Reaffirming the Approach to Child Witness Testimony and Section 106 Burden in Homicide Trials

1. Introduction

In The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh (2025 INSC 261), the Supreme Court of India revisited fundamental principles regarding the testimony of child witnesses and the application of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Act”) in cases involving suspicious deaths within the confines of a home. This decision carries paramount significance as it clarifies the standard for assessing the credibility of child witnesses, addresses the implications of delayed recording of such testimony, and underscores the shifting burden of proof under certain factual scenarios.

The case resulting in the appeal turned on whether the conviction of the accused (Balveer Singh) for murder of his wife, as determined by the Trial Court, should be reinstated following the High Court’s reversal of that conviction. Balveer Singh was charged under Sections 302, 201, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”) in connection with his wife’s death. Crucial evidence included the testimony of their seven-year-old daughter, who was the sole eyewitness, and the manner in which the accused allegedly disposed of the victim's body. The Supreme Court meticulously examined the roles of child witnesses, the notion of a “tutored” witness, and the evidentiary standard by which the burden may shift under Section 106 of the Evidence Act.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court’s judgment reaffirms the Trial Court’s ruling, setting aside the High Court’s acquittal. The Court examined in detail:

Trial Court Proceedings: The Trial Court convicted Balveer Singh based upon the testimonies of the deceased’s minor daughter (Rani), alongside circumstantial evidence including his suspicious conduct—specifically, the undisclosed nighttime cremation of his wife’s body and his subsequent flight from the scene.
High Court Reversal: The High Court acquitted Balveer Singh, finding Rani’s testimony to be possibly “tutored” owing to an 18-day delay in recording her police statement and her living with relatives allegedly inimical to the accused.
Supreme Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court reinstated Balveer Singh’s conviction. It held that the High Court erred in discarding the child’s testimony solely on the grounds of delayed recording and her post-incident residence with her maternal uncle. The Court emphasized that delayed examination need not nullify a child witness’s credibility unless there is concrete evidence of unfair practice or evidence tampering. The Court further explained that in cases where the accused alone is privy to certain crucial facts (e.g., cause of death inside the home), Section 106 of the Evidence Act may shift the burden to the accused to offer an explanation, which Balveer Singh failed to do.

3. Analysis

(a) Precedents Cited

The Supreme Court surveyed multiple precedents that address child witness testimony, notably Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, Pradeep v. State of Haryana, and Ratansinh Dalsukhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat. These cases emphasize:

Competency of Child Witnesses: Section 118 of the Evidence Act does not bar a minor from testifying if they can understand the questions and provide rational answers.
Potential Tutoring: While child witnesses are sometimes susceptible to coaching, their testimonies can remain reliable if they withstand thorough cross-examination and exhibit internal consistency.
Need for Corroboration: Corroboration is a measure of caution rather than a mandatory requirement; each case must be evaluated on its facts.

The significant point of law regarding the burden on the accused (when certain facts lie especially within his knowledge) is anchored in Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer and Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra. These precedents make clear that:

While the primary burden of proof rests upon the prosecution, once they establish a prima facie chain of incriminating events (especially in circumstances that occur in the privacy of a home), Section 106 of the Evidence Act places a correlative duty on the accused to explain events uniquely within his personal knowledge.
The inability to provide a credible explanation or presenting a false explanation can strengthen the inference drawn against the accused.

(b) Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s methodology combined both direct and circumstantial analyses:

Credibility of the Child Witness: The Court reiterated that no universal rule discounts a child’s testimony simply for their age or for delay in taking their police statement. Rather, the testimony is weighed for internal consistency, coherence, and whether it aligns with other proven facts. Rani’s testimony:
- Was consistent regarding the events leading to her mother’s apparent death.
- Survived cross-examination without material contradictions, establishing that Balveer Singh assaulted the deceased by pressing his leg on her neck.
- Was deemed natural and believable, particularly in the context of Balveer’s subsequent conduct of cremating the body in secrecy at night and fleeing the village.
Applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act: The Court emphasized the principle that once the prosecution has shown a victim died within the confines of the marital home in suspicious circumstances—especially if the accused and deceased were last seen together—the accused bears the burden to explain how the victim died. Because Balveer Singh fled and offered no plausible explanation for his wife’s sudden death, the Court invoked Section 106 to draw an inference adverse to him.
Rejection of Tutoring Allegations: The High Court’s suspicion about tutoring was found insufficient. Merely residing with relatives who are in rivalry with the accused does not itself prove that the child’s account was fabricated. The Supreme Court held that no direct evidence or pointed inconsistencies emerged to confirm that Rani’s statement was manipulated.
Delay in Recording Statement: Although her statement was recorded 18 days post-incident, the Court deemed it a possible investigative lapse rather than orchestrated manipulation. No question was raised at trial requiring the Investigating Officer to explain the delay, nor was there evidence that the delay was used to fabricate the child witness’s testimony.

(c) Impact

By reversing the High Court and affirming the Trial Court’s conviction, the Supreme Court has:

Reinforced Child Witness Testimony: Even where there is a significant gap before the child’s official statement is recorded, the testimony remains viable if it appears consistent and voluntary.
Clarified Section 106 of the Evidence Act: Where a suspicious death occurs within the privacy of a home and direct evidence is naturally limited, the prosecution need only establish a prima facie link. The onus then shifts to the accused to provide a credible account—failure to do so can significantly bolster a conviction.
Guided Lower Courts on “Tutoring”: The judgment sets parameters for courts to differentiate between genuine recollection and possible “coaching” of child witnesses. Mere possibility of influence, without real proof, cannot invalidate critical testimony.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 106 of the Evidence Act: This provision imposes a burden on the accused to explain certain facts that are “especially within his knowledge.” In cases where the prosecution demonstrates strong circumstantial proof (e.g. victim last seen with the accused, secretive disposal of the victim's body, accused’s flight from the scene), the law expects the accused to clarify how or why the death occurred, failing which the Court may draw an adverse inference.
Child Witness Competency: Under Section 118 of the Evidence Act, no age threshold bars giving testimony. The judge must be satisfied that the child understands the duty to speak truthfully and can answer coherently. If consistent, the child’s testimony can alone form the basis for conviction.
Tutoring Allegation: “Tutoring” arises if others have dictated or heavily influenced the child’s version of events. While minor inconsistencies or urging a child to speak up do not automatically imply dishonesty, major contradictions or signs of direct coaching can undermine a child’s credibility.

5. Conclusion

In reinstating Balveer Singh’s conviction, the Supreme Court underscores that the judiciary must proactively assess the substance of a child witness’s testimony and not dismiss it for reasons such as delayed recording or the child’s residence with extended family. This judgment also highlights that Section 106 of the Evidence Act provides a critical evidentiary principle in cases where suspicious deaths occur in the privacy of the defendant’s household and direct evidence is, by nature, limited.

The decision serves as a reminder that judges have a dual duty: no innocent person should be punished, but equally, no guilty person should be allowed to escape justice. When the prosecution establishes facts that point toward the accused’s involvement, his silence or failure to provide a credible explanation can solidify the inference of guilt. This approach, bolstered by reaffirming the reliability of child witnesses, provides a vital safeguard against impunity in crimes—especially those committed against women and within the sanctuary of the home.