Proof, Not Presumption: Executing Historic Compromise Decrees Requires Demonstrable Breach and Possession — Kapadam Sangalappa v. Kamatam Sangalappa (2025 INSC 1307)

Introduction

This judgment of the Supreme Court of India arises out of a century-long dispute between two sects of the Kuruba community of Anantapur District, Andhra Pradesh—namely, the Kapadam families of Gungulakunta and the Kamatam families of Yerrayapalli—over the performance of rituals and custody of idols and paraphernalia of their common deity, Lord Sangalappa Swamy. What began as a dispute over seemingly modest pooja articles evolved into repeated litigation, culminating in a 1933 compromise decree that structured ritual performance, custody, and governance through trusteeship and accounts. Decades later, in 1999–2000, the dispute resurfaced in execution proceedings aimed at enforcing that compromise.

The case presents a narrow but important legal question: when parties seek to execute a historic compromise (or “scheme”) decree regulating a religious endowment, what evidentiary threshold must the decree-holder satisfy to compel delivery of sacred movable properties (idols and pooja articles) under Order XXI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)?

In Civil Appeal Nos. 281–282 of 2015, the appellants (Kapadam) challenged the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s order setting aside the Executing Court’s directive to seize and deliver idols from the respondents (Kamatam). The Supreme Court, while leaving undisturbed the High Court’s conclusions on maintainability and limitation (not appealed by the respondents), examined only whether the 1933 compromise decree was executable on the facts and whether a breach by the respondents was proved.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court (Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.; Vipul M. Pancholi, J.) dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court’s decision setting aside execution. The Court held:

• Maintainability of the execution petition and issues under the A.P. Endowments Act had attained finality (not appealed by respondents). The sole question was executability on facts.
• The decree-holders (appellants) failed to prove a breach by the respondents of the 1933 compromise decree.
• The Executing Court erred by relying on inference and presumption—particularly, an assumption that long silence meant the arrangement continued—rather than on cogent proof. “Findings based on presumption cannot replace proof.”
• There was no convincing evidence that possession of the idols/pooja articles ever passed to the respondents, or that the condition precedent of payment of Rs. 2,000 by the respondents (under Clause 1 of the decree) was satisfied.
• No evidence was produced of the mandated trusteeship and accounts (Clause 2), facts especially within the knowledge of the appellants.
• Order XXI Rule 31 CPC (execution for specific movable property) could not be invoked absent proof that the judgment-debtor possessed the specific items sought.

On these grounds, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court’s setting aside of execution and dismissed the appeals.

Background and Procedural History

The dispute dates to O.S. No. 486 of 1927 (District Munsif, Anantapur), where Kamatam members sought custody of idols and paraphernalia. The suit and ensuing appeal (A.S. No. 114 of 1928) were dismissed, with an observation that a representative suit under Section 92 CPC would be apt to regulate management of the endowment.

Acting on this, a representative suit (O.S. No. 1 of 1931; renumbered O.S. No. 15 of 1933) culminated in a compromise decree dated 01.11.1933 before the Subordinate Judge, Anantapur. Salient terms:

• Clause (1): Appellants (Kapadam) had been performing pooja and incurring expenses; respondents (Kamatam) would pay Rs. 2,000 towards half-share of pooja expenses; failure to pay would entail loss of their right to perform pooja.
• Clause (2): Two trustees from each group to supervise rituals and maintain accounts; idols of Lord Sangalappa Swamy to be installed alternately for six months each at Yerrayapalli and Gungulakunta; pooja to rotate every three months.

The arrangement was intended to end the feud. Decades later, the appellants alleged non-rotation in 1999 and filed E.P. No. 59 of 2000 to execute the 1933 decree. After procedural skirmishes (including revisions permitting preliminary issues), the Executing Court held the EP maintainable and, on 13.09.2005, directed delivery of the idols/articles, invoking Order XXI Rule 31 CPC.

On revision (C.R.P. No. 5224 of 2005), the High Court allowed the challenge on 06.01.2012: while recognizing maintainability and rejecting limitation and locus objections, it set aside execution for want of proof of breach. Review failed. The present appeals followed to the Supreme Court.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and the Legal Backdrop

The judgment does not cite reported case law; instead, it anchors its reasoning in settled statutory principles and the procedural history:

• Section 92 CPC (representative suits for public charitable and religious trusts): The 1933 suit was brought in a representative capacity, leading to a compromise decree akin to a scheme regulating worship, custody, and governance.
• Order XXI Rule 31 CPC (execution of decrees for specific movable property): The Executing Court’s direction to seize idols and pooja articles depended on proof that the judgment-debtors possessed the specified items.
• Section 9 CPC and Section 42 of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987: The High Court had held that the execution petition was maintainable and that the Endowments Act did not oust the civil court’s jurisdiction in execution. That finding was not appealed by the respondents and thus was not re-opened by the Supreme Court.
• Evidence Act (principles of burden and proof; Section 106 by implication): The Court emphasized that facts especially within a party’s knowledge (e.g., appointment of trustees, maintenance of accounts) must be proved by that party. More broadly, it reaffirmed the trite rule that the decree-holder bears the onus to establish breach in execution.

These foundational principles—not external precedents—shape the Court’s analysis. The Court reinforces, rather than reworks, orthodox execution jurisprudence.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Narrowing the controversy

Since the respondents did not appeal the High Court’s conclusions on maintainability, the Supreme Court confined itself to whether the decree was executable on the facts and whether breach was proved. This disciplined approach avoided re-litigating issues settled below and foregrounded the evidentiary threshold for execution.

b) The burden in execution: Proof over presumption

The Court crystallizes a clear rule for execution of historic compromise/scheme decrees:

• The decree-holder must prove willful disobedience of the decree and, where movables are sought, that the judgment-debtor possesses the specified property.
• Inferences based merely on silence over time or absence of earlier quarrels are insufficient. As the Court remarks, “Findings based on presumption cannot replace proof.”
• Where obligations in a compromise decree are conditional, the decree-holder must establish that the condition precedent was satisfied; absent that, no enforceable obligation arises.

c) Conditional obligations under Clause (1): Payment as a condition precedent

Clause (1) of the 1933 decree records that the appellants were then performing pooja and bearing expenses, and stipulates that the respondents’ right to participate hinges on paying Rs. 2,000 towards half-share of pooja expenses—failing which they “will lose their right to perform pooja.”

The Court finds no evidence that the respondents ever paid this amount. Indeed, PW-1 (appellants’ witness) did not establish such payment and admitted ignorance about whether the Rs. 2,000 was paid to his ancestors. The Court treats non-payment as established or, at minimum, highly probable on the record. If the condition was never fulfilled, the respondents’ right to participate did not ripen, and there was no corresponding obligation to rotate idols or deliver articles to them or back from them. This undercuts the very premise of the execution.

d) Possession and Order XXI Rule 31: No proof that the respondents held the movables

For execution seeking delivery/seizure of specific movable property, the decree-holder must prove that the judgment-debtor holds the very property. The Court underscores the absence of:

• Independent evidence (documentary or third-party) that the respondents ever took possession of the idols/articles;
• Any record of exchange/rotation consistent with the scheme; or
• Any accounting trail evidencing shared custody or transfer.

Instead, the Executing Court had reasoned that decades of quiet implied the arrangement continued and the respondents must have possession. The Supreme Court rejects this as impermissible conjecture, particularly because the parties before the Executing Court were not the original 1933 litigants and memories/evidence had faded with time. Formal proof, not inference, is indispensable.

e) Clause (2) trusteeship and accounts: Failure of scheme governance

The compromise decree mandated two trustees from each sect to supervise rituals and maintain accounts. The Court notes there is no evidence that trustees were appointed or accounts were maintained. These facts are especially within the appellants’ knowledge; their failure to prove them weakens the claim that the scheme operated at all.

The Court observes that had trusteeship and accounts been implemented, the present dispute might have been avoided—signalling the centrality of governance mechanisms in religious endowment arrangements.

f) Standard of appellate interference

While findings of fact are generally afforded deference, the Supreme Court intervened because the Executing Court’s order rested on assumption rather than evidence. The High Court was correct to set aside execution; the Supreme Court found “absolutely no reason to interfere” with that conclusion.

3. What the Judgment Establishes

The decision articulates and sharpens a practical standard for executing old compromise/scheme decrees in religious endowment disputes:

• Decree-holders must prove both the subsistence of the decree’s obligations and their breach; historic silence or sentiment cannot substitute for proof.
• Where a decree imposes conditional obligations (e.g., payment), execution requires proof that the condition precedent was fulfilled.
• For delivery of specific movable property, the decree-holder must prove that the judgment-debtor is (or was) in possession of the particular movables sought to be seized. Mere assumptions of rotation or exchange are insufficient.
• Failure to implement governance provisions (trustees, accounts) strongly suggests the scheme was not acted upon, weakening executability on facts.

4. Impact and Implications

a) For religious endowment disputes

• Parties seeking to revive or enforce old scheme decrees must marshal concrete evidence: trustee appointments, minutes, accounts, donation/expense records, and contemporary acknowledgments of rotation or custody.
• Where governance mechanisms have lapsed, a fresh representative action under Section 92 CPC or recourse to the applicable endowments statute may be more appropriate than bare execution. Courts will be reluctant to compel seizure of sacred objects without unimpeachable proof.
• The ruling will likely deter speculative or sentiment-driven executions that risk exacerbating community tensions without an evidentiary foundation.

b) For execution jurisprudence generally

• It reinforces a strict evidentiary threshold in decrees for specific movables under Order XXI Rule 31 CPC: possession by the judgment-debtor must be proved, not presumed.
• It emphasizes that executing courts cannot cure evidentiary gaps with “probable” inferences drawn from historical quiet or assumptions about traditional practices.
• It highlights that compromise decrees with conditional and administrative components can become factually non-executable if the conditions are unfulfilled and governance architecture is not implemented.

c) On the interface with endowments legislation

Though not directly adjudicated by the Supreme Court (because unchallenged), the case leaves intact the High Court’s view that civil court execution jurisdiction was not ousted by Section 42 of the A.P. Endowments Act in these circumstances. Practically, however, lack of executability on facts may drive parties to seek administrative schemes and supervision through statutory mechanisms or fresh Section 92 CPC proceedings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Section 92 CPC (Representative Suit): A special procedure for suits concerning public religious and charitable trusts, allowing representative litigation to frame or modify schemes, appoint trustees, and regulate administration.
• Compromise Decree: A decree embodying a settlement between parties. It has the force of a decree, but in execution, only those terms that are clear, subsisting, and unconditional can be enforced. Conditions precedent must be shown to have been met.
• Execution Petition (EP): A proceeding to enforce a decree. The executing court enforces the decree as it stands and cannot “go behind it,” but it can examine whether the decree is executable on the facts and whether breach is proved.
• Order XXI Rule 31 CPC (Specific Movable Property): Allows enforcement of a decree for delivery of specified movable property. The decree-holder must prove the judgment-debtor holds or controls the particular property; otherwise, seizure cannot be ordered.
• Burden of Proof in Execution: The decree-holder bears the initial burden to show violation. Assertions must be supported by evidence—documents, witnesses, accounts—not mere assumptions.
• Facts Especially Within Knowledge (Evidence Act, Section 106 principle): If a fact is peculiarly within one party’s knowledge (e.g., whether trustees were appointed by that party’s group, whether accounts were maintained), that party must prove it.
• Condition Precedent: A requirement that must be fulfilled before an obligation arises. Here, payment of Rs. 2,000 by the respondents was a condition for their right to perform pooja and participate in the rotation; without proof of payment, their obligation to rotate could not be enforced.

Key Takeaways

• Execution of historic scheme/compromise decrees concerning religious endowments demands strict proof of subsisting obligations and breach; sentiment and presumption are insufficient.
• Where obligations are conditional, the decree-holder must prove satisfaction of the condition precedent.
• Delivery of sacred movables under Order XXI Rule 31 CPC cannot be ordered absent proof that the judgment-debtor possesses the specified items.
• Lack of implementation of trusteeship and accounts undermines claims that a scheme decree has been acted upon.
• Practical resolution of long-dormant religious disputes may require fresh representative proceedings or statutory schemes, rather than execution of ancient compromises unsupported by contemporary records.

Conclusion

Kapadam Sangalappa v. Kamatam Sangalappa is a careful reaffirmation of an exacting evidentiary standard in execution proceedings, especially where parties seek to revive historic compromise decrees regulating religious endowments. The Supreme Court’s insistence on proof—of conditional compliance, of possession of movables, and of governance through trusteeship and accounts—guards against speculative or symbolic executions that may inflame community tensions without legal foundation.

The judgment’s enduring significance lies in its crisp articulation: in execution, proof prevails over presumption. For litigants and courts alike, the decision provides a principled roadmap—document the implementation of scheme decrees, maintain accounts, and demonstrate actual breach; failing that, the appropriate course may be fresh representative litigation or statutory restructuring, not execution by inference. By dismissing the appeals, the Court preserves doctrinal clarity in execution law and urges robust governance in the sensitive domain of religious endowments.

Case Details

Case: Kapadam Sangalappa and Others v. Kamatam Sangalappa and Others
Citation: 2025 INSC 1307
Court: Supreme Court of India (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)
Bench: Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.; Vipul M. Pancholi, J.
Date: 11 November 2025