Only the Discovery Speaks: Supreme Court Reaffirms Limits of Section 27 Evidence Act and the High Threshold for Reversing Acquittals — Rajendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2025)

Introduction

In Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal/Uttarakhand, Criminal Appeal Nos. 476–477 of 2013 (2025 INSC 1193), decided on 7 October 2025, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India (Pankaj Mithal, J. and Prasanna B. Varale, J.) restored the trial court’s acquittal of three accused—father (Rajendra Singh), son (Bhupender Singh), and son-in-law (Ranjeet Singh)—who had been convicted by the High Court for the murder of Pushpendra Singh under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The case centrally turned on the identity of the assailants. The Court assessed whether the prosecution had discharged its burden through reliable ocular testimony, test identification processes, and forensic linkage, or whether the conviction rested on conjecture, chance witnesses, and an impermissible use of disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The decision also reaffirms the stringent standard governing appellate interference with acquittals.

Key issues before the Supreme Court included:

• Whether the appellants were proved to be the assailants through trustworthy identification evidence.
• Whether recoveries of weapons based on custodial disclosures could, without more, connect the appellants to the crime.
• Whether the High Court was justified in reversing an acquittal absent a finding of perversity in the trial court’s assessment.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court’s conviction under Section 302 IPC (fine of Rs. 10,000 each and life imprisonment), and restored the acquittal. The Court held that:

• The identity of the assailants was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The principal resident eyewitness (Amarjeet Kaur, PW-7) saw three assailants but did not and could not identify them; there was no test identification parade (TIP) or in-court identification.
• The testimonies of PW-1 (father of the deceased) and PW-2 (Jwala Singh) were unreliable and/or those of chance witnesses whose presence and accounts were uncorroborated and contradicted by PW-7’s credible version.
• Recoveries of swords and a kanta based on disclosure statements were from accessible/open places; more importantly, the forensic linkage to the deceased was absent, and the confessional part of the disclosures was inadmissible under Sections 25–27 of the Evidence Act.
• The High Court erred in overturning an acquittal without demonstrating perversity or patent error in the trial court’s appreciation of evidence.

Result: Benefit of doubt was extended to the appellants, their bail bonds were discharged, and they were acquitted.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor (Privy Council, 1947): The Court relied on the classic exposition that only that portion of a custodial disclosure which “distinctly relates to the fact discovered” is admissible (Section 27 Evidence Act). For example, “I will show where the knife is concealed” is admissible to the extent it leads to discovery; but “with which I stabbed A” is a confessional statement barred by Sections 25 and 26. Applying this, the bench refused to treat the accused’s disclosure statements as proof that the recovered weapons were indeed the “weapons of crime.”
• Manjunath and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421: The Court affirmed the principle from Pulukuri Kottaya: admissibility under Section 27 is strictly confined to “so much of the information” that distinctly leads to discovery. The recovery itself cannot substitute proof that the weapon was used in the commission of the crime; such linkage requires independent evidence (e.g., forensics, credible eyewitness identification).

These authorities decisively shaped the Court’s approach: recovery sans forensic correlation, and absent reliable ocular identification, is insufficient to sustain a conviction—especially where the trial court had acquitted.

Legal Reasoning

1) Identity of the Assailants: Ocular Evidence and TIP

• PW-7 (Amarjeet Kaur), the householder in whose residence the fatal assault occurred, is the Court’s “primary” witness. She saw three men armed with swords and a kanta chase and assault the deceased. Critically, she:
  • Did not know the assailants and could not identify them by name or otherwise.
  • Was never asked to identify the appellants; no TIP or in-court identification was conducted.
  • Stated that the father (PW-1) and others reached the spot about half an hour after the assailants fled.
  Her testimony was found “independent, natural, and trustworthy.” It established the happening of the crime but not the identity of the perpetrators.
• PW-1 (Diler Singh, father of the deceased) claimed to have chased the appellants from the junction to PW-7’s house and to have seen them attack his son. However, his account was undermined by:
  • PW-7’s clear assertion that relatives arrived half an hour after the attackers left—rendering PW-1 not an eyewitness to the assault.
  • Unnatural conduct: although he claimed to have hugged his bloodied son, his own blood-stained clothes were neither seized nor produced and were later washed and reused.
  • Questionable presence: the junction was not on his route back from the flour mill; PW-4 (Kakka Singh, the mill owner) did not corroborate that PW-1 visited the mill that day.
  The Court treated PW-1 as a chance witness and unreliable regarding identity.
• PW-2 (Jwala Singh) was also a chance witness. He claimed to follow PW-1 at a distance of 60–70 steps. Given that PW-1’s presence was disbelieved and PW-7’s account placed the relatives’ arrival long after the incident, PW-2’s testimony could not repair the identification gap.
• Absence of independent corroboration: Despite multiple shops and field-labourers allegedly seeing the chase, no independent witness from the vicinity was examined to corroborate the pursuit or the identity of the assailants.

Conclusion on identity: The prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants were the three men who entered PW-7’s house and attacked the deceased. The failure to conduct any identification procedure was fatal in a case involving strangers to the principal eyewitness.

2) Recoveries and Section 27 Evidence Act

• Nature and place of recoveries: One sword was recovered from a garage; another sword and the kanta were recovered from bushes in a sugarcane field—both accessible/open locations that diminish probative value absent further linkage.
• Forensic linkage missing: No forensic report was adduced to show that blood on the weapons matched that of the deceased. The Court underscored that recovery without forensic corroboration cannot prove that the weapons were used in the murder.
• Scope of admissibility: The State’s argument that the accused “admitted” to having used the recovered weapons was rejected as inadmissible in light of Sections 25 and 26; only the “discovery” part under Section 27 is admissible. The confessional overlay—“these are the weapons with which we committed the offence”—is excluded from evidence.

3) Appellate Restraint: Reversing an Acquittal

The Court reaffirmed that a High Court should not interfere with a trial court’s acquittal unless the trial court’s findings are perverse or manifestly erroneous. The trial judge is best placed to assess witness demeanor and credibility. Here, absent perversity, the High Court erred in substituting its view to convict on a record that did not establish identity or connect the appellants to the crime.

Impact and Implications

• Police investigation protocols:
  • Where principal eyewitnesses do not know the assailants, conducting a prompt Test Identification Parade (TIP) is critical. Its absence will seriously undermine the prosecution’s ability to establish identity.
  • Recoveries must be forensically linked—through blood grouping/DNA or other trace evidence—to the deceased or the scene. Mere recovery does not equal guilt.
  • Seize and preserve all blood-stained clothing of witnesses and relatives claiming physical contact with the deceased; unexplained failure can become a significant evidentiary gap.
  • Secure independent witnesses from the vicinity where the chase or attack allegedly occurred to corroborate key aspects of the narrative.
• Prosecution strategy:
  • In cases built on identity by strangers, the chain must include reliable identification evidence (TIP/in-court identification supported by prior TIP), forensic corroboration, and consistent ocular testimony.
  • Do not over-rely on disclosure-based recoveries; ensure the “last mile” scientific linkage to the crime.
• Judicial review on appeals:
  • Reiterates the high threshold for upsetting acquittals. Where two views are reasonably possible, the view favoring the accused should prevail.
  • High Courts must identify and record perversity or serious misappreciation before reversing an acquittal.
• Defense toolkit:
  • Challenge chance witnesses whose presence, route, or conduct is doubtful.
  • Insist on strict compliance with Section 27 limits and forensic corroboration for recovered articles.
  • Highlight absence of TIP and inconsistencies between independent eyewitnesses and related witnesses.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Chance witness: A person who happens to be at the scene by coincidence, not because of any usual or expected presence. Courts treat their testimonies with caution. Such a witness must convincingly explain why they were there and how they observed what they claim to have seen.
• Test Identification Parade (TIP): A pre-trial process where a witness is asked to identify an unknown suspect from a line-up. While not substantive evidence by itself, it strengthens in-court identification. Absence of TIP where identity is disputed can be fatal.
• Sections 25–27, Indian Evidence Act, 1872:
  • Section 25: A confession to a police officer is inadmissible against the accused.
  • Section 26: A confession made while in police custody is inadmissible unless made before a Magistrate.
  • Section 27: A narrow exception—only that part of information from an accused in custody that “distinctly relates” to a discovered fact is admissible (e.g., showing where a weapon is hidden). The confessional part (“which I used to kill X”) remains inadmissible.
• Perversity standard for reversing acquittals: An appellate court may overturn an acquittal only if the trial court’s view is not merely another possible view but is so unreasonable or against the evidence as to be perverse. If two plausible views exist, the acquittal stands.
• Forensic linkage: Scientific connection between recovered items and the crime—e.g., matching blood/DNA on weapons to the victim, or establishing that blood found is human and belongs to the deceased. Without such linkage, recoveries have limited probative value.
• IPC and BNS reference: The FIR referenced Section 302 IPC (murder). The judgment notes the corresponding provision under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Section 103(1) BNS), reflecting statutory transition; however, the offence and prosecution arose under the IPC.

Conclusion

Rajendra Singh is a clear reaffirmation of foundational criminal law principles: the prosecution must establish identity through credible, cogent evidence; disclosure-led recoveries cannot shoulder the burden of proof in the absence of forensic corroboration; and appellate interference with acquittals is permissible only upon demonstrable perversity. The Court’s careful parsing of eyewitness credibility, insistence on identification protocols like TIP, and strict application of Sections 25–27 of the Evidence Act together ensure that convictions do not rest on speculation or inadmissible confessional material.

The case is likely to influence investigative and prosecutorial practices by underscoring the need for:

• Prompt and proper identification procedures where assailants are unknown to eyewitnesses.
• Scientific tying of recovered weapons to the crime, not merely their recovery.
• Vigilant corroboration through independent witnesses and preservation of critical physical evidence.

In sum, “only the discovery speaks”—but only to the extent the law permits. Without reliable identification and forensic bridges, conviction cannot stand. The Supreme Court’s restoration of acquittal in this case reinforces due process safeguards and the presumption of innocence at the heart of criminal justice.

Case Snapshot

• Court: Supreme Court of India
• Coram: Pankaj Mithal, J.; Prasanna B. Varale, J.
• Citation: 2025 INSC 1193
• Date: 7 October 2025
• Disposition: Appeals allowed; High Court conviction set aside; trial court acquittal restored; benefit of doubt extended; bail bonds discharged.
• Core Holdings:
  • Failure of identification (no TIP/in-court identification from the key eyewitness).
  • Chance witnesses’ testimonies treated with caution; contradictions with independent witness (PW-7).
  • Section 27 Evidence Act allows admission only of the discovery-linked portion; confessional portions barred by Sections 25–26.
  • Weapon recoveries from open places without forensic linkage insufficient to prove guilt.
  • High threshold to reverse acquittals; absence of perversity vitiates High Court’s interference.