Parity and Prolonged Custody Do Not Dilute the UAPA Bail Bar: Commentary on Anwar Rashid v. Union Bank of India (NIA)

Parity and Prolonged Custody Do Not Dilute the UAPA Bail Bar:
A Commentary on Anwar Rashid v. The Union Bank of India through National Investigation Agency

I. Introduction

The Patna High Court’s Division Bench decision in Anwar Rashid v. The Union Bank of India through National Investigation Agency (Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 310 of 2025, judgment dated 20 November 2025) is a significant addition to the jurisprudence on bail under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA). The Court, speaking through Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, J. (for the Bench also comprising Sourendra Pandey, J.), dismisses a bail appeal by an alleged ex-SIMI member accused of terror financing and association with multiple proscribed organisations and convicted terrorists.

The judgment crystallises three important principles:

  • Individualised assessment over parity: Bail granted to co-accused — including by the Supreme Court — does not automatically entitle similarly placed accused to bail under UAPA. Each accused’s role and the incriminating material against him must be separately evaluated.
  • Strength of prima facie material under Section 43D(5): Where there are “overwhelming materials” suggesting terror funding and association with banned organisations and convicted terrorists, the bar under Section 43D(5) UAPA is attracted and bail must be refused.
  • Prolonged custody not, by itself, a ground: In serious UAPA cases involving alleged threats to national security, a custody period of about two-and-a-half years, without more, is not sufficient to override the statutory bar on bail; the appropriate response is to expedite the trial.

The case arises in the backdrop of NIA’s investigation into alleged Popular Front of India (PFI)-linked activities in Patna, centred around “Ahmed Palace” in Phulwarisharif, where incriminating material such as the “India 2047 – Towards Rule of Islamic India” document was recovered. The appellant, though not apprehended at the initial raid, was later implicated on the strength of materials recovered from his residence in Uttar Pradesh and his alleged deep connections with banned outfits and convicted terrorists.

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

1. Origin of the Case: Phulwarisharif Raid and ‘India 2047’ Document

The prosecution case began with a self-statement by the Officer-in-Charge of Phulwarisharif Police Station, Inspector Akrar Ahmad Khan, recorded on 12 July 2022. Acting on information about:

“some miscreants... planning to do some occurrence during the proposed Patna visit of the Prime Minister of India” and undergoing “training for a fortnight for this purpose”,

the police raided “Ahmed Palace” at Naya Tola Nahar, under Phulwarisharif PS. The search allegedly yielded:

  • Multiple copies of a seven-page document titled “India 2047 towards Rule of Islamic India, Internal Document not for circulation”;
  • Pamphlets (Hindi and Urdu) of Popular Front of India (PFI);
  • Forty-nine flags in PFI colours (red, green, white with a blue star);
  • Booklets in Urdu and other literature;
  • A photocopy of a lease deed in the name of the house owner, Farhat Bano, and lessee, Athar Parvez.

Statements recorded at the spot attributed to co-accused Athar Parvez allegedly disclosed:

  • His past association with SIMI;
  • His present role in SDPI and PFI networks;
  • A stated objective to
    “take revenge against the atrocities upon Muslims” and to “unleash war against a particular community of the local society.”
  • References to recent retaliatory attacks in Amravati (Maharashtra) and Udaipur (Rajasthan).

On this basis, an FIR (Phulwarisharif P.S. Case No. 827 of 2022) was registered under various sections of the IPC, later re-registered by the NIA as NIA FIR No. 31/2022/NIA/DLI on 22 July 2022.

2. Transfer to NIA and Legal Framework of Charges

Considering the gravity and national security implications, the Central Government formed the opinion that a scheduled offence under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 had been committed, requiring NIA investigation. The offences invoked include:

  • IPC: Sections 120, 120B (criminal conspiracy), 121 (waging war), 121A (conspiracy to wage war), 122 (collecting arms for waging war), 153A, 153B/34 (promoting enmity, etc.);
  • UAPA: Sections 10, 13, 17, 18, 20, 38, 39.

For prosecuting such offences, sanction was obtained from the Ministry of Home Affairs under:

  • Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), and
  • Section 45(1) of the UAPA.

3. Role and Allegations against the Appellant, Anwar Rashid

The appellant’s premises at 82, Noorkhanpur, near Ek Minara Masjid, Bhadohi (U.P.) were searched by NIA as one of sixteen locations identified via call data records linking various accused. From his premises, NIA claims to have recovered:

  • Documents showing bank details and financial transactions;
  • Material reflecting association with members of various proscribed terrorist organisations;
  • Ideological material showing support for terrorist organisations;
  • A diary / bunch of papers containing names, addresses and details of:
    • Convicted terrorists and undertrial prisoners in major terror cases (e.g., Aurangabad Arms Haul, Indian Mujahideen cases, 7/11 Mumbai train blasts, Gateway of India blasts, Daesh/ISIS case, Nanded Arms Haul, 26/11 Mumbai attacks);
    • Families of such convicts;
    • A “shaheed list” of persons allegedly killed in police encounters.
  • Letters from convicted or accused terrorists, including:
    • A letter from Abdus Sami (convicted in an ISIS case investigated by Delhi Police), seeking financial assistance;
    • A letter from Safdar Hussain Nagori, convicted SIMI leader and erstwhile Secretary General, expressing ideological positions and desire for “shahadat” (martyrdom);
    • A letter from one Mohammad Abrar Amir, Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan, advising the appellant to “resolve his problem” while staying in India, noting that going to Pakistan would cause “a lot of problem” for him.
  • Receipts and records of electronic money orders sent to various jail inmates, including terror convicts and accused, totalling at least ₹88,700 between November 2014 and July 2015, as evidenced by a letter the appellant wrote to the Postmaster, Bhadohi.

The NIA alleges that:

  • The appellant is an ex-member of the banned organisation SIMI;
  • After SIMI’s ban, he was instrumental in forming a new association “Wahadat-e-Islami Hind”;
  • He created and managed a secret group of ex-SIMI members to work for PFI’s agenda, including that outlined in the “India 2047” document;
  • He provided financial assistance and ideological support to terror convicts and their families, thereby facilitating and supporting terrorist activities;
  • He acted as an “intermediate messenger” between imprisoned terrorists and external associates, conveying messages and sending radical literature.

The chargesheet also links him with separatist actors like Asiya Andrabi (head of Dukhtaran-e-Millat) and Khurram Parvez, alleging that he was involved in spreading the ideology of waging war against the Government of India and disaffection against the lawful government.

4. Criminal Antecedents and Pending Cases

The trial court and the High Court noted that nine criminal cases had been registered against the appellant over more than 20 years, including allegations of murder, attempt to murder, and UAPA offences. The Court observed that the “nature of cases are on similar lines”, treating this as indicative of a consistent pattern of involvement in serious offences.

5. Proceedings before the Special Court and Appeal to the High Court

The learned Special Judge, NIA, Patna, after examining the chargesheet (including the third supplementary chargesheet), documents, and statements, rejected the appellant’s bail on 25 July 2024 in Special Case No. 07 of 2022. The court relied on:

Aggrieved, the appellant filed the present criminal appeal under Section 21 of the NIA Act before the Patna High Court, challenging the denial of bail.

III. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed the bail appeal and upheld the trial court’s order. In essence, the Court held:

  1. Prima facie case under UAPA and IPC established for bail purposes: The materials recovered from the appellant’s premises, together with protected witness statements and his alleged role in ex-SIMI and PFI-linked activities, constitute “overwhelming materials” suggesting:
    • Raising funds for terrorist activities (Section 17 UAPA);
    • Association with terrorist organisations and convicts (Sections 10, 20, 38, 39 UAPA);
    • Participation in broader conspiracies potentially amounting to “waging war” and “spreading disaffection” against the Government of India (IPC Sections 121, 121A, etc.).
    Therefore, the Court could not conclude that there were “no reasonable grounds” to believe the accusations were prima facie true.
  2. Section 43D(5) UAPA bars bail: Once the Court finds reasonable grounds to believe that accusations are prima facie true, the proviso to Section 43D(5) mandates that such an accused “shall not be released on bail.”
  3. Parity with co-accused rejected: The bail granted to several co-accused, whether by the Supreme Court or by the Patna High Court itself, does not apply to the appellant’s case because:
    • The nature and extent of material seized from the appellant’s premises are qualitatively different and more incriminating;
    • In the co-accused cases, courts had found that the rigours of Section 43D(5) were not attracted, whereas here they are clearly attracted;
    • The Supreme Court explicitly confined its reasoning to the particular accused before it, cautioning that those observations would not govern co-accused.
  4. Duration of incarceration not a determinative factor in this category of case: The appellant’s custody of about two-and-a-half years, coupled with the likelihood that the trial would take time due to a large number of witnesses, is not a sufficient ground to grant bail in a case alleging serious threats to national security and public safety.
  5. Direction for expeditious trial: While refusing bail, the Court directed the Special Judge, NIA, Patna, to make all endeavours to conclude the trial “as early as possible, preferably within a period of one year,” and called upon NIA to remain vigilant in producing witnesses.

IV. Key Legal Issues

The judgment effectively addresses the following intertwined issues:

  1. Whether the materials against the appellant meet the “prima facie true” threshold required under the proviso to Section 43D(5) UAPA, thereby activating the statutory bar on bail.
  2. Whether the principle of parity with co-accused — several of whom have been granted bail — can override or dilute the operation of Section 43D(5) in the appellant’s favour.
  3. Whether prolonged incarceration (about two-and-a-half years) and anticipated delay in trial constitute independent grounds for bail in a UAPA case where serious national security allegations exist.

V. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1

Watali is the cornerstone of modern UAPA bail jurisprudence. The Supreme Court in that case substantially restricted the scope of bail under Section 43D(5) UAPA. The Patna High Court relies on it, along with more recent decisions, to reinforce the principle that:

  • At the bail stage, the court must only see whether the accusations are prima facie true on the face of the case diary and the police report;
  • The court should not conduct a mini-trial or meticulously weigh the evidence; it must, in effect, proceed on the basis that the prosecution’s material is credible unless patently absurd or inherently improbable;
  • If the court finds “reasonable grounds” to believe the accusations are prima facie true, bail must be denied.

In Anwar Rashid, this framework underpins the Court’s entire analysis: once the seized diaries, letters, financial receipts, and witness statements are taken at face value, they cumulatively satisfy the prima facie threshold. On that premise, Watali compels denial of bail.

B. GURWINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB, 2024 INSC 92

While the Patna High Court does not detail the facts of Gurwinder Singh, it invokes the decision for two propositions:

  • Supreme Court’s continuing concern with the threat posed by terrorist organisations and their support networks;
  • Reaffirmation that where accusations are prima facie true, Section 43D(5) operates as a stringent bar against bail.

Used in this judgment, Gurwinder Singh is an instance of the Supreme Court consistently applying Watali-type reasoning and emphasising national security concerns, which the Patna High Court draws on to justify a cautious and security-centric approach.

C. UNION OF INDIA v. BARAKATHULLAH, 2024 INSC 452

Again, without traversing the facts, the High Court refers to Barakathullah as a recent Supreme Court decision where:

  • The Court reiterated that UAPA offences warrant a stricter bail regime given the grave repercussions for national security;
  • The “prima facie true” test remains the touchstone; once met, bail is ordinarily impermissible.

For the Patna High Court, Barakathullah bolsters the view that courts must err on the side of caution when dealing with accused linked to proscribed organisations or terror funding networks, particularly where strong incriminating material is seized.

D. Bail Orders of Co-Accused in the Same NIA Case

The appellant relied heavily on bail orders granted to several co-accused, invoking the principle of parity. The High Court surveyed these:

  • Nooruddin Jangi @ Advocate Nooruddin Jangi – granted bail by Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 749 of 2023, where:
    • Only limited material was found, such as participation in protest marches under the PFI banner;
    • No material prima facie showed involvement in activities amounting to overwhelming public functionaries by criminal force or substantial terror-related roles.
  • Jalaluddin Khan – granted bail by the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 3173 of 2024. The Supreme Court found:
    • It was not possible to conclude that there were reasonable grounds to believe the accusations under UAPA were prima facie true;
    • Crucially, the Court expressly confined its conclusions to Jalaluddin alone and stated that its reasoning would have “no bearing on the trial and cases of the co-accused.”
  • Athar Parvez – granted bail by the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 5387 of 2024. The Court noted that:
    • The principal material recovered against him was a rent deed for the first floor of Ahmed Palace;
    • Protected witnesses did not attribute specific terror-linked conduct to him sufficient to trigger the UAPA bar;
    • Accordingly, the first condition under Section 43D(5) — that accusations be prima facie true — was not met.
  • Other co-accused granted bail by the Patna High Court:
    • Arman Mallick – Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 93 of 2024;
    • Mohammad Sinan – Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 514 of 2024;
    • Iqbal @ Iqbal Abdul Khader – Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 535 of 2024;
    • Abid K.M. – Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 875 of 2024;
    • Abdul Rafeek M. – Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 949 of 2024.
    In these cases, the Court found that, like Athar Parvez, the first condition under Section 43D(5) was not satisfied; hence the statutory bar did not apply.
  • By contrast, bail was denied to co-accused Mohammad Irshad Alam and Reyaz Moarif (Criminal Appeal (DB) Nos. 130 of 2024 and 42 of 2024), where the High Court found sufficient material to attract the Section 43D(5) bar.

The High Court in Anwar Rashid uses this set of decisions to underline that:

  • Parity operates only where the factual and legal position of the accused is comparable;
  • Co-accused with lesser or no incriminating recovery stood on a different footing from the appellant, from whose premises a large volume of sensitive material was seized;
  • Supreme Court’s express caveats about the non-transferability of its observations to co-accused must be strictly respected.

VI. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Application of Section 43D(5) UAPA

Section 43D(5) UAPA, extracted by the Court, provides:

“(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail...
Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail... if the Court... is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.”

The Court adopted the established two-step approach:

  1. Identify whether the accused is charged with offences under Chapters IV and VI of UAPA (terrorist acts and terrorist organisations);
  2. On perusal of the case diary and chargesheet, determine whether there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that the accusations are prima facie true.

Here, the appellant is charged with Sections 10, 13, 17, 18, 20, 38 and 39 UAPA, clearly falling within the regime of Section 43D(5). The central question, therefore, was whether the materials could support a prima facie finding.

2. Evaluation of Evidence at Prima Facie Stage

The Court, consistent with Watali, refrained from microscopic evaluation but summarised the key incriminating features:

  • Ex-SIMI membership and new organisation: The appellant was an ex-member of SIMI and played a role in forming “Wahadat-e-Islami Hind” after SIMI’s ban.
  • Secret group of ex-SIMI cadres for PFI’s agenda: He was “instrumental in preparing a secret group of ex-SIMI members to work for the agenda of PFI,” specifically targeting the vision outlined in the “India 2047” document (establishing Islamic rule in India).
  • Financial support to terrorists and their families: Diaries, letters and receipts show repeated financial assistance to:
    • Convicted terrorists and terror accused lodged in various jails;
    • Families of key terror convicts, including high-profile figures such as Safdar Nagori and others.
  • Correspondence with convicted terrorists and Pakistani Islamist actors: Letters from ISIS-convicted accused and a Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan member indicate ideological alignment and suggest he contemplated migration to Pakistan to further SIMI’s ideology, though later dissuaded.
  • “Shaheed list” and glorification of encounter-killed accused: The list and terminology used (shaheed) suggest an ideological identification with individuals killed in police encounters.
  • Links with pan-India terror incidents: The diaries and documents link him to inmates convicted in major terror cases: Aurangabad Arms Haul, Indian Mujahideen attacks, Mumbai 7/11 train blasts, Gateway of India blasts, Daesh/ISIS, Nanded Arms Haul, and 26/11 Mumbai.

Based on this, the Court concluded that there are “overwhelming materials” against the appellant. In particular, the Court emphasised:

  • His financial support to terror convicts and their families;
  • His ideological commitment to banned organisations’ causes;
  • His role as an organiser and facilitator of ex-SIMI and PFI-linked activities.

Thus, the Court held that, at this stage, it cannot come to a conclusion that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accusations to be prima facie untrue. On the contrary, the material strongly supports the prosecution’s case at the prima facie level required by Section 43D(5).

3. Rejection of Parity Argument

The appellant argued that, as many co-accused had been granted bail, he too should receive bail on the principle of parity. The Court squarely rejected this contention for several reasons:

  • Differential material: The quantity and quality of incriminating material seized from the appellant are markedly greater and more directly indicative of sustained terror support activity, unlike the relatively limited or ambiguous material against co-accused who obtained bail.
  • Case-by-case nature of UAPA bail: Each accused must be independently evaluated in light of the evidence against them. Parity cannot override the statutory requirement of a prima facie assessment under Section 43D(5).
  • Explicit Supreme Court caveats: In granting bail to co-accused, the Supreme Court expressly confined its reasoning to those particular accused and clarified that its observations would not govern the cases of co-accused. The High Court honours these caveats.
  • Previous denials of bail to similarly placed co-accused: The High Court also points out that bail had been refused to certain co-accused (e.g., Irshad Alam and Reyaz Moarif) where Section 43D(5) was found to be attracted. The appellant stands closer to this category than to those who were bailed out.

The Court concludes that “by no stretch of imagination” can the appellant’s case be placed on an identical footing with bailed co-accused. Accordingly, parity is inapplicable.

4. Prolonged Incarceration and Delay in Trial

The appellant highlighted that he has been in custody for approximately two-and-a-half years and that, given the large number of prosecution witnesses, early completion of trial is unlikely. The Court’s response is nuanced:

  • It acknowledges the period of incarceration;
  • However, it observes that:
    “mere incarceration of two and half years in the case of the present nature which involves a threat to the security of the nation and its citizens... cannot be kept on equal footing with the other cases and mere period of incarceration... cannot be a good ground to grant bail.”
  • Instead of granting bail, the Court issues a direction to expedite the trial:
    “all endeavours be made by the learned trial court to conclude the trial as early as possible, preferably within a period of one year.”

This approach aligns with the Supreme Court’s understanding that in certain extreme delay cases bail may be warranted, but here the Court implicitly finds that a custody of two-and-a-half years in such a grave matter does not yet reach that threshold, especially when the trial can still be expedited meaningfully.

VII. Complex Concepts and Legal Terminology Explained

1. UAPA and Sections 10, 13, 17, 18, 20, 38, 39

  • UAPA (Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967): India’s principal anti-terror statute, aimed at preventing unlawful activities threatening sovereignty, integrity, and security of India. It contains:
    • Chapter III – Unlawful Associations;
    • Chapter IV – Terrorist Activities;
    • Chapter VI – Terrorist Organisations.
  • Section 10: Punishes membership of, or participation in the activities of, an association declared “unlawful”.
  • Section 13: Punishes unlawful activities broadly, including speech, writing, or actions that support separation of territory or question India’s sovereignty and integrity.
  • Section 17: Punishes raising or providing funds with the intention or knowledge that they will be used to commit a terrorist act.
  • Section 18: Punishes conspiracy, attempt, or abetment in relation to terrorist acts.
  • Section 20: Punishes being a member of a “terrorist organisation” listed in the First Schedule of UAPA (e.g., SIMI, ISIS).
  • Sections 38 & 39: Deal specifically with:
    • Membership, support, or association with a terrorist organisation (Section 38);
    • Providing support to a terrorist organisation (Section 39), including material, financial or other assistance.

2. Section 43D(5) UAPA – The Bail Bar

Section 43D(5) departs from ordinary CrPC bail principles. Key elements:

  • It applies when a person is accused of offences under Chapters IV and VI (terrorist acts and terrorist organisations);
  • It requires courts to examine the case diary and final report under Section 173 CrPC;
  • If the court finds reasonable grounds for believing the accusation is prima facie true, bail must be refused;
  • Courts cannot undertake a detailed evaluation of evidence or test its veracity; they assume the prosecution’s material is generally reliable at this stage.

In simple terms, this provision creates a reverse presumption against bail in serious terror cases, subject only to the prima facie assessment.

3. “Prima Facie True”

“Prima facie true” does not mean the accused is proven guilty; it means that, on the surface and without detailed scrutiny, the material suggests that the charges could reasonably be true. It is a low threshold but more than mere conjecture:

  • There must be concrete materials – documents, witness statements, financial trails – directly connecting the accused with the alleged offences;
  • Courts must avoid speculative inferences but may draw reasonable ones based on the seized material and statements.

4. Parity in Bail

“Parity” means similarly situated accused should be treated similarly in bail decisions. However:

  • Parity is not an absolute right; it applies only where the role, allegations, and evidence against co-accused are genuinely comparable;
  • In UAPA cases, parity cannot override Section 43D(5) – if the bar is attracted against one accused due to stronger material, he cannot claim parity with a co-accused against whom little or no incriminating evidence exists.

5. “Waging War” against the Government of India (IPC Sections 121, 121A, 122)

These are among the gravest offences in the IPC:

  • Section 121: Waging war or attempting/conspiring to wage war against the Government of India;
  • Section 121A: Conspiracy to commit offences under Section 121 or to overawe the Government by criminal force;
  • Section 122: Collecting men, arms or ammunition to wage war against the Government.

“Waging war” is not limited to conventional warfare; courts have held that organised violent acts aimed at subverting the authority of the Indian State can fall within this category, though this remains a fact-specific and sensitive inquiry ultimately for trial.

6. “Terror Funding” and Support to Families of Terror Convicts

Under UAPA, funding need not be directly used to buy weapons; providing money to facilitate sustenance, legal defence, or organisational activities of terrorists or their families may be construed as support to a terrorist organisation or terrorist act, depending on the facts. In this case, the Court treats:

  • Systematic sending of funds to convicted terrorists and their families;
  • Documentation of such payments in diaries and receipts;
  • Correspondence with such convicts soliciting and acknowledging support,

as sufficient to cross the prima facie threshold for terror funding and organisational support.

VIII. Impact and Broader Implications

1. Reinforcement of a Stringent UAPA Bail Regime

This judgment reinforces the already strict bail standard under UAPA by:

  • Emphasising that once prima facie material of terror funding and organisational association is shown, courts are bound by Section 43D(5) to refuse bail;
  • Underscoring that courts must pay particular heed to financial trails and documentary evidence (diaries, letters, receipts), which can powerfully indicate sustained support networks for terrorism;
  • Signalling that involvement need not be operational (e.g., directly executing attacks) — organisational, logistical, and financial support can suffice.

2. Delimiting the Use of Parity in UAPA Cases

The judgment makes a clear doctrinal point: parity is subordinate to Section 43D(5). Its implications:

  • Defence strategies that rely heavily on co-accused bail orders will have limited success where the evidentiary profile of the applicant is materially different;
  • Each accused must independently satisfy the “no reasonable grounds” standard to escape the Section 43D(5) bar, regardless of co-accused outcomes;
  • Trial and appellate courts must consider Supreme Court’s explicit caveats that their bail orders in multi-accused terror cases are case-specific and not precedential for co-accused without separate assessment.

3. Prolonged Custody, Fair Trial, and Balancing Security

The Court’s approach to prolonged incarceration reflects a delicate balance:

  • It refuses to treat two-and-a-half years in custody, by itself, as a ground to override Section 43D(5) in a serious terror case;
  • Nonetheless, it recognises the importance of not allowing trials to linger indefinitely, and thus directs completion “preferably within one year”;
  • This approach aligns with Supreme Court decisions that, in extreme delay situations, have allowed bail even under special statutes, while here implying that the delay threshold has not yet been crossed.

In effect, the Court suggests that, at least in early or mid-stages of UAPA prosecutions, the appropriate safeguard for an undertrial’s liberty is expeditious trial rather than bail.

4. Treatment of Ideological and Associational Evidence

The judgment also illustrates how courts are increasingly treating:

  • Past membership of banned organisations (e.g., SIMI);
  • Formation of successor or front organisations after a ban;
  • Ideological documents (like “India 2047”);
  • Lists of encounter-killed “martyrs” and supportive correspondence,

as significant indicators of continuing affiliation with extremist objectives. Defence strategies premised on characterising such evidence as mere ideological expression disconnected from criminality may face growing difficulty at the bail stage, especially where combined with financial and operational links.

5. Guidance for Future Cases

For prosecuting agencies (like NIA), the judgment underscores the value of:

  • Comprehensive documentation of financial transactions and correspondence;
  • Establishing linkages between accused and known terror convicts across different cases and states;
  • Securing protected witness statements that corroborate the organisational and financial roles of the accused.

For defence counsel, the decision highlights:

  • The necessity of contesting the “prima facie true” assessment by showing that seized materials are either innocuous, misinterpreted, or weakly linked to terror activities;
  • The limited utility of parity where the evidentiary profile is different;
  • The growing importance of arguing delay and right to fair trial once custody becomes exceptionally long and trial progress remains negligible—though that stage may not yet have been reached in this case.

IX. Conclusion

The Patna High Court’s decision in Anwar Rashid v. Union Bank of India (through NIA) advances UAPA bail jurisprudence by making explicit that:

  • Parity and prolonged custody do not, by themselves, dilute the statutory bar under Section 43D(5) UAPA when there is strong prima facie material of terror funding and association with proscribed organisations;
  • Individualised assessment of each accused’s role and the evidence against him is central; co-accused bail orders, even from the Supreme Court, are not automatically transplantable;
  • Financial and organisational support to terrorists and their families can be as legally significant as direct participation in attacks, at least for the purpose of bail under UAPA.

At the same time, the Court acknowledges the need to safeguard the undertrial’s rights by directing an expedited trial. The judgment thus embodies the tension at the heart of terrorism-related adjudication: balancing the imperatives of national security with constitutional guarantees of personal liberty and fair trial, under a statutory framework that deliberately tilts the scales against bail in serious UAPA cases.

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