Opportunity, Not Outcome: Victim’s Right to Be Heard, Annulment of Perverse Bail Orders, and Limits on Joint Trials – Commentary on Lakshmanan v. State (2025 INSC 1483)

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1. Introduction

1.1. Case Overview

This Supreme Court judgment in LAKSHMANAN v. STATE THROUGH THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE & ORS., 2025 INSC 1483, arises from a deeply disturbing fact situation: - An initial incident of caste-based assault and attempt to murder (Crime No. 39 of 2020) under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 2015 (“SC/ST (POA) Act”), followed by - The subsequent murder of the prime injured eye-witness (Suresh) in 2022 (Crime No. 202 of 2022) while some of the accused were on bail in the earlier case. The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court had, by judgment dated 09.04.2025: 1. Granted bail to the accused in Crime No. 39 of 2020; and 2. Directed a joint trial of the two cases (Special S.C. No. 25 of 2021 and P.R.C. No. 17 of 2023). The defacto complainant (Lakshmanan, the injured first informant and a Scheduled Caste victim) challenged this before the Supreme Court.

1.2. Core Legal Issues

The Supreme Court was called upon to decide:

1. Whether the High Court’s grant of bail was vitiated by violation of the victim’s right to be heard under Section 15A(5) of the SC/ST (POA) Act.
2. Even if Section 15A(5) was complied with, whether the bail order was so perverse and non‑reasoned that it warranted annulment by the Supreme Court.
3. Whether the High Court, while deciding bail, could direct a joint trial of:
   • Crime No. 39 of 2020 – caste-based violence and attempt to murder; and
   • Crime No. 202 of 2022 – subsequent murder of the same victim-witness, allegedly to stifle evidence;
   in light of Sections 219–223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) and the corresponding provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).

1.3. Significance

This judgment is important for at least three doctrinal clarifications:

1. It refines the understanding of the victim’s right to be heard under Section 15A(5) SC/ST (POA) Act: the right is to a real opportunity of audience, not to a favourable outcome or a detailed reasoning on every objection.
2. It draws a clear and operational distinction between “cancellation” of bail and “annulment/setting aside” of a perverse bail order, reiterating when superior courts may interfere with bail, particularly in heinous offences and atrocity cases.
3. It reaffirms that separate trials are the rule and that a joint trial is a limited, discretionary exception, and underscores that bail courts should not pre‑empt trial‑court discretion by casually directing joint trials.

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2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1. Factual and Procedural Background (Condensed)

- On 24.02.2020, during surveying/fencing of agricultural land in Sambiranipatti Village, the appellant Lakshmanan and his friend Suresh were allegedly attacked by A1 Gopalakrishnan and others with deadly weapons; Lakshmanan, a Scheduled Caste member, was subjected to caste-abuse. - FIR in Crime No. 39 of 2020 (Melavalavu PS) was registered under IPC sections including 307 (attempt to murder) and Section 3(2)(va) SC/ST (POA). - The accused were granted bail by the Special Court (PCR), Madurai, on 09.09.2020. - Trial (Special S.C. No. 25 of 2021) did not progress due to alleged non‑cooperation of the accused. - The complainant pursued cancellation of bail before the High Court. - While on bail in Crime No. 39 of 2020, on 18.12.2022, A1, A2, A4 and A11 allegedly murdered Suresh in broad daylight to prevent his testimony, leading to Crime No. 202 of 2022 (IPC Sections 147, 148, 341, 302, 506(ii), 294(b), 120B). - Bail in the first case (39/2020) was cancelled by the High Court on 31.03.2023 due to misuse of liberty and intimidation of witnesses. - Subsequent bail applications were repeatedly dismissed by the trial court and, on earlier occasions, by the High Court as well. - However, by judgment dated 09.04.2025, the High Court:

• Allowed criminal appeals and granted bail afresh to the accused in Crime No. 39 of 2020; and
• Directed a joint trial of the two cases (Crime No. 39 of 2020 and Crime No. 202 of 2022).

- The defacto complainant challenged this in the Supreme Court.

2.2. Supreme Court’s Holdings

The Supreme Court held:

1. No violation of Section 15A(5) SC/ST (POA):
   • The victim was notified and heard in the bail proceedings.
   • The defect alleged was only that the High Court did not discuss each objection; this goes to the quality of reasons, not to denial of hearing.
   • Therefore, bail could not be cancelled on the sole ground of Section 15A(5) violation.
2. Annulment of the bail order due to perversity and non‑application of mind:
   • Though Section 15A(5) was complied with, the High Court’s bail order itself was manifestly perverse.
   • It ignored:
     • Earlier cancellation of bail for misuse of liberty.
     • The murder of a key injured witness (Suresh) while the accused were on bail.
     • The gravity of offences, including Section 307 IPC and SC/ST (POA) offence.
     • The criminal antecedents and allegations of intimidation.
   • On this basis, the Supreme Court set aside (annulled) the High Court’s bail order and cancelled the bail of the respondents.
3. Illegality of the High Court’s direction for a joint trial:
   • The High Court’s direction to hold a joint trial of Crime No. 39 of 2020 and Crime No. 202 of 2022 was held to be:
     • Contrary to Sections 219–223 Cr.P.C. and Section 242 BNSS, and
     • Beyond the proper limits of bail jurisdiction.
   • The Supreme Court emphasised that:
     • Separate trial is the rule; joint trial is an exception.
     • The two crimes were distinct in time, nature, and evidence, and did not meet the statutory criteria for joint trial.
     • The decision on joint or separate trial lies primarily with the trial court at the outset of proceedings, not to be casually dictated at the bail stage.
   • The joint-trial direction was therefore set aside.
4. Directions:
   • Appeals allowed.
   • Bail granted by the High Court stands cancelled.
   • Respondent-accused directed to surrender within two weeks; failing which, the trial court is to secure their custody in accordance with law.
   • Trial court to conduct trial independently, on merits, and in accordance with law.

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3. Detailed Analysis

3.1. Factual Matrix and Competing Narratives

Although the Supreme Court consciously avoids entering into detailed civil land‑dispute controversies, the broad competing narratives are important to understand:

• Complainant’s case:
  • The accused assaulted the appellant and Suresh while lawfully fencing agricultural land.
  • The assault was caste-motivated and falls squarely within Section 3(2)(va) SC/ST (POA) Act.
  • While on bail in the 2020 attempt-to-murder case, certain accused conspired to eliminate Suresh to prevent his testimony, resulting in his murder in 2022.
  • The accused misused bail, intimidated witnesses, disrupted court proceedings, refused to accept copies under Section 207 Cr.P.C., and some were detained under the “Goondas” preventive detention law (Act 14), showing danger to society and witnesses.
• Accused’s case:
  • The complainant allegedly belongs to a land mafia encroaching on government land and water bodies.
  • A1 Gopalakrishnan allegedly acted in public interest by filing writ petitions to remove encroachments; this allegedly provoked enmity leading to false implication in criminal cases.
  • They claimed to have no criminal antecedents, asserted social standing, and argued that the murder was orchestrated by the complainant’s group to frame them.
  • They also emphasized prolonged incarceration as undertrials and lack of trial progress.

The Supreme Court, rightly, does not adjudicate on these rival factual narratives at the bail stage, but focuses on whether the High Court’s approach to bail and joint trial was legally sustainable.

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3.2. Victim’s Right to Be Heard under Section 15A(5) SC/ST (POA) Act

3.2.1. Statutory Framework

Section 15A of the SC/ST (POA) Act is a rights‑centric provision titled “Rights of victims and witnesses”. Sub-section (5) states (as quoted in the judgment):

“(5) A victim or his dependent shall be entitled to be heard at any proceeding under this Act in respect of bail, discharge, release, parole, conviction or sentence of an accused or any connected proceedings or arguments and file written submission on conviction, acquittal or sentencing.”

Coupled with Section 15A(3), which mandates “reasonable, accurate and timely notice” of any court proceeding (including bail), Section 15A is designed to:

• Ensure that victims of caste atrocities are not passive bystanders but active stakeholders in the criminal process.
• Operationalise the principle of audi alteram partem (“hear the other side”) for victims, who historically have had weak or no voice in criminal procedure.

3.2.2. Precedents: Hariram Bhambhi and Hemal Ashwin Jain

The Court relies heavily on:

• Hariram Bhambhi v. Satyanarayan, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1010 – where the Supreme Court, with Justice B.V. Nagarathna on the Bench, held:
  • Section 15A(3) (notice) and Section 15A(5) (right to be heard) are mandatory.
  • The victim is an “active stakeholder” in proceedings under the SC/ST (POA) Act.
• Hemal Ashwin Jain (sheth) v. Union Of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 3285 – Gujarat High Court decision approvingly cited in Hariram and again endorsed here, which held:
  • Failure to provide the victim an opportunity in bail proceedings under the SC/ST (POA) Act is a failure of justice.
  • Section 15A(3) is mandatory; non-compliance can render a bail order null and void.

In the present judgment (paras 11.2–11.3, 18), the Supreme Court re‑affirms these principles: Section 15A(3) and (5) are mandatory and embody victim-centric procedural rights.

3.2.3. Clarification Introduced in Lakshmanan: “Opportunity, Not Outcome”

The substantial contribution of this case is a nuanced clarification of the scope of Section 15A(5):

1. Right is to an opportunity of hearing, not to a particular result:
   • Section 15A(5) guarantees the victim or dependent:
     • Timely notice of bail proceedings (via Section 15A(3)); and
     • An actual opportunity to be heard (personally or through counsel/Special Public Prosecutor).
   • However, it does not guarantee:
     • A favourable outcome (i.e., denial of bail); or
     • A detailed written adjudication on every objection raised by the victim.
2. When does violation justify cancellation of bail?
   The Court carefully delineates when breach of Section 15A(3)/(5) justifies cancellation/annulment of bail:
   • Cancellation/annulment is justified when there is:
     • No notice of the bail proceeding to the victim;
     • Complete exclusion from the process; or
     • Denial of any opportunity of audience.
   • Cancellation is not justified merely because:
     • The court did not accept the victim’s submissions; or
     • The bail order did not specifically deal with or rebut each objection; or
     • The hearing is alleged to have been “mechanical”, despite actual opportunity having been available.
3. Bail orders are not mini-judgments:
   • At the bail stage, courts form only a prima facie view; they are not required to write exhaustive reasoned orders as in final judgments.
   • Section 15A(5) cannot be interpreted to transform bail hearings into full merits trials or to demand detailed refutation of every victim’s point.

3.2.4. Application to This Case

In the present case:

• The appellant was aware of the bail proceedings and had filed objections.
• The High Court’s order recorded the existence of such objections.
• There is no allegation that:
  • Notice was not served;
  • The victim was prevented from appearing; or
  • The court refused to hear the victim’s counsel.
• The grievance was instead that the High Court did not engage in detail with each objection.

The Supreme Court, therefore, concludes: - No violation of Section 15A(5) is made out. - The appellant’s complaint pertains to the quality of reasoning, not to denial of hearing. This clarification is doctrinally important: it prevents Section 15A(5) from being misused as a blanket tool to challenge any grant of bail, while still firmly safeguarding the mandatory right to notice and participation.

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3.3. Annulment of Perverse Bail Orders vs Cancellation of Bail

3.3.1. Conceptual Distinction

The Court emphasizes a distinction that is sometimes blurred in practice:

1. Cancellation of bail (classic sense):
   • Typically based on post‑bail conduct or supervening circumstances.
   • Examples:
     • Threatening witnesses;
     • Committing new offences while on bail;
     • Violating bail conditions;
     • Absconding or evading trial.
   • The focus is on whether, after bail, the accused’s conduct has made it no longer conducive to permit liberty.
2. Annulment / setting aside of a bail order:
   • Operates in a different “field”.
   • Focuses on whether the original bail order itself was legally unsustainable because:
     • It is perverse (ignores crucial material, rests on irrelevant considerations), or
     • It suffers from illegality/arbitrariness/non‑application of mind.
   • Even if the accused has not (yet) misused bail, a perverse/unreasoned bail order can be set aside by a superior court.

3.3.2. Reliance on Shabeen Ahmad and AJWAR v. WASEEM

The Court draws on:

• Shabeen Ahmad v. State of U.P., (2025) 4 SCC 172 – where the Supreme Court criticised mechanical grant of bail in serious offences and re‑emphasised the need for:
  • Considering the nature of accusations, manner of commission, gravity, antecedents, risk of tampering, etc.; and
  • Permitting interference with bail orders that are illegal, perverse, or premised on irrelevant material.
• AJWAR v. WASEEM, (2024) 10 SCC 768, which synthesised earlier bail jurisprudence (Chaman Lal, Kalyan Chandra Sarkar, Prasanta Kumar Sarkar, Neeru Yadav, Mahipal, P v. State of M.P., etc.) and stated:
  • At the stage of granting bail, a court must consider:
    • Nature and gravity of accusation;
    • Manner of commission;
    • Antecedents;
    • Likelihood of tampering with evidence/ threatening witnesses;
    • Risk of absconding;
    • Impact on society, especially in grave offences.
  • For setting aside bail, factors include:
    • Supervening circumstances post‑bail;
    • Post‑bail conduct that affects fair trial;
    • Ignorance of relevant material or gravity by lower court;
    • Use of irrelevant considerations; and
    • Perversity or non‑application of mind in the bail order.

The present judgment adopts and applies these principles to hold that the High Court’s bail order is so fundamentally flawed that it must be annulled.

3.3.3. Why the High Court’s Bail Order Was Perverse

The Supreme Court identifies several decisive flaws (paras 12.1–12.5):

1. Ignoring prior cancellation of bail and misuse of liberty:
   • The accused had earlier been granted bail and that bail was subsequently cancelled by the High Court due to:
     • Serious supervening circumstances – notably the murder of Suresh, a prime witness in the earlier case, and
     • Allegations of witness intimidation and obstruction of trial.
   • These are not peripheral facts; they go to the core of whether the accused can be trusted on bail.
   • The High Court, while re‑granting bail, failed even to advert to this background, let alone analyse why bail was again appropriate. This was a serious omission.
2. Failure to consider the gravity of offences, including under SC/ST (POA):
   • The FIR in Crime No. 39 of 2020 alleges:
     • Unlawful assembly with deadly weapons;
     • Brutal assault causing serious injuries;
     • Caste‑based abuse and offences attracting Section 3(2)(va) SC/ST (POA);
     • Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder).
   • These are serious and socially sensitive offences, often involving structural power imbalances and risk of witness intimidation.
   • The High Court’s order contains no meaningful evaluation of:
     • The gravity and potential punishment;
     • The pattern of conduct (attempt to murder followed by actual murder of witness);
     • The broader societal impact in atrocity cases.
3. Non-consideration of criminal antecedents and threat perception:
   • The State placed on record that some accused were:
     • Declared “Goondas” and preventively detained under Act 14; and
     • History sheeters or habitual offenders.
   • The High Court recorded antecedents but failed to draw any conclusion or assess their implications for:
     • Risk of reoffending;
     • Threat to witnesses;
     • Obstruction of justice.
   • Merely reciting antecedents without analytic engagement is, as the Supreme Court notes, an “empty formality”.
4. Reliance on irrelevant factors (civil dispute) and absence of reasoned linkage:
   • The High Court appears to have been swayed by the existence of a civil land dispute between the parties.
   • However, the pendency of civil proceedings does not dilute the criminality of violent conduct such as attempted murder and caste atrocities.
   • The High Court also offered a vague rationale that release on bail would allow the accused to “contest the case effectively”, with no reasoned linkage explaining how that outweighed:
     • Prior bail cancellation;
     • The murder of a key witness while on earlier bail;
     • Documented allegations of threat and disruption in court.
5. Failure to consider consistent earlier judicial findings:
   • Earlier High Court orders in multiple appeals and petitions (2023–2024) had:
     • Denied bail; and
     • Recorded specific findings on misuse of bail and threat to witnesses.
   • The impugned bail order did not engage with these earlier consistent judicial assessments.

On this basis, the Supreme Court concludes that the High Court’s bail order is vitiated by perversity, arbitrariness and non‑application of mind. It therefore annuls the order and cancels bail.

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3.4. Joint Trial vs Separate Trial: Limits on High Court’s Power at Bail Stage

3.4.1. Statutory Scheme – Cr.P.C. and BNSS

The Court situates the issue within the statutory framework:

• Section 218 Cr.P.C. – General rule:
  • “For every distinct offence… there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge shall be tried separately.”
  • Separate trials are the norm.
• Sections 219–223 Cr.P.C. – Exceptions allowing joinder of charges and joint trials in specific circumstances. For instance:
  • Section 219 Cr.P.C. (quoted in the judgment) allows trial together of up to three offences of the “same kind” committed within twelve months, punishable under the same section.
  • Other provisions (e.g., Section 223) permit joint trial of multiple persons where they are accused of the same offence in the same transaction, or different offences committed in the same transaction, etc.
• BNSS, 2023 – Section 242:
  • Pari materia with Section 219 Cr.P.C., but extends the ceiling to five offences of the same kind.
  • Like the Cr.P.C., treats joint trial as an exception.

3.4.2. Precedents on Joint Trials: Nasib Singh, Cheemalapati, Chandra Bhal, Essar Teleholdings, and Mamman Khan

The Court relies on the recent decision in Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1975, which itself synthesised earlier case law including:

• Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab – detailed analysis of Sections 218–223 Cr.P.C. and joint trial principles.
• State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1850 – recognising that:
  • Separate trial is the normal rule, joint trial an exception.
  • However, where several persons participate in the same act/transaction, separate trials may be inconvenient and a joint trial may be justified, provided it does not prejudice the accused.
• Chandra Bhal v. State of U.P., (1971) 3 SCC 983 – emphasising:
  • Separate trial is not illegal even where joint trial is permissible.
  • The issue must be decided at the beginning of the trial, not on the basis of the final result.
  • Interference is warranted only if prejudice or failure of justice is demonstrated.
• Essar Teleholdings Ltd. v. CBI, (2015) 10 SCC 562 – clarifying that:
  • Even when statutory conditions under Section 223 for joint trial are met, it remains a matter of judicial discretion.
  • Joint trial should not be ordered if it:
    • Prolongs the trial;
    • Wastes judicial time; or
    • Prejudices/confuses an accused involved only in some of the offences.

From these, Mamman Khan distilled key principles (quoted in the present judgment):

1. Separate trial is the rule under Section 218; joint trial is a permissible exception under Sections 219–223.
2. Even when statutory conditions are met, a joint trial is a matter of discretion, not compulsion.
3. The decision must be taken at the outset of the trial, not retrospectively based on the outcome.
4. Two key considerations:
   • Whether joint trial would prejudice the accused; and
   • Whether it would cause delay or waste of judicial time.
5. Evidence recorded in one trial cannot simply be “imported” into another, hence improper jointing/splitting can create serious procedural complications.
6. Conviction or acquittal cannot be set aside merely on the possibilty of a different mode of trial; prejudice or miscarriage of justice must be shown.

3.4.3. Application to the Two Cases in Lakshmanan

The two cases are:

• Crime No. 39 of 2020 – Special S.C. No. 25 of 2021:
  • Caste‑based assault and attempt to murder.
  • Offences include Section 307 IPC and Section 3(2)(va) SC/ST (POA).
  • Incident on 24.02.2020.
• Crime No. 202 of 2022 – P.R.C. No. 17 of 2023:
  • Murder of Suresh, prime witness in the first case, allegedly to prevent his testimony.
  • Offences under Sections 147, 148, 341, 302, 506(ii), 294(b), 120B IPC.
  • Incident on 18.12.2022 – nearly two years later.

The Supreme Court notes:

• The two FIRs:
  • Arise out of distinct occurrences at different times and dates;
  • Have different factual foundations, witnesses, and evidence; and
  • Involve different offences (attempt to murder plus atrocity vs. later murder).
• They cannot be treated as:
  • “Offences of the same kind” within the meaning of Section 219 Cr.P.C./Section 242 BNSS; or
  • Part of the exact same transaction for purposes of joint trial under Sections 220–223 Cr.P.C., in the strict statutory sense.

Most crucially, the High Court:

• Did not conduct any statutory analysis of:
  • Dates/time gap;
  • Nature of offences;
  • “Same transaction” test;
  • Prejudice to accused;
  • Judicial economy vs complexity.
• Issued a joint-trial direction at the bail stage, without reasons and pre‑empted the trial court’s discretion.

The Supreme Court therefore holds:

1. The High Court’s direction for joint trial:
   • Is legally unsustainable under Cr.P.C./BNSS; and
   • Is beyond the proper remit of a bail proceeding.
2. Decisions on joint vs separate trials should normally be:
   • Left to the trial court at the threshold of trial; and
   • Based on a reasoned assessment of statutory criteria and possible prejudice/delay.

The direction for joint trial is therefore set aside.

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3.5. Thematic Undercurrents: Witness Protection, Caste Atrocities, and Bail

Though not framed as a separate holding, the judgment reflects deeper concerns:

• Elimination of witnesses while on bail:
  • The murder of Suresh, an injured eyewitness, allegedly while the accused were on bail, is seen as emblematic of witness elimination and obstruction of justice.
  • This weighs heavily against continued liberty, especially where there is a demonstrated pattern.
• SC/ST (POA) Act and systemic vulnerability:
  • The Court explicitly acknowledges that in atrocities cases, intimidation of victims and witnesses is a recurring concern.
  • This resonates with the very rationale of Section 15A and special procedures for SC/ST victims.
• Public confidence in criminal justice:
  • Citing earlier decisions, the Court warns that superficial application of bail parameters in grave cases can erode public faith in the justice system.
  • This is especially acute in cases of dowry deaths, honour killings, and caste atrocities where vulnerable communities may already distrust state institutions.

The implicit message: “Bail is the rule” is not a shield for those who demonstrably misuse liberty to subvert trials, particularly in structurally sensitive offences.

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4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1. “De facto complainant”

- The de facto complainant is the real person who claims to be the victim or injured party and who sets the criminal law in motion (e.g., by lodging an FIR), regardless of who is named as the formal complainant in the case title. - Here, Lakshmanan is the de facto complainant in Crime No. 39 of 2020.

4.2. Section 15A(5) SC/ST (POA): What Exactly Is the Right?

- The victim/dependent has the statutory right

To receive prior notice of bail and other key proceedings.

To be present and heard (through counsel if desired).

- It does not guarantee:

• A particular decision on bail; or
• A long, detailed discussion of each point raised by the victim.

- A real, not symbolic, opportunity must be given; but courts still retain judicial discretion.

4.3. Cancellation vs Annulment of Bail

- Cancellation (classic):

• Based on what happens after bail is granted.
• Example: accused threatens witnesses; violates conditions; commits new offences.
• Court then cancels bail due to misuse of liberty.

- Annulment/setting aside:

• Based on defects in the original bail order itself.
• Example: court ignored crucial materials, applied wrong principles, or used irrelevant reasons.
• Superior court can quash such an order even if no post‑bail misconduct is shown.

4.4. “Perverse” Bail Order

A “perverse” order is one that: - Ignores crucial, relevant materials (e.g., prior bail cancellation, serious supervening offences); - Relies on irrelevant factors (e.g., mere existence of a civil dispute) while ignoring gravity and antecedents; or - Demonstrates clear “non‑application of mind”. Such an order is open to interference by a superior court.

4.5. Joint Trial vs Separate Trial

- Separate trial:

• General rule: each distinct offence → separate charge and trial.
• Ensures clarity of evidence and minimises prejudice.

- Joint trial (exception):

• Permitted only in defined circumstances:
  • Multiple offences of the same kind within a year; or
  • Offences forming part of the same transaction; or
  • Multiple persons accused in relation to the same transaction, etc.
• Even then, joint trial is discretionary – based on:
  • Whether it prejudices the accused; and
  • Whether it promotes or hinders judicial economy.

4.6. “Same Transaction”

While not exhaustively defined, “same transaction” generally looks at: - Proximity of time, place, or continuity of action; - Whether the acts are so related that they can be viewed as part of one continuous narrative. In Lakshmanan, the 2020 assault and 2022 murder, though factually related in motive, are separate incidents separated by nearly two years, with different evidentiary bases, thus not treated as a single “transaction” for joint-trial purposes.

4.7. BNSS 2023 and Its Relevance

- The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) is a new procedural code intended to replace the Cr.P.C. - Section 242 BNSS mirrors Section 219 Cr.P.C. conceptually (offences of the same kind within twelve months) but allows up to five such offences in one trial. - The Court cites BNSS to show that:

• Even under the new procedural regime, joint trials remain the exception and are structurally constrained by statute.

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5. Impact and Future Implications

5.1. For Victims and the SC/ST (POA) Framework

- The judgment reinforces that:

• Victims under the SC/ST (POA) Act are central stakeholders with enforceable participation rights.
• Courts must ensure actual notice and hearing at the bail stage.

- Simultaneously, it prevents Section 15A(5) from being overstretched into a demand for a specific outcome:

• Victims can expect to be heard, but cannot insist that acceptance of their objections is a condition precedent to the validity of bail.

- As a result, future challenges to bail orders on Section 15A grounds will need to demonstrate:

• Complete denial of participation, rather than mere disagreement with reasons.

5.2. For High Courts and Trial Courts in Bail Matters

The decision sends a clear message to courts:

• In serious offences (attempt to murder, murder, SC/ST (POA), etc.), bail cannot be granted mechanically.
• Courts must:
  • Factor in gravity, antecedents, risk to witnesses and trial fairness.
  • Express in the bail order, even if briefly, the key considerations that weighed in favour of granting bail.
• When there has been:
  • Prior cancellation of bail due to misuse, or
  • Death of a witness while on earlier bail,
  such circumstances must be addressed head‑on before any further bail is granted.

5.3. On the Doctrine of Annulment of Bail Orders

This case fortifies an important strand of jurisprudence: - Superior courts (High Courts and Supreme Court) retain the power to:

• Annul or set aside bail orders that are:
  • Unreasoned;
  • Perverse; or
  • Based on irrelevant or incomplete consideration of material facts.

This serves as a check against: - Casual or inconsistent application of bail principles; and - The risk that serious offences may be dealt with lightly at the pre‑trial stage.

5.4. On Joint Trials and Procedural Discipline

The judgment will likely guide future practice in:

• Restraining bail courts from issuing broad procedural directions (like joint trials) unrelated to the immediate liberty question, unless absolutely necessary.
• Re‑emphasising that:
  • The trial court is the primary forum to decide on joint vs separate trials; and
  • Such decisions must be reasoned and grounded in statutory criteria and potential prejudice, not convenience alone.

This is especially relevant in complex cases involving multiple FIRs over time (e.g., riot situations, repeated communal incidents, or connected yet separate crimes) where the temptation to “club everything” is high.

5.5. For Witness Protection and Marginalised Communities

By factoring the murder of a key witness while on bail into its reasoning, the Court underscores:

• The centrality of witness safety to the integrity of the criminal process.
• The particular vulnerability of Scheduled Caste victims who bring atrocity complaints and may face serious backlash.

The judgment thus aligns with broader constitutional commitments to equality, dignity, and access to justice for marginalised groups.

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6. Conclusion

Lakshmanan v. State is a carefully structured judgment that advances three key doctrinal clarifications:

1. Victim’s Right under Section 15A(5) SC/ST (POA) Act:
   • The right is mandatory and encompasses:
     • Timely notice under Section 15A(3); and
     • A real opportunity to be heard at bail and other significant stages.
   • However, it is a right to opportunity, not to a particular outcome or granular reasoning on every objection.
   • Cancellation of bail on this ground requires showing complete denial of hearing, not mere dissatisfaction with reasoning.
2. Annulment of Perverse Bail Orders:
   • The Supreme Court reiterates that:
     • Even absent fresh post‑bail misconduct, a bail order can be set aside if it is perverse or unreasoned and ignores material considerations.
   • In this case, the High Court’s failure to:
     • Consider prior cancellation of bail;
     • Account for the murder of a key witness while on bail;
     • Engage with the gravity of offences (including SC/ST (POA)); and
     • Evaluate antecedents and witness-safety concerns;
     rendered its bail order unsustainable, warranting annulment and cancellation of bail.
3. Limits on Joint Trials at the Bail Stage:
   • Separate trials remain the rule; joint trials are a tightly controlled exception under Sections 219–223 Cr.P.C. and Section 242 BNSS.
   • Decisions on joint trials should:
     • Typically be taken by the trial court at the outset, not by a bail court incidentally; and
     • Be based on a rigorous analysis of statutory conditions, prejudice, and judicial economy.
   • The High Court’s direction for joint trial of two distinct FIRs (2020 assault and 2022 murder) without such analysis was therefore set aside.

In its result, the judgment restores a stricter, principle‑driven approach to bail in grave atrocities cases, insists on meaningful participation of victims without converting bail hearings into mini‑trials, and reins in overbroad procedural directions at the bail stage. It will be an important precedent for: - Bail jurisprudence in serious and sensitive offences; - Operationalising victim rights under the SC/ST (POA) Act; and - The correct application of joint-trial provisions under both Cr.P.C. and BNSS. In substance and in signal, the decision reinforces the idea that procedural fairness for both accused and victims, rigorous application of bail standards, and the integrity of the trial process are indispensable to criminal justice.