Reaffirmation of the 50% Reservation Cap and Centralised SEBC Identification under Article 342A: The Maratha Quota Judgment

Reaffirmation of the 50% Reservation Cap and Centralised SEBC Identification under Article 342A: The Maratha Quota Judgment

Case: Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil (S) v. Chief Minister and Others (S)

Citation: 2021 INSC 284 | Court: Supreme Court of India (Constitution Bench) | Date: 05 May 2021


Introduction

This Constitution Bench decision addresses foundational questions on India’s reservation architecture. It resolves (a) whether the constitutionally recognised 50% cap on reservations survives, (b) whether Maharashtra’s separate reservation for the Maratha community could validly exceed that cap, and (c) how the Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018 restructures the power to identify “Socially and Educationally Backward Classes” (SEBCs). The judgment spans the interplay between Articles 14, 15(4), 16(4), 338B, 342A and 366(26C), analyses the Gaikwad Commission report underpinning the Maratha quota, and revisits seminal precedents (notably Indra Sawhney).

The case arises out of challenges to the Maharashtra SEBC Act, 2018 (as amended in 2019) that granted 12% reservation in education and 13% in public employment to the Maratha community. The Bombay High Court had upheld the Act save for reducing the quantum to the Commission’s recommended 12%/13%. The Supreme Court stayed its operation for fresh admissions/appointments (09.09.2020) and subsequently constituted a Constitution Bench to decide six questions of enduring importance, including the effect of the 102nd Amendment.


Summary of the Judgment

  • Indra Sawhney stands; 50% cap reaffirmed: The Court unanimously declined to refer Indra Sawhney (1992) to a larger bench. It reiterated that reservations under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) should not ordinarily exceed 50%. The ceiling is anchored in the equality code (Articles 14, 15 and 16) and may be surpassed only in exceptional/extraordinary circumstances, narrowly construed.
  • Maratha reservation struck down: The Court held that Maharashtra failed to establish “extraordinary circumstances” to justify crossing 50%. It found no constitutional basis to treat the Maratha community as inadequately represented under Article 16(4) and rejected reliance on the Gaikwad Commission, noting methodological flaws and legal misdirections. The Act, 2018 (as amended in 2019) was declared ultra vires Articles 14 and 16. Savings were granted for admissions/appointments between 27.06.2019 and 09.09.2020; PG medical admissions before 09.09.2020 remained undisturbed.
  • Interpretation of the 102nd Constitutional Amendment: By a 3:2 majority (Bhat, Gupta, Nageswara Rao, JJ.), the Court held that, post-102nd Amendment, only the President can identify SEBCs for the purposes of the Constitution, via a list under Article 342A(1); only Parliament can subsequently amend it (Article 342A(2)). States may suggest/consult but cannot themselves finally notify SEBCs. The dissent (Bhushan, Nazeer, JJ.) held that States retain their power, with a mandatory consultation duty under Article 338B(9). The Court upheld the constitutionality of the 102nd Amendment; it does not violate the basic structure nor require ratification under the proviso to Article 368(2).

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992): The cornerstone for reservation law. The Court reaffirmed that eight out of nine opinions either fixed or accepted a 50% ceiling which may be breached only in “extraordinary situations” (e.g., far-flung/remote areas, populations out of the national mainstream). It clarified the distinction between adequate and proportionate representation and rejected proportionate representation under Article 16(4). Periodic review and data-based identification were endorsed.
  • M.R. Balaji (1963), T. Devadasan (1964), N.M. Thomas (1976), K.C. Vasanth Kumar (1985): These decisions shaped the doctrinal path to Indra Sawhney, debating whether reservation is an exception or a facet of equality, and cautioning against excessive quotas.
  • M. Nagaraj (2006) and Jarnail Singh (2018): Reiterated constitutional requirements for reservation in promotions (backwardness, inadequacy, and administrative efficiency). The Court corrected a misreading by the Gaikwad Commission: Nagaraj did not authorize breaching the 50% ceiling merely upon “quantifiable data”.
  • Krishnamurthy (2010), Union of India v. Rakesh Kumar (2010), Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao (2020), Vikas Gawali (2021): These applied or reiterated the 50% ceiling in different constitutional settings (local self-government reservations, Scheduled Areas) and underscored its normative force.
  • Kalpana Mehta (2018): On using parliamentary committee reports as interpretive aids. Applied in the context of the 102nd Amendment debate, yet the majority treated the constitutional text as controlling.
  • Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao (1990), Action Committee (1994), Bir Singh (2018): On the conclusive and exclusive nature of Presidential lists under Articles 341/342 for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes—analogized to interpret Article 342A and its centralization logic for SEBC identification (majority view).

2) Legal Reasoning

a) Stare decisis and the 50% rule

The Court applied stare decisis and the doctrine of “greatest common measure of agreement” (Rajnarain Singh) to extract a clear majority in Indra Sawhney that the 50% cap is binding. Reservation beyond 50% risks “reverse discrimination” and undermines the equality structure (Articles 14, 16). The cap is not a mere prudential guideline but a constitutional principle that harmonizes substantive equality (15(4), 16(4)) with universal equality (15(1), 16(1)).

b) “Extraordinary circumstances” standard reaffirmed

While the exceptions in Indra Sawhney are illustrative and not exhaustive, they remain narrow. The Court cited Rakesh Kumar and Krishnamurthy to note that exceptions were upheld primarily in the special context of Scheduled Areas/local bodies. Maharashtra’s claim (that 80–85% of the population being backward justifies exceeding 50%) was rejected as contrary to the equality framework and Dr. Ambedkar’s Constituent Assembly caution against majoritarian reservations.

  • Incorrect reliance on Nagaraj: The Commission read Nagaraj to allow exceeding the 50% cap upon “quantifiable data”—a clear misreading. The cap survives even in promotion reservations (Nagaraj), much more so in initial appointments/admissions.
  • Miscomputation of representation: The Commission compared Maratha presence against total (reserved + open) posts. The Court recalculated Maratha representation in the open category alone and found substantial presence:
    • Grade A: 33.23% of open posts held by Marathas
    • Grade B: 29.03%
    • Grade C: 37.06%
    • Grade D: 36.53%
    This level of representation negates “inadequacy” under Article 16(4).
  • Sample and data issues: The urban sample was very small; key parameters lacked state averages; Mumbai was excluded; the marking rubric and the composition of the Commission raised neutrality concerns.
  • Adequate v. proportionate representation: The Commission slipped into a proportionality-by-population yardstick, which Indra Sawhney explicitly disallows.

d) Article 338B – consultation and structure

All judges recognized the new National Commission for Backward Classes (NCBC) under Article 338B. Bhushan, J. viewed Article 338B(9) as imposing a mandatory consultation duty on the Union and States for “all major policy matters” affecting SEBCs; consultation must be effective and meaningful (importing classic “consultation” jurisprudence). Even under the majority’s centralized identification view (Article 342A), States retain wide policy levers in the design, quantum and modalities of reservation, subject to the equality code and the 50% ceiling.

e) Article 342A and Article 366(26C) — centralization v. federalism

  • Majority (Bhat, Gupta, Nageswara Rao, JJ., 3:2):
    • “SEBCs” means those “so deemed under Article 342A” (Article 366(26C)). The definitional “means” and “deemed” signal exclusivity—i.e., only classes in the Presidential list under Article 342A(1) are SEBCs for purposes of the Constitution.
    • “Central List” in Article 342A(2) refers to the list notified under Article 342A(1). Only Parliament may include/exclude thereafter. States may suggest/send proposals but cannot finally identify SEBCs.
    • The 102nd Amendment does not damage the federal structure; it reconfigures identification while leaving States’ implementation space under Articles 15(4), 15(5), 16(4) intact. Ratification under the proviso to Article 368(2) was unnecessary.
    • Transitional protection: existing State lists to continue until the President issues the Article 342A(1) list (direction under Article 142).
  • Dissent (Bhushan, Nazeer, JJ., 2:3):
    • States retain the power to identify SEBCs; “Central List” in Article 342A(2) concerns only Union employment/institutions. Article 338B(9) mandates consultation with NCBC; the federal balance is preserved.

3) Impact

  • Immediate:
    • Maharashtra SEBC (Maratha) quota is invalid; no fresh admissions/appointments under the Act after 09.09.2020. Admissions/appointments between 27.06.2019 and 09.09.2020 were saved; PG medical admissions before 09.09.2020 remain undisturbed.
    • States across India must treat the 50% cap as a binding constitutional principle; “extraordinary circumstances” remain a confined exception, demanding rigorous justification.
    • Pending the Presidential SEBC list under Article 342A(1), existing State lists were saved by the Court.
  • Systemic:
    • Data quality & metrics: The decision raises the bar on “quantifiable data”, sampling integrity, and the correct benchmark for “inadequacy” (adequate vs. proportionate representation).
    • NCBC’s constitutional role: State and Union policy makers must institutionalise “meaningful consultation” and rely on robust, periodic, and evidence-based evaluations.
    • Federal debates: The majority’s centralisation holding provoked an important federal conversation about the locus of power to identify SEBCs; the judgment signalled that any recalibration must come through constitutional processes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adequate vs. Proportionate Representation: Article 16(4) permits reservation to secure adequate (not proportional to population) representation of backward classes in public services.
  • Extraordinary Circumstances: A narrow exception allowing breach of 50%—e.g., for remote/isolated populations out of the national mainstream. General claims of a high “backward population” share are insufficient.
  • Stare Decisis: Doctrine that promotes legal certainty and continuity—used to uphold Indra Sawhney’s 50% ceiling.
  • Article 338B (NCBC): A constitutional commission with investigative, advisory, reporting and consultative functions. Under Bhushan, J., consultation with NCBC is mandatory for major policy matters.
  • Article 342A & Article 366(26C): Under the majority view, SEBC identification is centralised—only the President’s list (amendable by Parliament) defines SEBCs “for the purposes of the Constitution”.

Conclusion

This judgment lays down two far-reaching propositions: first, the 50% ceiling on reservations, anchored in the equality code, survives untouched and can be breached only in the most extraordinary and rigorously justified situations. On that test the Maratha quota fails; the Gaikwad Commission’s analysis—especially on “inadequacy” and the use of data—was legally and methodologically deficient. Secondly, by a majority, the Court construed the 102nd Amendment to centralise SEBC identification—the President alone identifies classes “for the purposes of the Constitution”, with Parliament holding the amending key. While States retain extensive policy space for designing and implementing reservations within the equality framework, the act of identification is, per the majority, centralised under Article 342A (subject to transitional savings).

In the broader constitutional trajectory, this decision cements the cap as a structural safeguard for the equality principle, clarifies the high threshold for invoking “extraordinary circumstances”, and reorients the institutional roles in the identification of SEBCs. It demands that reservation policy returns to first principles: credible data, clear constitutional standards, and false equivalences avoided—especially the slippage from “adequate” to “proportionate” representation. Policy makers must now also internalise the constitutionalised NCBC’s advisory centrality and the disciplined use of data while navigating the complex field of affirmative action.

Case Details

Year: 2021
Court: Supreme Court Of India

Judge(s)

Ashok BhushanS. Abdul NazeerL. Nageswara RaoHemant GuptaS. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.

Advocates

RAJ SINGH RANA

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