Reinforcing the Bona Fide Remorse Standard and Deterrent Punishment in Criminal Contempt Proceedings

Introduction

In the suo motu criminal contempt petition High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its own motion v. Vineeta Srinandan (2025 BHC-AS 18189-DB), the Bombay High Court addressed a publication circulated by the Director-Cultural of Seawoods Estates Limited. The circular, issued during the pendency of Writ Petition No. 11652 of 2023, contained scandalizing language accusing High Court and Supreme Court judges of bias, “dog-feeding mafias,” and “crushing democracy.” This commentary examines the background, key legal issues, the court’s decision, and the broader implications of the judgment.

Background and Key Issues

Parties:
- Petitioner (Suo motu): Bombay High Court
- Contemnor/Respondent: Mrs. Vineeta Srinandan, Director-Cultural of Seawoods Estates Limited
Context: A challenge to Rule 20 of the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023, by Seawoods Limited, with an intervention moving by Ms. Leela Verma.
Contempt Material: A circular dated 29 January 2025, circulated in a residential colony, containing derogatory insinuations against the judicial system.
Legal Question: Whether the circular constituted criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and if so, what punishment was appropriate.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court concluded that:

The circular scandalized and lowered the authority of the High Court and Supreme Court (Section 2(c)(i)).
It prejudiced and interfered with pending judicial proceedings (Section 2(c)(ii)) and obstructed the administration of justice (Section 2(c)(iii)).
The Board of Directors of Seawoods disowned the circular; only Mrs. Srinandan was responsible.
The contempt proceedings against the company were dropped, but Mrs. Srinandan was held personally liable.
Her conditional and unconvincing apology was rejected as not demonstrating genuine remorse.
She was convicted of criminal contempt and sentenced to one week’s simple imprisonment and a ₹2,000 fine, with the sentence suspended for ten days.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court relied on a rich body of Supreme Court authority to delineate the contours of criminal contempt:

Rajendra Sail v. M. P. High Court Bar Association (2005): Emphasized that malicious or scurrilous attacks on judicial decisions that undermine public confidence attract contempt and that apologies must be bona fide to mitigate punishment.
Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of U. P. (1953): Held that disparaging statements calculated to deter litigants or erode trust in the judiciary are punishable in contempt.
Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (1969): Established the test of whether material is “calculated to interfere” with administration of justice.
C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta (1971): Observed that scurrilous attacks on judges have an adverse effect on due administration of justice.
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (1970): Warned that vilification of courts or instruments of justice invites contempt.
P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker (1988): Stressed that criticism must not impair public faith or bring the administration of justice into ridicule.
Roshan Lal Ahuja, In re (1993): Clarified that fair criticism is permissible but that calculated attempts to undermine judicial prestige are contempt.
D.C. Saxena v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India (1996): Defined “scandalizing” as imputing improper motives to judges and lowering court authority.
J.R. Parashar v. Prashant Bhushan (2001): Highlighted that attributing motives to judges sows public distrust and is pernicious to administration of justice.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded as follows:

Section 2(c) ingredients: The circular’s language “scandalises,” “lowers the authority,” and “interferes with due course of judicial proceedings.”
Section 12 punishment framework: up to six months’ imprisonment or ₹2,000 fine, with allowance for remission on apology. The court found the apology conditional and insincere, thus not warranting full remediation.
Fair criticism vs. contempt: The circular went beyond critique of judicial reasoning and targeted the integrity of judges themselves, accusing them of collusion with a “dog-feeding mafia.”
Deterrence and public confidence: Drawing on Rajendra Sail, the court underscored the need for deterrent sentencing to preserve the public’s trust in the rule of law.
Corporate liability: While Section 4–5 Contempt Act can attribute corporate contempt to officers, the Board’s disavowal led to sole liability of the contemnor.

Impact

This judgment is significant for several reasons:

Reasserting Contempt Standards: It reaffirms that any publication imputing improper motives to judges or attacking the institution’s integrity is criminal contempt.
Bona Fide Remorse Test: Merely tendering an apology is insufficient—courts will scrutinize its genuineness before considering remission.
Deterrent Sentencing: Even educated and otherwise law-abiding citizens can be fined and imprisoned for contempt unless they demonstrate true contrition.
Corporate Governance: Companies must monitor delegated authorities’ communications during litigation to avoid vicarious contempt exposure.
Future Litigation: Advocates and commentators will note the boundaries of “fair criticism,” especially in public bodies’ engagements and written materials.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Criminal Contempt: Any act or publication that scandalizes or lowers the court’s authority, interferes with judicial proceedings, or obstructs administration of justice.
Scandalizing the Court: Attacking judges’ motives or integrity in a way that undermines public confidence in the judiciary.
Due Course of Judicial Proceeding: The orderly process of adjudication from filing a case to final judgment, which must remain uninfluenced by external pressures.
Bona Fide Remorse: A genuine apology showing real regret, not a tactical or conditional statement, essential for remission of contempt punishment.
Deterrent Punishment: A penalty proportionate to the wrong, designed to discourage similar conduct by others and preserve respect for the law.

Conclusion

The Bombay High Court’s decision in High Court on its own motion v. Vineeta Srinandan powerfully reaffirms that:

Scurrilous or baseless attacks on judges and courts are not protected free speech but criminal contempt.
Apologies must be unqualified and reflect genuine contrition to avert or mitigate punishment.
Courts will impose deterrent sentences to safeguard the rule of law and maintain public confidence in the judiciary.

In the broader legal landscape, this judgment serves as a caution to litigants, corporations, and public commentators: critique the judicial process responsibly and within bounds, or face stringent contempt sanctions.