Reasserting the Limits of Article 227 and Clarifying the Effect of “No Instructions” Pursis:
Commentary on Shri Digant v. M/s P.D.T. Trading Co. & Ors., 2025 INSC 1352

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Shri Digant v. M/s P.D.T. Trading Co. & Ors. (2025 INSC 1352, decided on 18 November 2025) is a significant reaffirmation of two interconnected principles:

• The limited, supervisory nature of High Court jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution over civil court judgments; and
• The legal effect of an advocate’s “no instructions” pursis when the vakalatnama has not been formally withdrawn in accordance with rules.

The case arose from a landlord–tenant dispute under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, but the Supreme Court chose not to re-enter the merits of the eviction. Instead, it focused squarely on whether the High Court was justified, in exercise of its writ/supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226/227, in setting aside a reasoned appellate judgment and remanding the suit on the ground that the tenant was allegedly deprived of an opportunity to lead evidence due to his advocate’s “no instructions” pursis.

The Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s remand order, restored the decree of the Small Causes Court as affirmed by the appellate court, and delineated the proper limits of Article 227 intervention, while also clarifying that a litigant cannot claim a denial of natural justice by remaining evasive and indifferent to communications from his own counsel.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Eviction Suit

The appellant–landlord (Shri Digant) instituted Civil Suit No. 85 of 2014 against the respondent–tenants (M/s P.D.T. Trading Co. and others) for possession under Sections 16(1)(g) and (n) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. These provisions broadly relate to:

• Section 16(1)(g): landlord’s bona fide requirement; and
• Section 16(1)(n): often used for other statutory grounds (e.g., non-user, change of user), depending on the exact sub-clause invoked.

Summons were served on the defendants, but:

• Defendants 2 and 3 remained absent; the suit was ordered to proceed ex parte against them on 19.04.2014.
• Defendant 1 also failed to appear, and proceedings were ordered ex parte against him on 24.06.2014.

Subsequently, the defendants appeared, sought recall of the ex parte orders, succeeded, and filed written statements. The matter then moved to the evidence stage.

B. The “No Instructions” Pursis (Exhibit 42)

During the trial:

• Defendants’ counsel applied for deletion of defendant no. 3 from the array (Exh. 40). That application was rejected on 26.11.2014.
• On the same date, counsel filed a pursis (Exh. 42) stating he had no instructions from the defendants because they were not attending his office. He annexed a copy of a notice dated 20.11.2014 sent by RPAD (Registered Post Acknowledgment Due) to his clients, warning them that if they did not contact him, future action (including possible withdrawal) might be taken.

Crucially:

• The pursis did not expressly state that the advocate was withdrawing his vakalatnama.
• The trial court never passed any order granting leave to withdraw the vakalatnama.
• On the very day he filed the pursis, the advocate continued to appear and argued Exh. 40 (defendant no. 3’s application for deletion).

The suit then proceeded, the plaintiff’s evidence was recorded, and on 04.03.2015 the Small Causes Court decreed the suit in favour of the landlord.

C. First Appeal under Section 34 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act

The defendants appealed under Section 34 of the 1999 Act. Their principal contention was:

• Once counsel filed a “no instructions” pursis, the trial court ought to have:
  • followed the procedure for withdrawal of vakalatnama under the Civil Manual and the Bombay High Court Rules; and
  • issued notice to the defendants to enable them to engage another advocate.

They claimed that, because this was not done, they had been denied a fair opportunity to lead evidence and defend the suit.

The appellate court (District Judge) undertook a detailed analysis (paras 13–25 of its judgment, reproduced in the Supreme Court’s order). Its key findings included:

• The pursis (Exh. 42) did not amount to withdrawal of the vakalatnama. It was merely a communication that the client was not giving instructions, accompanied by the copy of a notice dated 20.11.2014.
• The notice to the defendants had been sent by RPAD, attracting a presumption of due service under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act.
• The defendants, in their appeal, maintained a studied silence on whether they had received the 20.11.2014 notice. They neither admitted nor denied receipt, despite repeated opportunities.
• This evasiveness showed lack of bona fides. A litigant cannot build an appeal by avoiding a clear stand on a critical factual issue within his exclusive knowledge.
• Even after filing Exh. 42, the advocate continued to participate (e.g., in Exh. 40). Thus, Exh. 42 could not be treated as a formal withdrawal of appearance under the Advocates Act or the Civil Manual.
• The defendants were businessmen, not rustic or uninformed litigants; their conduct—previously allowing the matter to go ex parte, getting it set aside, and then again failing to give instructions—showed casualness and indifference.
• Cited precedents such as Rafiq v. Munshilal, AIR 1981 SC 1400, and various Bombay High Court decisions were distinguished on facts, primarily because in those cases the litigant was demonstrably blameless, whereas here the defendants were evasive and inactive.

Accordingly, the appellate court held that the trial court had not erred in proceeding with the matter and dismissed the appeal by its order dated 16.06.2021.

D. Writ Petition before the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench)

The defendants then invoked Articles 226/227 of the Constitution by filing Writ Petition No. 4227 of 2021 before the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench. The Supreme Court records (para 9) that:

“the only point urged before the High Court was that the Trial Court gave no opportunity to the defendants to lead evidence after the counsel representing the defendants had submitted pursis (Exhibit-42), claiming no instructions.”

To deal with that submission, the High Court relied on:

• Clause 660(4) of the Civil Manual (Bombay High Court), and
• Rule 8(4) of Chapter XXXII of Schedule VII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 (framed under Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act).

Both provisions, in substance, require that where an advocate who has filed a vakalatnama wishes to withdraw:

• He must serve a written notice of his intention on the client at least seven days in advance of the next date of hearing.
• He must seek leave of the court to withdraw by filing a written note along with:
  • either the client’s letter instructing withdrawal, or
  • a copy of the intimation to the client plus the client’s written acknowledgment.
• The court may then permit withdrawal if it is satisfied no inconvenience will be caused to the court or the client.

The High Court noted:

• The notice by the advocate was dated 20.11.2014, but postal records showed it was posted only on 25.11.2014.
• The “no instructions” pursis (Exh. 42) was filed on 26.11.2014.
• Therefore, there was clearly no seven-day advance notice as mandated by Clause 660(4)/Rule 8(4).
• There was also no material to show that the notice was ever served on the tenant; no acknowledgment was produced.

The High Court concluded that the trial court had accepted the “no instructions” pursis “on the face of it” without ensuring compliance with the mandatory procedural safeguards, thereby depriving the tenant of an effective opportunity to participate. On that basis, the High Court:

• Set aside the trial court decree and the appellate judgment; and
• Remanded the matter to the Small Causes Court for fresh decision after giving the tenant a fair opportunity.

E. Appeal to the Supreme Court

The landlord challenged the High Court’s order by way of special leave, which was granted, converting the matter into Civil Appeal No. 13801/2025.

The landlord’s submissions (para 16) included:

• Between the date of Exh. 42 and the date of judgment, more than three months elapsed; in that period, the defendants made no effort to appear, engage a new counsel, or participate.
• The trial court never permitted withdrawal of vakalatnama; the counsel merely stated “no instructions” and annexed his letter.
• The appellate court had found that the defendants did not even assert that the letter was not served on them; their own inaction was the real cause.
• There was no complaint or disciplinary action against the previous advocate, suggesting that counsel misconduct was not even seriously alleged.
• The High Court had overstepped its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 by re-evaluating factual aspects already considered in detail by the first appellate court, without any jurisdictional error being shown.

The tenant’s counsel defended the High Court’s order on the footing that non-compliance with Clause 660(4)/Rule 8(4) meant that the tenant was unrepresented without fault on his part, and the remand was a just consequence.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order dated 30.01.2023, and restored the decree of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. The key holdings are:

1. On the scope of Article 227: The High Court’s interference was beyond the permissible limits of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. The first appellate court had given a detailed, reasoned judgment on the precise issue raised (effect of Exh. 42 and alleged denial of opportunity). Its view was at least a plausible view on facts and law; such a view is not open to correction under Article 227, absent a jurisdictional error or grave injustice.
2. On the effect of the “no instructions” pursis: The counsel had not sought withdrawal of vakalatnama; the trial court had not permitted such withdrawal. Therefore, the High Court’s elaborate invocation of rules regarding withdrawal of appearance was “misconceived”. The appellate court’s conclusion that the defendants could not take advantage of their own indifference and evasiveness was justified.
3. No other grounds survived: Before the High Court, only the “denial of opportunity” point was pressed; no other ground was argued. Given that the plaintiff’s evidence was unrebutted and the appellate court had already considered the Exh. 42 issue, there was no warrant to disturb the concurrent findings and decree.

Consequently, Writ Petition No. 4227 of 2021 stands dismissed, and the eviction decree in favour of the landlord is final, subject to any execution-related proceedings.

IV. Analysis of Legal Issues and Reasoning

A. The Scope of High Court Jurisdiction under Articles 226/227

The Supreme Court devoted a discrete portion of the judgment (paras 21–23) to clarifying the scope of High Court powers under Articles 226 and 227 in relation to orders of civil courts.

1. Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath (2015) 5 SCC 423

The Court cited the three-Judge Bench decision in Radhey Shyam & Anr. v. Chhabi Nath & Ors. which settled that:

• Judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to writs of certiorari under Article 226.
• Such orders may be scrutinised under Article 227, but that power is supervisory and must be used sparingly.

The judgment then referred to the classic enumeration (drawn from Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675) of situations warranting Article 227 intervention, namely:

• Where the court/tribunal has assumed jurisdiction it does not possess;
• Where it has failed to exercise jurisdiction it does possess, leading to failure of justice; or
• Where jurisdiction is being exercised in a manner that oversteps its limits or results in grave injustice.

Crucially, the Court emphasized that Article 227 is not a vehicle for correcting mere errors of fact or law or for reappreciating evidence. It is aimed at keeping subordinate courts “within the bounds of their authority,” not at providing yet another level of appeal.

2. Application to the Present Case

Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court noted:

• The appellate court had “considered in detail” the effect of Exh. 42 and, after a “threadbare analysis,” concluded that the trial court had not erred in proceeding with the case.
• The appellate court’s reasoning included:
  • Distinguishing Exh. 42 from a formal withdrawal of vakalatnama;
  • Considering the RPAD notice and presumption of service;
  • Assessing the defendants’ prior conduct and evasive stance on receipt of notice; and
  • Concluding the defendants “cannot take advantage of his [their] own wrong”.
• This was, at the very least, a plausible view supported by material on record.

Once that is accepted, the High Court’s role under Article 227 was limited. Even if the High Court might have taken a different view on the same facts, that does not justify intervention, absent:

• Jurisdictional overreach or failure; or
• A grave miscarriage of justice.

The Supreme Court found no such jurisdictional error. Instead, it held that the High Court had “clearly exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227” by effectively substituting its view for that of the appellate court on a matter of factual and procedural evaluation.

B. “No Instructions” Pursis vs. Withdrawal of Vakalatnama

1. The High Court’s Approach

The High Court treated the filing of the “no instructions” pursis (Exh. 42) as if it were synonymous with withdrawal of vakalatnama. It then tested the situation against Clause 660(4) of the Civil Manual and Rule 8(4) of the Appellate Side Rules, and concluded:

• The statutory requirement of seven days’ prior notice had been violated (notice dated 20.11.2014, posted 25.11.2014; pursis filed 26.11.2014); and
• There was no proof of service of the notice on the tenant.

Building on this, the High Court held that the tenant had been deprived of a chance to engage another counsel, and that the trial and appellate courts had, by accepting Exh. 42 without ensuring compliance with those rules, violated the procedural safeguards designed to protect litigants from going unrepresented.

2. The Supreme Court’s Critique

The Supreme Court disagreed at a more fundamental level. It accepted the appellate court’s characterization that:

• Exh. 42 was not a withdrawal of vakalatnama, but merely a statement of “no instructions,” accompanied by a prior warning letter to the client.
• No leave of the court for withdrawal of appearance was sought or granted.
• On the same day, counsel actively participated in other aspects of the case (Exh. 40), showing that he had not, in fact, withdrawn.

On that premise, the Supreme Court held that the High Court’s extensive reliance on rules governing formal withdrawal of vakalatnama was misplaced:

“once the appellate court took into consideration all relevant aspects including the fact that pursis (Exh.42) did not seek withdrawal of the Vakalatnama, and withdrawal was not even permitted, there was no such jurisdictional error which warranted exercise of powers under Article 227… The High Court without any justification went on to consider the procedure prescribed for withdrawal of Vakalatnama when neither withdrawal of Vakalatnama was permitted by the Trial Court nor the pursis prayed for its withdrawal. In such circumstances, the entire exercise of the High Court was misconceived.” (para 23)

The Court implicitly draws a sharp doctrinal distinction between:

• “No instructions” – an advocate informing the court that he is receiving no cooperation or instructions from the client; and
• “Withdrawal of vakalatnama/appearance” – a formal, procedural step governed by the Advocates Act, Civil Manual, and High Court Rules, requiring notice and leave of court.

The procedural safeguards in Clause 660(4)/Rule 8(4) are triggered only when withdrawal is actually sought. They cannot be retrospectively used to:

• Treat any “no instructions” pursis as equivalent to withdrawal; or
• Invalidate proceedings simply because the litigant later claims to have been unaware, especially when his own conduct suggests otherwise.

This clarification is a key doctrinal contribution of the judgment.

C. Litigant’s Conduct and the Principle Against Benefiting from One’s Own Wrong

Another central pillar of the Supreme Court’s reasoning is the emphasis on the defendants’ own conduct. Adopting and endorsing the appellate court’s appraisal, the Court noted:

• The defendants had earlier allowed proceedings to go ex parte, only to seek recall—indicating a pattern of non-diligence.
• After Exh. 42, the case remained pending for about three months; yet the defendants neither appeared nor made any move to engage a new counsel.
• They never squaredly stated whether they had received the 20.11.2014 notice from their counsel, despite repeated opportunities. This fact was within their exclusive knowledge.
• They did not complain against their counsel or initiate any professional misconduct proceedings, which one might expect if the counsel had truly acted in derogation of instructions.

In these circumstances, the appellate court concluded, and the Supreme Court agreed, that:

• The defendants were “casual, lazy and indifferent”; and
• They could not, in law or equity, be allowed to benefit from their own wrong (or inaction) by seeking to set aside a decree on the plea of counsel’s conduct.

This analysis also explains why the principle laid down in Rafiq & Anr. v. Munshilal & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 1400 (“a party should not suffer for the misdemeanor or inaction of his counsel”) was deemed inapplicable. That doctrine presupposes that:

• The fault lies predominantly with counsel, and
• The litigant is bona fide and has not contributed to or acquiesced in the lapse.

Here, by contrast, the defendants’ own evasiveness about the RPAD notice and prolonged inaction undermined any claim to such equitable indulgence. In other words, Rafiq protects the diligent but unlucky litigant, not the deliberately indifferent one.

D. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai

As noted above, Radhey Shyam clarified that civil court judgments are not subject to certiorari under Article 226 but may be examined under Article 227, with severe limits. Surya Dev Rai had earlier discussed when supervisory jurisdiction could be invoked; its list of grounds (jurisdictional error, failure to exercise jurisdiction, grave injustice) was reproduced with approval.

In Shri Digant, the Supreme Court uses these precedents to:

• Draw a clear line between supervisory and appellate jurisdiction; and
• Demonstrate that the High Court cannot transform Article 227 proceedings into a de facto second appeal on facts and procedure.

2. Rafiq v. Munshilal; Goswami Krishna Murarilal; Lachi Tewari

These Supreme Court decisions were extensively discussed by the first appellate court:

• Rafiq & Anr. v. Munshilal & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 1400 – held that an innocent party should not suffer due to counsel’s default in appearance.
• Goswami Krishna Murarilal Sharma v. Dhan Prakash & Ors., (1981) 4 SCC 574; and
• Lachi Tewari & Ors. v. Director of Land Records & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 41 – both reflecting the Court’s willingness, in appropriate cases, to set aside orders where parties suffer for no fault of their own on account of counsel or procedural lapses.

The appellate court, after analysing the specific facts of each decision, concluded that:

• The present case was “drastically different” because the defendants were actively evasive about a crucial fact (receipt of the notice) and had shown consistent indifference.
• They could not simply “blame his [their] previous counsel to seek sympathy” from the court.

The Supreme Court did not re-elaborate these cases but, by expressly approving the appellate court’s approach and restoring its judgment, endorsed the distinction drawn: past precedents excusing litigants from counsel’s fault do not create a blanket immunity from the consequences of one’s own indifference.

3. Bombay High Court Decisions

The appellate court also discussed Bombay High Court rulings, such as:

• Govinda Bhagoji Kamble & Ors. v. Sadu Bapu Kamble & Ors., 2005 (1) Mh.L.J. 651; and
• Rameshkumar Vyankatswami Poona v. Swami Vivekanand Co-op. Housing Society, Shrirampur & Anr., 2018 (6) Mh.L.J. 227.

It distinguished these cases primarily on:

• The nature of notice and withdrawal of vakalatnama; and
• The litigant’s bona fides (or lack thereof) in each factual matrix.

Again, the Supreme Court did not reanalyze these cases in depth, but affirmed the appellate court’s conclusion that those precedents, which often favour litigants who are kept in the dark by counsel, do not extend to litigants who evade clear questions about receipt of counsel’s communications.

E. Interpretation of Procedural Rules: Clause 660(4) and Rule 8(4)

The High Court’s analysis was strongly rooted in:

• Clause 660(4) of the Civil Manual – governing trial court practice; and
• Rule 8(4) of Chapter XXXII, Appellate Side Rules, 1960 – framed under Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act.

Both provisions, as extracted in the Supreme Court judgment, require:

• Seven days’ prior written notice of withdrawal by the advocate to the client;
• A written note to the court seeking permission to withdraw; and
• Filing of the client’s instructions or acknowledgment of intimation.

The Supreme Court’s key move was to hold that:

• These provisions are relevant only when an advocate “wishes to withdraw his appearance” and seeks leave of the court to do so.
• They do not apply where, as here:
  • The advocate does not ask to withdraw;
  • The court does not grant permission to withdraw; and
  • The advocate continues to appear in some capacity.

Thus, the rules cannot be used to retroactively categorise every “no instructions” intimation as a de facto withdrawal, nor to invalidate proceedings that continued in the absence of fresh counsel where the litigant himself was indifferent and evasive.

This preserves the protective function of Clause 660(4)/Rule 8(4) for genuine cases of withdrawal, while avoiding their misuse as an engine of delay or as a post-facto basis for re-opening concluded litigation.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Vakalatnama

A vakalatnama is a written authority given by a party to a case authorising a lawyer to act and appear on his behalf in court. Once filed, it remains in force until:

• The party revokes it; or
• The advocate withdraws with leave of the court; or
• The case concludes.

2. Pursis

A pursis (commonly used in Maharashtra and some other jurisdictions) is a written note or memorandum filed before the court, usually to inform it of some factual or procedural development (e.g., settlement, no instructions, concessions, or requests).

A “no instructions” pursis simply tells the court that the advocate is not receiving instructions from the client. It is not, by itself, a formal withdrawal of appearance unless expressly so stated and followed through with the required procedure.

3. RPAD and Presumption of Service

RPAD stands for Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. When a letter is sent by RPAD:

• Postal records and the law (Section 27 of the General Clauses Act) create a presumption that it was delivered to the addressee in the ordinary course.
• The addressee can rebut this presumption by clearly stating and proving that he never received it; silence or evasiveness typically works against him.

4. Ex Parte Proceedings and Recall

When a party, despite service of summons or notice, fails to appear, the court may proceed ex parte, i.e., in his absence, and pass orders or decrees. Such orders can later be set aside (recalled) if the absent party shows:

• Sufficient cause for non-appearance; and
• Bona fide intent to contest the matter thereafter.

However, repeated default or casual conduct makes it increasingly difficult to secure such indulgence.

5. Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution

• Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue writs (including certiorari, mandamus, etc.) for enforcement of fundamental and other legal rights. After Radhey Shyam, judicial orders of civil courts are generally not amenable to certiorari under Article 226.
• Article 227 gives High Courts a power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals in its territory. This is not an appellate power; it is meant to ensure that subordinate courts:
  • Act within their jurisdiction;
  • Follow basic principles of law and procedure; and
  • Do not cause grave injustice.

Under Article 227, High Courts cannot:

• Re-weigh evidence as in an appeal;
• Interfere merely because a different view is possible; or
• Convert the writ jurisdiction into a routine second appeal.

6. Section 16 and Section 34 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999

• Section 16(1)(g) & (n): Provide certain statutory grounds on which a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant (e.g., bona fide requirement, specific defaults, etc.).
• Section 34: Provides for an appeal against certain orders of the rent court (Small Causes Court), usually to the District Court or designated appellate authority.

In this case, the landlord’s decree under Section 16(1)(g) & (n) was affirmed by the appellate court under Section 34, and ultimately restored by the Supreme Court.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. For High Courts: Re-emphasised Restraint under Article 227

The judgment serves as a robust reminder that High Courts must:

• Resist the temptation to re-try or reweigh civil disputes under the guise of supervisory jurisdiction.
• Interfere only in cases of jurisdictional error, serious procedural irregularity causing manifest injustice, or situations akin to denial of natural justice where the litigant is blameless.
• Show particular deference to first appellate courts, which are the final fact-finding bodies in civil litigation. Once such a court has carefully considered a procedural grievance (as here, regarding Exh. 42), the High Court should not supplant that reasoning absent a clear error of jurisdiction or principle.

In practice, this decision may curtail the increasingly common practice of using Article 227 petitions to re-open decrees on thin or technical grounds, especially where lower courts have already given reasoned decisions.

B. For Trial and Appellate Courts: Handling “No Instructions” Situations

The decision provides comfort to trial courts that:

• They are not automatically obliged to adjourn matters or issue fresh notices whenever an advocate files a “no instructions” pursis, particularly where:
  • There is a history of delays or ex parte conduct by the party; and
  • The advocate has not formally withdrawn and continues to appear.
• They may proceed to judgment if:
  • Service of summons and relevant communications is established or presumable; and
  • The litigant has demonstrated indifference or non-cooperation.

Appellate courts, for their part, are reassured that detailed factual and procedural evaluation of such issues, resulting in a plausible conclusion, will normally be respected by the Supreme Court and insulated from interference under Article 227.

C. For Advocates: Compliance with Withdrawal Rules Still Important

While the Supreme Court held that Clause 660(4)/Rule 8(4) were not directly triggered here (because no formal withdrawal was sought), the judgment should not be read as diluting those safeguards. Rather:

• Advocates who do intend to withdraw must scrupulously comply with:
  • Advance written notice to clients;
  • Filing of appropriate notes and acknowledgments; and
  • Obtaining leave of the court.
• However, if an advocate merely indicates “no instructions” while continuing to appear, and the client remains silent and inactive despite communication, courts are not obliged to treat this as a withdrawal that automatically invalidates subsequent proceedings.

The judgment thus maintains the integrity of professional rules while preventing their opportunistic invocation by indifferent litigants at a later stage.

D. For Litigants: Duty of Diligence and Candour

Perhaps the strongest policy message is directed at litigants:

• Litigants must act with diligence:
  • Respond to counsel’s communications;
  • Attend court when notified; and
  • Take proactive steps if they learn of adverse proceedings.
• They must also maintain candour with the court:
  • If asked whether a notice (like the 20.11.2014 RPAD letter) was received, they must answer clearly, not remain evasive.
  • Silence on such a point can be taken as indicative of lack of bona fides.
• They cannot expect appellate or writ courts to rescue them from the consequences of their own indifference by blame-shifting onto former counsel without substantive proof.

This has systemic implications: it discourages strategic non-participation and late-stage attempts to revive litigation by alleging denial of opportunity unbacked by clear factual assertions.

E. For Landlord–Tenant Litigation

Although the Supreme Court did not address the substantive grounds of eviction, the practical effect is substantial for landlord–tenant disputes:

• The eviction decree, obtained in 2015 and affirmed in 2021, remains intact, avoiding further delay due to remand.
• The judgment signals judicial unwillingness to prolong already aged rent matters on purely procedural or technical pleas when:
  • The landlord has led unrebutted evidence; and
  • The tenant’s procedural grievance has been fully examined and rejected at the appellate level.

In jurisdictions where rent control litigation often drags on for years or decades, this case may be cited to support finality where tenants have had, but not utilised, opportunities to contest.

VII. Conclusion

Shri Digant v. M/s P.D.T. Trading Co. & Ors. is an important reaffirmation and refinement of two key strands of Indian procedural law:

1. The limits of Article 227 jurisdiction: High Courts must exercise great restraint when asked to interfere with civil court judgments. Even perceived procedural lapses do not warrant intervention if a competent appellate court has already conducted a detailed analysis and reached a plausible conclusion, absent jurisdictional error or manifest injustice.
2. The treatment of “no instructions” by counsel: A mere “no instructions” pursis, unaccompanied by a formal request to withdraw vakalatnama and an order granting withdrawal, does not automatically trigger the safeguards applicable to withdrawal of appearance. Where the litigant’s own conduct shows indifference and evasiveness, courts are entitled to proceed, and the litigant cannot later invoke those safeguards to undo a lawful decree.

By restoring the trial decree and the appellate judgment, the Supreme Court has:

• Reinforced the finality of civil proceedings appropriately scrutinised by the first appellate court;
• Discouraged strategic blame on counsel as a universal ground for reopening litigation; and
• Clarified the proper application of procedural rules governing advocates’ withdrawal in a way that balances protection of litigants with the need for procedural efficiency and honesty.

In the broader legal landscape, this decision will likely be cited both as a leading authority on the bounds of Article 227 and as a cautionary precedent for litigants and lawyers regarding responsibility, candour, and the consequences of procedural indifference.