Presumption of Marriage, Halala and Maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.:
A Detailed Commentary on V.P. Abdurahiman v. C. Safiya, 2025 KER 94062 (Kerala High Court)

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1. Introduction

The decision of the Kerala High Court in V.P. Abdurahiman v. C. Safiya, RP(FC) No.343 of 2024, decided on 05 December 2025 by Dr. Justice Kauser Edappagath, engages with a sensitive and technically complex intersection of:

• the secular, summary maintenance jurisdiction under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), and
• the requirements of Muslim personal law regarding remarriage between a divorced couple, particularly the doctrine commonly referred to as Nikah Halala.

The case arises out of a revision petition filed by the husband, V.P. Abdurahiman (revision petitioner), challenging an order of the Family Court, Malappuram in M.C. No.270 of 2022, which had granted maintenance to the respondent, C. Safiya, at the rate of ₹6,000 per month under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

The parties are Muslims governed by Muslim personal law. The material timeline is as follows:

• The parties first married on 09.05.1983 in accordance with Muslim rites.
• A daughter, Shabna, was born of this wedlock.
• The husband divorced the wife by pronouncing talaq on 20.09.1986.
• The very next day (21.09.1986), the husband married one Asmabi; four children were born in that wedlock.
• On 04.04.1991, the respondent (Safiya) married one Moideenkoya – an intervening second marriage on her side, which the husband admits.
• The dissolution of this second marriage with Moideenkoya, however, is contested by the revision petitioner.
• After the death of his second wife Asmabi on 06.11.2020, the husband claims to have married a third wife, Kadeeja.
• The respondent, in 2022, filed M.C. No.270/2022 for maintenance, contending that she re-married the petitioner on 27.04.2012 in accordance with Muslim customary rites.

Thus, the dispute in revision does not concern the first marriage or its dissolution—both are admitted—but centres on:

1. whether the respondent’s intervening marriage with Moideenkoya was validly dissolved, and
2. whether there was a legally valid second marriage (re-marriage) between the same parties on 27.04.2012 entitling her to claim maintenance as a “wife” under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

The case, therefore, raises sharp questions on:

• the evidentiary burden to prove dissolution of a prior marriage and the validity of a later marriage in proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C.,
• the role and limits of the presumption of marriage arising from long cohabitation, and
• the manner in which Muslim personal law rules on remarriage (including halala) influence who can be treated as a “wife” for the purposes of Section 125 Cr.P.C.

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2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Orders Under Challenge and Relief Granted

The Family Court, Malappuram, in M.C. No.270/2022, had:

• accepted the respondent’s case that she had remarried the petitioner on 27.04.2012, and
• granted her maintenance at ₹6,000 per month under Section 125 Cr.P.C. from the date of the petition.

The husband challenged this order in revision before the High Court, contending essentially that:

• no valid remarriage had taken place on 27.04.2012; and
• the respondent had not proved dissolution of her intervening marriage with her second husband, Moideenkoya, so any subsequent marriage with the petitioner was void under Muslim law.

2.2 Principal Findings of the High Court

The High Court’s key findings are:

1. Non-proof of dissolution of intervening marriage:
   • The respondent did not plead in her maintenance petition about her second marriage with Moideenkoya or its dissolution.
   • In her chief affidavit she vaguely stated that she divorced him within a year of the marriage but could not specify the date or year of divorce in cross-examination.
   • She had no case that talaq was pronounced in her presence or directly communicated to her; she claimed that her father and uncle obtained talaq from Moideenkoya.
   • No reliable corroborative evidence was adduced. PW2 (her brother) and PW3 (her daughter) did not competently speak to the fact of dissolution, having been minors at the relevant time.
   • Consequently, the Court held that the dissolution of the marriage with Moideenkoya was not proved.
2. Effect under Muslim law: void (batil) second marriage:
   • One essential condition for a valid Muslim marriage is that the woman must not have a living and legally recognised husband.
   • If a woman whose marriage with a living man continues under Muslim law purports to marry another man, the second marriage is batil (void).
   • As the dissolution of the respondent’s marriage with Moideenkoya was not proved, she must be treated as still married to him for legal purposes.
   • Therefore, any alleged remarriage with the petitioner in 2012 would be void even if factually performed, as it is hit by the doctrine of halala and by the rule against a woman having more than one husband.
3. Insufficient proof of the alleged remarriage of 27.04.2012:
   • While Muslim law does not require a written marriage contract or registration, a valid nikah under Sunni law requires:
     • offer and acceptance (ijab and qubul) in the same meeting,
     • free consent and competency, and
     • the presence of at least two adult Muslim male witnesses, or one male and two female witnesses.
   • The respondent examined herself and PWs 2 and 3, who stated that a nikah was performed at their residence by a khatib with two witnesses.
   • However, none of the alleged witnesses to the nikah were examined, nor was the mosque register (in which PW1 claimed the witnesses had signed) summoned.
   • The khatib who allegedly officiated the nikah was also not examined.
   • In these circumstances, the Court held that the marriage was not satisfactorily proved even on the evidence adduced.
4. Presumption from long cohabitation cannot override legal disqualification:
   • The respondent argued that long cohabitation as husband and wife with the petitioner should raise a presumption of valid marriage under Section 125 Cr.P.C., relying on Supreme Court decisions such as Chanmuniya and Kamala v. M.R. Mohan Kumar.
   • The High Court accepted the general principle that prolonged cohabitation may raise a presumption of marriage, but emphasised that:
     • the presumption is rebuttable, and
     • it operates only where there is no insurmountable legal obstacle to a valid marriage (e.g., not within prohibited degrees, no subsisting earlier marriage).
   • Referring to Mohd. Amin v. Vakil Ahmad, and to the line of cases such as Vimala (K.), Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav, and Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya, the Court held that a woman whose earlier marriage legally subsists cannot be treated as a “wife” under Section 125 Cr.P.C. on the mere basis of cohabitation in a subsequent relationship.
   • In this case, since the respondent had failed to prove dissolution of the intervening marriage with Moideenkoya, she remained legally disqualified from marrying the petitioner. Therefore, no presumption of valid marriage under Section 125 Cr.P.C. could arise from their alleged cohabitation.
5. Remand for fresh evidence in the interests of justice:
   • The Court acknowledged that proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are summary in nature, and that parties may sometimes fail to appreciate fully the necessity of detailed evidence.
   • It also recognised that a finding in maintenance proceedings on whether a person is a “wife” may have a long-term bearing on her legal status.
   • In this backdrop, rather than finally dismissing the claim, the High Court:
     • set aside the Family Court’s order granting maintenance, and
     • remanded M.C. No.270/2022 to the Family Court, Malappuram for fresh disposal, granting both parties an opportunity to adduce further evidence on:
       • the dissolution of the respondent’s marriage with Moideenkoya, and
       • the alleged remarriage between the petitioner and the respondent.
   • The Family Court was directed to dispose of the case within three months from receipt of a copy of the order.

Accordingly, the revision petition was disposed of by setting aside the impugned maintenance order and remanding the matter; the High Court did not finally adjudicate the respondent’s status as “wife” or her ultimate entitlement to maintenance.

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3. Precedents and Authorities Cited

3.1 Presumption of Marriage and Cohabitation

3.1.1 Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha (2011) 1 SCC 141

The respondent relied on Chanmuniya to argue that:

• In proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C., which are social welfare in nature, strict and technical proof of marriage is not always necessary.
• Where a man and woman have lived together as husband and wife for a long time, the court should lean in favour of a presumption of marriage rather than treat the woman as a mere concubine, so that she does not suffer destitution.

In Chanmuniya, the Supreme Court broadly favoured an expansive and purposive interpretation of “wife” in maintenance laws to cover women who are in “relationships in the nature of marriage,” though it left certain issues for a larger Bench.

3.1.2 Kamala & Others v. M.R. Mohan Kumar (2019) 11 SCC 491

Kamala reiterated that:

• Long cohabitation as husband and wife can raise a presumption of lawful marriage.
• Courts should ordinarily presume in favour of marriage and against concubinage where a couple has been accepted by society as husband and wife.

The respondent invoked this line to contend that her alleged long cohabitation with Abdurahiman from 2012 onwards should entitle her to maintenance, even if formal proof of marriage were deficient.

3.1.3 Mohd. Amin v. Vakil Ahmad, AIR 1952 SC 358

The High Court itself cited Mohd. Amin to reiterate the classical rule that:

• Where a man and woman have cohabited for a long time and are treated as husband and wife, the law will generally presume a valid marriage and not concubinage.
• However, such a presumption applies only where there is no insurmountable obstacle to a valid marriage, e.g., the parties are not within prohibited degrees of relationship, and there is no subsisting earlier marriage rendering the union void.

This qualification—that the presumption operates only where a valid marriage is legally possible—plays a central role in the High Court’s reasoning.

3.2 “Wife” Under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and Bigamous Relationships

3.2.1 Vimala (K.) v. Veeraswamy (K.) (1991) 2 SCC 375

The three-judge Bench in Vimala recognised that:

• Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure of social justice meant to prevent destitution.
• However, a woman whose marriage is void ab initio because the man had a living spouse at the time is not a “legally wedded wife” and, therefore, not a “wife” within the meaning of Section 125.

The principle is that while the provision is to be liberally construed, its ambit cannot be stretched to validate a union which is a complete nullity under the relevant personal law.

3.2.2 Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav, AIR 1988 SC 644

In Yamunabai, the Supreme Court held that:

• A marriage contracted by a woman with a man who already has a living spouse, where the parties are Hindus, is void under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
• Such a woman cannot claim the status of “wife” under Section 125 Cr.P.C., as the expression “wife” presupposes a lawful marriage.

This decision laid down a relatively rigid approach, excluding bigamous second wives from the ambit of “wife” under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

3.2.3 Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State Of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 636

Savitaben reaffirmed Yamunabai, holding that:

• Even though Section 125 is a social justice provision, its benefits cannot be extended to a woman whose marriage is a nullity due to the subsistence of a prior lawful marriage of the man.
• To be a “wife” under Section 125, there must be a marriage valid in law under the applicable personal law.

The Kerala High Court in the present case uses these decisions to insist that:

• Presumption from cohabitation cannot cure a fundamental legal defect in the marriage (such as a subsisting earlier marriage or violation of personal law conditions); and
• A woman in a relationship that is void due to such legal impediments cannot be treated as a “wife” for Section 125 Cr.P.C.

3.3 Halala and the Requirement of a Genuine Intervening Marriage

3.3.1 Quranic basis: Surah Al-Baqarah, Verse 230

The judgment refers to the Quranic verse (Surah Al-Baqarah, 2:230), which is commonly understood in classical Sunni jurisprudence to mean:

• After a final, irrevocable divorce (talaq), a man cannot lawfully remarry his former wife unless:
  • she has married another man,
  • the second marriage has been consummated, and
  • that second marriage has lawfully ended (through divorce or the second husband’s death).

This is the doctrinal basis for what is known as Nikah Halala—a controversial and much-debated concept, but one that the Court treats here as an operative rule of Muslim personal law.

3.3.2 Saiyid Rashid Ahmad v. Anisa Khatun, AIR 1932 PC 25

The Privy Council decision in Saiyid Rashid Ahmad is cited for the proposition that:

• The intervening second marriage that enables the first couple to remarry must:
  • be a genuine marriage, not a sham arrangement;
  • have actually taken place, and
  • be consummated.
• The law insists on these elements to prevent abuse of the rule (for example, a mere paper marriage entered into solely to make the first wife “halal” for her former husband).

The Kerala High Court leverages this authority to stress that, for a divorced Muslim couple to remarry each other validly, the woman must:

• have entered into a real intervening marriage with another man,
• that intervening marriage must have been consummated, and
• its dissolution must be legally proved.

Absent proof of lawful dissolution of the intervening marriage, the subsequent marriage to the former husband is void, and the woman cannot claim the status of “wife”.

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4. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.1 Step 1: Clarifying the Essentials of a Muslim Marriage

The judgment begins by outlining the legal structure of a Muslim marriage (nikah), emphasising:

• It is both a religious rite and a civil contract.
• Essential elements include:
  • Offer and acceptance (ijab and qubul) in the same meeting;
  • Free consent of competent parties;
  • Presence of at least two adult Muslim male witnesses, or one male and two female witnesses (under Sunni law);
  • Payment or stipulation of dower (mahr) by the husband.
• Though not mandatory, in practice in India:
  • a nikah ceremony is performed, often by a religious cleric (khatib),
  • a marriage contract (nikah-namah) may be prepared, and
  • entries may be made in a mosque marriage register.

This framework is used later to examine whether the alleged remarriage of 2012 was sufficiently proved, particularly in terms of:

• the presence (and non-examination) of witnesses,
• the role of the wali (guardian) for the bride, and
• the khatib who purportedly conducted the marriage.

4.2 Step 2: Halala and the Necessity of an Intervening Marriage

The Court then explains:

• Muslim law recognises various modes of divorce:
  • Talaq (unilateral divorce by the husband),
  • Khula (divorce initiated by the wife),
  • Mubarat (divorce by mutual consent), and
  • divorce by court under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.
• After divorcing through talaq in a manner amounting to an irrevocable divorce, a man cannot remarry his former wife directly.
• The woman must first:
  • marry another man,
  • the marriage must be consummated, and
  • she must later be divorced or widowed from the second husband—only then can she lawfully remarry her first husband.

Thus, the Court treats the remarriage between the same spouses as contingent upon the lawfulness and dissolution of the intervening marriage. It insists that:

• Proof of the intervening marriage’s dissolution is a jurisdictional fact for assessing the validity of the alleged remarriage.
• Without such proof, the alleged remarriage with the first husband would be void (batil).

4.3 Step 3: Assessing Proof of Dissolution of the Intervening Marriage

Applying these principles, the Court noted that:

• The respondent did not even plead the existence and dissolution of her marriage with Moideenkoya in her Section 125 petition—this omission itself is telling.
• Her later testimony on divorce was vague and unparticularised:
  • No date or year of divorce was mentioned.
  • No assertion that talaq was pronounced in her presence or communicated directly to her.
  • The narrative that her father and uncle obtained the talaq from Moideenkoya was unsupported by any independent evidence.
• PWs 2 and 3, being minors at the time of the supposed divorce, could not offer reliable direct evidence about the event.

On this foundation, the Court held that the respondent had failed to discharge the burden of proving dissolution of her marriage with Moideenkoya, a burden that lay on her since:

• she was asserting the legal capacity to remarry the petitioner, and
• the petitioner specifically denied such capacity (by disputing the dissolution of the intervening marriage).

The consequence is doctrinally significant: if the second marriage with Moideenkoya remains legally subsisting (for lack of proof of divorce), any subsequent marriage with the former husband is not only irregular but void ab initio.

4.4 Step 4: Evaluating Proof of the Alleged Remarriage of 27.04.2012

Even assuming, arguendo, that the respondent was competent to marry, the High Court found that she had not sufficiently proved the alleged remarriage.

Key aspects:

• She claimed that the nikah took place at her residence, performed by a khatib, with two witnesses present.
• PW2 (her brother) claimed to have acted as her wali (guardian) for the nikah.
• PW1 (respondent) said that the witnesses had signed the mosque register.

However:

• No independent witness of the nikah (i.e., none of the alleged adult male witnesses) was examined.
• The khatib who performed the alleged marriage was not examined.
• The relevant mosque register was not summoned or produced.

In summary, while PWs 1–3 testified in favour of the marriage, the Court considered this insufficient in the face of:

• the petitioner’s categorical denial of any marriage in 2012, and
• the absence of testimony from those whose participation Muslim law makes legally critical—witnesses and the officiant.

Thus, the Court was not prepared to accept that a valid nikah had been established even on the lower evidentiary threshold generally applied in Section 125 proceedings.

4.5 Step 5: Limits of the Presumption of Marriage from Cohabitation

The respondent attempted to rely on:

• the general principle in Chanmuniya, Kamala, and Mohd. Amin that prolonged cohabitation as husband and wife raises a presumption of lawful marriage; and
• the policy rationale that Section 125 Cr.P.C. is intended to prevent vagrancy and destitution by providing a summary remedy for neglected wives.

The High Court accepted the core of this jurisprudence but emphasised a critical limiting condition:

• The presumption of lawful marriage applies only where there is no insurmountable legal bar to a valid marriage under the parties’ personal law.

In other words:

• If personal law renders the union void (e.g., because the woman has a living, undivorced husband or because of prohibited degrees of relationship),
• the courts cannot, through a presumption arising from cohabitation, override that substantive legal defect.

The Court drew on Vimala, Yamunabai and Savitaben to reiterate that:

• Section 125 Cr.P.C. does not permit recognising as “wife” a woman whose marriage is void ab initio under the applicable personal law.
• Hence, a presumption from cohabitation cannot be invoked to confer the status of “wife” on a party to a void marriage.

Applying this:

• Since the respondent had not proved dissolution of her marriage with Moideenkoya, she was legally incapable of remarrying the petitioner according to Muslim law.
• The alleged cohabitation with the petitioner therefore could not give rise to a presumption of a valid marriage for Section 125 purposes.

4.6 Step 6: Summary Nature of Section 125 Proceedings and Remand

Despite finding the respondent’s evidence inadequate, the Court did not conclusively dismiss her claim. Instead, it reasoned that:

• Section 125 proceedings are summary. Litigants may sometimes under-appreciate the rigour needed to prove:
  • the dissolution of a previous marriage, and
  • the precise validity of a subsequent marriage.
• However, a finding made in these proceedings on whether a woman is the “wife” of a man can have far-reaching civil consequences for her status, including in subsequent suits or matrimonial litigation.

Balancing correctness of law with fairness to the parties, the Court:

• Set aside the Family Court’s order granting maintenance;
• Remanded the maintenance petition for fresh consideration, with liberty to both parties to adduce further evidence; and
• Directed expeditious disposal within three months.

Thus, while the Court clarified the law on the interplay of:

• Muslim personal law rules on remarriage and halala,
• the evidentiary requirements for dissolution of prior marriage, and
• the presumption of marriage under Section 125 Cr.P.C.,

it left the final determination of the respondent’s status and entitlement to maintenance open, dependent on evidence yet to be produced.

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5. Impact and Significance

5.1 Reinforcing the Personal Law Limits on “Wife” in Section 125 Cr.P.C.

This judgment reaffirms and applies, in the context of Muslim personal law, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that:

• The expression “wife” in Section 125 Cr.P.C. refers to a woman who has a marriage valid in law under the personal law applicable to the parties.
• A woman in a void (batil) marriage—e.g., where she already had a subsisting lawful husband—cannot be regarded as a “wife” for the purpose of claiming maintenance under Section 125.
• Social welfare considerations, while important, cannot be stretched to override fundamental invalidity of a marriage under personal law.

By applying this to a Muslim second-marriage scenario, the judgment underlines that:

• Where Nikah Halala is treated as a requirement for remarriage between previously divorced spouses, compliance with its conditions (real intervening marriage, consummation, and lawful dissolution) becomes a pre-condition for recognising any subsequent remarriage.

5.2 Evidentiary Standards in Section 125 Proceedings Involving Muslim Marriages

The decision has practical implications for how Family Courts and parties approach cases involving:

• prior talaq and later alleged remarriage between the same spouses, and
• intervening marriages under Muslim law.

It suggests that even in summary proceedings:

• Where the dissolution of a prior marriage is foundational to the validity of the subsequent marriage, mere oral assertions without particulars or supporting evidence will not suffice.
• Courts may expect:
  • witnesses to the talaq or certified records (if available),
  • evidence of communication of talaq to the wife, and
  • where possible, entries from mosque records or marriage certificates.
• Similarly, for the alleged subsequent nikah, courts may call for:
  • examination of the khatib,
  • examination of the requisite male witnesses, and
  • production of any nikah-namah or mosque register.

The judgment thus tends to raise the practical evidentiary bar in Section 125 cases where complex marital histories and multiple marriages under Muslim law are involved.

5.3 Clarifying the Scope of Presumption from Cohabitation

The decision refines, rather than rejects, the doctrine that long cohabitation can give rise to a presumption of marriage:

• It confirms that such a presumption is indeed recognised in Indian law and can be invoked to support claims of maintenance where formal proof of marriage is weak or missing.
• However, it also clarifies that this presumption cannot be used to:
  • “legalise” a relationship that is substantively void under personal law, or
  • bypass non-derogable marriage conditions under religious law, such as the requirement that the woman must not already have a living, undivorced husband.

This has broader implications beyond Muslim law:

• For Hindus, Christians and others, similar logic applies where a woman claims maintenance as a second wife while the man’s first valid marriage is still subsisting.
• Courts will continue to be cautious in invoking cohabitation-based presumptions where doing so would directly contradict the personal law’s concept of a valid marriage.

5.4 Procedural Fairness in Status-Determining Proceedings

A notable feature of the judgment is its remedial choice:

• Instead of finally rejecting the claim (which the Court might have done, given the deficiencies in evidence), it remands the matter for fresh evidence.

This approach has two practical consequences:

• It underlines that, despite the summary character of Section 125 proceedings, when such proceedings decide or heavily influence marital status, courts should be circumspect before delivering a conclusive finding on incomplete evidence.
• It signals to Family Courts the importance of:
  • framing clear factual and legal issues related to marital status, and
  • ensuring that parties are made aware of the specific types of evidence required to substantiate dissolution of a prior marriage and validity of a later marriage.

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6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 Section 125 Cr.P.C.: Maintenance in a Nutshell

Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a summary, secular remedy that allows a:

• “wife,”
• child, and
• parent

who is unable to maintain themselves, to obtain a monthly maintenance order from a person with sufficient means who has neglected or refused to maintain them.

It is not a matrimonial suit; it does not grant divorce or decide all matrimonial rights, but it does require the court to decide:

• whether the applicant is, legally, a “wife” of the respondent, and
• whether there is neglect or refusal to maintain.

The term “wife” includes:

• a legally wedded wife, and
• in some circumstances, a divorced wife who has not remarried.

However, it does not ordinarily include a woman whose marriage is void ab initio.

6.2 Nikah, Wali, Khatib, and Nikah-Namah

• Nikah: The Muslim marriage contract, consisting of ijab (offer) and qubul (acceptance) in the same meeting, with witnesses.
• Wali: A guardian (often the father, otherwise a close male relative like a brother) who may represent the bride in the nikah, particularly under certain schools of Muslim law.
• Khatib: A religious cleric who typically officiates the nikah ceremony—reciting verses from the Quran, explaining rights and obligations, and recording consent.
• Nikah-Namah: A marriage contract or document that records the terms of nikah, including the identity of parties, amount of dower, witnesses, and officiant. Often, but not always, recorded in a mosque register.

6.3 Talaq, Halala, and Iddat

• Talaq: Divorce initiated by the husband. Depending on form and number, it can be revocable (where the husband can take the wife back during iddat) or irrevocable.
• Iddat: A mandatory waiting period a Muslim woman must observe after divorce or the husband’s death before she may remarry. Its duration varies with circumstances (pregnancy, death vs. divorce, etc.).
• Nikah Halala:
  • If a divorce between spouses is final and irrevocable, classical Sunni law requires that the wife must marry another man and that marriage must be consummated and then validly dissolved before she can remarry her former husband.
  • This intervening marriage must be genuine, not a sham entered into solely for enabling remarriage to the first husband.

6.4 Batil (Void) Marriage

Under Muslim law:

• A batil marriage is one that is void from the outset, such as where:
  • the woman already has a living, undivorced husband, or
  • the parties are within prohibited degrees of kinship.

A batil marriage:

• confers no valid spousal rights,
• does not give rise to mutual inheritance between the spouses, and
• cannot usually be treated as a foundation for maintenance as a “wife” under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

6.5 Presumption of Marriage from Cohabitation

Courts often apply the principle that:

• where a man and woman have lived together and are widely treated as husband and wife for a long period, the law presumes that they are legally married, unless the contrary is shown.

This presumption:

• protects women from being stigmatised as concubines or illegitimate partners,
• aids them in claiming maintenance, legitimacy for children, etc., and
• is rebuttable: it disappears if strong evidence shows that a valid marriage was legally impossible (e.g., because of a subsisting prior marriage).

The present case focuses on this crucial limitation.

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7. Conclusion

V.P. Abdurahiman v. C. Safiya occupies an important space in the ongoing judicial effort to reconcile:

• the beneficent, secular goals of Section 125 Cr.P.C., and
• the structural requirements of personal law concerning marriage validity, particularly under Muslim law.

The key takeaways are:

1. Dissolution of intervening marriage is a pre-condition:
   For a divorced Muslim couple to validly remarry each other where halala rules are invoked, the woman’s intervening marriage with another man must be:
   • genuine,
   • consummated, and
   • legally dissolved.
   Proof of such dissolution is essential; without it, any alleged remarriage with the first husband is void.
2. Presumption from cohabitation has limits:
   While long cohabitation may give rise to a presumption of lawful marriage, this presumption cannot be used to:
   • confer “wife” status in a relationship that is void ab initio under personal law, or
   • neutralise a clear legal disqualification to marriage (i.e., the woman’s subsisting marriage with another man).
3. “Wife” under Section 125 is constrained by personal law:
   Consistently with Supreme Court precedent, the Kerala High Court reiterates that a woman whose marriage is void—whether under Hindu or Muslim law—cannot claim maintenance as a “wife” under Section 125 Cr.P.C.
4. Evidentiary rigour in summary proceedings:
   Even in the relatively informal setting of Section 125, claims that depend on complex marital histories—including multiple marriages and divorces—require solid evidence: witness testimony, documentary proof, and, where relevant, religious or community records.
5. Fairness through remand:
   Recognising both the insufficiency of the evidence and the serious consequences of status determinations, the Court remands the matter, giving the respondent another opportunity to prove:
   • the dissolution of her marriage with Moideenkoya, and
   • the alleged 2012 remarriage with the petitioner.
   This reflects a measured judicial approach—ensuring legal correctness while preserving the litigant’s chance to establish her status on a fuller evidentiary record.

In sum, the judgment consolidates a critical principle: the presumption of marriage and the benevolent thrust of Section 125 Cr.P.C. cannot be deployed to bypass non-derogable marriage conditions entrenched in personal law. At the same time, it insists that where a woman’s status as “wife” is at stake, courts should ensure that the issue is resolved on a properly developed evidentiary foundation, not on incomplete or casual assertions.