Quashing of FIRs in BNS Offences Relating to Online Religious Speech: Commentary on Buddha Prakash Bouddha v. State of Madhya Pradesh

1. Introduction

1.1. Case Overview

The decision in Buddha Prakash Bouddha v. State of Madhya Pradesh, W.P. No. 44600 of 2025, decided on 19 November 2025 by the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior (per Milind Ramesh Phadke, J.), concerns the scope of the High Court’s power under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash a First Information Report (FIR) at the investigation stage, particularly where the FIR invokes offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) relating to:

Promotion of enmity between groups – Section 196(1)(b) BNS;
Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings – Section 299 BNS;
Statements conducing to public mischief – Section 353(1)(c) and (2) BNS (described as the successor to Section 505 IPC).

The petitioner is a journalist and administrator of a WhatsApp group titled “B.P. Bouddh Patrakar News”. He posted, in that group, a seven-page extract allegedly taken from a scholarly book, containing assertions about ancient Hindu rituals, including beef consumption, cow/bull sacrifices, and allegedly derogatory references to the Brahmin community. A member of the Hindu/Brahmin community lodged a complaint, asserting that the post hurt religious sentiments, leading to registration of FIR No. 143/2025 at Police Station Daboh, District Bhind.

The petitioner invoked Article 226 of the Constitution seeking:

Quashing of FIR No. 143/2025 and all consequential proceedings;
Compensation/costs for alleged harassment and mala fide prosecution;
Any other appropriate relief.

1.2. Core Legal Issues

The judgment is structurally simple but raises multiple layered issues:

Quashing at FIR Stage: When can the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 (or its analogous power under Section 482 CrPC), quash an FIR that on its face alleges cognizable offences?
BNS Religious & Speech Offences: How should early BNS-era cases involving alleged religious insult and “public mischief” be treated, especially where the speech occurs on a WhatsApp group?
Fundamental Rights vs Criminal Process: How are Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) and journalistic freedom balanced against statutory offences protecting religious feelings and public order?
Mala Fides and Abuse of Process: When can allegations that an FIR is a retaliatory “counterblast” for journalistic criticism of the police justify quashing?

Though the Court does not fashion an entirely new doctrine, it reaffirms and applies the Supreme Court’s framework in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra to a contemporary fact situation involving online speech under the BNS. That is the practical significance of this ruling.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Justice Phadke dismisses the writ petition, holding that:

The FIR, taken at face value, discloses prima facie cognizable offences under Sections 196(1)(b), 299, 353(1)(c) and 353(2) BNS (paras 11–13).
At the investigation stage, the Court cannot:
- Examining the petitioner’s defence that the text was academic or shared in good faith;
- Determine whether he had the requisite mens rea (deliberate and malicious intention);
- Resolve disputed facts such as alleged mala fides of the police and complainant (para 11).
The plea that the FIR is a retaliatory counterblast to the petitioner’s critical reports about the police is a question of fact requiring evidence and cannot be adjudicated in writ proceedings at this stage (para 11).
Consistent with Bhajan Lal and Neeharika Infrastructure, quashing is permissible only in the “rarest of rare” cases where:
- No offence is made out on the face of the FIR, or
- The allegations are absurd or inherently improbable (para 12).
The present case does not meet that threshold (para 13).

Result:

The FIR stands, and investigation may proceed;
The writ petition is dismissed (para 14);
No order as to costs is made.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1. Statutory Framework and Constitutional Context

3.1.1. BNS Offences Invoked

The Court is dealing with early litigation under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), the successor to the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The petitioner himself characterises the invoked provisions as follows (para 7):

Section 196(1)(b) BNS – “promotion of enmity between groups”, replacing or corresponding to Section 153A IPC.
Section 299 BNS – “deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings”, corresponding to Section 295A IPC.
Sections 353(1)(c) and 353(2) BNS – expressly described as the “erstwhile Section 505 IPC”, dealing with statements or rumours likely to cause public mischief.

All these offences are cognizable in nature. This matters for Article 226 jurisprudence because once the FIR discloses a cognizable offence, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the police have a statutory duty to investigate, which the High Court should be slow to obstruct.

3.1.2. Constitutional Rights Invoked

The petitioner places strong reliance on:

Article 19(1)(a) – freedom of speech and expression;
Freedom of the press – treated as part of Article 19(1)(a);
Freedom to practice profession (as a journalist) – Article 19(1)(g);
Article 14 – equality and non-arbitrariness.

He frames the FIR as:

A retaliatory measure to silence a dissenting journalist critical of the police (paras 5–6);
An attempt to criminalise academic discussion and a closed-group digital publication, thereby chilling free speech (paras 4–8).

The Court, however, does not enter into a full-scale Article 19(1)(a) vs 19(2) (reasonable restrictions) balancing exercise. Instead, it treats the constitutional arguments as part of the defence case which can only be tested at a later stage, after evidence is collected.

3.2. Petitioner’s Case: Journalism, Private WhatsApp Group, and Academic Citation

The petitioner’s narrative (paras 4–8) rests on several key planks:

Nature of the Platform:
- A WhatsApp group “B.P. Bouddh Patrakar News” operated solely by the petitioner from his personal mobile number.
- Only the administrator (the petitioner) could post messages; other members only read.
- The group is characterised as a “closed digital forum” with voluntarily joined members interested in “journalistic discourse, current affairs, and counter-narrative discussions.”
Nature of the Impugned Content:
- The post was an extract from a book by Dr. Surendra Kumar Sharma (“Agyaat”), a scholarly literary work (para 6).
- The book is not banned by any government (para 6).
- The content was described as “purely academic in nature” and part of counter-narrative discourse (paras 4, 6).
Bonafide and Mens Rea:
- The petitioner claims he acted in good faith, without intent to insult or outrage religious feelings (paras 4, 7–8).
- He emphasises the absence of mens rea – the essential element of deliberate and malicious intention under Sections 196 and 299 BNS (para 8).
- He further asserts that there is no allegation in the FIR showing actual promotion of enmity or disturbance of public tranquillity (para 8).
Alleged Police Mala Fides:
- The petitioner asserts that the Thana Incharge (Station House Officer), Rajesh Sharma, sent a WhatsApp message at 11:16 PM on 26.09.2025, directing that a complaint be brought against the petitioner branding him as an “extremist” (para 5).
- This, he argues, shows a premeditated, motivated approach by the police, prompted by his prior journalistic reports on police excesses (para 5).
- The FIR is alleged to be a “counterblast” to those reports and an attempt to stifle free press (paras 5, 8).
Legal Consequence Urged:
- Since, according to him, the essential ingredients of Sections 196, 299 and 353 BNS are not made out even on a bare reading of the FIR (para 7), the investigation itself is labelled an abuse of process.
- He therefore seeks quashing of the FIR and compensation for harassment (paras 1, 3, 8).

3.3. State’s Response: FIR Discloses Cognizable Offences; Defence is Premature

The State’s position (para 9) is straightforward and classic:

The FIR unambiguously discloses the commission of cognizable offences under the BNS provisions mentioned.
At the stage of investigation:
- The Court must only see whether a prima facie offence is disclosed on the face of the FIR;
- The defence of the accused – such as good faith, academic character of the content, or alleged mala fides – is irrelevant at this stage.
The content in question is argued to be “highly inflammatory and provocative”, capable of outraging religious sentiments and disturbing public tranquillity (para 9).
Therefore, the writ petition is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed.

3.4. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.4.1. Prima Facie Ingredients and Limit on Fact-Finding

In para 11, the Court identifies the core of the dispute as one involving:

Allegations of publication/circulation of material capable of:
- Hurting religious sentiments; or
- Promoting disharmony.

The Court then holds:

“The allegations contained in the impugned FIR, when taken at their face value, disclose prima facie ingredients of the offences invoked.” (para 11)

This is the critical factual-legal finding. Once this conclusion is reached, the rest of the reasoning naturally flows from the Supreme Court’s established jurisprudence. Crucially, the Court treats the following questions as issues for investigation and trial, not for a quashing proceeding:

Whether the petitioner:
- Acted with deliberate and malicious intention (mens rea);
- Quoted the extract in good faith;
- Shared content that was purely academic in nature; or
- Actually published material that was capable of disturbing public tranquillity.
Whether the post overstepped permissible limits of free speech (para 11).

These questions, the Court says, are all evidentiary in nature and cannot be decided by the High Court in a writ petition at the stage of investigation.

3.4.2. Treatment of Alleged Mala Fides

On the petitioner’s assertion that the FIR is a mala fide counterblast orchestrated by the police, the Court holds:

“The plea of mala fides asserted by the Petitioner is also a question of fact, which would require evidence and cannot be conclusively determined in proceedings under Article 226 at the stage of investigation.” (para 11)

The Court, therefore, adopts the view that even allegations of mala fide do not, by themselves, justify quashing, if:

The FIR otherwise discloses a cognizable offence on its face; and
The determination of mala fides would need factual enquiry and evidence.

This tracks the Supreme Court’s cautious approach: exceptional mala fide cases may justify intervention, but only when lack of offence or patent absurdity is apparent on the record. Mere motive, without more, is insufficient.

3.4.3. Deference to Investigation and Application of SC Precedents

The Court explicitly relies on and applies two leading Supreme Court decisions (para 12):

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604;
Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315.

Drawing from these, the Court notes:

Quashing is justified only in the “rarest of rare cases” where:
- The allegations do not constitute any offence; or
- The allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.
At the FIR stage, the High Court must not conduct a “roving enquiry” into the truth of the allegations or the sufficiency of evidence (para 12).
When the FIR discloses a cognizable offence, investigation should ordinarily proceed unhindered (para 12).

On this basis, the Court concludes (para 13) that no ground exists for exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction and dismisses the petition.

3.5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

3.5.1. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992)

Bhajan Lal is a seminal case where the Supreme Court catalogued situations in which quashing of an FIR or criminal proceedings could be justified under Article 226 or Section 482 CrPC. The Court laid down an illustrative (not exhaustive) list of categories, including:

Where the allegations, even if taken at face value, do not constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused;
Where the allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person could reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding;
Where there is an express legal bar to institution or continuance of proceedings;
Where the criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and has been instituted maliciously with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance or to spite the accused.

In the present case:

The High Court expressly invokes Bhajan Lal to emphasise that quashing is an exception, not the rule (para 12).
It essentially finds that:
- The FIR does disclose recognizable offences;
- The allegations are not so absurd or inherently improbable as to justify quashing at the threshold;
- Alleged mala fides cannot be conclusively determined at this stage.

Thus, Bhajan Lal supplies the doctrinal framework that the High Court applies to reject the petitioner’s plea.

3.5.2. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021)

Neeharika Infrastructure is a more recent, comprehensive judgment where the Supreme Court:

Reiterated and strengthened the principle that the High Court should be slow to interfere with investigation at the FIR stage;
Clarified that, ordinarily:
- No interim order should be passed staying investigation when the FIR discloses a cognizable offence;
- The High Court is not to test the veracity or sufficiency of allegations or evidence at the threshold.

The High Court in Buddha Prakash Bouddha quotes Neeharika for precisely this proposition, emphasising:

“…the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 or Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., must refrain from conducting a roving enquiry into the truthfulness of allegations or evaluating the sufficiency of evidence at the FIR stage.” (para 12)

In effect, Neeharika buttresses the high threshold for quashing, particularly in cases like the present, where:

The offences are cognizable;
The alleged conduct (religious offence, public mischief) has direct bearing on public order and social harmony.

3.6. Freedom of Speech, Academic Discourse, and Digital Platforms

3.6.1. Court’s Treatment (or Non-Treatment) of Article 19(1)(a)

The petitioner’s principal narrative is constitutional:

He characterises his WhatsApp group as a journalistic platform for informed discourse and counter-narratives (para 4).
He insists that the impugned post is a scholarly extract from a publicly available book, not hate speech (paras 4–8).
He frames the FIR as an attempt to chill free press and dissent (paras 5, 8).

The Court, however, does not engage in a direct constitutional balancing between:

Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech), and
Reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), such as:
- Public order;
- Decency and morality;
- Relations between different religious communities.

Instead, the Court treats free speech assertions as defensive arguments that must be assessed on evidence at trial or at least at a more advanced stage of the proceedings. Implicitly, it accepts that the statutory framework under BNS (Sections 196, 299, 353) is a facially valid restriction on speech under Article 19(2), and that:

Whether a particular expression is protected or punishable depends on
- Context,
- Intent,
- Effect, and
- Reasonable foreseeability of public disorder.

All of which require evidence.

3.6.2. Academic Work and Good Faith

The petitioner strongly relies on the fact that:

The impugned material is a verbatim extract from an academic or scholarly text that is not banned (para 6);
He shared it in exercise of journalistic and academic good faith (paras 4, 6, 8).

However, the Court does not accept academic sourcing as a basis for quashing. It considers:

Good faith and academic character as elements going to:
- Mens rea (deliberate and malicious intention), and
- Possible statutory defences (like good faith discussion of public questions);
But holds that these are matters of evidence, not determinable at the threshold (para 11).

The net effect is a cautious message: even academic or scholarly content, if perceived and alleged as capable of outraging religious feelings or promoting disharmony, can be investigated under BNS offences. Academic pedigree does not provide automatic immunity at the FIR stage.

3.7. WhatsApp Group as the Site of “Publication”

An important factual feature is that the alleged offending content was posted on a WhatsApp group with:

Restricted posting (only the admin could post);
Membership presumably curated or voluntary.

The petitioner stresses that this is a “closed digital forum” (para 4), suggesting that:

The communication is not equivalent to public broadcast;
Its capacity to disturb public tranquillity is limited or speculative.

The Court does not explicitly analyse whether:

A WhatsApp group of this nature amounts to a public forum or a private conversation for the purpose of BNS offences; or
The element of “publication” or “circulation” to the public at large is satisfied.

Instead, the Court appears to:

Accept the FIR’s assertion that the material was circulated in a group and capable of hurting religious sentiments of members of that community (paras 2–3);
Treat the nature and reach of the group as factual questions that must be explored in investigation.

This implicit approach suggests that in the BNS era, private or semi-private digital communications (like WhatsApp groups) can still attract criminal liability if the statutory elements—such as intention and likelihood of disturbing public order—are otherwise met.

4. Impact and Future Implications

4.1. For Journalists and Digital Speakers

The decision has significant practical implications for:

Journalists who use digital groups to disseminate opinions and material;
Social media administrators of curated or “closed” groups;
Those engaging in historical or religious scholarship online.

Key takeaways:

Threshold for Quashing remains High: Even when content is:
- Sourced from academic works;
- Circulated in limited, invite-only groups;
- Arguably part of journalistic or scholarly debate;
the High Court will rarely quash at the FIR stage if the content is alleged to hurt religious sentiments or promote enmity.
Mens Rea is a Trial Question: Whether the author acted deliberately and maliciously (or in good faith) will typically be assessed:
- After investigation; or
- At the stage of discharge/framing of charge; or
- At trial.
Mala Fide Prosecution Claims are Hard to Prove at Threshold: Even plausible narratives of retaliatory prosecution (e.g., critical reporting on police) usually do not suffice, by themselves, to secure quashing if a cognizable offence is disclosed on paper.

4.2. For BNS Jurisprudence on Religious Offences

Though the judgment is short, it is among the early reported decisions where:

Traditional IPC religious/hate-speech offences, now restructured as BNS Sections 196, 299 and 353, are applied to digital communications;
The High Court reaffirms continuity of IPC-era quashing jurisprudence (Bhajan Lal, Neeharika) in the BNS regime.

It signals that:

The mere shift from IPC to BNS does not materially alter the threshold of judicial intervention at the FIR stage;
Courts may defer most complex questions (intent, interpretation of religious content, public impact) to the investigative and trial process.

4.3. For Police and Complainants

From the law-enforcement perspective:

Police are reassured that once an FIR plausibly alleges:
- Outraging religious sentiments; or
- Promotion of enmity; or
- Statements capable of causing public mischief;
they may proceed with investigation without immediate fear of quashing in the High Court.
Complainants in religious offence cases gain a relatively secure pathway to investigation, given the Court’s reluctance to second-guess allegations at the outset.

At the same time, this has a converse implication:

The risk of over-criminalisation of speech, especially religious critique or scholarly commentary, increases if police and complainants resort quickly to BNS provisions.
Protection of free speech will more commonly depend on:
- The moderation and fairness of police investigation; and
- The vigilance of trial courts in evaluating intent and context.

5. Explanation of Key Legal Concepts

5.1. Article 226 and Writ Jurisdiction

Article 226 of the Constitution empowers every High Court to issue directions, orders, or writs (including writs like habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari) to:

Any person or authority, including the government;
For enforcement of fundamental rights and “for any other purpose.”

In criminal matters, High Courts use Article 226 (and/or Section 482 CrPC) to:

Quash FIRs or criminal proceedings in appropriate cases;
Correct jurisdictional errors or abuse of process.

5.2. Writs of Certiorari and Mandamus

Certiorari: A writ by which a higher court quashes an order or proceeding of a lower court or authority where:
- There is lack of jurisdiction, or
- There is patent error of law.
Mandamus: A writ directing a public authority to perform a public or statutory duty that it has failed or refused to perform.

Here, the petitioner effectively seeks a certiorari-like relief to quash the FIR and a mandamus-like relief to command the authorities not to proceed with a motivated prosecution and to grant compensation.

5.3. FIR and Cognizable Offence

FIR (First Information Report): The earliest information given to the police about the commission of a cognizable offence. It sets the criminal law in motion.
Cognizable Offence: An offence for which the police may:
- Register an FIR; and
- Arrest without warrant;
- Begin investigation without prior permission from a magistrate.

Because the offences under BNS sections 196, 299, and 353 are cognizable, the Supreme Court has consistently held that courts should not lightly interfere with investigation once an FIR discloses such an offence.

5.4. Mens Rea

Mens rea refers to the “guilty mind”—the mental element or intention required for an offence. For offences like:

Promotion of enmity between groups; and
Deliberate and malicious acts outraging religious feelings;

the law usually requires:

Intent to promote hatred or ill-will; or
Deliberate and malicious intention to insult religion or religious beliefs.

The petitioner argues that such mens rea is absent in his case. The Court holds that whether mens rea existed is a question for evidence and trial, not for a quashing proceeding.

5.5. Prima Facie Case

A prima facie case means that, on an initial reading, the allegations:

If assumed to be true;
Are sufficient to attract the legal ingredients of an offence.

In quashing jurisprudence, the High Court asks: “Assuming the allegations in the FIR are true, do they, on their face, make out any offence?” It does not ask whether the allegations are actually true or provable—that is for investigation and trial.

5.6. “Rarest of Rare” in the Context of Quashing

The phrase “rarest of rare” appears here not in the death-penalty context, but in the context of quashing FIRs. It signifies that:

Quashing at the FIR stage is an extraordinary remedy;
It is reserved for cases where:
- No offence is disclosed at all; or
- The allegations are patently absurd/inherently improbable; or
- There is a clear and undisputed legal bar.

Buddha Prakash Bouddha applies this standard to hold that the present case does not fall into such exceptional categories.

6. Conclusion

The decision in Buddha Prakash Bouddha v. State of Madhya Pradesh is a concise but significant reaffirmation of the limited scope of High Court intervention at the FIR stage, especially in the context of:

BNS offences dealing with promotion of enmity, outrage of religious feelings, and public mischief; and
Online and digital communications via platforms like WhatsApp.

Key takeaways include:

When an FIR, read as a whole and taken at face value, discloses cognizable offences, the High Court will typically:
- Allow investigation to proceed; and
- Decline to evaluate truthfulness, intent, or context at the threshold.
Assertions of:
- Good faith,
- Academic nature of content,
- Private or closed-group dissemination, or
- Mala fide motivation by the police,
are all generally treated as matters for investigation and trial, not for summary quashing.
The framework set by Bhajan Lal and Neeharika Infrastructure continues to govern quashing petitions in the BNS era, indicating continuity of doctrine despite the statutory transition from IPC to BNS.
For journalists and digital speakers, the ruling underscores that:
- Reliance on scholarly works or counter-narrative discourse does not, by itself, insulate one from criminal process if the content is alleged to hurt religious sentiments or public order; and
- Protection for free speech will more often be decided after investigation, rather than at the FIR threshold.

In the broader legal landscape, this judgment is best understood not as creating new doctrine, but as transposing existing Supreme Court principles to the emerging terrain of BNS-based regulation of online religious speech. It strengthens the message that quashing is exceptional, and that in most cases, the criminal process must be allowed to run its course before constitutional defences and questions of intent are conclusively adjudicated.