Recognizing “Relationships in the Nature of Marriage” Under the Domestic Violence Act

Introduction

The Delhi High Court’s judgment in Anamika Chandel v. Dr. Naresh Chandel (decided on January 7, 2025) offers a significant clarification regarding what constitutes a “domestic relationship” under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”). The case arises out of competing claims and disputed marriages among connected family members. The High Court specifically considered whether a woman could maintain a complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act when her marital status and that of the respondent were heavily contested.

In this case, the petitioner, Ms. Anamika, alleged that she was married to the respondent, Dr. Naresh, and had resided with him for several years, during which time she was subjected to cruelty. The respondent refuted the marital relationship, emphasizing that both he and the petitioner were previously married to other individuals. The lower court (the Additional Sessions Judge) had allowed the respondent’s appeal, rejecting the petitioner’s complaint. However, the Delhi High Court reversed that decision, restoring the petitioner’s complaint and allowing it to proceed to evidence, primarily on the ground that the Court could not summarily dismiss an allegation of a “relationship in the nature of marriage” without probing facts more thoroughly.

This commentary provides an in-depth analysis of the case background, the Court’s rationale, the precedents relied upon, and the potential impact on future disputes relating to the DV Act.

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court overturned the Additional Sessions Judge’s judgment dated July 19, 2016, which had dismissed the petitioner’s complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act. While the respondent produced documents such as a “Friendship Agreement” and a marriage certificate to argue that the petitioner was already married to his brother (and that he himself was married to another woman at the time), the High Court held that these documents could not be accepted as conclusive proof at the initial stage.

The key finding was that for the DV Act to apply, it is sufficient for a woman to show that she was (or had been) in a “domestic relationship” with the respondent as defined under Section 2(f) — which includes a relationship in the nature of marriage. The High Court reasoned that the petitioner’s claim that she was married or, at the very least, in a marital-like relationship with the respondent for several years needed to be tested by leading evidence rather than being dismissed at a preliminary stage.

Accordingly, the High Court restored the complaint to the trial court, directing it to determine the legitimacy of the purported marriage or marriage-like relationship after a full appraisal of evidence.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

In supporting her case, the petitioner relied on Deoki Panjhiyara v. Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad (2013) 2 SCC 137, where the Supreme Court held that a mere production of a marriage certificate in support of an earlier marriage is not necessarily conclusive proof preventing courts from examining the veracity of the parties’ current marital status. The High Court echoed this principle by clarifying that initial documentary evidence can be disputed and can require fuller examination through trial.

Other references included the DV Act’s definitional sections (Section 2(a), 2(f), 2(q), and 2(s)), all of which provide a legislative framework indicating that proof of a valid marriage is not the sole criterion for invoking domestic violence protections. Instead, even a “relationship in the nature of marriage” can be brought within the purview of the DV Act.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s decision primarily rested on the definitions in the DV Act, particularly Section 2(f), which covers a wide ambit of domestic relationships. The Court observed:

1. At the initial stage, courts must accept factual allegations on demurrer — meaning they should assume the petitioner’s allegations might be true unless definitively proven otherwise. Hence, the question of whether Anamika’s or Dr. Naresh’s prior marriages invalidated their relationship could not be conclusively decided without assessing evidence in depth.
2. A relationship can be recognized as “in the nature of marriage” if parties have cohabited or held themselves out as spouses, even when conventional legal formalities are contested. The Court noted that the petitioner’s claim (she lived in the respondent’s household for about seven years) merited a full trial to determine the nature of the relationship.
3. The documents, including the “Friendship Agreement,” the marriage certificate allegedly showing the petitioner’s marriage to Mr. Vijay (the respondent’s brother), and other evidence of the respondent’s prior marriage to one Ms. Kavita, must be weighed through the trial process. Summarily dismissing the petitioner’s case would deprive her of the statutory protections intended by the DV Act.

Consequently, the High Court stressed that the possibility of domestic violence cannot be curtailed if a woman can show she was in a domestic relationship as per Section 2(f), whether or not there is an uncontested, formal marriage certificate in place.

C. Impact

The judgment has significant implications for future cases under the DV Act:

• It clarifies that the DV Act extends protection to women in relationships that are in the nature of marriage, even amidst unclear or disputed marital statuses.
• Trial courts are reminded that preliminary documentary contradictions do not automatically oust a claim under the DV Act. Courts need to hear evidence to determine if a domestic relationship in the nature of marriage actually existed.
• It underscores that the evidentiary stage is crucial for clarifying the validity or nature of competing marriage claims; mere documents from the respondent, if contested, should not summarily affect the maintainability of a complaint.
• More broadly, it reinforces India’s jurisprudence on protecting the rights of women who might face domestic violence, even when the legal status of their marriage is not yet fully established.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Domestic Relationship: Under Section 2(f) of the DV Act, a domestic relationship covers partnerships where two people live (or have lived) together in a shared household. This provision applies whether the relationship is by blood (consanguinity), by marriage, or “in the nature of marriage,” covering a live-in relationship or an otherwise informal union.

2. Relationship in the Nature of Marriage: This concept acknowledges that legal marriage is not the only basis for a cohabitating relationship deserving legal protection. If a man and a woman conduct themselves as spouses and reside in a common household, the law can regard their relationship as akin to a marriage for addressing domestic abuse claims.

3. Maintainability of Complaint Under DV Act: Before dismissing a complaint, the judge must accept the core allegations as true unless they are plainly unsubstantiated. The Court cannot simply reject a claim based on the respondent’s say-so, particularly when documentary evidence (like a “Friendship Agreement” or additional marriage certificates) is disputed.

Conclusion

The High Court’s decision in Anamika Chandel v. Dr. Naresh Chandel underscores that legal relief under the DV Act does not hinge solely on the uncontested validity of a formal marriage certificate. Instead, courts are duty-bound to explore whether parties had a relationship “in the nature of marriage” and whether domestic violence occurred within that relationship. By setting aside the lower court’s dismissal and restoring the petitioner’s complaint, the High Court reaffirmed the broad remedial purpose of the DV Act, ensuring that a potentially aggrieved woman’s rights are not negated by technical or preliminary documentary objections.

In the broader legal context, this judgment strengthens protections for women in non-traditional or disputed marital arrangements, highlighting the Act’s forward-looking intent. Parties alleging harm under the DV Act can now be more confident that courts will first examine the circumstances of their domestic relationship in detail before deciding the matter on its merits.