Overriding Effect of the Family Courts Act over Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act in Matrimonial Declarations

1. Introduction

This judgment of the Patna High Court addresses two distinct but interlinked facets of matrimonial law:

• How far an appellate court will interfere with a Family Court’s appreciation of evidence in a matrimonial dispute; and
• More importantly, whether Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (which limits “mere declaratory” suits) can bar a declaratory proceeding in a Family Court concerning the validity of a marriage, in light of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

The case arose from a challenge by a husband to a decree of nullity granted by the Family Court at the instance of his first wife, declaring his second marriage void under Section 11 read with Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The husband’s central contention was that the suit, being only declaratory and not asking for any further consequential relief such as restitution of conjugal rights, was barred by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.

The Division Bench decisively rejects this argument, holding that by virtue of Section 20 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the provisions of the Specific Relief Act – including Section 34 – do not restrict matrimonial declaratory suits before a Family Court. This is the principal doctrinal contribution of the decision.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The parties

• Appellant / Opposite Party No. 1: Anjani Kumar @ Pappu Kumar, husband.
• Respondent No. 1 / Applicant (1st Set): Mamta Bharti, first wife of the appellant.
• Respondent No. 2 / Opposite Party No. 2 (2nd Set): Rukmini @ Mansa, second wife of the appellant.

2.2 The marriages and the matrimonial case

• Mamta Bharti (Respondent No. 1) claimed that she was legally married to Anjani Kumar on 29.06.2001 at village Lakho, P.S. Muffasil, District Begusarai.
• Subsequently, Anjani Kumar allegedly contracted another marriage with Rukmini @ Mansa (Respondent No. 2) during the subsistence of the first marriage.
• Mamta instituted Matrimonial Case No. 176 of 2010 (Registration No. 1148 of 2013) before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Begusarai, claiming that:
  • Her marriage with the appellant was validly solemnized and subsisting; and
  • The appellant’s later marriage with Rukmini was in contravention of Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and thus void under Section 11 of the Act.

2.3 Decision of the Family Court

The Family Court framed four issues:

1. Maintainability of the matrimonial case – decided in favour of Mamta; the suit was held maintainable.
2. Whether the marriage between Mamta and Anjani on 29.06.2001 was solemnized – answered in the affirmative; the first marriage was held proved and valid.
3. Whether the appellant had entered into another marriage after his marriage with Mamta, in violation of Section 5(i) of the HMA – answered in favour of Mamta; the second marriage was found to have been contracted during the subsistence of the first marriage.
4. Whether Mamta was entitled to any relief – answered in her favour; the court held that she was entitled to relief under Section 11 of the HMA, and consequently declared the marriage between Anjani Kumar and Rukmini @ Mansa as null and void.

Accordingly, by judgment dated 29.09.2022 and decree dated 14.10.2022, the Family Court declared the marriage between the appellant and Respondent No. 2 (the second wife) null and void.

2.4 The appeal to the High Court

The husband preferred the present miscellaneous appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, challenging both the judgment and the decree. Procedurally:

• Notice on Respondent No. 1 (Mamta) was served through her father. The appellant filed a petition of “jointness”, which the Court accepted, treating service on her as valid.
• Respondent No. 2 (Rukmini) appeared through counsel and supported the appellant.
• The matter was heard under Order XLI Rule 11 CPC (hearing on admission of appeal), with arguments concluded on 25.11.2025; judgment was delivered on 05.12.2025 as a CAV judgment (reserved judgment).

3. Issues Before the High Court

The High Court crystallized the controversy into two “points of determination”:

1. Non-consideration of oral evidence of PW 3 (father of Respondent No. 1):
   Whether the alleged non-consideration, or inadequate consideration, of the oral evidence of PW 3 was so fatal as to “demolish” the entire judgment and decree of the Family Court?
2. Bar under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act:
   Whether Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 creates a bar on the maintainability of the declaratory suit framed before the Principal Judge, Family Court, in the absence of a claim for further relief (such as restitution of conjugal rights); and, if so, what would be the consequence for the Family Court’s decree?

4. Summary of the Judgment

• The Court upheld the Family Court’s decree declaring the second marriage between the appellant and Respondent No. 2 as null and void under Section 11 of the HMA.
• On the first issue (appreciation of PW 3’s testimony), the Court held that:
  • The Family Court had not relied solely on PW 3, but had considered a range of evidence including:
    • Testimony of PW 1;
    • Fifteen photographs (Exhibits 6 to 6N);
    • Document dated 21.04.2014 before the Mediation Centre, Begusarai (Exhibit 12);
    • Other documents such as Exhibits 7, 10A (an undertaking and affidavit by the appellant), 9 and 11.
  • In a civil proceeding, the standard is preponderance of probabilities, and on that standard, the findings of the Family Court were sound.
  • Minor contradictions in oral evidence could not upset the decree; the appellant had to stand on his own evidence and documents.
  Accordingly, the first point was answered against the appellant.
• On the second issue (Section 34 Specific Relief Act), the Court held that:
  • Section 7(1), Explanation (b) of the Family Courts Act explicitly allows suits or proceedings for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or to the matrimonial status of any person before a Family Court.
  • Section 10(1) of the Family Courts Act makes the CPC and other laws applicable, but only “subject to the other provisions” of the Act.
  • Crucially, Section 20 of the Family Courts Act contains an overriding clause: the Act will prevail over anything inconsistent in any other law for the time being in force.
  • On that basis, the Court concluded that the “principle laid down under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 shall not be applicable upon the suits filed under the Family Courts Act, 1984”.
  • Consequently, even if the applicant/wife had not claimed further relief such as restitution of conjugal rights, the declaratory relief sought under Section 11 HMA was not barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.
  Thus, the second point was also answered against the appellant.
• Finding no illegality or infirmity in the Family Court’s judgment and decree, the High Court dismissed the appeal.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Appreciation of Evidence and the Standard of Proof

The first ground of challenge was essentially evidentiary: the appellant claimed that the Family Court failed to properly appreciate the oral evidence of PW 3 (the father of Respondent No. 1), who allegedly deposed favourably to the appellant.

The High Court’s approach is consistent with the general restraint exercised by appellate courts in interfering with findings of fact in civil matters:

• The Court emphasizes that the Family Court’s findings were not based on PW 3 in isolation. They were underpinned by:
  • Evidence of PW 1 (the applicant herself or another key witness);
  • Photographic evidence (15 photographs, Exhibits 6–6N) supporting the factum of the first marriage;
  • A document dated 21.04.2014 before the Mediation Centre, Begusarai (Exhibit 12), which presumably recorded admissions or attempts at settlement;
  • Exhibit 10A, an undertaking and affidavit by the appellant himself before the High Court – likely acknowledging marital relationships or obligations;
  • Other supporting documents (Exhibits 7, 9, 11) reinforcing the first marriage and/or the second marriage during its subsistence.
• The Court reiterates the settled principle that civil cases are decided on a balance (preponderance) of probabilities, not on proof beyond reasonable doubt (the criminal standard).
• It notes that an appellant “must stand on his own document”; that is, inconsistencies in the opponent’s testimony cannot rescue an otherwise weak case unsupported by the appellant’s own evidence.
• Minor contradictions in oral evidence are characterized as inconsequential, especially where documentary evidence and the overall probabilities support the case of the first wife.

In effect, the Division Bench affirms the Family Court’s factual conclusion that:

1. The first marriage between Anjani and Mamta was validly solemnized on 29.06.2001 and continued to subsist; and
2. During this subsistence, Anjani contracted a second marriage with Rukmini, offending Section 5(i) of the HMA.

On this aspect, the judgment does not create new law, but it reinforces the limited scope for appellate interference in well-reasoned factual findings reached on proper appreciation of evidence under the preponderance of probability standard.

5.2 The Interplay Between the Specific Relief Act and the Family Courts Act

The core doctrinal development lies in the High Court’s treatment of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 vis-à-vis the Family Courts Act, 1984.

5.2.1 Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act

The provision is quoted in the judgment, and may be summarized as follows:

Section 34 – Discretion of Court as to declaration of status or right
Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief.

Proviso: No Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.

In matrimonial contexts, the “legal character” at issue is the status of a person as married, unmarried, spouse of X, etc. Under Section 34, while a suit for a mere declaration is permissible, the proviso bars the Court from granting such a declaration if the plaintiff could seek, but fails to seek, consequential relief.

The appellant’s argument was rooted precisely in this proviso: Mamta, having sued only for a declaration that the second marriage is void, and not for restitution of conjugal rights or any other positive relief, should have her suit barred under Section 34.

5.2.2 Jurisdictional scheme of the Family Courts Act

The Court responds by carefully deploying the structure of the Family Courts Act:

• Section 7(1) – Jurisdiction
  This grants Family Courts exclusive jurisdiction over specified matrimonial and family disputes. Explanation (b) is critical:

  A suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or to the matrimonial status of any person falls within the jurisdiction of the Family Court.

  This directly contemplates declaratory proceedings regarding marital status.
• Section 10(1) – Procedure
  This section provides that, subject to the other provisions of the Act and any rules, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and of any other law in force shall apply to suits and proceedings before the Family Court. It also deems the Family Court to be a civil court.
  
  This means that general civil law (including, ordinarily, the Specific Relief Act) applies, but only subordinate to, and consistent with, the Family Courts Act.
• Section 20 – Overriding effect
  The Court reproduces and relies on this section:

  The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.

  This is a classic non obstante (overriding) clause, ensuring that wherever there is inconsistency between the Family Courts Act and another law, the former prevails.

5.2.3 The Court’s conclusion

On the basis of these provisions, the High Court states:

• Because the Family Courts Act is a later and special legislation (1984) compared to the Specific Relief Act (1963), and because of Section 20, the Family Courts Act prevails wherever there is inconsistency.
• Section 7(1) Explanation (b) positively authorizes a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or matrimonial status. This authorisation would be undermined if Section 34’s proviso were allowed to bar such suits on the ground that no consequential relief has been claimed.
• Thus, the Court declares:

  The principle laid down under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 shall not be applicable upon the suits filed under the Family Courts Act, 1984, due to Section 20 of the Family Courts Act.

• Accordingly, even though the applicant/respondent (the first wife) did not claim restitution of conjugal rights or similar “further relief”, the Family Court’s grant of declaratory relief under Section 11 HMA was fully valid and not hit by Section 34.

5.2.4 Doctrinal significance (ratio decidendi)

The core legal principle emerging from this part of the judgment can be formulated as:

In matrimonial suits or proceedings before a Family Court seeking a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or the matrimonial status of any person, Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (including its requirement of seeking further relief) does not operate as a bar, because such matters are governed by the special regime of the Family Courts Act, 1984, which has overriding effect by virtue of Section 20.

Within the territorial jurisdiction of the Patna High Court, this is a binding precedent and will govern Family Courts dealing with similar challenges.

5.3 Nature of Relief under Sections 5(i) and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act

Although the decision does not dwell at length on substantive Hindu matrimonial law, it implicitly affirms the Family Court’s application of Sections 5(i) and 11 of the HMA.

• Section 5(i) HMA – Condition for a Hindu marriage:
  It requires that “neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage”. If one party is already married and the marriage is subsisting, a subsequent marriage violates this condition.
• Section 11 HMA – Void marriages:
  Any marriage solemnized after the commencement of the Act shall be null and void if it contravenes, inter alia, the condition specified in clause (i) of Section 5.

When the first marriage is valid and subsisting, a later marriage contracted during its subsistence is:

• void ab initio (void from the very beginning) under Section 11; and
• capable of being the subject of a decree of nullity (a declaration that the marriage is null and void).

The relief itself is essentially declaratory: the court declares that the marriage is not valid in law. The High Court’s affirmation of the Family Court’s power to grant this declaration without requiring any additional relief (such as restitution of conjugal rights) strengthens the understanding that:

A suit (or proceeding) under Section 11 HMA, especially when presented before a Family Court, is inherently a status-declaratory proceeding, not constrained by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.

5.4 Character and Reach of the Holding on Section 34 SRA

A notable feature of the judgment is the breadth of its language: it states that “the principle laid down under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 shall not be applicable upon the suits filed under the Family Courts Act, 1984.”

Doctrinally, this can be read in two ways:

1. Narrow reading (strongest and safest):
   The Court’s holding is limited to the specific inconsistency between Section 7(1) Explanation (b) of the Family Courts Act and Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act in matters of marital status declarations. Under this view, the Family Courts Act prevails only to the extent of this inconsistency; other, non-conflicting principles of the Specific Relief Act may still inform Family Court proceedings.
2. Broad reading (textually suggested by the judgment):
   The language suggests that the Specific Relief Act as a whole is inapplicable to suits under the Family Courts Act. If taken literally, this could exclude the application of all general doctrines of declaratory relief from matrimonial litigation in Family Courts.

From a doctrinal perspective, the narrow reading aligns more closely with the standard interpretive principle that an overriding clause (like Section 20) displaces only those provisions of a general law that are “inconsistent” with the special statute, not the entire body of that general law.

However, for practical purposes in Bihar, practitioners and Family Courts are likely to treat this decision at least as establishing the following:

• A pure declaration as to the validity of a marriage or matrimonial status is independently maintainable in the Family Court.
• The Court is not required to refuse such a declaration merely because the plaintiff has not coupled it with a claim for further relief (e.g., restitution, maintenance, etc.).

5.5 Precedents and Authorities

The judgment, as reported in the extracted text, does not cite any prior case law. It proceeds almost entirely on a statutory construction of:

• The Family Courts Act, 1984 – Sections 7, 10 and 20;
• The Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 34; and
• The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Sections 5 and 11.

This is important: the Court is effectively laying down a precedent on first principles rather than relying on an existing line of authority specifically on the interaction between Section 34 SRA and Family Court declaratory jurisdiction.

At a more general level (although not explicitly mentioned in the judgment), the reasoning is consonant with:

• The general doctrine that a special law (here, Family Courts Act) overrides a general law (Specific Relief Act) in its field, especially where supported by a non obstante clause (lex specialis derogat legi generali and lex posterior derogat priori).
• The established understanding that matrimonial remedies under special statutes (like the HMA) often function independently of general civil relief frameworks, though they may borrow procedural rules from the CPC.

Since the judgment is marked “AFR” (Approved for Reporting), it is clearly intended to be citable authority, contributing a fresh and express articulation of this relationship between the two statutes in the context of matrimonial declarations.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

Some of the key legal concepts used in the judgment can be clarified as follows:

6.1 “Void” Marriage vs “Voidable” Marriage

• A void marriage (Section 11 HMA) is treated in law as if it never existed. It is incurably invalid, for example, where:
  • One party already has a spouse living (Section 5(i));
  • The parties are within prohibited degrees of relationship, without valid custom, etc.
• A voidable marriage (Section 12 HMA) is valid until annulled by a decree (e.g., due to fraud, impotence, etc.).
• In this case, the second marriage was held “void” because it was contracted during the subsistence of a prior valid marriage.

6.2 “Preponderance of Probabilities”

• This is the standard of proof in civil cases, including matrimonial disputes in Family Courts.
• It asks: Is the version of facts advanced by one party more likely than not to be true? Even a 51% probability suffices.
• This is a lower threshold than the criminal standard of “beyond reasonable doubt”.

6.3 Declaratory Suits and Section 34 SRA

• A declaratory suit asks the court to formally declare the existence (or non-existence) of a legal status or right (e.g., that A is the lawful wife of B; that a deed is void; etc.).
• Section 34 allows such suits in respect of legal character or right to property, but its proviso says:
  • If the plaintiff could have asked for further relief (e.g., injunction, possession, restitution) and chooses not to, the court cannot grant a bare declaration.
• The Patna High Court holds that this restriction does not control Family Court declarations on marriage validity or matrimonial status.

6.4 Overriding Effect (Non Obstante Clause) – Section 20 Family Courts Act

• A statutory provision starting with “notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law…” is called a non obstante clause.
• It means that if another law says something inconsistent on the same subject, the Act with the non obstante clause prevails.
• Section 20 of the Family Courts Act uses such language to ensure that, in case of conflict, the Family Courts Act overrides other laws (like the Specific Relief Act) in its field of operation.

6.5 Restitution of Conjugal Rights

• This is a remedy under Section 9 of the HMA whereby a spouse can ask the court to order the other spouse to resume cohabitation and restore marital consortium.
• The appellant argued that because the first wife did not seek this “further relief” along with her declaration, her case was barred by Section 34 SRA.
• The Court rejected this, holding that such consequential relief is not a precondition to a declaration of marital status in the Family Court.

7. Impact and Implications

7.1 On Matrimonial Litigation in Family Courts

The judgment substantially clarifies that within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court:

• A spouse (such as a first wife) can institute a proceeding in the Family Court purely for a declaration that a subsequent marriage of the other spouse is void, without the need to also seek restitution, divorce, or similar relief.
• Family Courts can grant such declarations without being hindered by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.

This has practical benefits:

• It allows parties to clarify marital status without being forced into additional reliefs they may not want – for instance, a spouse may not desire restoration of cohabitation but may wish only to invalidate a bigamous union for legal certainty.
• It helps resolve conflicts regarding bigamy by providing a clear civil declaration that a second marriage is void, which may, in turn, have implications for criminal proceedings under Section 494 IPC, maintenance claims, succession, etc.

7.2 On the Relationship between General Civil Law and Special Matrimonial Statutes

By privileging the Family Courts Act over the Specific Relief Act, the decision strengthens the doctrinal view that:

• Matrimonial disputes constitute a special area of law with its own legislative framework (HMA + Family Courts Act).
• General civil law statutes (CPC, Specific Relief Act) play a subsidiary role and operate only in so far as they do not conflict with that special framework.

This approach is consistent with how Indian courts often treat specialised regimes (e.g., industrial disputes, consumer disputes, company law) vis-à-vis general civil law.

7.3 For Second Wives in Void Marriages

Although the second wife (Respondent No. 2) supported the appellant’s challenge, the result is that her marriage is judicially declared null and void. While not directly addressed in the judgment, this has collateral implications:

• Her status as “wife” is not recognized under the HMA in respect of this marriage.
• Nevertheless, following broader jurisprudence (outside this judgment), “second wives” in void marriages may still have access to certain protections (e.g., under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, in some circumstances; or equitable reliefs), but that is beyond the scope of this particular case.

7.4 For Future Appeals Against Family Court Decrees

On the evidentiary aspect, the decision underscores:

• The limited scope of interference with the Family Court’s factual findings when they are based on a considered evaluation of oral and documentary evidence.
• The importance of documentary admissions and corroborative materials (such as mediation records, affidavits, photographs) in proving the existence and subsistence of marriages.

Appellants will find it difficult to overturn such decrees on the basis of selective emphasis on particular witnesses (like PW 3 in this case), especially when the trial court has engaged with the record holistically.

8. Conclusion

The decision in Anjani Kumar @ Pappu Kumar v. Mamta Bharti & Anr is significant for two central reasons:

1. It reaffirms the factual finding that a second marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid first marriage is void under Sections 5(i) and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
   The appellate court declined to interfere with the Family Court’s fact-based conclusion, resting on a robust evidentiary foundation and the civil standard of preponderance of probabilities.
2. It lays down a clear doctrinal principle that the Family Courts Act, 1984 – by virtue of Section 20 and Section 7(1) Explanation (b) – overrides Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 in matrimonial status declarations.
   A party may thus validly seek a bare declaration as to the validity of a marriage or matrimonial status in a Family Court without being compelled to combine it with further relief, and the declaration cannot be refused on the basis of Section 34’s proviso.

In the broader legal landscape, the judgment strengthens the autonomy of the matrimonial jurisdiction under the Family Courts Act and clarifies that general constraints applicable to declaratory suits in civil courts do not fetter the Family Court’s power to determine and declare marital status. It will serve as a guiding precedent in Bihar (and as persuasive authority elsewhere) for future cases involving challenges to second marriages and the maintainability of status-centric matrimonial proceedings.