Pragmatic Condonation Within the 120‑Day Cap: Calcutta High Court Clarifies Discretion and Costs under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC

Introduction

In Central Bank of India & Ors v. Jay Kumar Goyal & Ors (IA No. GA‑COM/3/2025 in CS‑COM/83/2025), the Calcutta High Court (Commercial Division, Original Side) confronted a recurring procedural flashpoint in commercial litigation: whether, and on what terms, a defendant may file a written statement after the initial 30 days but within the statutory outer limit of 120 days stipulated by the amended Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as applied via the Commercial Courts Act, 2015).

Defendants 5 to 15 sought condonation of an 87‑day delay, an order permitting their written statement to be taken on record, and consequential directions. The plaintiffs opposed, pressing a strict construction of the 30‑day mandate and relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in SCG Contracts (2019) 12 SCC 210 to emphasize the non‑extendable outer limit, while also seeking time to file an affidavit in opposition.

Against this backdrop, Justice Aniruddha Roy delivered a reasoned decision on November 6, 2025, that both affirms the strictness of the 120‑day cap and articulates a pragmatic, merits‑oriented approach to condoning delay within that cap, including the purposive use of costs as a curative mechanism.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court refused the plaintiffs’ request to file an affidavit in opposition, noting that the critical facts (service dates, filing dates, volumes of pleadings) were undisputed on the record and that further affidavits would serve only to keep the application pending on the 119th/120th day.
Reaffirming the legal position under the amended Order VIII Rule 1, the Court held that it retains discretion to extend time beyond 30 days, but not beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons, upon recording reasons and imposing costs.
Finding the defendants’ reasons credible—voluminous pleadings (11 volumes each for plaint and interim application), actively contested interlocutory applications culminating shortly before the Puja vacation, the age of certain impugned transactions necessitating document retrieval, and senior counsel’s unavailability during vacation—the Court exercised discretion to extend time until the hearing day and directed that the written statement be filed by 6:00 p.m. the same day.
The Court imposed costs of Rs. 50,000, payable to the State Legal Services Authority, West Bengal, within seven days. Non‑payment would trigger a sanction: the written statement would be returned and not taken cognizance of.
Relying on a recent coordinate bench decision (Exide Industries Ltd v. Amara Raja Energy and Mobility Ltd, 22 September 2025), the Court emphasized a non‑technical, “no mini‑trial” approach to condonation within the 120‑day window and a preference for adjudication on merits.

Key Dates and Procedural Milestones

June 19, 2025: Plaint presented.
July 10, 2025: Writ of summons and plaint served on Defendants 5–12 and 15 (30‑day window expired August 9, 2025; 120‑day window expiring November 7, 2025).
August 18, 2025: Writ of summons and plaint served on Defendants 13–14 (30‑day window expired September 17, 2025; 120‑day window expiring December 16, 2025).
November 3, 2025: Written statement affirmed on behalf of Defendants 5–15 (the judgment text states 2024, evidently a typographical error in context).
November 4, 2025: Master Summons filed; written statement served on plaintiffs’ Advocate-on-Record.
November 6, 2025: Application heard and allowed; filing permitted by 6:00 p.m. same day.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

SCG Contracts (India) Pvt Ltd v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt Ltd, (2019) 12 SCC 210: The Supreme Court’s controlling ratio is that the 120‑day outer limit for filing a written statement in commercial suits is mandatory and non‑extendable. The Calcutta High Court’s decision is fully consistent with SCG: it condones delay only within the 120‑day period and reaffirms forfeiture beyond it.
Exide Industries Ltd v. Amara Raja Energy and Mobility Ltd (Calcutta High Court, 22 September 2025, unreported): The coordinate bench emphasized that within the 120‑day window: courts should resist turning condonation into a “mini‑trial”; explanation of “every day’s delay” is unnecessary; technicalities should not eclipse substantial justice; and where the written statement and an extension application are on the record within time, a pragmatic approach should prevail. Justice Roy expressly relied on these principles and noted that no appeal was shown to be pending from Exide.
Further Calcutta High Court authorities (as catalogued in Exide): - Rajendra Kumar Kothari & Anr v. Varun Kumar Kothari (DB, 17 February 2025, A.P.O. No. 106 of 2023) - SKM Agro Pvt Ltd v. Paritosh Biswas (15 September 2022) - M/s. Ashok Exporters and Importers & Ors v. M/s. Imax Infrastructure Pvt Ltd & Ors (12 November 2024) - Skipper Limited v. Surender Kumar Goyal (22 November 2024) These decisions collectively trend toward a merits‑first, non‑hypertechnical approach to condonation within the statutory ceiling.

Legal Reasoning

Textual anchor: Order VIII Rule 1 (as amended for commercial suits). The proviso permits the court to extend the initial 30‑day period, provided: - Reasons are recorded in writing; - Costs are imposed as the court deems fit; and - The extension does not exceed 120 days from service of summons, after which the right to file is forfeited and the court “shall not allow” the written statement to be taken on record.
Judicial discretion within a hard outer limit. Justice Roy recognizes both the strict outer bound and the discretionary space within it. The decision demonstrates how this discretion should be exercised: by a reasoned, fact‑sensitive order justified on real case management considerations and fairness, not rote recitals.
Costs as a curative mechanism. An important doctrinal contribution of this judgment is its characterization of the “costs” element as a curative tool: the legislature’s requirement of costs, in the Court’s view, is designed to remedy procedural lapses (within the cap) so that a defaulting party is not shut out from defending, subject to the 120‑day restriction. This aligns with substantial justice and the natural justice right to be heard.
Merits over technicalities. Echoing Exide, the Court declines to fetishize “every day’s delay” explanations and rejects a “mini‑trial” on condonation when the written statement and extension application are undisputedly within 120 days. This approach reflects the Commercial Courts regime’s twin goals—expedition and fairness.
Case‑management on the crucial day. The Court refused to permit an affidavit in opposition that would push the matter past the 119th/120th day, noting the facts were already on the record and further affidavits would not assist. This is a clear demonstration of active case management aimed at preventing the process from itself causing forfeiture.
Assessment of reasons offered. The defendants’ grounds—highly voluminous pleadings and annexures; contested interlocutory applications (the plaintiffs’ injunction and the first defendant’s Section 12A revocation) heard until September 22, 2025 with judgment on October 29, 2025; the age of some transactions requiring document retrieval; senior counsel’s unavailability during Puja vacation; affirmation and service of written statement within the 120 days—were accepted as bona fide and consistent with a diligent effort rather than dilatory conduct.
Sanction for non‑payment of costs. The Court coupled the grant with a stringent condition: if the Rs. 50,000 cost to SLSA is not paid within seven days, the written statement will be returned and not taken cognizance of. This calibrates leniency with discipline.

How This Decision Interacts with SCG Contracts

SCG Contracts erects a bright‑line prohibition against taking a written statement on record beyond 120 days in commercial suits.
This judgment fully respects that boundary; it neither dilutes nor distinguishes SCG. Rather, it elaborates the content of judicial discretion within the 120‑day window, indicating that courts should record reasons and levy costs but avoid procedural hyper‑technicality that undermines adjudication on merits.

Impact and Prospective Significance

Within 120 days, condonation should be the norm, not the exception, where bona fide reasons exist. The Court’s embrace of Exide’s “no mini‑trial” and “no every‑day’s‑delay” approach signals that, absent deliberate or contumacious delay, defendants who act within 120 days and place their written statement and an extension application on record can ordinarily expect relief, subject to costs.
Affidavit‑in‑opposition is not a tactical tool to run out the clock. Plaintiffs should not expect the court to entertain additional affidavits on the cusp of the 120‑day deadline where facts are already clear from the record; judges may prioritize timely decision‑making to avoid inadvertent forfeiture by passage of time.
Costs as a behavioral nudge. The strong cost‑order (payable to SLSA with a sanction of return of the written statement upon non‑payment) will likely become a template: courts will condone within time but condition relief on prompt payment of meaningful costs to reinforce procedural compliance.
Per‑defendant computation matters. The judgment underscores that the 120‑day clock runs from service on each defendant individually. Multi‑defendant suits require precision in tracking separate deadlines; late‑served defendants (like Defendants 13–14 here) retain more time.
Strategic guidance for litigants. - Defendants should: a) serve their written statement and move a time‑extension application well within 120 days; b) collect documentary material early; c) be prepared to pay costs; and d) avoid relying solely on counsel unavailability unless supported by other bona fide factors. - Plaintiffs should anticipate that courts will favor merits within 120 days and structure their opposition accordingly (e.g., by demonstrating deliberate delay, prejudice, or attempts to game the system), rather than relying on bare technical objections.
Alignment with the Commercial Courts’ ethos. The ruling strengthens an adjudicatory culture that is both time‑bound and fair—eschewing procedural ambushes while maintaining the discipline of a hard deadline.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Order VIII Rule 1 (Commercial Suits): - A defendant should file a written statement within 30 days of service of summons. - The court may extend this time, with reasons and costs, but not beyond 120 days from service. - After 120 days, the right to file is forfeited and the court cannot take the written statement on record.
Master Summons: An Original Side procedural device (in the Calcutta High Court) by which a party seeks orders/directions from the court in the suit (here, an extension of time to file the written statement).
Affidavit‑in‑Opposition: The standard form of a responding affidavit filed to oppose an interlocutory application. Courts may dispense with it if the material facts are already on the record and the timing would cause undue prejudice (as on the “crucial day” in this case).
“Forfeiture” of the right to file a written statement: A statutory consequence under the Commercial Courts regime; once 120 days elapse from service of summons, courts are barred from taking the written statement on record—no inherent power or equitable considerations can override this.
Costs as “curative”: The judgment conceptualizes the statutory provision for costs not merely as punitive but as a means to cure a procedural lapse (within the cap), allowing the defendant to be heard while compensating for delay and reinforcing discipline.

Additional Observations

Typographical inconsistency: The judgment notes that the written statement was “affirmed” on November 3, 2024. Given the surrounding chronology, this appears to be a typographical error; November 3, 2025 is consistent with all other dates.
Pendency of interlocutory applications: The Court acknowledges that while the statute does not treat such pendency as a formal ground for defaulting the 30‑day mandate, it can be part of the factual matrix informing discretionary extension within the 120‑day cap.

Conclusion

This decision fortifies a balanced procedural doctrine for commercial suits: the 120‑day outer limit for written statements remains sacrosanct, but within that window courts should apply a practical, merits‑oriented discretion grounded in recorded reasons and meaningful costs. By declining to allow procedural skirmishing (like belated opposition affidavits) to run out the clock, and by conceptualizing costs as a curative device, the Court advances both expedition and fairness—the twin pillars of the Commercial Courts framework.

Key takeaways:

The 120‑day limit is absolute; beyond it, no written statement can be taken on record.
Within 120 days, courts have discretion to condone delay beyond 30 days upon recorded reasons and costs, without a “mini‑trial” on condonation or a demand for “every day’s delay” explanation.
Voluminous pleadings, active interlocutory litigation, and bona fide practical constraints can justify extension, especially where the written statement is affirmed/served and an extension application is filed within time.
Costs may be used as a curative instrument, including stringent consequences for non‑payment.
Courts may manage proceedings to avoid deadline‑driven forfeiture, particularly on the cusp of the 120‑day expiry.

Central Bank of India v. Jay Kumar Goyal thus contributes a clear, practice‑shaping statement from the Calcutta High Court on how trial courts should operationalize Order VIII Rule 1 in commercial litigation—ensuring that discipline in timelines does not devolve into denial of the right to defend where timely, bona fide effort is evident.