Punimati v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 INSC 1454): Scrutinising Sole Related Eyewitness Testimony and Medical/Recovery Evidence in Group Assault Murder Cases

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in Punimati & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., along with the connected appeal Dayalu & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported as 2025 INSC 1454, is a significant reaffirmation of foundational criminal law principles on:

the weight to be given to a sole related/interested eyewitness,
the consequences of non-examination of a material witness,
the evidentiary value of recoveries when panch witnesses turn hostile, and
the need for coherence between ocular evidence and medical evidence.

The case arose from a group assault resulting in the death of one Goreylal, allegedly at the hands of several accused persons belonging to the Teli caste, armed with lathis and a stone. The prosecution case was accepted by both the Trial Court and the Chhattisgarh High Court, resulting in convictions under Section 302 read with Sections 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

However, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi (authoring the judgment) set aside the concurrent findings and acquitted the appellants. The decision underscores that:

a conviction cannot rest solely on a related witness whose testimony contains material contradictions,
where a key eyewitness (here, the granddaughter Indu Bai) is not examined, the prosecution may fail to discharge its burden, and
where medical evidence and recovery evidence do not support the ocular account, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused.

While the judgment does not purport to create a “new” rule in a technical sense, it rearticulates and tightens the application of settled principles in the specific context of group assault/murder trials under Sections 302/149 IPC that rest on a single, related eyewitness.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The alleged incident

According to the prosecution:

On 14 July 2010, at about 9:00 a.m., the deceased, Goreylal, went to a village pond to bathe.
His mother, Parasbai (PW‑4), was cooking at home. Her granddaughter Indu Bai (Goreylal’s daughter) was playing outside.
Indu allegedly came running to PW‑4, saying that persons belonging to the Teli caste were assaulting her father near the pond.
PW‑4 claims that on reaching near the pond, in front of one Maya Ram Sahu’s house, she saw the accused – Sonai Bai, Punimati, Puni Bai, Shyam Bai, Dayalu, Gajadhar and Dayanidhi – assaulting her son with lathis (sticks) and stones, and that his hands were tied behind his back.
She then went back home, returned after some time, and found that her son had died.

The First Information Report (FIR) was lodged the same day at 12:40 hours (approximately three and a half hours after the alleged incident), registering an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.

2.2 Investigation and trial

Following investigation:

A charge-sheet was filed against multiple accused persons.
The Trial Court framed charges under:
- Section 302 read with Sections 148 and 149 IPC against all accused (murder with unlawful assembly and common object); and
- Section 506-B IPC (criminal intimidation) against accused no. 5 specifically, for allegedly threatening PW‑4.
The prosecution examined ten witnesses and produced documentary evidence; the accused were examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Trial Court convicted the accused:

Under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC: life imprisonment + Rs. 1,000 fine (with six months’ default sentence).
Under Section 148 IPC (rioting, armed with a deadly weapon): two years’ rigorous imprisonment + Rs. 200 fine (with six months’ default sentence).

2.3 Appeal before the High Court

The accused filed separate appeals before the Chhattisgarh High Court:

Criminal Appeal No. 904 of 2012
Criminal Appeal No. 931 of 2012

By a common judgment dated 17 February 2021, the High Court dismissed both appeals, affirming the convictions and sentences.

2.4 Appeals before the Supreme Court

Two sets of appellants approached the Supreme Court:

Criminal Appeal No. 3647 of 2025 – by original accused no. 2 and 3 (including, inter alia, Punimati).
Criminal Appeal No. 3648 of 2025 – by original accused no. 5, 6 and 7 (Dayalu and others).

The core grounds urged were:

The conviction was based almost entirely on the testimony of PW‑4 (mother of the deceased), an interested/related witness with material contradictions.
Non-examination of the granddaughter, Indu Bai, who first reported the assault and was a material eyewitness.
Independent witnesses (PW‑1, PW‑2, PW‑3, PW‑9) having turned hostile and not supporting the prosecution’s case.
Medical evidence and recovery of alleged weapons were inconsistent with or did not corroborate the prosecution version.

3. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed both appeals and acquitted the appellants, setting aside:

the judgment of the High Court dated 17 February 2021, and
the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court dated 1 September 2012.

Key conclusions of the Court include:

PW‑4’s testimony was unreliable as the sole foundation for conviction:
- There were major contradictions between her FIR version and her deposition in court regarding whether she actually saw the assault or only its aftermath.
- In cross-examination, she admitted that when she reached the spot, the accused were merely standing there and the deceased was already injured, and that she could not specify which accused caused which injury.
Non-examination of Indu Bai was a serious lacuna:
- Indu was the person who allegedly first saw the assault and informed PW‑4.
- The prosecution’s failure to examine her meant that a crucial eyewitness account was missing, undermining the completeness of the prosecution case.
Independent witnesses did not support the prosecution:
- PWs 1, 2, 3 and 9 turned hostile; some explicitly stated that they did not see the accused assaulting the deceased.
- PWs 2 and 3 – who were seizure witnesses – denied that any weapons were recovered in their presence or that any memorandum statements of the accused were recorded in their presence.
Medical evidence did not align with the prosecution story:
- PW‑7, the doctor, found multiple injuries including three incised wounds on the body of the deceased.
- The alleged weapons – one stone (triangular) and multiple lathis – are ordinarily blunt objects, not typically causing incised injuries.
- The doctor did not specify in the post-mortem or opinion which injuries were caused by which weapon, weakening the linkage between recovered weapons and the fatal injuries.
Recovery of weapons was not convincingly proved:
- The IO (PW‑8) claimed seven sticks were produced by accused pursuant to memorandum statements, and a stone was seized from the scene.
- However, key seizure witnesses (PW‑2 and PW‑3) did not support this; they denied any such recoveries in their presence.
- Given this, and the medical incongruities, the Court discounted the recovery evidence.
Prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt:
- In light of the contradictions in PW‑4’s testimony, the absence of a crucial eyewitness (Indu), hostile independent witnesses, and inconclusive medical/recovery evidence, the Court held that the prosecution had failed to discharge the burden of proof.
- Consequently, the appellants were entitled to the benefit of doubt.

The Court therefore:

Allowed the appeals,
Set aside the judgments of the Trial Court and High Court, and
Noted that the appellants had already been released on bail by order dated 30 July 2025, and thus their bail bonds stood discharged.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 The treatment of PW‑4 as a sole related eyewitness

The central evidence against the accused was the testimony of PW‑4, Parasbai, the mother of the deceased. Defence counsel argued that she was:

an interested/related witness, and
a chance witness, with material contradictions in her statements.

The Supreme Court began by reiterating the well-settled principle that:

“Merely because the witness is an interested or related witness, his/her deposition cannot be discarded. Further, deposition of such witnesses is required to be scrutinized closely.”

Thus, the Court did not reject PW‑4’s testimony simply because she was the mother of the deceased. Instead, it subjected her evidence to careful scrutiny, as required in law.

Upon scrutiny, the Court noted substantial discrepancies:

FIR version (as summarized in para 3):
- PW‑4 claimed that after being informed by Indu, she went near the pond and saw the accused assaulting her son with sticks and stones; his hands were tied behind.
- She then went back home, came out again, and found him dead.
Deposition in court:
- In examination-in-chief: PW‑4 said that Indu informed her that the accused persons “have killed” her son, and when she went, the accused were present and tried to assault her.
- In cross-examination: she admitted that when she reached the spot, the accused persons were standing there, and the deceased was already injured. She further admitted she could not say whose lathi or whose stone had struck the deceased.

These inconsistencies left open a crucial doubt:

Was PW‑4 truly an eyewitness to the assault itself?
Or did she only see the aftermath (the injured/dead body and the accused standing there)?

The Court found that, on her own admission in cross-examination, she did not see the assault taking place and therefore could not reliably link the accused to the specific acts causing death. This undercut the High Court and Trial Court’s approach of treating her as a straightforward eyewitness to the killing.

Additionally, PW‑4 admitted that she:

could not identify whose particular lathi or stone had struck the deceased, and
acknowledged that an independent witness (PW‑1) had not seen the incident and arrived later.

In such a scenario, the Supreme Court held that it would be unsafe to base a conviction solely on PW‑4’s testimony, without any corroboration from other credible sources.

4.2 Non-examination of a crucial eyewitness – the missing testimony of Indu Bai

The Court attached substantial importance to the fact that the prosecution did not examine:

Indu Bai – the granddaughter of PW‑4 and daughter of the deceased.

Her importance was threefold:

She was allegedly present at or near the scene when the assault took place.
It was she who first informed PW‑4 that people of Teli caste were assaulting her father.
According to PW‑4’s initial version, Indu had direct knowledge of the ongoing assault, making her a potential star eyewitness.

The Supreme Court observed:

Given that the prosecution’s narrative originated from Indu’s information, and she was naturally present at the scene, her non-examination was a serious omission.
There was no satisfactory explanation for why the prosecution failed to present her evidence.

In criminal trials, especially in serious offences such as murder:

Non-examination of a material witness – one who could have materially supported or contradicted the prosecution case – can be fatal, unless cogently explained.
Here, given the doubts surrounding PW‑4’s exact role as an eyewitness, Indu’s testimony assumed even greater significance.

By highlighting this omission, the Court underscored the prosecution’s duty to present the best available evidence, and not to selectively withhold eyewitness accounts that might alter the complexion of the case.

4.3 Hostile independent witnesses and the evidentiary vacuum

Several independent witnesses who might have corroborated the prosecution’s narrative either turned hostile or did not support the case. In particular:

PW‑1 – stated that:
- He had not seen the incident.
- He later came and covered the deceased with a cloth.
- This directly contradicted any suggestion that he witnessed the assault or could link specific acts to specific accused.
PW‑2 and PW‑3 – both independent witnesses and alleged:
- signatories to seizure memos, and
- present during the preparation of inquest reports,
turned hostile in material respects:
- PW‑2 (Sarpanch) stated that:
  - No accused made any memorandum statement in his presence.
  - No weapon or article was seized from any accused in his presence.
- PW‑3 similarly did not support the prosecution’s version regarding seizure/recovery.

The Court acknowledged the general principle that the testimony of a hostile witness is not to be discarded in toto; parts of it can still be relied upon if otherwise credible. However, in this case:

The fact that no independent witness supported the alleged assault or identified the accused as assailants created serious doubt.
Their hostile stance particularly undermined the recovery of weapons and the alleged voluntary production of weapons by the accused.

Thus, the prosecution’s case was left standing almost solely on PW‑4’s shaky testimony, with no independent corroboration.

4.4 Recovery of weapons and the reliability of the IO’s testimony

The Investigating Officer, PW‑8, deposed that:

He recorded memorandum statements of the accused (presumably admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act to a limited extent).
Based on those statements, the accused produced lathis; in all, seven sticks were produced by different accused.
A stone was seized from the place of occurrence.

However:

PW‑2 and PW‑3, who were cited as pancha (witnesses) to the seizure and inquest, categorically stated that:
- No such recoveries were made in their presence.
- No memorandum statements were recorded in their presence.
This directly contradicted the IO’s version and cast doubt on whether the alleged recoveries took place as claimed.

Given:

this contradiction,
the absence of any forensic evidence definitively linking the weapons to the crime, and
the doctor’s inability to connect specific injuries to these weapons,

the Court held that the recovery evidence could not safely be relied upon to sustain the conviction.

4.5 Medical evidence and its dissonance with the prosecution narrative

The medical evidence came from PW‑7, Dr. Chain Singh Painkara, who conducted the post-mortem. He found:

Multiple injuries on the deceased,
Among them, three incised wounds.

This created a crucial inconsistency:

The prosecution alleged that the only weapons used were:
- Lathis (sticks), and
- One stone (triangular in shape) seized from the scene.
Lathis and stones are blunt weapons, generally causing:
- abrasions,
- contusions,
- lacerated wounds,
- fractures.
They are not typically associated with incised wounds (which are usually caused by sharp-cutting instruments like knives, axes, or sharp edges).

While PW‑7 broadly stated that the injuries “could possibly” be caused by the stone and lathis shown to him:

He did not specify in the post-mortem report which injuries were caused by which weapon.
He admitted in cross-examination that:
- He had not mentioned in the post-mortem report whether the lacerated and incised wounds were caused by any specific weapon.
- He had not indicated in the query report which particular injury was attributable to the stone shown to him.

The Supreme Court found it difficult to accept that:

three incised wounds were caused by a single stone or lathis, without any further explanation or corroboration; and
the prosecution had not even alleged that a sharp weapon was used.

Thus, there was a serious mismatch between the nature of injuries and the alleged weapons, which further weakened the prosecution’s case.

4.6 Application of the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard and benefit of doubt

At its core, the Court’s reasoning is an application of the well-known criminal law standard that:

The prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If there remains a reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to the benefit of that doubt.

The Court cumulatively considered:

Contradictions in PW‑4’s testimony about:
- whether she saw the actual assault, and
- the manner of assault.
Non-examination of Indu Bai, a material eyewitness.
Independent witnesses (PWs 1, 2, 3, 9) not supporting the prosecution.
Medical evidence that:
- showed incised wounds inconsistent with the alleged weapons, and
- failed to link specific injuries to specific weapons.
Unreliable recovery evidence due to contradictions between the IO and pancha witnesses.

In this backdrop, the Court held that:

The prosecution had not established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of killing the deceased and that they actually carried out the fatal assault.
Therefore, the convictions under Section 302 read with 149 IPC and Section 148 IPC could not be sustained.

The decision is thus a textbook example of the Court granting an acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt, rather than making findings on exactly who committed the crime.

4.7 Implications for convictions under Sections 148 and 149 IPC

The accused had been convicted both under:

Section 148 IPC – rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon; and
Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC – murder committed by a member of an unlawful assembly with a common object to commit murder.

While the judgment does not deeply analyse the doctrinal contours of Section 149 IPC, it has an important practical implication:

To sustain a conviction with the aid of Section 149 IPC, there must be credible evidence of participation and a common object.
When the only eyewitness is found unreliable, and the role of each accused in the alleged unlawful assembly is uncertain, a conviction for collective liability cannot be maintained merely on suspicion.

By setting aside the Section 149 conviction, the Court made clear that:

In cases of group assault, courts must be especially careful not to convict large numbers under Section 149 IPC where the evidence does not reliably establish that each accused was part of the unlawful assembly with the requisite common object, or that an offence in prosecution of that object was committed.

4.8 Precedential context: where this judgment fits in the broader case-law

The judgment refers generally to “well-settled law” but does not cite earlier precedents by name within the extracted text. Nonetheless, it is clearly grounded in, and consistent with, a long line of Supreme Court decisions on:

Evidence of related/interested witnesses
Hostile witnesses and partial reliance on their testimony
Ocular vs. medical evidence
Non-examination of material witnesses
Standard of proof and benefit of doubt

Without attributing them as being expressly cited in this particular judgment, one can say that the Court’s approach resonates with landmark principles such as:

Related witness evidence is not automatically suspect; it must be carefully scrutinised. If found credible, it can form the basis of conviction.
Medical evidence that directly contradicts the positive testimony of eyewitnesses may cast doubt on the prosecution case; if it only does not fully support but does not contradict, ocular evidence may still prevail. Here, however, the ocular evidence itself was shaky, and medical evidence introduced further doubt.
Failure to examine a natural eyewitness available to the prosecution (here, the child who first reported the assault) can be a serious infirmity, especially when other evidence is weak.

Thus, Punimati v. State of Chhattisgarh does not so much break new doctrinal ground as it:

re-applies and reinforces these principles to a case involving:
- a single related eyewitness,
- hostile independent witnesses, and
- medical inconsistencies.
Serves as a cautionary precedent for trial and appellate courts against:
- uncritically accepting solitary related witness accounts in group assault cases, and
- failing to reconcile or address glaring inconsistencies between medical and ocular evidence.

5. Impact and Future Implications

5.1 For trial courts and appellate courts

The judgment reinforces several practical guidelines for courts:

Do not treat related witness testimony as inherently unreliable, but:
- subject it to heightened scrutiny, and
- look for internal consistency and external corroboration where possible.
Where the prosecution relies mainly on a single related witness:
- minor discrepancies can be ignored, but
- material contradictions (such as whether the witness actually saw the assault) cannot be brushed aside.
Non-examination of material eyewitnesses should be closely interrogated:
- Courts should question why a natural eyewitness – especially one named in the initial narrative – was not examined.
- Unexplained omissions can justify drawing an adverse inference or at least reduce the weight given to the prosecution case.
Medical evidence must be seriously considered:
- If the alleged weapons are inconsistent with the nature of the injuries (e.g., incised wounds from blunt weapons), courts must demand an explanation.
- Vague medical opinions (“could possibly”) without clear linkage should not be over-relied upon.
In applying Sections 148 and 149 IPC:
- Courts must be cautious in attributing collective liability in the absence of strong evidence of common object and participation.

5.2 For investigation and prosecution

The judgment sends a clear signal to investigating agencies and prosecutors:

Examine all natural and material eyewitnesses – especially those mentioned in the FIR or early statements, unless there is a cogent reason not to.
Ensure that:
- seizure witnesses are reliable and properly briefed on their role,
- documentation of recoveries is meticulous, and
- there is follow-up forensic or medical analysis linking weapons to injuries.
Where children are eyewitnesses:
- Consider appropriate procedural safeguards, but do not avoid examining them when they are crucial to the truth.

5.3 For defence strategy

For the defence bar, this judgment illustrates effective lines of challenge:

Highlighting material contradictions between FIR, statements under Section 161 CrPC, and court testimony.
Emphasising non-examination of key witnesses (like Indu in this case) as a central weakness in the prosecution case.
Using hostile witnesses not merely as a neutral factor, but to undermine the very existence of alleged recoveries or assault narratives.
Exploiting medical-ocular inconsistencies, particularly where the nature of injuries and weapons don’t logically match.

6. Complex Legal Concepts Explained

6.1 “Interested” or “related” witness

A witness is said to be “related” when they are a family member or otherwise closely connected to the victim or accused. They are sometimes called “interested” if they may have a stake in the outcome of the case.

Key points:

The law does not treat related witnesses as automatically unreliable.
Courts must:
- examine such testimony with care and caution, and
- test it against probabilities and other evidence.
If found entirely credible and consistent, a conviction can be based even on a lone related witness.

6.2 “Chance witness”

A “chance witness” is someone who happens to be at the scene of the crime by chance, not because they ordinarily reside or work there or had a natural reason to be present.

Courts:

do not automatically discard chance witnesses, but
expect a plausible explanation for their presence at the scene and consider their evidence with caution.

In this case, defence counsel argued that PW‑4 was a “chance witness”, but the Court’s main concern was not her presence but the consistency and reliability of her account.

6.3 Hostile witness

A “hostile witness” is a prosecution witness who:

denies or contradicts their earlier statements, or
otherwise appears to be supporting the defence.

Under Indian law:

Merely being declared hostile does not render the entire testimony invalid.
The court can still rely on any part of the hostile witness’s testimony that it finds credible and consistent with other evidence.

Here, PWs 1, 2, 3 and 9 became hostile in key respects. Their testimonies were important because:

They undermined the claim that they had seen the assault or that weapons were recovered in their presence.

6.4 Relevant IPC provisions – Sections 302, 148, 149 and 506-B

Section 302 IPC – Murder:
- Punishes the offence of murder with death or imprisonment for life and fine.
Section 148 IPC – Rioting, armed with a deadly weapon:
- Applies when a person is guilty of rioting (unlawful assembly using force or violence) while armed with a deadly weapon or something likely to cause death.
Section 149 IPC – Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object:
- Creates vicarious liability for criminal acts committed by any member of an unlawful assembly if:
  - the act is done in prosecution of the common object, or
  - such that members knew it was likely to be committed.
Section 506-B IPC – Criminal intimidation:
- Relates to threatening another person with injury to person, reputation, or property, with intent to cause alarm or compel them to do or omit an act.

In this case, the primary convictions were under Sections 302/149 and 148. Once the factual foundation for the accused’s participation and common object was found doubtful, these convictions could not stand.

6.5 Memorandum statement and recovery (Section 27 Evidence Act)

A “memorandum statement” refers to that portion of an accused’s statement to police which:

leads to the discovery of a fact (e.g., location of a weapon), and
is admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, even though confessions to police are generally inadmissible.

In practice:

The accused gives a statement like “I have hidden the weapon at X place; I will show it.”
Police record this and, in the presence of independent witnesses, recover the weapon.
The fact of discovery and the part of the statement relating to that discovery become admissible.

In this case:

The IO claimed such memorandum statements and recoveries occurred.
But key witnesses (PWs 2 and 3) denied that any such statements or recoveries took place in their presence.
This severely limited the evidentiary value of the alleged recoveries.

6.6 “Beyond reasonable doubt” and benefit of doubt

“Beyond reasonable doubt” is the standard of proof in criminal trials. It means:

The evidence must be so convincing that a reasonable person would have no real doubt about the accused’s guilt.
It does not require absolute certainty, but it does require moral certainty based on evidence.

“Benefit of doubt” means:

If, after weighing all the evidence, the court finds that a reasonable doubt remains about the accused’s guilt, the doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused.

In Punimati, the Supreme Court found that:

Multiple factors combined to create serious doubt about the prosecution story,
Therefore, the appellants were entitled to acquittal.

7. Concluding Remarks

The Supreme Court’s decision in Punimati v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 INSC 1454) is a robust reaffirmation of core criminal law safeguards against wrongful conviction. While dealing with a brutal killing arising from an alleged group assault, the Court insisted that:

Mere suspicion, even strong suspicion, cannot substitute proof.
The testimony of a sole related eyewitness, especially when internally inconsistent, cannot by itself sustain a conviction in the absence of corroboration.
Non-examination of a material eyewitness (here, the granddaughter Indu) is a serious flaw, particularly when the entire prosecution narrative originates from that witness’s observation.
Hostile independent witnesses and lack of support for recoveries must be factored into assessing whether the prosecution has met the required standard of proof.
Medical evidence that does not fit the alleged weapons (three incised wounds from lathis and a stone) cannot be ignored; it may be decisive in tipping the scales toward reasonable doubt.

In the broader legal context, the judgment:

Strengthens the jurisprudence on the need for careful appraisal of witness credibility, especially in cases involving group liability under Sections 148 and 149 IPC.
Provides clear guidance that appellate courts must not mechanically affirm trial court convictions based on solitary related witnesses where surrounding evidence is weak or contradictory.
Reinforces the constitutional commitment to fair trial and presumption of innocence by ensuring that life sentences for murder are imposed only when the evidentiary foundation is solid and beyond reasonable doubt.

Ultimately, Punimati stands as a reminder that the criminal justice system’s legitimacy depends not only on punishing the guilty, but also on ensuring that those against whom the case is not proved beyond reasonable doubt are not condemned on the basis of conjecture, suspicion, or incomplete proof.

Note: This commentary is for academic and informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice.