Reaffirming the “Plausible-View” Doctrine in Rape-Acquittal Appeals – A Detailed Commentary on State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sanjay Kumar (2025 INSC 561)

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sanjay Kumar and the companion appeal involving Chaman Shukla revisits two enduring questions in criminal jurisprudence: (1) to what extent an appellate court may interfere with an acquittal when the prosecution rests primarily on the testimony of a child-prosecutrix, and (2) what evidentiary threshold must be met to convert suspicion of rape into proof beyond reasonable doubt. The case arose from the alleged kidnapping and rape of a 14-year-old girl in March 2012. The Trial Court convicted Sanjay Kumar (kidnapping, rape, abduction, destruction of evidence) and Chaman Shukla (destruction of evidence). The Himachal Pradesh High Court reversed these findings, citing material inconsistencies and lack of corroboration. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, which has now affirmed the High Court, thereby solidifying the “plausible-view” restraint on appellate interference with acquittals, especially in sexual-offence cases where the evidence is equivocal.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Court (Ahsanuddin Amanullah & Prashant K. Mishra, JJ.) dismissed both State appeals.
• It held that material contradictions in the prosecutrix’s statements (FIR, s.164 CrPC, and in-court testimony) created reasonable doubt about the prosecution’s version.
• Absence of independent corroboration (medical DNA, tower location records, PW-6’s non-support) weakened the prosecution.
• Applying the settled rule that an acquittal may be reversed only when the High Court’s view is “manifestly illegal or perverse”, the Court found the High Court’s assessment to be a “plausible view” and therefore immune from interference.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited / Invoked

Although the reported text does not list authorities exhaustively, the following line of precedents forms the bedrock of the Court’s reasoning and is expressly or implicitly invoked:

• Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 – sets out the five guiding principles for appellate interference with acquittals (substantial and compelling reasons, no reversal on mere possibility of another view, “plausible view” doctrine).
• Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 – reiterates that an acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence.
• State of Rajasthan v. Abdul Mannan (2011) 8 SCC 65 – emphasises that inconsistencies striking at the core of prosecution make conviction unsafe.
• State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384 & Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai (1983) 3 SCC 217 – lay down that conviction can rest on sole testimony of prosecutrix if it is trustworthy; but those very cases caution that the testimony must inspire confidence and be substantially consistent.
• Rajoo v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) 15 SCC 133 – holds that medical evidence is corroborative but not indispensable, yet absence thereof assumes significance when prosecution version is shaky.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Supreme Court

1. Material Contradictions: The prosecutrix placed the alleged rape on 31 March in her s.164 statement but shifted it to 30 March during trial, and attributed different locations (house of PW-6 v. house of Shukla). Such contradictions were deemed “material” – affecting the core substratum – rather than mere embellishments.
2. Silence and Conduct of the Victim: The Court noted her admitted failure to raise an alarm or disclose coercion to PW-6, Shukla, villagers, or even to the police at Rampur, which undermined spontaneity and consistency expected in genuine cases of abduction by a stranger.
3. Missing Independent Evidence: (a) PW-6 did not support the prosecution; (b) Call-detail records (CDRs) and tower locations, allegedly central to tracing, were withheld; (c) DNA profiling of semen stains was not conducted. The Court drew an adverse inference under Illustration (g) to s.114, Evidence Act.
4. Age Factor Irrelevant Once Main Charge Fails: Although the prosecutrix was a minor (14 years), which would render any intercourse statutory rape, that finding could not rescue the prosecution because the identity of the perpetrator remained unproved.
5. Re-appraisal Standard: Citing Chandrappa, the Court reiterated that an appellate court may re-appraise evidence but should not upset an acquittal if the lower court’s view is “a possible and reasonable view” based on the record. The High Court’s conclusion that rape was not proved beyond reasonable doubt satisfied this test.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

The decision is unlikely to revolutionise substantive rape law, but its procedural consequences are significant:

• Stricter Evidentiary Expectations in Child-Rape Prosecutions: Investigators must not rely exclusively on the victim’s testimony where other corroboration is readily available (DNA, CDRs, witnesses at safe-houses).
• Plausible-View Barrier Fortified: States contemplating appeals against acquittals in sexual-offence cases must now cross a higher threshold by demonstrating perversity, not mere disagreement. The judgment serves as a caution against reflexive appellate challenges in sensitive cases.
• Role of Forensic & Digital Evidence: The Court’s adverse inference for non-production of tower data and DNA profiles signals that 21st-century prosecutions cannot ignore available scientific aids.
• Victim-Centric Yet Fair-Trial Balance: While earlier case-law stressed credence to the prosecutrix, the present decision reminds courts that such deference is not absolute and must yield where serious inconsistencies exist.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Plausible-View Doctrine: If two interpretations of evidence are reasonably possible, the one favouring the accused (especially an acquitted accused) must prevail. The appellate court interferes only when the lower court’s view is “manifestly illegal” or “grossly perverse”.
• Material vs. Minor Contradiction: A contradiction is “material” when it strikes at a vital element (time, place, identity, act). Minor contradictions involve peripheral details (exact timings, incidental descriptions) and don’t usually derail a prosecution.
• Adverse Inference (s.114(g), Evidence Act): When a party suppresses evidence within its control (e.g., CDRs, DNA), the court may presume that such evidence would have been unfavourable to that party.
• Presumption of Innocence Post-Acquittal: Once an accused is acquitted, the presumption of innocence is strengthened, making it harder for an appellate court to convict without very weighty reasons.
• Section 164 CrPC Statement: A voluntary statement recorded before a Magistrate; though not substantive evidence, it can be used to corroborate or contradict the witness during trial.

5. Conclusion

State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sanjay Kumar does not carve an entirely new legal path but powerfully consolidates existing jurisprudence on three fronts: (a) the autonomy of appellate courts is circumscribed by the “plausible-view” doctrine when faced with acquittals; (b) in offences against minors, the prosecution still bears the burden of excluding reasonable doubt through consistent testimony and scientific corroboration; and (c) the judiciary remains committed to balancing victim-centric sensitivities with the accused’s right to a fair trial. The judgment thus stands as a cautionary tale for investigators and prosecutors: emotional gravity of sexual-offence cases cannot substitute for rigorous evidence collection, lest acquittals—once recorded—become virtually immune from appellate reversal.