Passport Renewal for Accused Persons: Section 6(2)(f) Not an Absolute Bar When Criminal Courts Retain Control over Foreign Travel

Passport Renewal for Accused Persons: Section 6(2)(f) Not an Absolute Bar When Criminal Courts Retain Control over Foreign Travel

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Mahesh Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1476, marks a significant clarification of the law governing passports for individuals facing criminal proceedings. The judgment addresses the interplay between the Passports Act, 1967, the exemption notification GSR 570(E) dated 25.08.1993, and the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.

At the core, the Court holds that Section 6(2)(f) of the Passports Act – which bars issuance of a passport when criminal proceedings are pending – is not an absolute and perpetual prohibition. Where competent criminal courts choose to permit passport renewal while retaining control over any foreign travel through bail conditions and orders, the statutory bar is relaxed by virtue of the exemption mechanism under Section 22 and GSR 570(E).

The case is also important constitutionally: it reiterates that liberty is the State’s first obligation, not its gift, and that temporary process-related restrictions cannot be allowed to ossify into de facto permanent exclusions from fundamental freedoms such as the right to travel.

2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 Parties

  • Appellant: Mahesh Kumar Agarwal, Indian citizen, holder of an ordinary passport (No. Z2611895) issued on 29.08.2013 and valid until 28.08.2023.
  • Respondents: Union of India (Ministry of External Affairs) and the Regional Passport Office (RPO), Kolkata.

2.2 Criminal Proceedings Involving the Appellant

  1. NIA Case (Jharkhand)
    • Origin: Tandwa P.S. Case No. 02/2016 (District Chatra, Jharkhand) re-registered as NIA RC No. 06/2018/NIA/DLI on 16.02.2018.
    • Allegations: Extortion, levy collection in coal mining areas (Amrapali and Magadh), alleged funding of a proscribed organisation.
    • Charges:
      • Section 120B IPC (criminal conspiracy) read with Section 17 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UA(P) Act);
      • Substantive offences under Sections 17 and 18 UA(P) Act;
      • Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908;
      • Section 201 IPC (causing disappearance of evidence).
    • Case pending as Special Case No. 03/2018 before the NIA Court, Ranchi.
  2. CBI Coal Block Case (Delhi)
    • Trial before Special Judge, PC Act, CBI (Coal Block Cases-01), Rouse Avenue Courts, New Delhi.
    • Conviction judgment dated 21.04.2022; sentence dated 25.04.2022.
    • Sentence: Maximum four years’ imprisonment under IPC offences; fine paid.
    • Appeal: Criminal Appeal No. 189/2022 pending before the Delhi High Court.
    • By order dated 23.05.2022, the Delhi High Court suspended the sentence subject to conditions, including that the appellant shall not leave India without prior permission of the Court.

2.3 Earlier Directions on Passport and Bail

  • In 2020, during challenge to the NIA cognizance order in the Jharkhand High Court, the appellant was directed to deposit his passport and not leave India without the Court’s permission. This appeal was later dismissed (11.01.2022), and SLP against it was also dismissed.
  • In 2022, in the NIA case, the Jharkhand High Court granted bail; the NIA Court, Ranchi, fixed bail conditions and insisted that the passport remain deposited with the Court (order dated 12.04.2022).

2.4 Applications Concerning Passport Renewal

  1. Before the NIA Court, Ranchi (Order dated 10.07.2023)
    • The appellant sought:
      • "No objection" for renewal of passport for 10 years; and
      • Release of the original passport from Court custody for that limited purpose.
    • NIA Court’s directions:
      • Passport to be handed over to the appellant only for renewal, on furnishing an indemnity bond of Rs. 50,000/- with two sureties (one resident of Ranchi).
      • Appellant to remain present for framing of charge and to personally receive the passport.
      • Appellant to file an undertaking:
        • Not to obtain any visa or travel outside India after renewal without permission of the NIA Court.
        • To deposit the renewed passport immediately with the Court office.
      • Order to be communicated to NIA Superintendent, MEA and RPO, Kolkata.
  2. Before the Delhi High Court (Order dated 04.09.2023)
    • Application (CRL.M.A. No. 21988/2023 in Criminal Appeal No. 189/2022) for "no objection" to renewal of passport.
    • The Delhi High Court:
      • Noted the existing condition that the appellant shall not leave India without its permission.
      • Held there was no basis to deny renewal for a regular period of 10 years.
      • Granted permission and "no objection" for renewal for 10 years.
  3. Application to RPO, Kolkata
    • Application for re-issue filed on 22.09.2023.
    • Appellant disclosed:
      • Pendency of NIA case;
      • Conviction in CBI coal block case and pending appeal;
      • Conditions imposed by Delhi High Court and NIA Court, including no travel abroad without permission.
    • On 17.10.2023, appellant produced certified copies of both court orders before the RPO.

2.5 Stand of the Passport Authority

RPO, Kolkata examined the application under Section 6(2)(f) of the Passports Act, GSR 570(E), and the MEA Office Memorandum dated 10.10.2019. It took the view that:

  • Exemption from Section 6(2)(f) is possible only if the criminal court expressly:
    • Permits departure from India, and
    • Specifies or enables determination of the period of travel.
  • The NIA Court had only given "no objection" for renewal and re-deposit, not permission to travel abroad.
  • Therefore, the bar under Section 6(2)(f) continued; a normal 10-year passport could not be issued.

2.6 Proceedings before the Calcutta High Court

  1. Writ Petition (WPO No. 352/2024)
    • Relief sought: Direction to Union of India and RPO, Kolkata, to renew the passport for 10 years in terms of orders of the NIA Court and Delhi High Court.
    • Single Judge’s decision (15.05.2024):
      • Found that re-issue/renewal is traceable to Section 5, and restrictions in Section 6(2) apply equally to renewal.
      • Held that:
        • Delhi High Court had given no objection for 10-year renewal;
        • NIA Court had given no permission to travel abroad, only to renew and re-deposit;
        • Hence, the bar under Section 6(2)(f) still operated.
      • Refused to direct renewal contrary to Section 6(2)(f).
  2. Intra-court Appeal (APOT No. 215/2024)
    • Interim view (07.02.2025): The Division Bench opined that:
      • High Court cannot function as an "executing court" for Delhi High Court and NIA Court orders;
      • Sentence in Delhi case was only suspended; conviction remained;
      • Section 6(2) grounds apply equally to re-issue, especially after abolition of separate "renewal" forms.
    • Final judgment (04.04.2025):
      • Held Section 6(2)(f) created a statutory embargo due to:
        • Pending NIA case; and
        • Subsisting conviction in Delhi case.
      • Found that in the absence of a court order permitting departure from India with specified/enable-able period of travel under GSR 570(E), RPO could not re-issue a normal 10-year passport.
      • However, left liberty to the appellant to approach the NIA Court and the Delhi High Court for further directions.

Aggrieved by this, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, leading to the present decision.

3. Key Legal Issues

  1. Whether, under the Passports Act, 1967, read with GSR 570(E) and the MEA OM dated 10.10.2019, the passport authority was justified in refusing to re-issue an ordinary passport for 10 years to a person:
    • Facing a pending NIA trial, and
    • Having a subsisting conviction under appeal,
    • Despite specific "no objection"/permissions from the relevant criminal courts.
  2. Whether Section 6(2)(f) creates an absolute bar to issuance/re-issuance of a passport while criminal proceedings are pending, or whether it is a qualified restriction subject to exemptions under Section 22 and GSR 570(E).
  3. How to interpret the requirement in GSR 570(E) of a court’s "permission to travel abroad" or "to depart from India":
    • Must it always be a concrete permission for a particular trip and period?
    • Or can permission for renewal with a standing condition that foreign travel requires prior leave suffice?
  4. Whether the pendency of a criminal appeal after conviction can be treated as "proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed" under Section 6(2)(f).
  5. Whether refusal to renew the passport, in the face of criminal courts’ conscious permissions, is compatible with the right to personal liberty and the right to travel abroad under Article 21.

4. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Judgment

  • The Court held that:
    • Section 6(2)(f) is not an absolute bar. It is expressly "subject to the other provisions" of the Act, notably Section 22, under which GSR 570(E) has been issued.
    • GSR 570(E) exempts persons with pending criminal proceedings from Section 6(2)(f) where the criminal court:
      • Has considered the matter and granted permission/no objection; and
      • The applicant gives an undertaking to appear as and when required.
    • The notification does not require that the criminal court must always approve a specific foreign trip with fixed dates as a pre-condition for passport issuance or renewal.
    • Where, as here, criminal courts:
      • Permit renewal of the passport;
      • Expressly state that the holder shall not leave India without prior permission of the court; and
      • Impose conditions such as re-deposit of the renewed passport,
      the underlying concerns of Section 6(2)(f) (ensuring the accused’s presence) are adequately addressed.
    • Both the Single Judge and Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court misapplied Section 6(2)(f) and failed to give proper effect to GSR 570(E) and the criminal courts’ orders.
  • The Court further held that:
    • Once there is a conviction, the situation is governed, if at all, by Section 6(2)(e), not 6(2)(f). A pending criminal appeal after conviction does not amount to "proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed" for the purposes of Section 6(2)(f).
    • The Delhi High Court’s specific "no objection" for a 10-year renewal, coupled with the NIA Court’s conditional permission, bring the appellant squarely within the exempted category under GSR 570(E).
    • Denial of renewal in such circumstances is a disproportionate and unreasonable restriction on the appellant’s right to personal liberty and to travel, as protected under Article 21.
  • The Supreme Court:
    • Allowed the appeal;
    • Set aside:
      • The Division Bench judgment dated 04.04.2025 in APOT No. 215/2024; and
      • The Single Judge’s judgment dated 15.05.2024 in WPO No. 352/2024.
    • Directed the respondents to re-issue an ordinary passport to the appellant for the normal period of 10 years, within four weeks of production of the judgment.
    • Clarified that the passport will remain subject to all existing and future orders of the NIA Court, Ranchi, and the Delhi High Court, including the conditions of:
      • No departure from India without prior permission; and
      • Deposit of the passport in court as directed.
    • Emphasised that nothing in this judgment:
      • Comments on the merits of the criminal proceedings;
      • Restricts the power of criminal courts to modify bail or travel conditions; or
      • Limits the passport authority’s powers under Section 10 to impound or revoke the passport if future circumstances so warrant.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Statutory Framework and Its Structure

5.1.1 Section 5: Applications and Orders

Section 5 is the gateway: it governs how an application for a passport is to be made and what the passport authority may do in response. It authorises the authority, after necessary inquiry, to:

  • Issue a passport (with appropriate endorsements); or
  • Issue a passport for some countries and refuse for others; or
  • Refuse to issue a passport entirely.

Crucially, every order of refusal must be in writing with recorded reasons, underscoring the requirement of transparency and accountability.

5.1.2 Section 6: Grounds of Refusal

Section 6 is an exhaustive list of grounds for refusal. For present purposes:

  • Section 6(2)(f): The passport authority shall refuse to issue a passport where "proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the applicant are pending before a criminal court in India".
  • Section 6(2)(e): Deals with prior convictions involving moral turpitude with sentences of not less than two years within five years preceding the application.

Importantly, Section 6(1) and (2) both start with the phrase "subject to the other provisions of this Act". This phrase is pivotal: it means Section 6 does not override, but is limited by, other provisions such as Section 22 (exemption power).

5.1.3 Sections 7 and 8: Duration and Extension

  • Section 7: A passport ordinarily remains in force for the period prescribed by rules (for ordinary passports, Rule 12 – 10 years), but:
    • It may be issued for a shorter period if:
      • The applicant so desires; or
      • The authority, for reasons communicated in writing, considers that a shorter period is appropriate.
  • Section 8: Where a passport is issued for a shorter period, it may be extended (so that total validity does not exceed the prescribed period). Critically, Section 8 provides:
    "…the provisions of this Act shall apply to such extension as they apply to the issue thereof."
    This links extension/re-issue back to the same conditions and restrictions that govern original issuance, including Section 6 and exemptions under Section 22.

5.1.4 Sections 9 and 10: Conditions, Impounding and Revocation

  • Section 9: Authorises the Central Government to prescribe:
    • Conditions and forms for issuance and renewal; and
    • Additional, case-specific conditions with prior Central Government approval.
  • Section 10(3): Allows impounding or revocation of a passport after it is issued, in defined cases, including:
    • Section 10(3)(e): where criminal proceedings are pending; and
    • Section 10(3)(h): where a warrant or an order prohibiting departure has been issued by a court.
    This shows the Act distinguishes between:
    • Refusal at the threshold (Section 6), and
    • Control over an already issued passport (Section 10).

5.1.5 Section 22 and GSR 570(E): The Exemption Mechanism

Section 22 empowers the Central Government to exempt any person or class of persons from the operation of any provisions of the Act or rules if it is necessary or expedient in the public interest. Pursuant to this, GSR 570(E) (25.08.1993) exempts:

"citizens of India against whom proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by them are pending before a criminal court in India"

from Section 6(2)(f), subject to conditions including:

  • The passport is to be issued:
    • For the period specified in the court’s order; or
    • If no period is specified, normally for one year as a default; or
    • If the court gives permission to travel abroad for a specific period exceeding one year, but not validity, the passport may match the period of travel.
  • Renewal for further one-year periods is possible in certain scenarios, provided:
    • The sanctioned travel has not been undertaken; and
    • The court’s order has not been modified or cancelled.
  • The citizen must give a written undertaking that he will appear before the concerned court whenever required.

The Supreme Court makes two crucial interpretative points:

  1. GSR 570(E) does not create a new bar; it creates a controlled exemption from Section 6(2)(f).
  2. It does not mandate that the court must, in every case, give a priori permission for a specific journey with exact dates. The structure is flexible enough to accommodate:
    • Pasport renewal; and
    • Judicial control over travel through bail conditions that require prior leave for each foreign trip.

5.1.6 OM dated 10.10.2019: Administrative Guidance

The MEA’s Office Memorandum of 10.10.2019:

  • Directs all Passport Authorities to apply GSR 570(E) "strictly" in cases where criminal proceedings are pending;
  • Requires insistence on the applicant’s undertaking under GSR 570(E);
  • Clarifies that an NOC or permission from a criminal court can override an adverse police report, with reasons recorded.

The Supreme Court correctly describes this OM as an administrative restatement that cannot expand or curtail the statutory exemption created by GSR 570(E).

5.2 Section 6(2)(f) and GSR 570(E): The Court’s Interpretation

The Calcutta High Court treated Section 6(2)(f) as a near-absolute prohibition, applicable until the criminal court explicitly permits a specific foreign trip and its duration. The Supreme Court rejects this:

  • First, Section 6(2)(f) is expressly "subject to" other provisions. Section 22 and GSR 570(E) are precisely such other provisions that create exceptions.
  • Second, GSR 570(E):
    • recognises that persons with pending criminal proceedings may still be issued passports; and
    • ties passport validity and use to:
      • the terms of the criminal court’s order; and
      • the applicant’s undertaking.
  • Third, the Court notes the flexibility:
    • Criminal courts may:
      • Either permit a specified trip for defined dates; or
      • Permit renewal of the passport while retaining control over any future travel by insisting that each foreign trip requires the court’s prior permission.
    • Both models adequately secure the presence of the accused.
  • Fourth, in the appellant’s case:
    • NIA Court:
      • Allowed renewal for 10 years (as sought) in substance, while:
        • Restricting use of the passport to the extent that no travel or visa could be obtained without its permission; and
        • Directing re-deposit of the renewed passport.
    • Delhi High Court:
      • Expressly granted "no objection" for 10-year renewal while preserving the condition of no foreign travel without permission.

Viewed together – as the OM itself contemplates when multiple courts are involved – these orders place the appellant firmly within the exempted category under GSR 570(E). The passport authority, therefore, was bound to operate within the exemption rather than enforce Section 6(2)(f) as an absolute bar.

5.3 Role and Limits of Passport Authorities

A key aspect of the judgment is the clear demarcation of roles:

  • The criminal courts:
    • Assess whether and to what extent the accused may be allowed to travel;
    • Impose bail and travel conditions; and
    • Retain powers to recall, modify, or tighten such conditions.
  • The passport authority:
    • Applies the Passports Act, Rules, and notifications;
    • Must respect the statutory exemption mechanism under Section 22 and GSR 570(E);
    • Cannot second-guess the criminal courts’ risk assessment when they consciously allow renewal subject to stringent controls.

The Court also rejects the Division Bench’s remark that granting relief would convert the writ court into an "executing court" for orders of other High Courts or the NIA Court. The Supreme Court clarifies:

  • The writ petition was not seeking execution of criminal court orders as such;
  • Rather, it sought enforcement of a statutory obligation under the Passports Act, as modified by GSR 570(E) and applied in light of those orders;
  • Directing the passport authority to comply with the exemption regime is implementation of statutory law, not execution of another court’s order.

5.4 Article 21, Right to Travel and Proportionality

The judgment opens with a powerful constitutional statement: liberty is the State’s first obligation, not its gift. It reaffirms that:

  • The right to travel abroad and the right to hold a passport are facets of personal liberty under Article 21; and
  • Any restriction must be fair, just, reasonable, and proportionate, with a rational connection to a legitimate objective.

The legitimate objective of Section 6(2)(f) and Section 10(3)(e) is to ensure that those facing criminal proceedings remain:

  • Within the reach of Indian courts; and
  • Amenable to the criminal justice process.

In this case:

  • That objective is already served by:
    • Conditions imposed by the NIA Court and Delhi High Court; and
    • The requirement of prior permission for every foreign trip, along with redeposit directions.
  • To add an indefinite denial of passport renewal, when both criminal courts have consciously allowed renewal, is disproportionate and unjustified.

The Court also draws an important conceptual distinction:

  1. Possession of a passport – a civil document that:
    • Enables the holder to seek visas and cross borders, subject to law; but
    • Does not, by itself, authorise travel in violation of court orders.
  2. Actual travel abroad – controlled by:
    • Criminal courts via bail conditions and specific permissions; and
    • Other statutory regimes (e.g., immigration, foreign exchange, etc.).

By refusing renewal purely on speculative fears that the passport might be misused, the passport authority effectively usurped the supervisory function of the criminal court – something the Act does not contemplate.

5.5 Convicts vs Accused: Section 6(2)(e) and 6(2)(f)

A significant doctrinal contribution of this judgment is the clear demarcation between:

  • Section 6(2)(f): applies to "proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed" – i.e., pre-conviction stage where the person is an accused.
  • Section 6(2)(e): applies when:
    • The Applicant has, during the last five years, been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude; and
    • Sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years.

The Calcutta High Court erred by treating the subsisting conviction (even though under appeal) as reinforcing Section 6(2)(f), which is conceptually designed for the allegation stage, not post-conviction appeals. The Supreme Court emphasises that:

  • A pending criminal appeal does not convert a convict back into an "accused" for Section 6(2)(f) purposes.
  • This aligns with the earlier decision in Vangala Kasturi Rangacharyulu v. CBI, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3549, which held that the pendency of a criminal appeal cannot itself be a ground for refusing passport renewal, and specifically directed the passport authority to renew the passport despite such pendency.

Thus, Section 6(2)(f) cannot be used as a catch-all justification where the real situation is one of post-conviction appeal.

5.6 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.6.1 Vangala Kasturi Rangacharyulu v. CBI (2021 SCC OnLine SC 3549)

The Court quotes paragraphs 7–10 of this judgment, which clarify:

  • Passport refusal on conviction grounds is governed by Section 6(2)(e), not 6(2)(f);
  • Section 6(2)(f) applies where the applicant is facing trial as an accused, not where he stands convicted and is pursuing an appeal;
  • Pendency of a criminal appeal cannot itself justify refusal to renew a passport.

In Mahesh Kumar Agarwal, this precedent is used to:

  • Reinforce that the passport authority incorrectly invoked Section 6(2)(f) in relation to the Delhi conviction;
  • Demonstrate that even with a standing conviction and appeal, renewal can and should occur, subject, of course, to courts’ travel conditions.

5.6.2 Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam (1967 SCC OnLine SC 21)

While the judgment provides only a reference, the case is historically important:

  • Recognised that the right to travel abroad is part of the "personal liberty" protected by Article 21.
  • Formed the foundation for later jurisprudence, particularly Maneka Gandhi.

The present decision stands firmly in that line of reasoning, reiterating that procedural regulation of travel (via passports) must not defeat the core of the right.

5.6.3 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248

Again cited in a cluster of precedents on Article 21, Maneka Gandhi famously held that:

  • Procedure affecting personal liberty must be "right, just and fair" – not arbitrary or oppressive;
  • Impounding of a passport must satisfy basic standards of natural justice and reasonableness.

In Mahesh Kumar Agarwal, these principles underpin the finding that:

  • Indefinite or automatic denial of passport renewal to a person already under strict judicial supervision is neither fair nor proportional;
  • Administrative insistence on additional barriers, beyond those imposed by criminal courts, risks upsetting the balance between state power and individual dignity.

5.6.4 Union of India v. Naveen Jindal (2004) 2 SCC 510

Though primarily a case about the right to fly the national flag, it is invoked as part of the "catena of judgments" that articulate a robust understanding of fundamental rights. It reinforces the broader constitutional context in which the Court interprets restrictions on liberty, including travel.

5.7 Critique of the Calcutta High Court’s Reasoning

The Supreme Court identifies several errors in the reasoning of the Single Judge and Division Bench:

  1. Treating Section 6(2)(f) as an absolute bar so long as any criminal proceeding is pending, without giving effect to the exemption framework under Section 22 and GSR 570(E).
  2. Misreading GSR 570(E) to require:
    • Permission for a specific, immediate foreign trip as a jurisdictional precondition for passport issuance or renewal; and
    • An explicit mention of the duration of the passport in the criminal court’s order, ignoring the fact that:
      • The Delhi High Court had expressly allowed 10-year renewal; and
      • The NIA Court’s order, read with the appellant’s application and conditions, implied acceptance of renewal, with tight controls on use.
  3. Over-reliance on the subsisting conviction to reinforce Section 6(2)(f), contrary to the conceptual framework of Sections 6(2)(e) and 6(2)(f) and the ruling in Vangala Kasturi Rangacharyulu.
  4. Ignoring proportionality:
    • Once criminal courts have deliberately chosen to allow renewal and ensure presence through bail conditions, total denial of renewal serves no additional legitimate purpose; it merely burdens liberty.
  5. Mischaracterising the writ petition as an attempt to "execute" orders of other courts, when it in fact sought enforcement of a statutory right as modified by a central government notification and supported by those orders.

5.8 Relationship Between Criminal Courts and Passport Authorities

The judgment delineates a coherent model for coordination:

  • Criminal courts:
    • Are best placed to assess the risk of flight or non-appearance;
    • Can:
      • Deny travel;
      • Permit limited travel;
      • Permit passport issuance/renewal but require prior permission for each journey;
      • Order deposit or re-deposit of the passport.
  • Passport authorities:
    • Apply the Act and Rules consistently with:
      • Section 6;
      • Section 10;
      • Section 22; and
      • GSR 570(E).
    • Must treat criminal court permissions/NOCs as determinative for bringing an applicant within the exemption, rather than as optional considerations.

The Supreme Court also clarifies that:

  • If future developments warrant:
    • The passport may be impounded or revoked under Section 10; and
    • Criminal courts may change bail or travel conditions.
  • The present decision does not curtail these powers but merely corrects the misapplication of the threshold refusal provision (Section 6(2)(f)).

5.9 Practical Impact and Future Significance

The judgment has far-reaching implications for:

5.9.1 Individuals Facing Criminal Proceedings

  • Accused persons are not automatically disqualified from holding or renewing passports merely because criminal cases are pending.
  • Where a criminal court:
    • Grants bail;
    • Allows passport issuance/renewal; and
    • Retains control over travel through conditions,
    passport authorities must give effect to that judicial balancing rather than superimpose additional, indefinite restrictions.

5.9.2 Administration of the Passports Act

  • Passport Offices across the country must:
    • Read Section 6(2)(f) together with Section 22 and GSR 570(E);
    • Stop treating Section 6(2)(f) as a blanket bar where courts have directed or implicitly permitted renewal with conditions;
    • Recognise that where courts require prior leave for foreign travel, that is sufficient compliance with the concerns behind Section 6(2)(f).
  • The OM of 10.10.2019 must be applied in a way that:
    • Respects the statutory design of GSR 570(E); and
    • Does not introduce extra conditions not found in the notification itself.

5.9.3 Judicial Practice

  • Criminal courts dealing with bail and travel conditions now have clear guidance that:
    • They may safely permit passport issuance or renewal while:
      • Retaining complete control over foreign travel; and
      • Requiring undertakings and re-deposit of passport.
    • They need not micro-manage each passport’s validity period, so long as broad judicial control over travel is preserved.

5.9.4 Constitutional Rights

  • The decision strengthens the jurisprudence that:
    • Procedural mechanisms (like passport issuance) must not be turned into substantive encroachments upon fundamental rights by rigid or mechanical application;
    • Temporary restrictions meant to secure judicial process must not harden into indefinite exclusions from liberty, especially when courts themselves deem such exclusions unnecessary.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 Section 6(2)(f): The "Pending Proceedings" Bar

This clause says a passport should normally be refused if a criminal case is pending against the applicant in an Indian court. Its purpose is to ensure that the person does not abscond and remains available for trial.

However, because it is "subject to other provisions", Parliament has allowed the Central Government to relax this bar in appropriate cases via Section 22. GSR 570(E) is the instrument that does precisely that.

6.2 GSR 570(E): The Exemption Notification

Think of GSR 570(E) as a safety valve built into the Passports Act:

  • Without it, anyone with a pending case would face a near-automatic refusal under Section 6(2)(f).
  • With it, such a person can obtain a passport if:
    • The relevant criminal court does not object; and
    • The person promises to appear whenever the court calls.

The notification also provides default validity periods (e.g., one year) where the court hasn’t specified a period, so that the system has flexibility without compromising judicial control.

6.3 Suspension of Sentence vs Stay of Conviction

In the Delhi case, the appellant’s sentence was suspended, but the conviction was not stayed. This means:

  • He is not required to be in jail while appeal is pending; but
  • The conviction stands unless set aside on appeal.

The Supreme Court emphasises that:

  • A person in this position is not "facing trial" as an accused for Section 6(2)(f) purposes.
  • Any passport-related consequence of conviction must be assessed under Section 6(2)(e), not 6(2)(f).

6.4 "Executing Court" Mischaracterisation

An "executing court" typically enforces or executes the decrees/orders of another court. The Calcutta High Court suggested that ordering passport renewal would amount to such execution of the Delhi High Court and NIA Court orders.

The Supreme Court clarifies:

  • The writ court was not being asked to enforce those orders as decrees.
  • It was asked to make the passport authority obey the Passports Act as modified by GSR 570(E), considering the criminal courts’ permissions as part of the legal landscape.

6.5 Passport vs Permission to Travel

A passport is akin to an identity and travel document; it:

  • Shows that the holder is a citizen; and
  • Allows foreign countries to consider granting visas.

But having a passport does not mean one is free to travel internationally in violation of court orders. A person on bail may:

  • Hold a passport; yet
  • Need explicit court permission to leave India.

The Supreme Court’s core point is: control over travel lies with the criminal court; control over the document lies with the passport authority. One should not overstep into the other’s domain.

7. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

The Supreme Court’s decision in Mahesh Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India reshapes the practical understanding of Section 6(2)(f) of the Passports Act. It firmly establishes that:

  • Section 6(2)(f) is a qualified, not absolute, bar. It is subject to:
    • Section 22; and
    • The exemption scheme in GSR 570(E).
  • GSR 570(E) must be interpreted liberally to give effect to its protective purpose:
    • Accused persons with pending cases can obtain or renew passports when criminal courts permit, subject to undertakings and conditions.
  • Criminal courts may legitimately:
    • Allow passport renewal; and
    • Retain tight control over foreign travel via prior permission requirements and re-deposit directions.
  • A pending criminal appeal after conviction does not fall within Section 6(2)(f); it must be treated, if at all, under Section 6(2)(e), consistent with Vangala Kasturi Rangacharyulu.
  • Administrative authorities cannot transform:
    • Time-bound, purpose-specific restrictions designed to protect the criminal process into
    • Indefinite disabilities to even hold a passport, especially when courts themselves have consciously avoided imposing such disabilities.
  • Liberty, including the freedom to travel, remains at the heart of Article 21. Restrictions must be proportionate and responsive to actual judicial assessments of risk, not to rigid administrative formulas.

By directing the passport’s re-issue for the normal 10-year period, fully subject to the orders of the NIA Court and the Delhi High Court, the Supreme Court restores the correct constitutional and statutory balance: the State must regulate travel with precision and restraint, not through broad, indefinite denials that the law neither mandates nor justifies.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court Of India

Judge(s)

Justice Vikram NathJustice Nilay Vipinchandra Anjaria

Advocates

ANUP KUMAR

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