Reactive Judicial Timelines and the Bar on Blanket “No-Arrest” Orders in Quashing Petitions: Commentary on State of U.P. v. Mohd. Arshad Khan (2025 INSC 1480)

Reactive Judicial Timelines and the Bar on Blanket “No-Arrest” Orders in Quashing Petitions:
Commentary on State of U.P. v. Mohd. Arshad Khan, 2025 INSC 1480

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in State of U.P. & Anr. v. Mohd. Arshad Khan & Ors., 2025 INSC 1480, is a significant clarification on two recurrent practices in criminal writ jurisdiction:

  1. High Courts directing time-bound completion of investigation at the very threshold of a case; and
  2. High Courts granting blanket protection from arrest (“no arrest / no coercive steps”) while refusing to quash an FIR.

The Court, speaking through Sanjay Karol J. (with Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh J. concurring), re‑emphasises that:

The judgment also reiterates a subtle but crucial discipline in the use of precedent: courts must link legal principles to the material facts of both the earlier and the present case, rather than transplanting orders mechanically.

2. Background and Procedural History

2.1 Factual matrix

The case arises from a probe into alleged irregularities in the procurement and use of arms licences in Agra, Uttar Pradesh. Based on an anonymous petition that ripened into a formal complaint dated 31 July 2024, the Special Task Force (STF) conducted a documentary and testimonial inquiry, leading to a report dated 31 January 2025 recommending registration of a criminal case.

An FIR dated 24 May 2025 (Case Crime No. 33 of 2025, P.S. Nai Ki Mandi, Agra) was registered under:

  • Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (cheating and forgery offences); and
  • Sections 3/25/30 of the Arms Act, 1959.

The FIR named, inter alia, three accused who became the respondents before the Supreme Court:

  • Muhammad Zaid Khan – alleged to have obtained an arms licence by giving a false date of birth (recorded as 25 November 1975 instead of the actual 25 November 1972), supported by forged documents and affidavits.
  • Mohd. Arshad Khan – alleged to have procured five arms licences (numbers 6365, 6491, 6415, 6316 and 6248 – all Tajganj) by using forged PAN, Aadhaar and driving licence documents, showing his date of birth as 15 January 1985, though official records indicated 1988. The change was allegedly to portray himself as a younger, skilled marksman and to secure benefits including import of arms/ammunition. He is also alleged to have been uncooperative in the inquiry.
  • Sanjay @ Sanjay Kapoor – then an Arms Clerk in the office of the Additional District Magistrate, Agra (later retired under VRS), alleged to have aided licence holders in forgery, concealment of material facts and use of false affidavits in processing arms licences.

2.2 Petitions before the High Court

Each of the accused‑respondents filed writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the Allahabad High Court seeking:

  • Quashing of the FIR; and
  • Protection from arrest.

The High Court, by identically worded orders in June–July 2025, did the following:

  • Refused to quash the FIR.
  • Directed the Investigating Officer (IO) to conclude the investigation within 90 days.
  • Directed that the petitioners shall not be arrested during the period of investigation and until cognizance is taken on the police report by the Magistrate.
  • Reserved liberty to recall the order in case of non‑cooperation by the accused.

These orders relied on a Division Bench decision of the same High Court in Shobhit Nehra v. State of U.P. (Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 7463/2024), where, in the peculiar context of an acrimonious family property dispute, the Court had:

  • Declined to quash the FIR;
  • Directed time‑bound investigation; and
  • Granted protection from arrest till cognizance.

2.3 Appeals before the Supreme Court

The State of Uttar Pradesh challenged these directions before the Supreme Court, contending that:

  • The “no arrest till cognizance” direction was contrary to the binding law in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State Of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401.
  • The 90‑day timeline for completion of investigation was unjustified in the absence of any finding of delay or stagnation and risked prejudicing a serious investigation.
  • The High Court had mechanically transplanted the directions from Shobhit Nehra without a factual comparison.

The Supreme Court granted leave and heard the appeals together.

3. Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Court essentially addressed three interrelated questions:

  1. Whether, in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 (or inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC), a High Court can, while declining to quash an FIR, direct:
    • Time‑bound completion of investigation at the very outset; and
    • Protection from arrest till cognizance is taken on the police report.
  2. Under what circumstances, if any, can courts judicially impose timelines on investigation, and how does this relate to the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21?
  3. What is the proper method of applying precedents like Shobhit Nehra, and what is the consequence of using such decisions without a factual and legal analysis?

4. Summary of the Judgment

4.1 Holdings

The Supreme Court held that:

  1. Time‑bound investigation directions set aside: The High Court’s direction to complete investigation within 90 days was unsustainable. Judicial timelines for investigation are permissible only as an exception, when warranted by demonstrated delay, stagnation or inaction; they cannot be imposed prophylactically at the inception of an investigation.
  2. Protection from arrest till cognizance set aside: The High Court’s direction that the accused shall not be arrested during investigation and till cognizance is taken is contrary to the law laid down in Habib Abdullah Jeelani and re‑affirmed in Neeharika Infrastructure. Such an order is effectively a grant of anticipatory bail without meeting the statutory criteria of Section 438 CrPC.
  3. Misuse of precedent (Shobhit Nehra): The High Court erred in mechanically applying Shobhit Nehra without analysing the material factual substratum. Precedents must be read in the context of the facts which give rise to the rule, as underscored in Quinn v. Leathem and subsequent Supreme Court cases.
  4. Limited transitional protection: While allowing the State’s appeals and setting aside the High Court’s directions, the Supreme Court allowed the existing interim protection in favour of the accused to continue for two weeks, after which “all actions as permissible in law will follow.” This gives the accused a window to seek appropriate remedies, such as anticipatory bail.

4.2 Net effect

The FIR and investigation remain undisturbed; the accused lose the special shield of:

  • court‑imposed investigative deadline; and
  • blanket “no arrest” protection.

Any further protection from arrest must now be sought under the proper statutory route (e.g., Section 438 CrPC) before the competent court.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Scope of writ jurisdiction in criminal matters

The Court begins by acknowledging that the High Courts’ powers under Article 226 are widely framed and extend to criminal law. Typical uses include:

The judgment emphasises that Article 226 continues to operate as a constitutional safety‑valve in the criminal process, but its use must be consistent with both:

  • the separation of functions between the judiciary and the investigative agencies; and
  • the guarantees of fairness and liberty under Article 21.

5.2 Time‑bound investigation: “reactive, not prophylactic”

5.2.1 Investigation as a complex, unpredictable process

The Court devotes substantial space to describing the inherent complexity of criminal investigation:

  • Witnesses may change their stance or become unavailable.
  • Crucial documents may turn out to be unusable or forged.
  • Intervening legal proceedings (bail applications, directions for further investigation, changes in IO, etc.) can alter pace and direction of the probe.
  • Investigations may require recalibration and additional steps, often in response to new information or court orders.

Because of this, the Court recognises that investigation cannot be fully scripted in advance, and that investigating agencies must be allowed a “reasonable degree of latitude.”

5.2.2 However, Article 21 forbids open‑ended investigations

While acknowledging practical constraints, the Court stresses that these cannot justify avoidable delay. The right to a speedy trial under Article 21—first articulated in:

—necessarily includes a timely and diligent investigation. Prolonged or unexplained delay harms:

  • the accused (continued cloud on liberty and reputation),
  • the victim (denial or deferral of closure), and
  • society (erosion of faith in criminal justice).

5.2.3 When can courts fix timelines?

Against this backdrop, the Court surveys prior decisions:

  • Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226 – stressed the need for prompt and effective investigation in high‑profile corruption cases; the Court monitored investigation and issued directions to prevent drift.
  • Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 INSC 1339 – reaffirmed that investigations cannot “continue endlessly” and that prolonged unexplained delay between FIR and charge‑sheet may itself infringe Article 21.
  • Union Of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003) 6 SCC 195 – cautioned that the “manner and pace of investigation” ordinarily lie in the domain of the investigating agency; courts should not routinely micro‑manage investigations.

Synthesising this jurisprudence, the Court formulates a clear doctrinal position:

Timelines for investigation are not to be drawn by courts from the very beginning as a matter of course. Doing so would be tantamount to “stepping on the toes” of the executive. Such timelines may be imposed only when there is material demonstrating undue delays, stagnation, or inaction. Put differently, timelines are imposed reactively and not prophylactically.

Applying this test, the Court finds no finding of delay, stagnation or mala fide in the present case. The FIR itself was recent, and there was no record‑based justification for a 90‑day completion order. Accordingly, the time‑bound direction was set aside.

5.3 “No arrest till cognizance” orders and the binding force of Neeharika

5.3.1 The Shobhit Nehra contrast

The High Court relied on its earlier decision in Shobhit Nehra v. State of U.P., where, in the context of a long‑standing, bitter family property dispute with parallel civil and criminal litigation going back decades, the Court:

  • considered the FIR to be intertwined with civil animosity;
  • perceived that arrest at the investigation stage could cause disproportionate impact on Article 21 rights; and
  • thus crafted a case‑specific order shielding the accused from arrest during a time‑bound investigation, while still allowing the investigation to proceed.

The Supreme Court notes that even if in those peculiar facts a protective order could be justified arguendo, it is “unclear” how the same rationale extends to the present case. The impugned orders:

  • do not analyse the factual context of the arms licence case;
  • do not explain how the background of civil/familial animosity in Shobhit Nehra is comparable; and
  • do not address the binding law in Neeharika Infrastructure.

5.3.2 Neeharika Infrastructure and Habib Abdullah Jeelani

The Court then reproduces and relies on key passages from:

In Habib Abdullah Jeelani, the High Court had dismissed a quashing petition but had directed the police not to arrest the accused during investigation. The Supreme Court:

  • held such a direction to be legally unacceptable;
  • observed that directing the police not to arrest, after declining interference with the FIR, is tantamount to granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC without satisfying its preconditions; and
  • called such orders “absolutely inconceivable and unthinkable”.

Neeharika Infrastructure builds on this, noting (with some emphasis from the present judgment):

“…this Court… deprecated such practice/orders passed by the High Courts, directing police not to arrest, even while declining to interfere with the quashing petition… such direction amounts to an order under Section 438 CrPC… and the same is legally unacceptable… It is absolutely inconceivable and unthinkable to pass an order directing the police not to arrest till the investigation is completed while declining to interfere… We again reiterate… and we direct all the High Courts to scrupulously follow the law… We caution the High Courts again against passing such orders of not to arrest or ‘no coercive steps to be taken’ till the investigation is completed and the final report is filed, while not entertaining quashing petitions…”

The Supreme Court in Mohd. Arshad Khan reiterates this binding proposition and finds that the Allahabad High Court’s direction—“the petitioner shall not be arrested… during investigation and till cognizance is taken”—falls squarely within the category of orders prohibited by Neeharika.

Importantly, the Court notes that, unlike in Shobhit Nehra, the impugned orders offer no attempt at justification, nor any engagement with Neeharika. The directions are therefore set aside.

5.4 Proper use of precedent: Quinn v. Leathem and Indian follow‑ups

A noteworthy jurisprudential component of the judgment is the reminder about how precedents must be used. The Court cites with approval the famous dictum from Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] AC 495:

“…every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case…”

This approach has been reaffirmed in several Indian decisions, such as:

  • State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 17;
  • Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2005) 2 SCC 42; and
  • All India Haj Umrah Tour Organisers Assn. v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 484.

The Supreme Court distils this into a working instruction:

  • When courts cite a precedent, they must identify the “material factual substratum”—the key facts that bear a direct nexus to the legal principle applied.
  • Only then can they legitimately transplant the principle into a new case with comparable facts.
  • Absent such application of mind, reliance on a precedent is superficial and risks misapplication of law.

In the present case, the High Court’s orders are found wanting because they do not compare the factual backdrop of Shobhit Nehra (protracted family dispute with overlapping civil and criminal proceedings) with the present case (alleged systemic irregularities in arms licences) and yet copy‑paste the relief.

6. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

6.1 Quashing and writ intervention in criminal proceedings

  • State Of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 A landmark on quashing of FIRs, it set out illustrative categories where interference is warranted (e.g., when allegations do not disclose an offence, are absurd, or are manifestly mala fide). In Mohd. Arshad Khan, it underpins the recognition that writ power in criminal matters is wide, but it also implies that refusal to quash means the FIR passes this threshold, so the High Court should be slow to hamstring the investigation thereafter.
  • Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 Reaffirms that the High Court’s power to intervene is not limited by the CrPC, especially where there is abuse of process or gross injustice. This undergirds the Court’s acknowledgment of the breadth of Article 226, even while restricting certain types of relief (such as blanket no‑arrest orders).

6.2 Writs to protect liberty and ensure fair investigation

  • Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494 and Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746 These cases highlight the Court’s readiness to use writ jurisdiction to protect the right to life and dignity in custodial settings, including compensation and institutional safeguards. They are cited here to show Article 226 as a living constitutional tool in criminal justice.
  • Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., (2008) 2 SCC 409 Clarifies that while statutory remedies (Sections 154(3), 156(3), 190, 200 CrPC) should ordinarily be pursued, Article 226 remains available in suitable cases. It frames writ intervention in investigations (e.g., mandating registration or fair investigation) as an exceptional backstop, not a routine supervisory tool.
  • Joginder Kumar v. State Of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260 and D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416 Lay down procedural safeguards concerning arrest, detention and interrogation, again showing that constitutional courts actively shape the contours of police power. In Mohd. Arshad Khan, they serve to contextualise the recurring theme: liberty and investigation must coexist in a balanced manner.

6.3 Speedy trial and delay in investigation

  • Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81 and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 Constitution Bench decisions recognising speedy trial as an integral part of Article 21. They provide the constitutional anchor for the Court’s insistence that investigations must be conducted with “reasonable promptitude and care,” and that unjustified delay can itself be an infringement of rights.
  • Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226 A seminal public interest litigation on investigating corruption in high offices. The Court monitored investigations, issued continuing mandamus, and underscored that investigative inertia in serious matters is constitutionally intolerable. It demonstrates that courts may, where delay is systemically entrenched, impose structural and temporal directions.
  • Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 INSC 1339 A contemporary precedent where the Court reiterated that investigations cannot be left to “drift endlessly.” It is invoked to show that open‑ended investigations are inconsistent with Article 21.
  • Union Of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003) 6 SCC 195 Cautions that the “manner and pace of investigation” should ordinarily be left to investigators. It provides the counter‑weight: while delay can invite judicial intervention, courts must not micro‑manage every investigation.

6.4 “No arrest / no coercive steps” and anticipatory bail

  • State Of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779 The Supreme Court deprecated High Courts’ practice of telling police “do not arrest” while dismissing quashing petitions. It held that such orders are equivalent to anticipatory bail without adherence to Section 438 CrPC, and called this “inconceivable and unthinkable.”
  • Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State Of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401 A three‑Judge Bench that systematically addressed the practice of High Courts granting “no coercive steps” orders. It:
    • reiterated that High Courts should rarely interfere in investigations at the FIR stage,
    • held that blanket directions not to arrest, while declining quashing, are impermissible, and
    • directed High Courts to scrupulously follow this position.
    In Mohd. Arshad Khan, Neeharika is treated as decisive and binding, and the High Court’s contrary orders are corrected on that basis.

6.5 Methodology of precedent application

  • Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] AC 495 – supplies the classic rule that general expressions in judgments must be confined to the facts of those cases.
  • State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 17; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2005) 2 SCC 42; All India Haj Umrah Tour Organisers Assn. v. Union of India, (2023) 2 SCC 484 – Indian decisions adopting and applying the Quinn principle, reinforcing the idea that precedents must be read contextually, not as freestanding textual snippets.

7. Impact and Future Implications

7.1 For High Courts: disciplining the use of writ and inherent powers

The judgment sends a clear institutional message:

  • No more “standard form” time‑limit orders at the FIR stage. High Courts must:
    • identify specific delay, stagnation or misuse;
    • record reasons; and
    • then, if warranted, impose a tailored timeline.
  • No blanket “no arrest / no coercive steps” relief when:
    • the Court declines to quash the FIR; or
    • the Court refuses to stay investigation.
    Such directions are functionally indistinguishable from anticipatory bail and must follow the statutory pathway under Section 438 CrPC.
  • Precedents must be fact‑sensitive. Merely citing a prior order that appears “similar” in relief is insufficient; the court must demonstrate how the material facts align.

7.2 For investigating agencies

Investigative agencies gain a clearer field of operation:

  • Courts will be less inclined to micro‑manage timelines at the outset.
  • However, agencies must be conscious that unexplained or mala fide delay can trigger judicially imposed deadlines under Article 21.
  • Investigators cannot assume an indefinite canvas: where delay is shown to prejudice liberty or fairness, courts retain the power to intervene.

7.3 For accused persons and defence strategy

The judgment closes off what had become a common litigation strategy in many High Courts:

  • Filing a writ petition under Article 226 / Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR, and while expecting dismissal on merits, seeking an interim or final “no arrest / no coercive steps” order as de facto anticipatory bail.

Post‑Mohd. Arshad Khan (reaffirming Neeharika and Habib Abdullah), accused persons must:

  • Use Section 438 CrPC (or analogous State provisions) for anticipatory bail, where:
    • they show specific grounds for apprehension of arrest; and
    • the court applies established bail criteria (nature of offence, role, antecedents, chance of tampering, etc.).
  • Invoke writ jurisdiction mainly where there is:
    • a clear Bhajan Lal-type case for quashing; or
    • a demonstrable constitutional violation (e.g., illegal detention, gross mala fides).

7.4 Doctrinal refinement: “reactive, not prophylactic” timelines as a guiding standard

The case contributes a succinct and workable doctrinal formula:

  • Judicial timelines for investigation are exceptional, and
  • they arise reactively—once delay/unfairness is shown—not as a prophylactic or routine practice.

This standard is likely to be invoked in future challenges to:

  • High Court orders that impose uniform X‑day deadlines across classes of cases; and
  • Public interest litigations seeking generic directions that all investigations be completed within a fixed time, regardless of factual context.

8. Complex Legal Concepts Explained

8.1 Article 226 writ jurisdiction (in criminal matters)

Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue writs (like habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto) to:

  • enforce fundamental rights; and
  • address other legal wrongs (“for any other purpose”).

In criminal law, this includes:

  • quashing FIRs or proceedings to prevent abuse of process;
  • directing registration of FIR or fair investigation; and
  • securing the release of illegally detained persons.

However, because the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) provides a detailed statutory scheme, courts insist that Article 226 is used sparingly and in exceptional cases—not as a substitute for ordinary remedies (bail, trial, appeal).

8.2 Section 482 CrPC: inherent powers of the High Court

Section 482 saves the High Court’s inherent powers to:

  • give effect to orders under the CrPC;
  • prevent abuse of the process of any court; or
  • otherwise secure the ends of justice.

It is commonly invoked to seek:

  • quashing of FIRs or criminal complaints;
  • modification of criminal proceedings where there is a jurisdictional error or manifest injustice.

The Supreme Court repeatedly emphasises that Section 482 is a residual, not plenary power: it cannot be used to bypass statutory processes, such as the detailed regime for bail, trial or appeal.

8.3 Quashing of FIR / criminal proceedings

To “quash” an FIR or criminal proceeding is to have the High Court terminate it at the threshold. Under Bhajan Lal, this is permissible, for example, when:

  • the FIR does not disclose a cognizable offence even if taken at face value;
  • the allegations are inherently absurd or improbable;
  • the proceeding is manifestly attended by mala fides (e.g., pure civil dispute dressed up as crime to harass); or
  • there is an express legal bar to the prosecution.

When a court refuses to quash, it effectively holds that further investigation or trial is at least legally tenable, and thus it should ordinarily be slow to cripple the investigation via “no arrest” or other blanket restraints.

8.4 “Cognizance” by the court

“Taking cognizance” is the stage when a Magistrate or court formally takes notice of an offence alleged in a police report (charge sheet) or complaint, and decides to proceed (e.g., to issue process, frame charges).

It marks the transition from:

  • the investigation stage (police‑controlled), to
  • the trial or inquiry stage (court‑controlled).

The impugned High Court orders had extended “no arrest” protection until cognizance, i.e., until the filing of charge sheet and the Magistrate’s decision to proceed—an extensive and generalised shield incompatible with the scheme of CrPC and the rulings in Habib Abdullah and Neeharika.

8.5 Anticipatory bail vs. “no arrest” / “no coercive steps” orders

Anticipatory bail (Section 438 CrPC) allows a person who apprehends arrest for a non‑bailable offence to seek an order that, in the event of arrest, they be released on bail.

Granting anticipatory bail requires the court to consider:

  • nature and gravity of accusation;
  • antecedents of the applicant;
  • likelihood of fleeing justice or tampering with evidence; and
  • the larger interests of society and the State.

In contrast, a direction in a quashing petition that “no coercive steps shall be taken” or “the petitioner shall not be arrested”:

  • often bypasses the statutory tests of Section 438 CrPC;
  • is sometimes granted without a detailed hearing or materials; and
  • can last for a prolonged period (e.g., till completion of investigation or taking of cognizance).

The Supreme Court has thus treated such directions as an improper, de facto grant of anticipatory bail and has prohibited them in the manner used by the High Court in this case.

8.6 Time‑bound investigation and Article 21

The CrPC already contains certain investigation‑linked timelines (e.g., Section 167 regarding maximum permissible period of police custody before filing charge sheet, failing which the accused may get “default bail”). However, it does not prescribe a universal fixed duration for every investigation.

Courts, invoking Article 21, have sometimes:

  • directed expeditious or time‑bound investigation in cases of egregious delay; or
  • monitored investigations in sensitive matters (e.g., Vineet Narain).

Mohd. Arshad Khan clarifies that such directions are a reactive constitutional remedy when delay is already established, not a routine add‑on whenever a writ petition is filed at the FIR stage.

8.7 The doctrine of precedent and ratio decidendi

A precedent binds later courts through its ratio decidendi—the principle of law that is applied to the material facts in issue. General observations, or what is said obiter dicta, have persuasive but not binding value.

The Court in this case stresses that:

  • Only those facts that have a direct nexus to the legal principle applied constitute the “material factual substratum”;
  • when applying a precedent, courts must identify and compare this substratum with the case before them; and
  • mechanically copying relief from an earlier judgment, without such analysis, is not in accordance with law.

9. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

State of U.P. v. Mohd. Arshad Khan is not a case about the merits of arms licence irregularities; it is a case about the proper boundaries of judicial intervention in the investigative process and the disciplined use of precedent. Its key contributions can be summarised as follows:

  1. Reactive, not prophylactic timelines: Courts may fix deadlines for completion of investigation only when necessary to remedy undue delay, stagnation or prejudice to Article 21 rights. Timelines are a reactive tool, not a standard prophylactic measure at the FIR stage.
  2. Bar on blanket “no arrest” after refusing to quash: Reaffirming Habib Abdullah Jeelani and Neeharika Infrastructure, High Courts cannot:
    • dismiss or decline to stay FIRs/investigations; and yet
    • simultaneously grant broad “no arrest / no coercive steps” protections till completion of investigation or cognizance.
    Such orders are tantamount to anticipatory bail without statutory compliance.
  3. Fact‑sensitive use of precedents: The decision re‑emphasises that judgments, including those of coordinate benches of High Courts, cannot be applied like templates. Courts must:
    • isolate the material facts and legal reasoning in the precedent; and
    • demonstrate how those align (or do not align) with the current case.
  4. Balanced vision of Article 21: The Court preserves a nuanced vision:
    • Article 21 guarantees speedy and fair investigation and trial,
    • but also respects the primary domain of investigators over how and at what pace they proceed, subject to constitutional scrutiny against inertia or abuse.
  5. Practical pathway for litigants: Accused persons who apprehend unjustified arrest must primarily turn to bail mechanisms under the CrPC, particularly Section 438 for anticipatory bail, rather than seeking broad “no coercive steps” orders in writ proceedings that do not meet the high threshold for quashing.

In the broader legal landscape, Mohd. Arshad Khan consolidates the discipline introduced by Neeharika Infrastructure, clarifies the constitutional logic behind time‑bound investigation orders, and insists on a methodical, fact‑based approach to the use of precedent. It will likely serve as an important reference point in future challenges involving judicial management of investigations and the interface between Article 21 rights and police powers.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court Of India

Judge(s)

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KAROL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH

Advocates

RUCHIRA GOEL

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