Omission of Accused’s Name in FIR as a Fatal Defect in Identification Evidence: A Commentary on Govind Mandavi v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 INSC 1399)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Govind Mandavi v. State of Chhattisgarh is a significant reaffirmation of the evidentiary value of the First Information Report (FIR) and the legal consequences of material omissions therein, particularly where the prosecution’s case rests on a single eyewitness whose later statements are found to be embellished.

The appellant, Govind Mandavi, was convicted by the Special Judge (SC/ST Act), North Bastar, Kanker, of murder under Sections 302/34 IPC and house-trespass with preparation for hurt under Section 460 IPC, and sentenced to life imprisonment. A co-accused was also convicted under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. On appeal, the High Court of Chhattisgarh acquitted the two co-accused but affirmed the conviction of the present appellant, principally on the strength of:

• the testimony of the deceased’s first wife, Smt. Sukmai Hidko (PW-2), as an alleged eyewitness;
• her identification of the appellant in a Test Identification Parade (TIP) and in court;
• the alleged motive arising from prior family disputes; and
• a forensic report showing “human blood” on an axe and shoes recovered at the appellant’s instance.

The Supreme Court, however, set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant, holding that:

• the omission of the appellant’s name in the FIR, despite the prosecution’s case that PW-2 had already identified him, was a material and fatal defect;
• subsequent statements of PW-2 were riddled with improvements and embellishments, and could not safely be relied upon;
• the TIP had no real probative value in the circumstances;
• the forensic evidence was inconclusive for want of blood-group matching or reliable linkage to the deceased.

At its core, the ruling reiterates that where the earliest version of events (the FIR) omits a crucial fact such as the identity of the assailant—particularly in a case of prior enmity—subsequent, improved versions are to be approached with “great caution and suspicion”. The Court also underscores that a TIP cannot cure an inherently doubtful identification, especially when the accused is already known to the witness.

II. Summary of the Judgment

1. Factual backdrop

• The deceased, Bivan Hidko, a Gond farmer, lived in a farm hut (store room) with his first wife, PW-2 (Smt. Sukmai Hidko), in village Iragaon, Kanker district, Chhattisgarh.
• On the night of 17 April 2021, two masked men allegedly came to the farm hut, woke the deceased, took him away, and he was later found dead with sharp-cut injuries in a nearby store room.
• PW-2 rushed to her father-in-law, PW-1 (Heeralal Hidko), and narrated the incident. On the next morning (18 April 2021 at 7:25 a.m.), PW-1 lodged a “merg intimation” and, based on that, an FIR under Sections 302/34 IPC was registered against “unknown” assailants.
• PW-2’s detailed statement under Section 161 CrPC was recorded only on 21 April 2021, four days after the incident, wherein she, for the first time, claimed to have identified the appellant when his mask allegedly fell off during the assault.
• The appellant and two others were arrested on 22 April 2021; recoveries of an axe, clothes and cash were allegedly made at their instance; a TIP was conducted the same day, in which PW-2 identified the appellant.

2. Courts below

• Trial Court: Convicted all three accused. The appellant and one co-accused were convicted under Sections 302/34 and 460 IPC; another co-accused was convicted under Section 302/34 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.
• High Court: Acquitted the two co-accused but upheld the appellant’s conviction, relying heavily on:
  • PW-2’s eyewitness testimony and her identification of the appellant;
  • the TIP conducted by PW-16 (Tahsildar);
  • the FSL report showing human blood on the appellant’s axe and shoes; and
  • the alleged motive arising out of disputes over the deceased’s second marriage to PW-6 (Binda Bai), who is the appellant’s sister.

3. Supreme Court’s decision

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, holding that:

• The non-mention of the appellant’s name in the FIR, despite PW-2 allegedly having identified him, was a material omission that “goes to the very root of the matter” and fatally undermines the prosecution case (paras 31, 41, 45).
• PW-1 and PW-2 had both substantially “modulated” and “improved” their versions in court, making their testimony untrustworthy (paras 39–41).
• The belated naming of the appellant in PW-2’s Section 161 CrPC statement, in the context of admitted prior enmity, appeared to be a “clear manipulation” intended to falsely implicate him (para 43).
• The TIP of the appellant was pointless and suspect, because:
  • PW-2 already knew the appellant (her co-wife’s brother); and
  • if he had genuinely been named in her Section 161 statement, there was no purpose in holding a TIP (paras 42–43).
• The FSL report merely showed the presence of “human blood” on some recovered articles; since no blood-grouping was proved and the samples were disintegrated, the forensic evidence could not connect those articles to the deceased (paras 12, 47).
• On reappreciation of the entire evidence, the prosecution failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the trial court and High Court had committed “grave errors in facts as well as in law” (para 48).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the trial court and the High Court and directed that the appellant be released forthwith if not required in any other case (paras 49–50).

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedent Relied On: Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P.

The Court’s key doctrinal move is its reliance on the classic precedent Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1026. In that case:

• The FIR, lodged by the deceased’s father, did not mention that the appellant had stabbed the deceased, even though, according to the prosecution, eyewitnesses and a dying declaration to that effect were available before the FIR was lodged.
• The Supreme Court held that such a serious omission—of the appellant’s alleged role in causing fatal injuries—was highly significant. Although an FIR is formally a prior statement usable under Sections 145 and 157 of the Evidence Act, the Court went further to say:
  “We think that omissions of such important facts, affecting the probabilities of the case, are relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act in judging the veracity of the prosecution case.”
• The Court also noted that the dying declaration naming the appellant was not mentioned in the FIR, further eroding confidence in the prosecution story.
• Ultimately, the Court acquitted the accused, holding that the prosecution version was unreliable in light of these omissions.

In Govind Mandavi, the Supreme Court quotes extensively from Ram Kumar Pandey (paras 44–45) and applies its reasoning by analogy. The key aspect of the analogy is:

• In both cases, the prosecution claimed that, at the time of lodging the FIR, crucial knowledge was already available to the informant (who was closely related to the deceased); but that crucial knowledge—identifying a particular accused—was conspicuously absent from the FIR.
• Such omissions are treated not as minor defects but as “relevant facts” under Section 11 of the Evidence Act, i.e., facts which, if proved, would make the existence or non-existence of the fact in issue highly probable or improbable.

By reaffirming Ram Kumar Pandey, the Court sends a clear message: where the first version omits the identity of the accused, even though the informant is alleged to have that information, later naming of the accused is inherently suspect and must be scrutinized with great care.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Central issue: identity of the assailant, not the fact of homicide

The Court expressly notes that the homicidal death of the deceased is undisputed and established by the medical evidence of PW-11, Dr. A.K. Dhruw (para 25). Thus, the focus of the appeal is not whether a homicide occurred, but:

• who committed it; and
• whether the prosecution has lawfully proved that the appellant was one of the assailants.

This sharp focus on identity leads the Court to examine, in detail:

• the earliest version of events (the merg intimation and FIR);
• the later statements and in-court testimony of PW-1 and PW-2; and
• the corroborative value (if any) of the TIP and forensic evidence.

2. The FIR and the “fatal” omission (paras 31, 41, 45)

The FIR (Exh. P/2) was based entirely on PW-1’s merg intimation (Exh. P/1), which itself was based on what he was told by PW-2 immediately after the incident. Crucially:

• PW-2’s earliest account to PW-1, as reflected in Exh. P/1 and Exh. P/2, stated that:
  • two “unknown masked persons” came to the farm hut;
  • they were described only by height and build (one tall, one short and lean);
  • they carried a sickle, took the deceased out, and shortly thereafter the deceased cried out;
  • she got scared and ran away.
• There is no mention in the FIR that:
  • any mask fell off during the incident;
  • PW-2 identified one of the assailants as the appellant; or
  • she was in such a state (illness or shock) that she was incapable of naming the assailant.

The Court finds this omission decisive. It observes that PW-2 gave a detailed description of the incident (time, manner, number of assailants, their weapons, their physical features, etc.), and yet the name of the accused—someone admittedly known to her—was left out:

Relying on Ram Kumar Pandey, the Court holds that such an omission is a relevant and powerful circumstance under Section 11 of the Evidence Act, and concludes:

3. Evaluation of PW-1 and PW-2: contradictions, improvements, and hostility

(a) PW-1 (Heeralal Hidko – father of the deceased)

In his examination-in-chief, PW-1 appears to suggest that PW-2 had specifically told him on the night of the incident that “Govind and Mansingh” came with a sickle and assaulted Bivan. This version contradicts the written merg intimation (Exh. P/1) he himself lodged, which mentions only “two unknown masked persons”.

When confronted by the Public Prosecutor and declared hostile, PW-1 accepts a complex and shifting narrative:

• He admits that PW-2 had initially spoken of “two unknown masked men”.
• He then claims that, after the last rites (on 21 April 2021), PW-2 told him there were “not two but three” masked men and gave the names of the three accused.
• He concedes that at the time of lodging the merg intimation and FIR, he had mentioned only “two unknown masked men”.

The Court notes that PW-1’s testimony reveals a clear attempt to align his oral deposition with the later prosecution theory, rather than with his own earliest written version. This undermines his credibility.

(b) PW-2 (Smt. Sukmai Hidko – the alleged sole eyewitness)

PW-2’s testimony is even more problematic. The Court painstakingly contrasts:

• her earliest version (as reflected in Exh. P/1 and Exh. P/2);
• her Section 161 CrPC statement recorded on 21 April 2021; and
• her in-court deposition, much of which emerges only after she is declared hostile and is asked leading questions by the prosecutor.

Key inconsistencies include:

• Number of assailants:
  • Earliest version: two unknown masked men.
  • Later: three men (two in the hut, one near the door; all masked).
• State of PW-2:
  • FIR: no suggestion of illness; she narrates detailed facts to PW-1.
  • Later: claims she was unwell and went to sleep after informing PW-1, thus explaining the omission of names.
• Identification of the appellant:
  • Earliest version: no name, only “unknown masked persons”.
  • Later: claims one masked person called her “didi” (elder sister), she recognised his voice as that of Govind, and that his mask also fell off, enabling visual identification.
  • In cross-examination, she insists she did tell PW-1 the name of Govind on the first night, which is flatly inconsistent with Exh. P/1 and Exh. P/2.

The Court concludes (para 39) that both PW-1 and PW-2 “have attempted to modulate and improve their versions while deposing on oath” and that their testimonies are full of “embellishments and contradictions”. This seriously erodes the reliability of PW-2 as a single identifying eyewitness.

4. Prior enmity as a double-edged sword (paras 28, 40–43)

The prosecution sought to use prior enmity and motive as strengthening its case: the deceased had married PW-6, the appellant’s sister, as a second wife because PW-2 could not conceive; quarrels and community panchayat meetings occurred; PW-2 and PW-6 clashed over access to PW-6’s child; and the appellant supported his sister in these disputes.

The Court accepts that this enmity existed and was “undisputed” (para 28). However, it treats this factor as a reason for heightened caution, not conviction:

• Family enmity is a recognised ground for false implication in criminal cases.
• The belated and evolving identification of the appellant by PW-2 becomes particularly suspect against this backdrop.

Thus, instead of treating motive as corroboration, the Court sees enmity as enhancing the risk that PW-2 might have “devised” a story implicating the appellant (para 41, 43).

5. Test Identification Parade (TIP) – why it failed to assist the prosecution (paras 42–43)

TIPs are ordinarily used as investigative tools to test whether a witness who did not previously know the accused can, nonetheless, recognise the suspect from among a group of similar-looking persons. Their evidentiary value is inherently limited but can provide corroboration to in-court (“dock”) identification if conducted fairly and at the earliest opportunity.

In this case:

• PW-2 admittedly knew the appellant prior to the incident, as he is her co-wife’s brother and used to visit the family (para 30, last part; para 42).
• The prosecution’s stance is that PW-2 had already named the appellant in her statement under Section 161 CrPC on 21 April 2021.
• Yet, a TIP was conducted on 22 April 2021, where she identified him again.

The Court finds this inherently illogical:

Thus, the TIP fails to add any independent value:

• It cannot test a “memory” of an unknown face, since the appellant was already known.
• It cannot corroborate a genuinely spontaneous identification, because the Court doubts whether PW-2 had named him at all in her Section 161 statement.

The Court ultimately sees the TIP as a procedural formality that did not advance the prosecution case and may have been used to create an appearance of corroboration where the core identification itself was weak.

6. Forensic (FSL) evidence (paras 12, 47)

The FSL report (Exh. P/40) showed:

• human blood on:
  • the axe (Article C) and shoes (Article E) allegedly recovered from the appellant;
  • clothes of the co-accused; and
  • clothes of the deceased (Articles H-1 and H-2).
• However, serological testing could not determine the blood group because the samples had disintegrated; thus, the result was “inconclusive”.

The Court holds that such evidence does not help the prosecution:

• Detecting “human blood” is too generic. It does not establish:
  • that the blood is that of the deceased; or
  • that the stains were caused during the offence in question, as opposed to earlier or unrelated incidents.
• There is no clear “link evidence” showing that the seized articles remained untampered and that they were exclusively in the possession of the appellant at material times.

Accordingly, the Court characterises the recoveries and FSL report as “inconsequential” (para 21(vi), accepted at para 47): they cannot meaningfully corroborate the already-weak eyewitness account.

7. Standard of appellate review and interference with concurrent findings

Ordinarily, the Supreme Court is slow to interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court and the High Court, particularly in a criminal appeal by special leave. However, when concurrent findings rest on a fundamentally flawed appreciation of evidence or result in grave miscarriage of justice, interference is justified.

Here, the Court explicitly characterises the lower courts’ approach as involving “grave errors in facts as well as in law” (para 48), particularly:

• uncritical reliance on PW-2 despite serious contradictions and material omissions;
• failure to appreciate the legal significance of the omission of the appellant’s name in the FIR;
• over-valuation of weak forensic and TIP evidence.

Given that the identity of the assailant was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court held that the only proper course was acquittal.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Strengthening the jurisprudence on FIR omissions

This judgment consolidates and extends the principle from Ram Kumar Pandey:

• Material omissions in FIRs—especially omission of the accused’s identity when the informant allegedly had that knowledge—are not mere technical defects; they are substantive circumstances that can decisively undermine the prosecution case.
• Courts must scrutinize later statements introducing such names with considerable scepticism, particularly where there is prior enmity.

Future criminal trials, especially in homicide cases rooted in family or village disputes, are likely to see defence counsel relying heavily on Govind Mandavi whenever:

• the FIR is silent on the identity of the accused or on an alleged dying declaration; and
• subsequent statements or in-court testimony suddenly introduce names or motives.

2. Caution in relying on single eyewitness identification

The Court’s rigorous dissection of PW-2’s testimony underlines:

• that a conviction based on a sole eyewitness must rest on testimony that is inherently consistent, credible, and free from major improvements; and
• that when a sole eyewitness’s later statements conflict with the first version of the occurrence, the prosecution’s burden becomes significantly harder to discharge.

Trial courts and High Courts are, by implication, reminded not to gloss over contradictions and improvements merely because they believe the witness is “natural” or closely related to the deceased; such witnesses are not immune from bias or motive to implicate.

3. Limited probative value of TIPs and forensic evidence

• On TIPs: The judgment reinforces the principle that TIPs are:
  • only investigative aids, not substantive evidence; and
  • of little or no utility when the accused is already known to the witness or has been named prior to the parade.
• On forensic evidence: The Court reiterates that:
  • forensic results must be scientifically specific (e.g., blood-group or DNA matching) and properly linked through chain-of-custody evidence to be truly probative;
  • mere proof of “human blood” on articles seized from an accused does not, by itself, substantially advance the prosecution case.

4. Protection against wrongful conviction in enmity cases

Lastly, the decision has a systemic dimension: it serves as a safeguard against wrongful convictions arising from:

• family feuds, second marriages, and intra-village enmities; and
• subsequent efforts to “fill gaps” in the prosecution case through delayed and improved statements.

By acquitting the appellant in the face of strong suspicion but insufficient proof, the Court reasserts the fundamental criminal law principle: suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. First Information Report (FIR)

The FIR is the earliest report made to the police about the commission of a cognizable offence. It is not “substantive evidence” by itself but is important because:

• it records the first version of events, often close in time to the incident; and
• courts use it to assess consistency and detect material omissions or contradictions in later testimony.

2. “Merg intimation”

In several states (including Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh), a “merg intimation” is a preliminary report to the police that an unnatural death has occurred. It triggers an inquest and can lead to the registration of a formal FIR if an offence is suspected.

3. Section 161 CrPC statement

Under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the investigating officer may orally examine any person believed to be acquainted with the facts of the case. Statements recorded under this provision:

• are not signed by the witness and are not substantive evidence;
• can be used in court only to contradict the witness (Section 145 Evidence Act) or to test credibility (Section 155 Evidence Act).

4. Section 164 CrPC statement

Section 164 CrPC empowers a Magistrate to record confessions or statements of witnesses on oath. Such statements:

• are recorded more formally and voluntarily, with judicial oversight;
• can be used to corroborate or contradict the witness, though the in-court testimony remains the primary evidence.

5. “Hostile witness”

A witness is said to be “hostile” when, during trial, it appears that:

• he/she is not supporting the case of the party who called him/her; or
• is deliberately suppressing truth or shifting positions.

When declared hostile, the party who called the witness (e.g., the prosecution) may cross-examine that witness and put leading questions, including confronting him/her with prior statements under Section 161 or 164 CrPC.

6. Test Identification Parade (TIP)

A TIP is a pre-trial procedure where a witness is asked to identify a suspect from a lineup of similar-looking individuals. Its purposes are:

• to test whether a witness who claims to have seen an unknown offender can pick him out correctly; and
• to provide some corroboration to later in-court identification.

TIPs have limited evidentiary value and become practically pointless if:

• the witness already knew the accused; or
• the accused has already been named by the witness in earlier statements.

7. Forensic serology and blood-grouping

Serology is the study of blood and other bodily fluids. In criminal cases:

• identifying the presence of “human blood” on a weapon or clothing is only a first step;
• linking that blood specifically to the victim (through blood-grouping or DNA) gives the evidence real probative force;
• if blood-grouping cannot be done (e.g., degraded samples), the evidence is often too weak to strongly support guilt.

8. Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act – “facts not otherwise relevant”

Section 11 makes certain otherwise-irrelevant facts admissible when:

• they are inconsistent with any fact in issue or relevant fact; or
• by themselves or in connection with other facts, they make the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue highly probable or improbable.

In this case, the Court (following Ram Kumar Pandey) treats the omission of the accused’s name in the FIR as a fact under Section 11 that makes the prosecution story (that PW-2 had already identified the appellant) highly improbable.

9. Sections 302, 34 and 460 IPC; Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act

• Section 302 IPC: Punishes murder with death or life imprisonment, plus fine.
• Section 34 IPC: Deals with “common intention”; when several persons act together with a shared intention to commit a crime, each is liable as if he alone had done the act.
• Section 460 IPC: Punishes lurking house-trespass or house-breaking at night by one or more persons jointly, if any person is hurt or death is caused during the commission.
• Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act: Prescribes enhanced punishment (including life imprisonment) where an offence punishable with 10 years or more under IPC is committed against a person on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.

V. Conclusion

Govind Mandavi v. State of Chhattisgarh stands as a robust reaffirmation of several foundational principles of Indian criminal jurisprudence:

• The FIR, as the earliest version of events, carries significant evidentiary weight in assessing the credibility of later testimony. When it omits the name of the accused despite alleged prior identification, that omission can be fatal.
• Courts must treat subsequent improvements and embellishments in witness statements—especially by a sole eyewitness and particularly in enmity-laden cases—with deep scepticism.
• TIPs and forensic results have limited, contextual value and cannot shore up an inherently weak case where the core identification evidence is unreliable.
• The criminal standard of proof—beyond reasonable doubt—remains paramount; suspicion or moral conviction cannot substitute for legally admissible and credible proof.

By setting aside concurrent convictions and directing the immediate release of the appellant, the Supreme Court underscores that the criminal justice system must err on the side of caution where life and liberty are at stake. The judgment is likely to be frequently cited in future to challenge convictions anchored in delayed, improved identification evidence and to highlight the centrality of the FIR and contemporaneous narratives in serious criminal trials.