Reaffirming the Distinction Between False Promise and Breach of Promise to Marry

1. Introduction

In Jaspal Singh Kaural v. The State of NCT of Delhi (2025 INSC 457), the Supreme Court of India revisited and clarified the law on what constitutes “rape” based on a promise to marry. The case highlights the delicate human and legal aspects that arise when parties enter into long-term intimate relationships, in which one party alleges that consent to physical intimacy was obtained under a false promise to marry. The Court, in weighing the evidence and legal precedents, has further refined the distinction between a genuine but unfulfilled promise to marry (breach of promise) and a “false promise” made solely to procure sexual relations.

The appellant, Mr. Jaspal Singh Kaural, challenged an order of the High Court of Delhi, which had set aside his discharge under Sections 376 (rape) and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Supreme Court ultimately allowed the appeal, restored the trial court’s discharge, and put an end to the criminal proceedings against him under these sections.

This commentary will explore the key aspects and implications of the Judgment, focusing on how the Supreme Court applied established principles to the facts at hand. It also addresses how this decision shapes the approach toward prosecution in “promise to marry” cases, particularly under Section 376 IPC.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s order discharging the appellant from charges under Sections 376 and 506 of the IPC. The primary allegations were that the appellant had engaged in a physical relationship with the complainant/respondent (while both were in subsisting marriages) on the promise to marry her once both parties were divorced. When the relationship soured, the complainant filed a First Information Report (FIR), alleging rape and criminal intimidation.

The trial court, after evaluating the evidence, found that the complainant had consensually entered into the relationship, fully aware of her own circumstances and the potential consequences. It concluded that there was neither a dishonest inducement nor a fraudulent intent behind the appellant’s promise to marry. The High Court reversed this discharge, holding that there was prima facie material to frame charges under Sections 376/506 IPC. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court, which restored the trial court’s order of discharge.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that not every promise to marry that remains unfulfilled automatically translates into a prosecutable rape charge. The Court emphasized the difference between a false promise from the outset and a genuine promise that could not be carried out due to unforeseen circumstances.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

One of the leading precedents the Court relied on is the decision in Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT) of Delhi [2023], where the Court made a nuanced distinction between a false promise made only to obtain sexual consent and a sincere promise subsequently broken. In Naim Ahmed, the prosecutrix (also a married woman) entered into a five-year relationship with the accused under assurances of marriage. The Court held that her consent did not fall under the “misconception of fact” category because the record suggested that she entered the relationship consciously.

Other recent cases, such as Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra and Prashant v. State of NCT Delhi, reinforce that an act of consensual intimacy followed by a breach or inability to fulfill a promise of marriage does not, by itself, amount to rape. These rulings collectively stand for the principle that a mere breach of promise, without dishonest or fraudulent intent, cannot meet the legal threshold under Section 375 IPC.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

In its legal reasoning, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of examining the complainant’s state of mind at the time she consented to the physical relationship. If the promise to marry is made purely to deceive, with no intention of fulfilling it, then consent is vitiated by “misconception of fact.” On the other hand, if there is at least a possibility that the accused intended to fulfill the promise but events later changed the course, then it is a breach of promise rather than a false promise.

The Court highlighted:

• Lack of Fraudulent Intent Initially: The record did not suggest that the appellant had an illicit or deceitful motive. He appeared to have taken certain affirmative steps—arguably indicating his intention to marry the complainant at some stage.
• Consensual Relationship Over a Prolonged Period: The complainant and appellant knew each other since 2011, reconnected in 2016, and remained in a sexual/romantic relationship for several years, despite both originally being in subsisting marriages.
• Section 506 IPC (Criminal Intimidation) Not Made Out: The Court found no credible evidence of genuine threats or intimidation. The promise to marry and any disagreements thereafter did not rise to the level of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC.

3.3 Impact

The Judgment has significant implications for future cases:

1. Clarification on Consent: It underscores that consent given by an individual fully aware of the nature of the act cannot be retroactively deemed “non-consensual” unless there was a conscious attempt from the outset to mislead.
2. Stricter Scrutiny of “Promise to Marry” Allegations: Courts will scrutinize the materials on record at the stage of framing charges to distinguish consensual breaches of promise from fraudulent inducement.
3. Reiteration of Revisional Jurisdiction Limits: The Judgment reaffirms that High Courts should be cautious in interfering with discharge orders, unless the trial court’s findings are manifestly perverse or unsupported by evidence.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

A crucial element in this case is the concept of “consent under misconception of fact,” as found in Section 375 of IPC. If consent is obtained by deceit—where the accused never intended to fulfill a promise of marriage—then consent is vitiated. However, distinguishing deceitful intent from a simple breach of promise requires examining the factual matrix. If it appears that, at the time the sexual relationship commenced, both individuals genuinely believed a future marriage was feasible, no offence of rape is made out solely by later non-fulfillment of that promise.

Also relevant is the procedure under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). This provision empowers a Sessions Court to discharge an accused if, after examining the case records and documents, the judge deems there is not sufficient ground to proceed. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that a Court is not to conduct a “mini-trial” at this stage but only to see whether the prosecution’s materials disclose the offence alleged.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Jaspal Singh Kaural v. The State of NCT of Delhi reinforces the principle that consent consciously given by an adult, even if based on a subsequent unfulfilled promise to marry, does not per se amount to rape under Section 376 IPC. The real key is whether the accused harbored a fraudulent intention from the very beginning to exploit the complainant. Without such an element of deception, a relationship that begins consensually remains so in the eyes of the law, and any later breakdown is more accurately a civil or personal matter rather than a criminal one. This Judgment thus adds a vital layer of clarity, ensuring that not every relationship failure is transformed into a criminal prosecution.

This decisive stance affirms a measured approach in such cases, protecting genuine victims of deceitful promises while safeguarding innocent parties from undue prosecution when a relationship fails due to other circumstances. Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision serves as an authoritative guide for future matters involving allegations of rape predicated on mere breach of promise to marry.