Non‑Abatement of Criminal Revisions and Victim Participation after Death of the Revisionist: A Commentary on Syed Shahnawaz Ali v. State of Madhya Pradesh

1. Introduction

The judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Syed Shahnawaz Ali v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., Criminal Appeal Nos. 5589–5590 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 1715–1716/2025), decided on 19 December 2025, addresses a long‑standing grey area in criminal procedure:

• Does a criminal revision petition abate on the death of the revisionist?
• Can legal heirs or victims of the crime continue or participate in such revision proceedings?

The Court, speaking through Manoj Misra J. (with Sanjay Karol J. concurring), lays down a structured doctrine on non‑abatement of criminal revisions and victim participation after the death of the original revisionist. The decision is rooted in a careful reading of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”), particularly Sections 394 (abatement of appeals), 397 (revisional jurisdiction), 401 (powers of revision), and the definition of “victim” in Section 2(wa). It also interfaces with the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) through Section 528 (corresponding to the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC).

On the facts, the case arises from a property dispute involving allegations of forgery and cheating. The informant (the appellant’s father), having successfully triggered registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC, challenged a discharge order by way of criminal revision. During the pendency of that revision, he died. His son, Syed Shahnawaz Ali, sought to continue the proceeding. The Madhya Pradesh High Court held that there is no provision for substitution in a criminal revision and treated the revision as abated. The Supreme Court has now reversed that approach and, in the process, clarified fundamental principles about:

• the nature of revisional jurisdiction,
• the concept of abatement in criminal proceedings, and
• the evolving role and rights of victims in the criminal justice process.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Factual Matrix

1. The appellant’s father, Shamshad Ali, filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC seeking registration of an FIR against respondents 2 to 5.
2. The application was allowed; an FIR was registered and investigated. A charge‑sheet indicted respondents 2 to 5 for offences under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120‑B and 34 of the IPC.
3. By order dated 07.03.2020, the XVII Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal:
   • discharged respondents 2 to 5 from offences under Sections 419, 467, 468, 471, 120‑B and 34 IPC, and
   • directed that the trial proceed only under Section 420 IPC.
4. Aggrieved, the informant filed Criminal Revision No. 1986 of 2020 before the High Court.
5. On 05.05.2021, the informant died. His son (the appellant), who was cited as a prosecution witness and was also an heir to the disputed property, filed an application (IA No. 19769 of 2021) to continue the revision.
6. The High Court, by order dated 21.02.2024, rejected the application, holding:
   • there is no provision for substitution in a criminal revision; and
   • consequently, the revision abated.
7. The appellant then approached the High Court by an application under Section 528 BNSS, 2023 (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC) seeking recall of the order dated 21.02.2024. This was dismissed by order dated 31.08.2024.
8. The appellant challenged both orders before the Supreme Court.

2.2 Core Issues

1. Does a criminal revision petition under Sections 397/401 CrPC abate on the death of the revisionist, particularly when the revisionist is an informant/complainant (not an accused)?
2. In the absence of a specific statutory provision for substitution in a criminal revision, can the legal heir or another victim be permitted to continue or assist in the revision proceedings?
3. What is the proper understanding of revisional powers and their relationship to the notion of abatement applicable to appeals under Section 394 CrPC?

2.3 Holding

The Supreme Court holds that:

• Criminal revisions do not automatically abate on the death of the revisionist, unlike appeals governed by Section 394 CrPC.
• Revisional courts exercise a discretionary supervisory jurisdiction; once a revision is entertained (and, in classical terminology, a “Rule” is issued), it should ordinarily be decided on merits regardless of the death of the revisionist, especially when:
  • the underlying main proceedings in the trial court continue, and
  • the revision was not at the instance of the accused in a manner that becomes infructuous on death.
• There is no statutory right of substitution in criminal revisions; however, there is also no statutory provision for abatement akin to Section 394. This leaves the High Court with discretion to:
  • continue the revision; and
  • permit an appropriate person to assist the Court in furtherance of justice.
• The definition of “victim” under Section 2(wa) CrPC can be used as a guiding standard to assess whether the person seeking to participate in or continue the revision has a genuine interest and is not a mere meddlesome interloper.
• Where the revision is at the instance of an informant or complainant, and the main proceedings survive, the revision does not abate merely because the informant dies.
• In the present case, the appellant—being the son and legal heir of the original informant and inheriting an interest in the property alleged to be affected by forged documents—is a “victim of the crime”. The revisional court ought to have allowed him to assist the Court.

2.4 Final Directions

• The Supreme Court sets aside:
  • the High Court’s order dated 21.02.2024 dismissing the revision as abated; and
  • the order dated 31.08.2024 rejecting the recall application / request to continue.
• Criminal Revision No. 1986 of 2020 is restored to the file of the High Court.
• The appellant is granted liberty to assist the revisional court in the capacity of a victim of the crime.
• The High Court is directed to decide the revision expeditiously on its own merits, uninfluenced by any observation in the Supreme Court’s judgment concerning the merits of the discharge order.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Role

3.1.1 Praban Kumar Mitra v. State Of West Bengal (Constitution Bench)

A central pillar of the Court’s reasoning is the Constitution Bench decision in Praban Kumar Mitra v. State Of West Bengal & Anr., 1958 SCC OnLine SC 79 : AIR 1959 SC 144. That case interpreted:

• Section 439 of the old CrPC, 1898 (revisional power of the High Court), which is pari materia with Section 401 CrPC, 1973, and
• Section 435 of the old Code (calling for records), corresponding to Section 397 CrPC, 1973.

The Constitution Bench laid down several foundational propositions:

1. Nature of Revisional Power: The revisional power is a discretionary power, not a vested right of the litigant. It is meant to ensure that:
   • justice is done in accordance with recognised rules of criminal jurisprudence, and
   • subordinate criminal courts do not exceed their jurisdiction or abuse their powers.
2. No Statutory Right to Revision: Unlike an appeal, which is a statutory right, a revision is essentially a supervisory mechanism of the High Court.
3. No Statutory Abatement in Revisions:
   • The old Code had Section 431 dealing with abatement of appeals, much like Section 394 in the present Code.
   • The Constitution Bench noted that no corresponding provision existed for revision petitions.
   • This was held to reflect a legislative intent to leave the handling of revisions upon the death of the petitioner to the discretion of the High Court, guided by justice rather than rigid procedures.
4. Duty of the High Court Once Revision Is Entertained:
   • When the High Court issues a Rule (i.e., formally entertains a revision and calls upon the other side to show cause), that Rule has to be heard and determined in accordance with law, irrespective of whether:
     • the petitioner is alive or dead, or
     • the petitioner is represented in court or not.
   • In hearing and deciding revisions, the High Court is discharging its statutory function of supervising the administration of criminal justice.
5. Complete Discretion Post‑Death of Petitioner:
   • The High Court has complete discretion to decide how to deal with a revision on the death of the petitioner.
   • It is neither bound to order substitution in every case, nor bound to treat the revision as abated.

The present judgment reproduces the key extract from Praban Kumar Mitra and adopts its reasoning in the context of the 1973 Code. The Supreme Court re‑affirms that:

• Appeals and revisions are not on the same footing regarding abatement and substitution; and
• the considerations applicable to the abatement of appeals under Section 394 CrPC do not mechanically apply to revision applications.

3.1.2 Honnaiah T.H. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2022)

The Court also relies on Honnaiah T.H. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1001, which addressed the question of who can maintain a revision petition. The Supreme Court in Honnaiah held:

• Revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397/401 CrPC is discretionary and can be exercised suo motu by the High Court to examine the correctness, legality, or propriety of an order passed by an inferior criminal court.
• Because the High Court can act even on its own motion, there is no absolute bar on a third party bringing to the Court’s attention that a revisional intervention is warranted.
• The locus of the revisionist is, therefore, not as strictly confined as in the case of an appeal.

Honnaiah in turn relied on:

• K. Pandurangan v. S.S.R. Velusamy & Anr., (2003) 8 SCC 625, where the Court rejected the argument that a complainant could not maintain a revision petition.
• Nadir Khan v. State (Delhi Administration), which had earlier acknowledged the broad sweep of the revisional power.

In Pandurangan, the Court emphasised:

“Under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the court has suo motu power of revision, if that be so, the question of the same being invoked at the instance of an outsider would not make any difference because ultimately it is the power of revision which is already vested with the High Court statutorily that is being exercised by the High Court.”

Drawing from these authorities, the present judgment confirms that:

• Revisional power is not tied to a narrow notion of “party” as in appeals.
• A revision may be triggered or “invited” even by persons who are not strictly parties to the proceedings below, subject to judicial control and prudence.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Supreme Court

3.2.1 Concept of Abatement in Criminal Law

The Court begins by explaining the concept of abatement using standard legal dictionaries:

• In Black’s Law Dictionary, “abatement” covers:
  • the act of eliminating or nullifying,
  • the suspension or defeat of a pending action for a reason unrelated to the merits, among other meanings.
• In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, in criminal law, abatement connotes:
  • termination of proceedings, without a decision on merits, and
  • without the assent of the prosecutor.

The Court contrasts abatement in civil proceedings and criminal proceedings:

• Civil proceedings:
  • If, on the death of a party, the right to sue or be sued does not survive against the remaining parties, the suit or appeal abates.
• Criminal proceedings:
  • The criminal trial is essentially against the offender (accused).
  • If the accused dies, the trial abates because one cannot prosecute or punish a dead person.
  Section 394 CrPC.

The Court explains Section 394 CrPC in brief:

• Appeals under Sections 377 (enhancement of sentence) or 378 (appeal in case of acquittal) abate on death of the accused.
• Other appeals (except from a sentence of fine) abate on the death of the appellant, subject to:
  • a proviso that allows near relatives of a deceased appellant (convicted and sentenced to death or imprisonment) to apply within 30 days for leave to continue the appeal.

The underlying rationale is:

• There is no point in prosecuting or executing punishment on a deceased person.
• But where a conviction stains the honour or civil consequences of a family, the law allows near relatives to clear the name of the deceased by continuing the appeal.

3.2.2 Distinction Between Appeals and Revisions

The Court then pivots to the crucial doctrinal distinction between appeals and revisions:

• An appeal is a statutory right. Its scope, availability, and abatement are determined by specific statutory provisions.
• A revision is:
  • a discretionary supervisory power of the High Court; and
  • meant to ensure legality, propriety, and regularity of orders passed by subordinate courts.

From Praban Kumar Mitra, the Court reiterates that:

• There is no statutory provision in the CrPC governing abatement or substitution in revisions, unlike Section 394 for appeals.
• This silence is deliberate; it leaves the High Court with flexibility to act in the interest of justice, case by case.
• Once a revision has been entertained, the High Court’s primary obligation is to:
  • exercise its statutory function of supervising the administration of criminal justice, and
  • examine the correctness, legality, or propriety of the impugned order.

3.2.3 When Can a Revision Be Treated as Abated or Infructuous?

Building on this doctrinal framework, the Court addresses when and why a revision may or may not continue after the death of the revisionist. It differentiates between:

1. Revisions at the instance of the accused/convict; and
2. Revisions at the instance of an informant/complainant or victim.

(A) Revisions by an accused/convict

The Court holds that where the revision is filed by an accused or a convict, the revisional court may refuse to continue the proceedings on his death, particularly in two situations:

1. Revision arises from an order passed during trial:
   • Example: An accused seeks revision against an order rejecting discharge, framing of charge, or some interlocutory order.
   • If the accused dies, the main trial itself abates.
   • Ancillary proceedings—like a revision challenging an interlocutory order during trial—would ordinarily also abate, as they have no independent existence once the main trial is extinguished.
2. Revision challenges an order of conviction or affirmance of conviction:
   • If the convicted revisionist dies, the sentence cannot be executed against a dead person.
   • In the absence of any application from a near relative for continuing the proceeding, the revisional court may legitimately treat it as having abated or become infructuous.

(B) Revisions by an informant/complainant (or victim)

In contrast, where the revision is at the instance of an informant or complainant, the Court draws an important distinction:

• The main criminal proceeding (e.g., the trial) usually continues notwithstanding the death of the informant/complainant.
• In such a scenario, the revision—seeking to test the correctness, legality, or propriety of a subordinate court’s order (such as discharge) in that ongoing trial—does not automatically abate.
• The High Court remains duty‑bound to perform its supervisory function over the subordinate criminal court.

Consequently, the Court concludes that the law of abatement that applies to appeals under Section 394 CrPC does not, by parity of reasoning, apply to revisions, particularly those filed by informants/complainants, and especially when the main trial survives.

3.2.4 Locus and the Role of the “Victim” in Revisions

Although formal locus rules are relaxed in revisions (thanks to the possibility of suo motu action), the Court is conscious of the risk that:

“the discretionary power may become a tool in the hands of those who, though have suffered no injury, have an axe to grind.”

To prevent misuse, the Court proposes a principled filter: the statutory definition of “victim” under Section 2(wa) CrPC:

“‘victim’ means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression ‘victim’ includes his or her guardian or legal heir.”

Key points in the Court’s reasoning:

• Although Section 2(wa) directly governs victim‑oriented rights (like appeal under the proviso to Section 372), its definition can serve as a guide in determining:
  • whether a person seeking to invoke or continue a revision has a legitimate stake in the outcome; and
  • whether such a person may be permitted to assist the Court.
• Thus, strict locus rules do not apply, but courts should prefer victims and persons directly aggrieved over complete strangers.
• The Court uses Section 2(wa) as a screening tool to deter “busybody” litigants from hijacking the revisional process.

3.2.5 Substitution vs. Assistance: The Court’s Nuanced Approach

A particularly important contribution of this judgment is the distinction between:

• a claimed right to be substituted as a revisionist; and
• the Court's power to permit a person to assist the Court in the revision.

The Court notes:

• There is no explicit provision in the CrPC prescribing substitution in revisions; consequently, no one can claim substitution as a matter of right.
• Equally, there is no provision for abatement of revisions akin to Section 394.

From these premises, the Court draws two conclusions:

1. Discretion to Continue the Revision:
   • Once a revision has been entertained, the revisional Court is empowered to proceed with the matter and test the impugned order, notwithstanding the death of the petitioner.
   • This flows from its statutory supervisory role, not from the rights of any particular litigant.
2. Discretion to Allow Assistance:
   • The Court may, in its discretion, permit a suitable person to assist the Court in the revision.
   • Such a person:
     • should have no conflict of interest; and
     • is preferably a victim of the crime, who has an authentic interest in ensuring correct adjudication.
   • Other victims of the same crime, as defined in Section 2(wa), may be allowed to do so.

Therefore, while the Court does not formally endorse a doctrinal “substitution” mechanism equivalent to that in civil procedure or Section 394’s proviso, it recognizes a functional equivalent: allowing legal heirs/victims to pursue and assist the revision to ensure justice.

3.2.6 Application to the Facts

Applying these principles:

• The main criminal proceedings (trial) against respondents 2 to 5 are still pending.
• The revision challenged an order of partial discharge—i.e., the dropping of serious charges like forgery (Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC) and conspiracy (Section 120‑B IPC), while retaining only Section 420 IPC.
• The revision was filed by the informant (not the accused). His death does not extinguish the main proceedings, nor the Court’s supervisory duty.
• On his death, his son (the appellant) has:
  • inherited an interest in the property allegedly affected by the forged sale deed; and
  • is therefore a “victim” within Section 2(wa) CrPC as a legal heir who has suffered loss.

Accordingly:

• The High Court’s view that the revision abated due to want of a substitution provision is legally erroneous.
• The High Court ought to have:
  • continued with the revision; and
  • allowed the appellant to assist in his capacity as a victim.

3.3 Impact and Prospective Significance

3.3.1 Clarification of Procedural Law: Revisions Do Not Automatically Abate

This judgment provides clear guidance to High Courts and Sessions Courts on a previously under‑theorised issue:

• There is no automatic abatement of criminal revisions on the death of the revisionist.
• Courts must examine:
  • who has filed the revision (accused vs. informant/complainant/victim);
  • the nature of the order challenged (interlocutory/trial‑stage vs. conviction); and
  • whether the main criminal proceedings continue to subsist.
• Only then can they decide whether:
  • the revision is rendered infructuous (e.g., where the trial itself abates), or
  • the revisional function survives and must still be discharged.

This will likely reduce situations in which High Courts, relying by analogy on Section 394, summarily treat revisions as abated on the death of the petitioner.

3.3.2 Strengthening Victim‑Centric Criminal Procedure

By explicitly using Section 2(wa) CrPC as a reference point for determining who can legitimately participate in or continue a revision, the Court:

• Reinforces the evolving jurisprudence that accords an active role to victims at various stages of the criminal process (investigation, trial, and appeal/revision).
• Makes clear that victims are not mere spectators but may:
  • question discharge or acquittal orders,
  • seek proper framing of charges,
  • and, where necessary, support the Court in revisional scrutiny.
• Ensures that the death of the original informant does not automatically silence the victim’s side, particularly where heirs or other victims continue to suffer civil or proprietary consequences of the alleged crime.

3.3.3 Guidance for Handling “Stranger” Revisions

The Court’s cautionary remarks about “complete strangers to the dispute” and persons with “an axe to grind” provide an important safeguard:

• While revisions are not bound by strict locus rules, courts must avoid allowing abuse of revisional powers by:
  • ideological busybodies,
  • commercial rivals, or
  • others with oblique motives who have suffered no genuine legal injury.
• Section 2(wa) CrPC (and its focus on “loss or injury” and inclusion of legal heirs) gives courts a structured way to filter genuine victims from interlopers.

3.3.4 Interplay with BNSS, 2023

Though the judgment primarily operates within the framework of the CrPC, it notes that the appellant moved the High Court under Section 528 BNSS, 2023, corresponding to Section 482 CrPC (inherent powers of the High Court). This has two implications:

• Even under the new statute (BNSS), the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court:
  • persists to prevent abuse of process; and
  • can be used to recall orders that rest on a misapprehension of basic procedural principles (such as wrongly assuming abatement of a revision).
• The doctrinal clarification in this judgment will likely inform the interpretation of analogous provisions in the BNSS framework as it increasingly replaces the CrPC.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 What Is a Revision, and How Is It Different from an Appeal?

• Appeal:
  • A statutory right granted by law (you can appeal only if the statute says so).
  • Lets the higher court re‑examine the case on facts and law, within the limits of the statutory scheme.
  • Abatement (ending of proceedings upon death) is explicitly regulated by Section 394 CrPC.
• Revision (Sections 397 and 401 CrPC):
  • Is not a right of the party; it is a discretionary power of the High Court (and Sessions Judge) to supervise subordinate criminal courts.
  • Focuses on:
    • legality (is the law applied correctly?),
    • propriety (is the order fair and appropriate in law?), and
    • regularity (has the proper procedure been followed?).
  • Can be exercised suo motu by the Court, even if no party files an application.
  • There is no explicit provision telling when a revision abates.

4.2 What Is “Abatement” in Criminal Cases?

“Abatement” means the termination of a case without a decision on the merits, usually because something outside the case has changed (for example, the death of a party).

• In criminal trials:
  • If the accused dies, the trial cannot continue because you cannot punish a dead person.
  • The trial therefore abates.
• In appeals:
  • Section 394 CrPC tells us when appeals abate on the death of the accused or appellant and when relatives can step in.
• In revisions:
  • There is no statutory rule saying they must abate.
  • Instead, the Court decides case‑by‑case whether the revision has become meaningless or whether it must still be decided to ensure justice.

4.3 Who Is a “Victim” Under Section 2(wa) CrPC?

Section 2(wa) defines “victim” as:

• a person who has suffered any loss or injury because of the act or omission for which the accused has been charged; and
• includes that person’s guardian or legal heir.

In practice, this includes:

• the direct person harmed (e.g., the one cheated or assaulted);
• their parents or guardians in suitable cases; and
• their legal heirs (e.g., children, spouse) if the victim has died.

In this case, the father alleged that his property was targeted through a fabricated sale deed. On his death, his son (the appellant) inherited that property interest and thus became a victim of the alleged forgery and cheating.

4.4 What Does It Mean to “Assist the Court” in a Revision?

Because no one has a “right” to be substituted as a revisionist, the Court adopts a more flexible concept: allowing a person to “assist the Court”. This means:

• The person can:
  • be heard through counsel,
  • make submissions on law and facts,
  • provide relevant documents and arguments.
• The Court retains full control over:
  • the scope and conduct of the revision; and
  • whether to accept or reject the submissions made.

In effect, “assisting the Court” grants a functional participation right to the victim or heir without overstating it as a strict procedural “substitution” right.

5. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

This judgment in Syed Shahnawaz Ali v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. significantly clarifies the law on criminal revisions and victim participation. Its key contributions may be summarised as follows:

1. No automatic abatement of criminal revisions:
   • Unlike appeals, criminal revisions have no statutory abatement rule.
   • Revisional courts must decide, in each case, whether the revision survives, based on the nature of the order and the survival of the main proceedings.
2. Distinct treatment of revisions by accused vs. informant/victim:
   • Revisions by an accused may become infructuous upon his death, especially if:
     • the main trial abates, or
     • the revision challenges conviction and no relative seeks to continue.
   • Revisions by an informant/complainant do not abate merely because he dies, particularly where the trial is ongoing.
3. Reaffirmation of the supervisory nature of revisional power:
   • Revision is a tool for the High Court to supervise the administration of criminal justice, not a private right.
   • Once a revision is entertained, the court should ordinarily decide it on merits, regardless of the petitioner’s death.
4. Victim‑centric approach to locus and participation:
   • The definition of “victim” in Section 2(wa) CrPC serves as a guiding filter for who may legitimately invoke or continue a revision, thus:
     • promoting victim rights; and
     • deterring abuse by uninterested third parties.
   • Legal heirs of the deceased victim/informant, who suffer continuing loss (e.g., property disputes), may assist the Court in revisions.
5. Functional substitute for substitution:
   • Even in the absence of a formal substitution provision, the Court may permit victims or legal heirs to assist in the revision, ensuring that justice is not thwarted by procedural gaps.

Ultimately, this decision strengthens both:

• the institutional role of High Courts in supervising criminal proceedings through revision; and
• the substantive participation rights of victims, especially where the alleged crime continues to have civil and proprietary repercussions for them or their heirs.

In doing so, it establishes a clear precedent: the death of a revisionist informant does not extinguish the High Court’s revisional duty nor the voice of the victim’s family, provided a genuine victim steps forward to assist the Court.