Primacy of Recruitment Rules over Counsel Concessions: No Absorption from an Expired Waitlist

Case: The Union of India & Ors. v. Subit Kumar Das

Citation: 2025 INSC 1235 (Supreme Court of India, 15 October 2025)

Bench: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.; Atul S. Chandurkar, J. (Author)

Introduction

This decision addresses a recurring problem in public employment: whether an assurance or concession by government counsel before a tribunal can translate into an enforceable right to appointment for a waitlisted candidate after the relevant selection has concluded and all selected candidates have joined. The Supreme Court unequivocally reaffirms that recruitment must be governed by the applicable Rules; neither concessions made in court nor equitable considerations can be used to bypass statutory prescriptions or extend the life of a waitlist into future recruitments.

The Union of India and All India Radio (AIR) challenged the Calcutta High Court’s direction mandating the “absorption” of respondent Subit Kumar Das as a Technician in the SC category, based primarily on a 15 January 1999 statement by government counsel recorded before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT). The respondent argued that the State’s assurance to “absorb” him on the next SC vacancy created a binding obligation. The appellants contended that such absorption would violate Recruitment Rules because (i) the original 1997 select list had been exhausted when all selected candidates joined, (ii) a waitlist creates no vested right beyond its limited contingency, and (iii) counsel’s concessions on law cannot override statutory recruitment frameworks.

The Court allowed the Union’s appeal, setting aside the High Court’s directions of 25 June 2024, and in doing so crystallized a clear rule with systemic implications for service law and public administration.

Background and Procedural History

1997 Recruitment: AIR’s Eastern Zone sought to fill three SC-category Technician posts. After interviewing eleven candidates, three were selected on merit. The respondent was placed at Serial No. 1 in a “Reserved Panel” (waitlist), to be operated only if any selected candidate did not join.
Original Application No. 989/1997: The respondent challenged the selection before CAT. On 25 August 1997, CAT ordered that any appointment would abide by the OA’s outcome.
Statement recorded on 15 January 1999: Counsel for respondents (the present appellants) stated that until OBC and ST reserved quota posts were filled, the applicant’s case would not be considered, and “[a]s soon as vacancy would arise against the SC quota, the applicant would be absorbed.”
CAT final order (09 December 2004): The CAT rejected the respondent’s challenge on merits—upholding the selection process, rejecting bias allegations, reaffirming that a waitlisted candidate has no vested right—yet directed consideration of the respondent in terms of the 15 January 1999 assurance.
High Court (23 February 2009, WPCT 276/2005): Affirmed CAT’s findings on the lack of waitlist rights; modified only the time limit for consideration, noting the direction flowed from the recorded concession.
New recruitment (23 February 2013): Prasar Bharati issued a new recruitment notice including Technician posts. In OA No. 739/2013, CAT directed one SC Technician post in East Zone be kept vacant (19 July 2013) and disposed of the OA on 27 November 2015, directing compliance with earlier orders.
Speaking order (19 February 2016): The Deputy Director General (P) recorded that all three 1997 SC vacancies had been filled by selectees; the respondent, as waitlisted, had no right to “absorption” in future vacancies and had crossed the maximum age; no rule-based relaxation was directed.
OA No. 436/2016 and WPCT No. 24/2021: CAT on 09 January 2020 asked for a fresh speaking order addressing vacancies post 27 November 2015. The High Court (interim orders in 2021) sought vacancy details from 2009; AIR’s affidavit stated no Technician vacancy at AIR Calcutta since 2009. On 25 June 2024, the High Court set aside CAT’s order and directed absorption under SC category in Eastern Zone with notional effect from 19 July 2013.
Supreme Court (15 October 2025): Allowed the Union’s appeal and dismissed the respondent’s writ petition.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court held that:

A waitlist does not constitute a continuing source of recruitment and confers no vested right except to the limited contingency of a selected candidate not joining, and only while the waitlist remains operative.
An assurance or concession by counsel that a waitlisted candidate “would be absorbed” against a future SC vacancy cannot override Recruitment Rules or indefinitely extend the life of a waitlist.
Reading the 15 January 1999 statement consistently with law, at best it could have applied only if any of the three 1997 selectees did not join (which did not happen); it could not be construed as a perpetual promise to fill future SC vacancies with a former waitlisted candidate.
Enforcing the concession to order “absorption” would unlawfully:
- Fill future vacancies from an expired waitlist;
- Reduce vacancies available to future aspirants; and
- Violate the applicable Recruitment Rules (including age and eligibility conditions).
Therefore, the High Court’s direction to absorb the respondent and to give notional effect from 19 July 2013 was unsustainable.

Result: High Court judgment dated 25 June 2024 was set aside; the writ petition was dismissed; the Union’s appeal was allowed without costs.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Association v. State of Gujarat (1994 INSC 199):
The Court quoted and relied upon the three-judge bench dictum that a waiting list is not a source of recruitment; it operates only if a selected candidate does not join. Crucially, the Court emphasized the systemic harm if waiting lists become “an infinite stock,” enabling the State to avoid holding fresh examinations and disadvantaging future candidates. This directly undercut the respondent’s claim to be appointed years later from the 1997 exercise.
Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan (1998 INSC 74):
Cited for the principle that a wrong concession on a question of law made by counsel does not bind the client and cannot create precedent. The Court used this to reinforce that the 1999 assurance could not compel action contrary to Recruitment Rules or extend the life of a waitlist.
Central Council for Research in Ayurveda & Siddha v. Dr. K. Santhakumari (2001 INSC 259):
Reaffirmed that if counsel makes an admission or concession under a mistaken understanding of law, it is not binding. Applied here, the so-called assurance that the respondent “would be absorbed” could not displace the legal position that future vacancies must be filled per the governing Rules and not via an expired waitlist.
Director of Elementary Education, Odisha v. Pramod Kumar Sahoo (2019 INSC 1092) and Employees’ State Insurance Corporation v. Union of India (2022 INSC 77):
Invoked to underscore that the State may place the correct legal position before the court and cannot be compelled to comply with an erroneous concession that conflicts with statutory provisions. The Court endorsed the appellants’ reliance on these decisions in service jurisprudence contexts.
Sri Sanjoy Bhattacharjee v. Union of India (1997 INSC 250):
Cited by the appellants to demonstrate the impermissibility of long-delayed appointments from old panels, consistent with the principle against perpetuating waitlists across recruitment cycles.
Cases cited by the respondent—Prem Prakash v. Union of India (1984 INSC 150), H.P. ST Employees Federation v. H.P.S.V.K.K. [2013] 10 SCC 308, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, In Re (2013 INSC 550), and Union Of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation (1993 INSC 154):
The Court found these inapposite in the face of the controlling recruitment law principles and the explicit holdings on waitlist limitations and non-binding nature of concessions on law. Notably, arguments invoking “model employer,” fairness, or legitimate expectation could not carry through where relief would violate Recruitment Rules.

Legal Reasoning

Waitlists are time- and contingency-bound; they are not a recruitment source.
The Court reaffirmed that a waitlist exists to address the contingency of a selected candidate not joining in the same recruitment cycle. Once all selected candidates join—or the waitlist’s operative period ends—the waitlist is exhausted. This doctrine prevents the State from carrying waitlists into future recruitments, which would otherwise diminish transparency and impair opportunities for later cohorts of candidates.
The 1999 statement must be read intra legem (within the law), not contra legem (against the law).
The Court carefully reconstructed the scope of the 1999 statement. Given that all three selectees joined, the only legally permissible reading is that the respondent could have been considered solely if any 1997 selectee had not joined. Construing the statement as a perpetual promise to fill any future SC vacancy would stretch it beyond legal limits and directly offend Recruitment Rules.
Counsel’s concession on law is not binding and cannot override statutory rules.
Applying Uptron India and Santhakumari, the Court held that an inadvertent or erroneous concession on a legal point—especially one that compels violation of Recruitment Rules—does not bind the State. Courts cannot enforce concessions that produce outcomes contrary to the statutory scheme governing appointments.
Protecting future candidates and the integrity of recruitment cycles.
Enforcement of the 1999 concession to absorb a waitlisted candidate in future vacancies would operate to the prejudice of candidates eligible in subsequent recruitments. It would effectively allocate a future vacancy to an earlier process, thereby reducing the number of vacancies for future aspirants and corrupting the competitive recruitment architecture.
No basis for age relaxation or rule-bending.
The 2016 speaking order noted the respondent had crossed the maximum age limit and that no relaxation had been authorized. While the Supreme Court did not rest its decision solely on age, it underscored more broadly that “absorption” could not be directed in derogation of the Rules—age limits included—absent a lawful basis for relaxation.
Systemic discipline in service law adjudication.
The High Court’s direction, premised on moral suasion that an assurance must be honoured, was found insufficient where enforcement would violate law. The Supreme Court insisted that equitable impulses cannot supplant legislative and regulatory frameworks, particularly in public employment.

Impact and Prospective Significance

Reinforcement of the “no perpetual waitlist” norm: Courts and tribunals will be constrained from directing appointments from panels whose operative life has ended. This stabilizes recruitment planning and protects the interests of future cohorts.
Limits on enforceability of counsel concessions: Government counsel must ensure that any undertakings are expressly “subject to Recruitment Rules.” Courts are likely to treat unqualified concessions on appointments or absorptions as non-binding where they collide with statutory schemes.
Administrative law alignment: The decision curtails attempts to invoke doctrines of legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel to obtain appointments contrary to rules. Substantive rights to appointment cannot be founded on assurances that are extra-legal.
Clarity for reserved category appointments: The ruling prevents the diversion of future SC-category vacancies to earlier waitlists, ensuring fresh competition and adherence to reservation rosters per recruitment cycle.
Judicial restraint in service matters: High Courts and tribunals will likely prefer directions to “consider in accordance with law” over orders for direct absorption where doing so would infringe recruitment norms or prejudice third-party rights.

Practical Guidance Going Forward

For Government Counsel: Avoid unconditional assurances regarding future appointments. Use precise language—e.g., “consideration in accordance with Recruitment Rules, subject to availability and eligibility.”
For HR/Personnel Authorities: Clearly define the validity period and scope of waitlists in recruitment notifications; document closure of select lists to pre-empt later claims.
For Candidates: Understand that waitlist placement does not guarantee appointment; once selectees join and the list expires, claims to future vacancies cannot be sustained.
For Courts/Tribunals: Scrutinize concessions to ensure they do not contravene statutory frameworks; prefer directions that maintain legal consistency and protect the competitive field for future aspirants.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Select List vs. Waitlist (Reserved Panel):
The “select list” comprises candidates chosen for appointment against existing vacancies. The “waitlist” (sometimes styled as “Reserved Panel”) is a standby list activated only if a selected candidate does not join within the same recruitment cycle. A waitlist is not a reservoir for future vacancies.
Concession/Assurance by Counsel:
Statements made by counsel in court. If the concession concerns a legal position that conflicts with statutory rules, it is not binding on the client (the State) and cannot compel illegal acts, such as appointing someone in breach of recruitment norms.
“Absorption” in Service Law:
Absorption typically means slotting an individual into a post without undergoing the regular competitive process, often used in contexts of transfers, deputations, or reorganizations. Courts are wary of using “absorption” to bypass competitive recruitment unless explicitly permitted by rules.
Merit-cum-Seniority vs. Seniority-cum-Merit:
Principles governing promotions. “Merit-cum-seniority” prioritizes merit, while factoring seniority. “Seniority-cum-merit” prioritizes seniority, subject to minimum merit/fitness. Counsel’s misstatement about which principle applies cannot alter the governing rule.
Legitimate Expectation and Promissory Estoppel (in brief):
These doctrines may protect procedural fairness or reliance interests, but cannot mandate actions contrary to statutory provisions. In public employment, courts do not enforce expectations that conflict with recruitment rules.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. Subit Kumar Das reaffirms and consolidates two fundamental propositions in public employment law:

A waitlist is not a continuing source of recruitment. Its operation is confined to the narrow contingency of non-joining by a selectee within the same recruitment, and it expires with the closure of that process.
Counsel’s concession—especially one implying future “absorption”—cannot be enforced where it undermines Recruitment Rules, disadvantages future aspirants, or perpetuates an expired waitlist into new recruitment cycles.

By setting aside the High Court’s order of absorption, the Court protects the integrity of competitive recruitment, safeguards the rights of future candidates, and underscores that the State’s role as a “model employer” includes scrupulous adherence to statutory frameworks. The ruling serves as a caution to administrative authorities and counsel: well-intentioned assurances cannot substitute for law, and equitable considerations cannot license deviations that would distort the recruitment architecture.

Key takeaway: Promises made in court must yield to the primacy of Recruitment Rules. No candidate can claim a right to future vacancies from a lapsed waitlist, and no court may compel such an appointment by enforcing a concession that contravenes the governing legal regime.