Re-drawing the Line: Supreme Court Re-affirms Strict Limits on Using Section 161 Statements and Section 27 Recoveries – Commentary on Renuka Prasad v. State (2025 INSC 657)

1. Introduction

In Renuka Prasad v. The State represented by Assistant Superintendent of Police (“Renuka Prasad”), the Supreme Court of India was asked to scrutinise a conviction entered by the Karnataka High Court that had overturned a trial-court acquittal in a sensational 2011 contract-killing. The High Court, dismayed by 71 out of 87 prosecution witnesses turning hostile, leaned heavily on the testimonies of three Investigating Officers (IOs), the “voluntary” statements of the accused, and several recoveries to convict six persons for murder and conspiracy (IPC §§302/120-B). The Supreme Court reversed that judgment, restored the acquittal, and used the occasion to issue an authoritative restatement on four evidentiary pivots:

The limited permissible use of statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC in light of the bar contained in Section 162 CrPC.
The scope of admissibility of “discoveries” under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
The narrow operation of Section 30 Evidence Act (use of a co-accused’s confession) when the underlying confession itself is only partly admissible under Section 27.
The degree of judicial caution required when IO testimony is the principal, or sole, prosecution plank.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Allowing a batch of criminal appeals filed by A1–A6, the Court (Dhulia & Chandran JJ.) held:

All substantive prosecution witnesses, including the minor eye-witness (PW-8), resiled at trial; hence the prosecution case was left to stand almost exclusively on police testimony and recoveries.
The High Court committed “egregious error” by treating Section 161 statements—spoken to only by the IOs—as substantive evidence, contrary to Section 162’s prohibition.
Recoveries of cash, weapons, clothes and vehicles did not satisfy the twin tests of Section 27: (i) disclosure must lead to a fact discovered, and (ii) that fact must be linked to the crime and the maker; here no such nexus existed.
Confessions by A1 or A3 regarding “sites of conspiracy” contained no independent “discovered fact” and were hit by Sections 25 & 26.
Because the Section 27 disclosure itself failed, it could not be pressed into service via Section 30 to rope in co-accused.
In murder appeals against acquittal, the presumption of innocence stands reinforced; even competing “probable views” must go to the accused. Here, only one view—of non-proof—was possible.
Consequently, convictions were set aside, the trial-court acquittal restored, and the accused ordered to be released.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) – Provided the locus classicus on appellate review of acquittals; served as the overarching benchmark.
Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor (1947 PC) – The anchor precedent on Section 27; the Court found the High Court had overlooked this binding authority and wrongly relied on the overruled decision in Athappa Goundan (Mad FB 1937).
Kali Ram v. State (HP) (1973), R. Shaji (2013), Rajendra Singh (2007) – Re-emphasised that S.161 statements are usable only for contradiction, never as substantive proof.
State v. Sunil (2001), Rizwan Khan (2020), Pradeep Kumar (2018) – Clarified that police testimony on recoveries need not always be corroborated by independent witnesses, but admissibility remains contingent on Section 27 criteria.
Kashmira Singh (1952) & Haricharan Kurmi (Constitution Bench, 1964) – Laid down the guarded use of a co-accused’s confession under Section 30; used here to negate the High Court’s contrary view.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Supreme Court

The Court’s logic proceeds in four concentric circles:

i. Section 161 / 162 CrPC:
Statements to police are not evidence. They are usable only to contradict the maker under the proviso to Section 162. Here, since PWs disowned their statements, and the IOs alone spoke to those statements, they remained inadmissible hearsay.

ii. Section 27 Evidence Act:
  a) Fact discovered ≠ object recovered; it includes the place of concealment and the accused’s knowledge.
  b) Only the portion of disclosure “distinctly relating” to that fact is admissible.
  c) The fact must be relevant to the crime.

Applied to facts:
· Weapons & clothes were not recovered on A5/A6’s disclosure but on A3’s statement – a conspirator, not assailant.
· No evidence showed A5/A6 ever passed those items to A3.
· Farm ownership not linked to A1.
· Cash recoveries were seizures under Section 102 CrPC, not Section 27 discoveries, and remained unconnected to the murder.
Hence Section 27 failed across the board.

iii. Section 30 Evidence Act:
Because the Section 27 disclosures themselves collapsed, there was no “confession” capable of being extended to co-accused. The High Court’s approach would have allowed Section 30 to swallow Sections 25-27 – an interpretative inversion firmly rejected.

iv. Appellate Latitude in Acquittal Appeals:
Even if two plausible views emerge, courts must adopt the one favouring the accused. In this case, no incriminating chain of circumstances existed; the prosecution case, once witness testimony evaporated, was “a mere scripted story”.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Judgment

Investigative Vigilance: Police reliance on bulk Section 161 statements without securing corroborative courtroom testimony is now even riskier. IOs must proactively preserve tangible, crime-linked evidence.
Trial Strategy: Prosecutors will find it harder to salvage a case merely through “hostile witness” theory; they must develop alternative evidentiary foundations (forensic, digital, scientific) that survive when witnesses fold.
Appellate Conscience: High Courts, while anxious to avoid letting serious crimes go unpunished, must resist the temptation to “fill gaps” with inadmissible material. The judgment re-centres the due-process compass.
Sections 27 & 30 Clarified: The decision plugs a recurring misconception in trial courts—treating any recovery as a license to read the entire accompanying confession—and reinsulates Section 30 from overextension.
Hostile-Witness Reform Discourse: The Court’s regret over witnesses turning hostile may accelerate policy debates on witness protection/statutory reforms, but without diluting evidentiary safeguards.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 161 CrPC	Police officer’s power to examine a witness during investigation.
Section 162 CrPC	Bar on using such statements as evidence, except to contradict the witness at trial.
Section 27 Evidence Act	Narrow “exception” allowing part of a statement made in police custody to be proved only if it leads to the discovery of a relevant fact.
Section 30 Evidence Act	Permits court to consider a confession of one accused against co-accused if they are tried jointly, but only as additional assurance, never as sole basis.
Hostile Witness	A witness who retracts or contradicts previous statements during trial. Their testimony is not automatically discarded; courts examine it for any portion still worthy of credit.
Test Identification Parade (TIP)	Pre-trial procedure to ascertain if a witness can identify the accused. Not substantive evidence; corroborative at best.

5. Conclusion

Renuka Prasad is less about the sensational facts and more about the Supreme Court’s refusal to dilute time-honoured evidentiary barricades because of investigative lapses or witness betrayals. It marks a clear, structured reaffirmation that:

Hostility of witnesses cannot convert IO testimony into substantive evidence;
Section 161 statements are constitutionally fenced off by Section 162;
Section 27 covers only that sliver of a disclosure which directly leads to a crime-relevant discovery, and even then, linkage to both crime and accused is indispensable;
Section 30 cannot be used to piggy-back inadmissible confession segments onto co-accused; and
In appeals against acquittal, moral outrage cannot replace legal proof.

By restoring the trial court’s acquittal, the Court underscores that criminal justice remains a “moral hazard” profession—judges may feel anguished when crime goes unpunished, yet they must stand guard over the evidentiary thresholds that shield the innocent. The precedent will reverberate in trial courts and High Courts alike, acting as a sober reminder that ends cannot justify means in criminal adjudication.