in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal was held not applicable, because:
    • That case did not arise from a matrimonial dispute, and
    • Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984—which specifically governs evidentiary flexibility in Family Courts—was not at issue there.
  2. Effect of Section 14 of the Family Courts Act:
    Section 14 expressly empowers Family Courts to: receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

    Hence:
    • The Indian Evidence Act is not strictly applicable to matrimonial cases before Family Courts.
    • A Family Court is authorised to receive and rely upon documents, including electronic photographs, even if they would otherwise attract technical objections under the Evidence Act.
  3. Factual evaluation of the photographs and testimony:
    On merits, the High Court found:
    • The wife, examined as NAW-1 (Non-Applicant Witness-1), did not deny her presence in the photographs.
    • She merely stated in a general way that the photographs had been “created using some trick”, without:
      • Identifying who created them, or
      • Explaining how they were manipulated.
    • She admitted that:
      • The photographs were initially present on her own mobile phone,
      • They were transferred into her husband’s phone, and
      • Her husband later broke her mobile phone.
    • The photographer who developed the photographs, Shailendra Gurubele (AW‑5), was examined as a witness and corroborated the production of the photographs.
  4. Inference regarding the husband’s conduct:
    The Court observed that the husband’s act of breaking the wife’s mobile phone appeared “natural”:
    • He had discovered evidence of his wife’s adultery on her mobile phone.
    • He transferred the pictures to his own device.
    • In anger and to prevent continuation of the alleged adulterous relationship, he broke her phone.
  5. Conclusion:
    Taking into account:
    • Section 14 of the Family Courts Act,
    • The wife’s own testimony and lack of specific denial, and
    • The corroborative testimony of the photographer (AW‑5),
    the High Court held that the Family Court had rightly relied upon the photographs, and found no merit in the appeal. The first appeal by the wife was accordingly dismissed.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Statutory Framework

3.1.1 Section 13, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Adultery)

Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act provides grounds for divorce. One classic ground (as it stood in older formulations and state amendments) is adultery—voluntary sexual intercourse outside the marriage. While the specific statutory wording has undergone changes over the decades, adultery remains a recognised matrimonial offence for dissolution of marriage.

In practice, direct evidence of adultery is rare. Courts generally rely on circumstantial evidence such as:

  • Compromising photographs or videos,
  • Frequent clandestine meetings, stays in hotels or lodges,
  • Admissions or text communications (messages, emails, chats),
  • Testimony of witnesses, neighbours, or hotel staff.

The photographs in this case formed the key circumstantial evidence allegedly establishing adulterous conduct.

3.1.2 Section 19, Family Courts Act, 1984 (Appeals)

Section 19 of the Family Courts Act provides for appeals from judgments or decrees of Family Courts to the High Court. The wife properly invoked this provision to file a First Appeal challenging the decree of divorce.

3.1.3 Section 14, Family Courts Act, 1984 (Relaxation of Rules of Evidence)

Section 14 is central to this case. It states, in substance, that a Family Court:

may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Key implications:

  • The Family Court is not bound by the strict rules of admissibility and relevancy which govern ordinary civil or criminal trials under the Evidence Act.
  • The Court has a wide discretion to receive and act upon any material it considers helpful in discovering the truth, subject to:
    • Principles of natural justice (notice, fair opportunity to contest, cross-examination), and
    • The overarching objective of effective resolution of family disputes.
  • This provision reflects the distinctive character of Family Courts: they are less adversarial and more conciliatory/inquisitorial, with a focus on substance over form.

3.1.4 Section 65-B, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Electronic Records)

Section 65-B lays down the conditions under which an electronic record (such as data on a computer, mobile phone, CD, pen drive, etc.) may be admitted as evidence through a printed copy, CD/DVD, or other output.

Core features:

  • Where the original electronic device is not produced in court, a printout or copy is treated as secondary evidence.
  • For such secondary electronic evidence to be admitted, the proponent must typically provide a certificate under Section 65-B(4), signed by a responsible person, stating:
    • How the electronic record was produced,
    • That the system/device was in regular use and functioning properly, and
    • That the copy is a faithful reproduction of the original electronic data.

The Arjun Panditrao decision (discussed below) clarified that compliance with Section 65-B is generally mandatory for admissibility of such electronic records in ordinary proceedings governed by the Evidence Act.

3.2 Precedent Cited: Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020)

The appellant-wife relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1. That decision is the leading authority on admissibility of electronic evidence under Section 65-B.

3.2.1 Essence of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Arjun Panditrao

Broadly, the Supreme Court held:

  • Section 65-B lays down a complete code for admissibility of electronic records in evidence when they are produced in secondary form (e.g., printout of a WhatsApp chat, CD copy of CCTV footage).
  • Production of a valid Section 65-B(4) certificate is generally mandatory when:
    • The electronic record is stored on a device that is not produced in court, and
    • Reliance is placed on a copy or output of that record.
  • Without such certificate, the secondary electronic record is typically inadmissible under the Evidence Act, unless:
    • The original device is produced and the court is satisfied under other provisions, or
    • Other exceptional circumstances apply (explained in the judgment).

The rationale is to ensure:

  • Authenticity and reliability of electronic records,
  • Protection against tampering, manipulation, or fabrication, and
  • Consistency in evidentiary standards across courts.

3.2.2 How the Appellant Invoked Arjun Panditrao

In Lumeshwari @ Pinky, the wife argued that:

  • The photographs relied upon by the husband were electronic records originating from a mobile phone.
  • They were produced in the form of developed/printed photographs—i.e., secondary evidence of electronic origin.
  • No Section 65-B certificate had been filed to satisfy the mandatory conditions laid down by the Supreme Court.
  • Therefore, as per Arjun Panditrao, the photographs were inadmissible, and the decree of divorce based on them was legally unsustainable.

3.3 The High Court’s Distinction: Section 14 as a Special Regime

3.3.1 Reasoning of the High Court

The High Court’s core response was to distinguish Arjun Panditrao on the basis of the special statutory framework governing Family Courts:

Case cited by counsel appearing for appellant before us is not applicable as said case is not related with matrimonial dispute and Section 14 of Family Courts Act is not in question.

The Court then emphasized:

As per Section 14 of Family Courts Act, a Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Since, Indian Evidence Act is not strictly applicable in matrimonial cases and further Court had been given authority to receive any report, statement, documents in evidence to find out the truth. Thus, this Court do not find any error in the judgment passed by Family Court by placing reliance on the said photographs.

3.3.2 Doctrinal Effect: A “Carve-Out” for Family Courts

This reasoning effectively creates a doctrinal carve-out:

  • The general rule (as per Arjun Panditrao) is that Section 65-B compliance is mandatory for secondary electronic evidence in proceedings governed strictly by the Evidence Act.
  • However, in Family Court proceedings, Section 14:
    • Overlays the Evidence Act, and
    • Permits the court to receive and rely upon evidence even if it is not strictly admissible under the Evidence Act.
  • Consequently, strict non-compliance with Section 65-B does not, by itself, bar the Family Court from considering electronic evidence—such as photographs—if:
    • The material appears relevant and useful to “deal effectually” with the dispute, and
    • The parties have had a fair opportunity to challenge its authenticity and reliability.

The judgment thus affirms that Section 14 of the Family Courts Act functions as a statutory relaxation of the rigours of the Evidence Act, including Section 65-B, in the limited sphere of family disputes.

3.3.3 Limits of the Relaxation

Though not expressly articulated, certain implicit limits can be inferred:

  • Family Courts cannot act arbitrarily; they must still respect natural justice (fair hearing, opportunity to cross-examine, etc.).
  • Material that is patently unreliable, forged, or doubtful cannot be blindly accepted; the court must exercise judicial discretion.
  • The relaxation is directed at technical rules of admissibility, not at fundamental requirements of fairness and rational decision-making.

In this case, the High Court found that the photographs passed the tests of fairness and reliability when considered alongside the wife’s testimony and the photographer’s evidence.

3.4 Evaluation of the Factual Findings

3.4.1 The Wife’s Testimony (NAW‑1)

The High Court noted the following crucial aspects of the wife’s evidence:

  1. No categorical denial of presence in photographs:
    She did not say that she was not the person depicted in the photographs. Instead, she only asserted that: said photographs have been created by using some trick.

    But she:
    • Did not name any person responsible for the alleged manipulation, and
    • Did not specify the nature of the “trick” or method used.
    The court saw this as a vague and evasive denial, insufficient to discredit the photographs.
  2. Admission about the origin and transfer of the photographs:
    The wife herself stated that:
    • The photographs were originally in her mobile phone,
    • They were subsequently transferred to her husband’s mobile phone, and
    • Her husband then broke her mobile phone.
    This admission substantially supports the husband’s version of events and links the photographs directly to her own device.

3.4.2 The Court’s Inference About the Husband’s Conduct

The High Court observed:

Breaking of mobile of appellant appears to be natural. Husband had evidence of wife's adultery on her mobile phone. He transferred said pictures in his mobile phone. No person will like her wife to be in continuation of adultery, therefore, husband (respondent herein) broke mobile phone of wife (appellant herein) in anger and to stop her communication with paramour.

This reasoning serves two functions:

  • It offers a behavioural explanation for why the original device (the wife’s mobile phone) was no longer available, mitigating any suspicion that the absence of the original source should discredit the photographs.
  • It reinforces the narrative of betrayal and emotional reaction, which the court finds plausible within the context of alleged adultery.

While some might consider this reasoning somewhat empathetic to the husband, from an evidentiary standpoint, it fills a potential gap in the chain of custody of the electronic record by explaining the destruction of the original device.

3.4.3 The Photographer’s Testimony (AW‑5)

The High Court also relied on the evidence of Shailendra Gurubele (AW‑5), the photographer who:

  • Prepared or developed the photographs, and
  • Was examined in court.

His testimony provided:

  • Technical confirmation that the photographs were derived from an actual source device and were duly developed, and
  • Independent corroboration of the husband’s production of the photographs.

This significantly strengthened the evidentiary integrity of the photographs, even in the absence of a Section 65-B certificate.

3.4.4 Standard of Proof in Adultery Cases (Though Not Expressly Discussed)

Though not explicitly mentioned in the text, Indian courts generally require that adultery be proved on the standard of preponderance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt, however:

  • The evidence must be of such a character that a reasonable person would conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that adultery has occurred.
  • Given the inherently secretive nature of adultery, a combination of strong circumstantial evidence (such as compromising photographs) and admissions is typically viewed as sufficient.

Here, the combination of:

  • Compromising photographs,
  • The wife’s own testimony linking the photos to her phone, and
  • The photographer’s corroboration

was considered by the court adequate to sustain the finding of adultery and justify the decree of divorce.

3.5 Legal Reasoning: From Section 14 to Affirmation of the Decree

The court’s reasoning can be analytically broken down as follows:

  1. Step 1: Identify the applicable evidentiary regime.
    Because this was a matrimonial dispute before a Family Court, the court recognised that Section 14 of the Family Courts Act governs what material can be received as evidence.
  2. Step 2: Interpret Section 14 as a relaxation of the Evidence Act.
    The court read Section 14 to mean that:
    • The Family Court is not bound by the strict technical provisions of the Evidence Act, including Section 65-B.
    • It has a broad authority to receive “any report, statement, documents, information or matter” that may assist in effectively resolving the dispute.
  3. Step 3: Distinguish Arjun Panditrao.
    Since Arjun Panditrao did not involve Section 14 or Family Courts, its ratio on mandatory 65-B certification is not controlling where a special statute (Family Courts Act) expressly modifies the evidentiary regime.
  4. Step 4: Assess the reliability of the photographs in fact.
    Without being constrained by 65-B technicalities, the court still examined:
    • The wife’s statements (including her admission that the photos came from her phone),
    • Her vague and unsupported claim of manipulation, and
    • The independent testimony of the photographer.
    It concluded that the photographs were reliable and genuine enough to be acted upon.
  5. Step 5: Uphold the Family Court’s factual finding of adultery.
    Given the evidentiary assessment and the legislative policy of prioritising truth over technicalities in Family Courts, the High Court held that there was no error of law or fact justifying interference with the decree of divorce.

4. Impact and Future Implications

4.1 Clarifying the Role of Section 14 in the Age of Electronic Evidence

The decision in Lumeshwari @ Pinky is particularly significant because:

  • It juxtaposes the strict electronic evidence regime of Section 65-B (as interpreted in Arjun Panditrao) against the flexible evidentiary approach mandated by Section 14 of the Family Courts Act.
  • It expressly affirms that Family Courts are not strictly bound by Section 65-B when receiving and relying on electronic material, such as photographs from mobile phones.

In practical terms, this judgment will:

  • Discourage technical objections in matrimonial disputes that aim solely to exclude relevant electronic material on the ground of lack of a 65-B certificate.
  • Encourage Family Courts to focus on:
    • The substantive reliability of electronic material (cross-examination, corroboration), rather than
    • Strict compliance with procedural and technical certification requirements.

4.2 Litigation Strategy in Matrimonial Cases Involving Electronic Evidence

For future family disputes involving mobile photographs, chats, emails, or social-media posts:

  • Parties trying to exclude electronic evidence cannot rely solely on the absence of a Section 65-B certificate; they will need to:
    • Challenge the authenticity (e.g., show actual tampering, fabrication),
    • Dispute the context or meaning of the communication or photograph, and
    • Exploit any inconsistencies in the evidence and testimony.
  • Parties relying on electronic evidence should still, as a matter of prudence:
    • Preserve original devices where possible,
    • Maintain a clear chain of custody,
    • Consider obtaining Section 65-B certificates where feasible—especially if the matter may later proceed to forums where the Evidence Act applies strictly (e.g., criminal proceedings or other civil litigation).

4.3 Risk of Misuse vs. Search for Truth

The judgment, while enabling a more flexible approach, also raises concerns:

  • Electronic photographs and videos are susceptible to manipulation (morphing, editing).
  • Relaxing formal safeguards like Section 65-B certificates might increase the risk of false or doctored evidence being relied upon.

However, the High Court’s approach balances this risk by:

  • Not dispensing with scrutiny altogether, but instead shifting scrutiny to:
    • Cross-examination,
    • Witness credibility, and
    • Corroborative evidence (like the photographer’s testimony).
  • Emphasising that the ultimate goal is to “find out the truth”, in line with the legislative purpose of the Family Courts Act.

4.4 Wider Doctrinal Influence

While the judgment is of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and binds courts within that jurisdiction, its reasoning:

  • Is likely to be persuasive for other High Courts and Family Courts across India.
  • May contribute to the development of a distinct evidentiary standard for Family Courts in relation to electronic evidence, differentiating them from ordinary civil and criminal courts.

Eventually, if similar cases reach the Supreme Court, this line of reasoning may:

  • Lead to a nationwide clarification that Section 14 of the Family Courts Act operates as a limited override of Section 65-B in matrimonial disputes, or
  • Prompt a more nuanced synthesis between the two provisions.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 What Is “Secondary Electronic Evidence”?

When information is originally stored on a digital device (like a mobile phone or computer), that data is the primary electronic record.

  • If you show the court the actual device and the original file, that is primary evidence.
  • If you instead produce:
    • A printout of a photograph stored on the device, or
    • A CD copy of a video stored on the device,
    that is secondary electronic evidence.

Section 65-B of the Evidence Act was designed to regulate when and how such secondary electronic evidence can be safely admitted.

5.2 What Is a Section 65-B Certificate?

A Section 65-B certificate is a written document, signed by a person responsible for the operation of the device or management of the electronic record, declaring that:

  • The electronic record was produced by a computer/device that was regularly used,
  • The device was working properly, and
  • The copy (printout, CD, etc.) being produced is a true and accurate reflection of the original electronic record.

In ordinary proceedings governed by the Evidence Act, such a certificate is typically required to make the secondary electronic evidence admissible.

5.3 What Does Section 14 of the Family Courts Act Really Do?

Section 14 says that Family Courts can:

receive as evidence any report, statement, documents, information or matter… whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

In simpler terms:

  • A Family Court does not have to reject helpful evidence just because some technical rule in the Evidence Act (like need for a 65-B certificate) is not fulfilled.
  • It can accept and rely on any material—including electronic photos, messages, informal letters—that helps it to reach the truth about the family dispute.

However, it must still:

  • Give both sides a fair chance to see and challenge that material, and
  • Evaluate whether it is credible, not forged or manipulated.

5.4 Adultery as a Ground for Divorce

In Hindu matrimonial law, adultery means voluntary sexual intercourse by a married person with someone other than their spouse.

  • It does not require criminal prosecution for adultery (especially after decriminalisation of adultery as an offence); it remains a civil wrong and a ground for divorce.
  • Because adultery usually occurs in private, courts accept circumstantial evidence—compromising photographs, love messages, hotel stays, etc.—rather than insisting on direct eyewitness testimony.

6. Conclusion

The decision in Lumeshwari @ Pinky v. Rajesh Dubey is an important precedent in the law of family disputes and electronic evidence. Its key contributions may be summarised as follows:

  1. It clarifies that Section 14 of the Family Courts Act permits Family Courts to receive and rely upon electronic evidence—even in the absence of a Section 65-B certificate—if such material is helpful in resolving the dispute.
  2. It distinguishes the Supreme Court’s ruling in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar by emphasising that:
    • That ruling operates in the context of courts strictly governed by the Evidence Act, whereas
    • Family Courts operate under a special statutory regime that relaxes evidentiary technicalities in favour of discovering the truth.
  3. On the facts, it demonstrates how:
    • A party’s own testimony (linking photographs to her phone),
    • Failure to dispute the photographs with specific and credible explanations, and
    • Corroboration by a photographer
    can collectively justify a finding of adultery and the grant of a decree of divorce.
  4. It signals to litigants and practitioners that, in Family Courts, technical objections based solely on non-compliance with Section 65-B are unlikely to succeed if the evidence is otherwise credible and relevant.

In the broader legal landscape, this judgment reinforces the idea that family law adjudication is unique: its primary focus is on the reality of relationships and the welfare of family members, rather than on rigid procedural formalism. The court’s approach—using Section 14 to prioritise substantive truth over technical admissibility—will likely influence how electronic evidence is handled in matrimonial litigation across the country.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Madhya Pradesh High Court

Judge(s)

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL DHAGAT

Advocates

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