Only-Possible-View Threshold Reaffirmed; Specificity and Public-View Requirement for Caste-Insult Offences under the SC/ST Act: State of Himachal Pradesh v. Mam Raj

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Himachal Pradesh High Court’s decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Mam Raj (Cr. Appeal No. 266 of 2015, decided on 29 August 2025), where a Division Bench (Vivek Singh Thakur and Sushil Kukreja, JJ.) dismissed the State’s appeal against an acquittal. The case involved allegations of repeated rape (Section 376 IPC), criminal intimidation (Section 506 IPC), intentional insult (Section 504 IPC), and an offence under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act), framed as Section 3(1)(xii) but discussed in terms of “intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate in any place within public view.”

The prosecutrix alleged that the accused committed forcible sexual intercourse on three occasions in 2011, threatened her, used caste-based slurs against her and her family, and blackmailed her through letters. The State challenged the Trial Court’s acquittal dated 26 September 2014, urging re-appreciation of evidence to secure a conviction. The High Court reaffirmed the well-settled appellate restraint in appeals against acquittal, carefully tested the credibility of the prosecutrix’s testimony against contemporaneous material (notably love letters), and concluded that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden beyond reasonable doubt.

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal and affirmed the acquittal. It held that:

An appellate court has full power to reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal, but such interference is circumscribed by a “double presumption of innocence” and the “possible view” doctrine.
In sexual offence cases, while the sole testimony of the prosecutrix can suffice, it must be of “sterling quality,” inspire confidence, and should not be improbable or riddled with material inconsistencies.
In this case, the prosecutrix’s testimony suffered from ambiguities and improvements, including the inability to specify dates or even months of the alleged rapes; absence of contemporaneous complaints; and inconsistency with the tenor of letters (Ex. P4–P40) found to reflect her affection for the accused rather than coercion or blackmail.
For the SC/ST Act charge, the prosecution failed to prove the essential ingredients: there was no proof of specific caste-based words, no proof that any such alleged insult occurred in a place within public view, and the principal witnesses were “interested,” with a property-related animus against the accused.
Given these deficiencies, the Trial Court’s view acquitting the accused was not only a possible view, but, on the record, the only possible view. No interference was warranted under Section 378 CrPC.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Bench anchored its decision in a robust line of Supreme Court authority governing appeals against acquittal and evaluation of evidence in sexual offence prosecutions:

Muralidhar @ Gidda v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730: Reiterates the Sheo Swarup approach—while appellate courts may reappraise evidence, they should give due deference to the trial court’s advantage in observing demeanour, recognize the double presumption of innocence, and refrain from overturning an acquittal unless the trial court’s conclusions are palpably wrong or perverse.
Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: Catalogues the narrow circumstances for interfering with acquittals—e.g., perverse reasoning, rejection of incontrovertible evidence, gross miscarriage of justice, or application of an unrealistic standard of proof.
H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: Clarifies that, even after reappreciation of evidence, an appellate court cannot reverse an acquittal merely because another view is possible. Reversal is justified only if guilt is the only possible conclusion.
On rape jurisprudence and evidentiary standards:
- State of HP v. Gian Chand, (2001) 6 SCC 71; Vijay @ Chinee v. State of MP, (2010) 8 SCC 191; Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, AIR 1990 SC 658; State Of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, AIR 1996 SC 1393; Pappu @ Yunus, AIR 2005 SC 1248: The prosecutrix’s credible, confidence-inspiring testimony can alone found a conviction; minor discrepancies are immaterial; courts must be sensitive; corroboration is a rule of prudence, not law.
- Tameezuddin @ Tammu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2009) 15 SCC 566: However, courts cannot accept a version that is inherently improbable or that “belies logic.”
- Jugendra Singh v. State of UP, (2012) 6 SCC 297: Underscores the gravity of sexual crimes and societal impact; courts must address the cry of the collective, while conforming to due process and proof standards.

Collectively, these precedents shaped the Bench’s dual emphasis: (i) the stringent limits on appellate interference with acquittals, and (ii) the nuanced evaluation of a prosecutrix’s testimony—carefully separating minor discrepancies (which should not derail a prosecution) from material infirmities (which can).

Legal Reasoning

1) Appellate Restraint under Section 378 CrPC

The Court reaffirmed core principles:

Double presumption of innocence: Acquittal fortifies the baseline presumption of innocence.
Possible view test: If the trial court’s view is a possible one on the record, the appellate court should not substitute its own merely because another view is plausible.
Only-possible-conclusion threshold: Interference is justified only if guilt is the sole conclusion reasonably open from the evidence.

Applied here, the High Court found not just that the acquittal was a possible view, but that the record could not sustain a conviction at all—hence, the trial court’s view was, in its words, “the only possible view.”

2) Credibility of the Prosecutrix and the “Sterling Quality” Test

The Bench accepted that, as a matter of law, a conviction for rape can rest on the prosecutrix’s sole testimony. However, the testimony must be coherent, trustworthy, and consistent with the case’s probabilities. On facts, the Court identified several material infirmities:

Absence of specifics: The prosecutrix alleged three rapes in 2011 but could not furnish dates, months, or even approximations in her deposition.
Improvements and ambiguities: The Court noted deliberate ambiguity and changes in stance on major aspects, undermining confidence in the narrative.
Lack of contemporaneous complaint: Despite alleging threats and repeated sexual assault, there was no prompt or contemporaneous complaint disclosed for those events.
Love letters contradicting coercion: Letters Ex. P4–P40 (dated between 25.11.2011 and 15.11.2012) reflected affection, not coercion, and were not shown to have been written under duress. The Court found these letters “fully probablized” the defence that the prosecutrix’s family (and ultimately the accused himself) opposed the relationship, and once the letters surfaced publicly, a false case followed.
Conduct inconsistent with allegations: The prosecutrix admitted that at her brother’s marriage (about 1–1.5 years prior to her 21.07.2014 deposition), the accused and his brother cooked meals—conduct difficult to reconcile with her allegations of ongoing blackmail, threats, and prior sexual assault.

These factors, taken together, led the Court to conclude that the prosecutrix’s testimony did not meet the “sterling quality” threshold. The prosecution thus failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

3) SC/ST Act Charge: Specific Words and “Public View”

Although the judgment lists the charge as Section 3(1)(xii) of the SC/ST Act, it describes and analyzes the ingredients of the “insult/intimidation to humiliate in any place within public view” offence (the then Section 3(1)(x)). Either way, the prosecution had to establish specificity and essential elements. The Court found:

No specificity: The prosecutrix’s assertion that the accused used caste-based remarks for 3–4 years lacked particulars—no specific words, contexts, or incidents were proved.
No public view: There was no evidence that any alleged insult occurred “in any place within public view,” an essential ingredient of the offence as framed and discussed.
Interested witnesses: PW-2 and PW-4 were living on land belonging to the accused’s grandmother and admitted a property dispute—rendering them interested witnesses whose uncorroborated testimony the Court treated with caution.
Improvements and omissions: PW-9’s improved testimony was contradicted by his prior statement (Ex. DB). Panchayat witnesses (PW-10, PW-12) spoke only of general abusive behavior, not of caste-specific insult in public view.

On this basis, the SC/ST Act charge failed on core ingredients.

4) IPC Sections 504 and 506

To establish Section 504 IPC (intentional insult to provoke breach of the peace) and Section 506 IPC (criminal intimidation), the prosecution was required to prove specific acts, words, and the requisite intent, along with consequent fear of injury (for Section 506). The Court found the allegations unspecific, unsupported by independent corroboration, and, in material parts, contradicted by the letters and subsequent conduct of the parties. As such, neither offence was made out.

5) Burden of Proof and the Severity Principle

The Court reiterated two foundational principles:

Burden remains with the prosecution: It never shifts to the accused; the State must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on acceptable evidence.
Stricter degree of assurance for serious charges: The more serious the offence, the higher the degree of assurance needed to reach conviction, mindful of the presumption of innocence.

Impact of the Judgment

Appellate practice in acquittal appeals: The decision robustly restates the “only-possible-conclusion” threshold for reversing an acquittal. This will continue to guide High Courts to exercise extreme caution before disturbing trial court acquittals, particularly where the trial court’s view is reasonably open on the record.
Sexual offence prosecutions: While confirming that the prosecutrix’s testimony can suffice, the case underscores that courts will test such testimony against contemporaneous material (e.g., letters, conduct) for internal consistency and plausibility. Documentation suggesting mutual affection can critically undermine allegations of coercion or blackmail, unless credibly explained.
SC/ST Act prosecutions: The judgment emphasizes the need to plead and prove:
- the exact caste-based words/acts;
- the context and place of occurrence; and
- that the incident occurred “within public view.”
Generalized allegations or testimony from interested witnesses without independent corroboration can be insufficient. The decision will likely heighten evidentiary rigor in future SC/ST Act cases in Himachal Pradesh.
Investigation and trial strategy: The case illustrates the importance of:
- prompt complaint and clear narration of dates/timelines (where possible);
- collecting and addressing potentially exculpatory materials (letters, messages) during investigation;
- scrutinizing witness impartiality, especially where property or personal disputes exist; and
- avoiding material improvements at trial inconsistent with prior statements.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Double presumption of innocence: Every accused is presumed innocent. An acquittal at trial strengthens that presumption, making appellate reversal harder.
Possible view vs. only possible view:
- Possible view: If the trial court’s view is reasonably possible on the evidence, the appellate court should not interfere.
- Only possible view: To reverse an acquittal, the appellate court must find that guilt is the only conclusion reasonably available from the record.
Sterling quality (prosecutrix’s testimony): Testimony that is inherently credible, consistent, and coherent—so reliable that it alone can form the basis for conviction without corroboration.
Interested witness: A witness who may have a stake, bias, or animus (e.g., due to property disputes). Their testimony is not inadmissible, but courts seek independent corroboration.
Improvements: Additions or changes in a witness’s trial testimony that were absent in earlier statements (e.g., to police). Material improvements can weaken credibility.
“Public view” under the SC/ST Act: The insult/intimidation must occur at a place and in circumstances visible to the public—not merely inside a private space with no onlookers—unless statutes or later amendments specify otherwise. Proof typically requires context, location, and corroborative accounts.
Section 313 CrPC statement: An opportunity for the accused to explain incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence; not evidence per se but may lend support to a defence if consistent with the record.

Conclusion

State of HP v. Mam Raj is a careful application of entrenched principles governing appeals against acquittal and evidentiary standards in sexual offences and SC/ST Act prosecutions. The High Court reaffirmed:

Appellate reticence: Acquittals are not to be overturned unless the trial court’s view is perverse or guilt is the only reasonable conclusion.
Sterling-quality test: The prosecutrix’s testimony, though potentially dispositive, must be credible, coherent, and consistent with surrounding material; inherently improbable or materially shifting narratives will not suffice.
Rigour under the SC/ST Act: Specific caste-based words, context, and public-view occurrence are critical; generalized or uncorroborated assertions—especially from interested witnesses—are inadequate.

On the facts, contemporaneous love letters, absence of specific timelines and complaints, and conduct inconsistent with allegations decisively undercut the prosecution case. The judgment thus offers two enduring messages: first, that the constitutional protection of the presumption of innocence commands real bite in appellate review; second, that the strength of sexual offence and atrocity prosecutions lies in precise, consistent, and corroborated narratives that withstand rigorous judicial scrutiny.