Non-Speaking Appellate Acquittals Are Unsustainable: Reaffirming the Duty to Give Reasoned Criminal Judgments – Commentary on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Babulal Malviya

1. Introduction

The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Babulal Malviya (Criminal Appeal No. 1706 of 2016, decided on 11 December 2025) is a significant reaffirmation of a foundational principle of adjudication: courts, particularly appellate courts, must render reasoned judgments, and non-speaking orders that overturn trial court convictions are unsustainable in law.

While the underlying substantive offence is relatively minor—an allegation under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code (voluntarily causing hurt)—the judgment is procedurally important. It squarely addresses:

• the obligation of a first appellate court in criminal cases to reappreciate evidence and record reasons, and
• the impermissibility of cryptic, one-line acquittal orders that set aside a reasoned conviction.

The High Court does not itself reassess the evidence for guilt or innocence. Instead, it focuses on the legality and adequacy of the appellate court’s process, ultimately setting aside the non-speaking acquittal and remanding the matter for fresh decision on merits with proper reasoning.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Parties and Nature of the Case

• Appellant: The State of Madhya Pradesh
• Respondent/Accused: Babulal Malviya
• Court: High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench
• Presiding Judge: Hon’ble Shri Justice Rajendra Kumar Vani

The respondent was prosecuted for an offence under Section 323 IPC, which criminalizes voluntarily causing hurt. The trial court, after appreciating the evidence, convicted him and imposed:

• Sentence: 6 months’ rigorous imprisonment
• Fine: ₹1,000 with default stipulation

The respondent/accused then filed a criminal appeal before the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal, which is the first appellate court in the criminal hierarchy for such matters.

2.2 The First Appellate Court’s Acquittal

The appellate court (Second Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal), by judgment dated 16.05.2011 in Criminal Appeal No. 49/2012, set aside the conviction and sentence and acquitted the accused. However, the crucial feature of that judgment was its extreme brevity and absence of reasoning.

The High Court reproduces the operative paragraphs (in Hindi) of the appellate court's judgment:

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Translated in substance, these paragraphs state only that:

• both parties were heard and the trial court record was perused; and
• the appeal is found fit to be accepted, so it is allowed and the conviction set aside, with the appellant acquitted.

There is no discussion of evidence, no analysis of the trial court’s reasoning, and no articulation of why the conviction was unsustainable.

2.3 The State’s Appeal to the High Court

The State challenged this acquittal before the High Court by a criminal appeal described as filed under Section 372(I) Cr.P.C. (likely meant to indicate the provision governing appeals). The State’s core grievance was not about the ultimate conclusion of acquittal per se, but about the manner in which the appellate court reached that conclusion—through a cryptic, non-speaking order.

The Public Prosecutor argued that:

• the appellate court had failed to discharge its duty as a first court of appeal;
• it did not examine or reappraise the evidence nor test the trial court’s findings; and
• its judgment was “short, cryptic and non-speaking”, thereby suffering from “perversity and illegality”.

The State sought remand of the matter to the appellate court for fresh decision on merits with proper reasons.

Notably, counsel for the respondent-accused, while opposing the appeal, fairly admitted that the appellate court had not given any reasoning for setting aside the conviction and sentence.

3. Summary of the High Court’s Judgment

The High Court allowed the State’s appeal, but only to the limited extent of setting aside the appellate court’s acquittal and remitting the appeal back to the appellate court for fresh consideration on merits, in accordance with law.

Key conclusions:

• The impugned appellate judgment is a “short, cryptic and non-speaking” order.
• No reasons have been given for disagreeing with the trial court’s reasoned conviction under Section 323 IPC.
• Such a judgment is not tenable in law and is contrary to well-settled principles laid down by the Supreme Court and various High Courts.
• It is “not expected” from a judicial officer of the appellate court to pass such an order; the High Court goes further and terms the approach of the appellate court as “condemnable”.
• The appellate court is duty-bound to reappreciate and marshal the evidence, test the reasoning of the trial court, and record its own reasons, however brief.

On these grounds, the High Court:

• Set aside the impugned appellate judgment dated 16.05.2011.
• Remitted the matter to the appellate court to decide the appeal afresh on merits, in accordance with law.
• Disposed of the State’s criminal appeal with these directions.

Importantly, the High Court did not pronounce upon the guilt or innocence of the respondent. It intervened solely on the issue of procedural legality and adequacy of reasoning.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Central Legal Issue: Are Non-Speaking Appellate Acquittals Sustainable?

The central legal question in this case is:

Whether a first appellate court in a criminal case can lawfully set aside a reasoned conviction and acquit the accused by a non-speaking, cryptic order that does not discuss evidence or give reasons?

The High Court’s clear answer is no. It reaffirms that:

• an appellate court must decide appeals on merits, not mechanically;
• it must examine and cross-check the trial court’s reasoning against the evidence on record; and
• it must record reasons for affirming or overturning the conclusions of the trial court, especially when it is setting aside a conviction.

4.2 Precedents and Authorities Cited

The High Court’s reasoning is deeply rooted in a line of precedents from the Supreme Court and High Courts that have consistently emphasized the necessity of reasoned orders.

4.2.1 Bani Singh & Others v. State of U.P. (1996) 4 SCC 720

In Bani Singh, the Supreme Court held that the appellate court must dispose of criminal appeals on merits. It cannot simply:

• dismiss an appeal for default, or
• confine itself to a superficial perusal of the trial court judgment.

The High Court quotes and relies on the principle that the appellate court is required to:

“…dispose of the appeal on merits, not merely by perusing the reasoning of the trial court in the judgment, but by cross-checking the reasonings with the evidence on record with a view to satisfying itself that the reasoning and findings recorded by the trial court are consistent with the material on record.”

This directly undermines the approach of the appellate court in Babulal Malviya, which did not demonstrate any such cross-checking or reappreciation.

4.2.2 State Of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal & Others (2004) 5 SCC 573

In Sohan Lal, the Supreme Court reiterated that:

“Giving of reason for a decision is an essential attribute of judicial and judicious disposal of a matter before courts… It is the only indication to know about the manner and quality of exercise undertaken, as also the fact that the court concerned had really applied its mind.”

The High Court uses Sohan Lal to stress that reasons are the proof of application of mind. An order that lacks reasons raises doubt about whether the court truly engaged with the case.

4.2.3 CCT v. Shukla & Bros. (2010) 4 SCC 785

The High Court extensively quotes from CCT v. Shukla & Bros., as referred to in State of Project Director, UP Education for All Projects Board v. Saroj Maurya & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 3465 of 2023).

Key observations (emphasized by the High Court) include:

• Right to know reasons:
  

  “A litigant has a legitimate expectation of knowing reasons for rejection of his claim/prayer. It is then alone, that a party would be in a position to challenge the order on appropriate grounds…”

• Reasons as life of law:
  

  “Reason is the very life of law… Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty… Absence of reasons… introduces an element of uncertainty, dissatisfaction…”

• Judge-made law mandating reasons:
  Though there may not be express statutory provisions in every context, “courts and tribunals are required to pass reasoned judgments/orders.” The practice and jurisprudence have made reasoned judgments an “indispensable part of basic rule of law.”
• Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice:
  Citing Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd., the judgment underscores that:

  “Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice… Reasons are the real live links to the administration of justice.”

These propositions directly support the High Court’s conclusion that a cryptic appellate acquittal is contrary to the rule of law and natural justice.

4.2.4 State Of Rajasthan v. Rajendra Prasad Jain (2008) 15 SCC 711

This case, referred to via an Allahabad High Court decision, contains the now famous formulation:

“Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion, and without the same it becomes lifeless.”

The High Court, echoing this, stresses that an order without reasons is a mere conclusion devoid of legal vitality.

4.2.5 M/S Namo Narayan Singh v. State Of U.P. & Ors., Writ Tax No. 1476 of 2022 (Allahabad High Court)

The Allahabad High Court, in Namo Narayan Singh, emphasized:

• Providing reasons is of the essence of judicial proceedings.
• Litigants are entitled to know why their prayers are accepted or rejected.
• Reasons make the right of appeal meaningful.
• Non-recording of reasons is violative of principles of natural justice and may indicate whimsical exercise of judicial discretion.

The High Court in Babulal Malviya imports these general principles into the criminal appellate context, reinforcing that the need for reasons is not confined to civil or tax matters.

4.2.6 State Project Director, UP Education for All Projects Board v. Saroj Maurya & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 3465 of 2023)

In Saroj Maurya, the Supreme Court set aside an unreasoned judgment of the High Court and remanded the matter because:

“in the absence of any reasoning in the impugned judgment, the same cannot be sustained.”

This directly parallels the situation in Babulal Malviya, where the High Court finds the unreasoned acquittal unsustainable and orders remand.

4.2.7 Other References: Aman Sinha v. State of U.P. & Ors. and allied precedents

The High Court also notes that Bani Singh has been followed in:

• Aman Sinha v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2024) 6 ILRA 12 (Allahabad High Court), reaffirming the requirement of deciding appeals on merits with reasons.

Collectively, these authorities form a strong and consistent jurisprudential base that the High Court deploys to invalidate the non-speaking acquittal.

4.3 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The High Court’s reasoning proceeds through several interconnected steps:

4.3.1 Duty of the First Appellate Court in Criminal Matters

A first appellate court in a criminal case has:

• a statutory duty to hear and decide the appeal; and
• a judicial duty to:
  • reappreciate the evidence,
  • examine the trial court’s reasoning, and
  • record its own reasons for affirming or reversing the findings.

Where the result is an acquittal that sets aside a conviction, this duty is particularly stringent, because:

• the trial court has already found the accused guilty after a detailed evaluation;
• overturning that conviction has serious implications for the victim’s rights and societal interest in prosecution of crime; and
• the appellate court must demonstrate that it has applied its mind to the entire record, not merely substituted a conclusion.

4.3.2 Necessity of Reasons as Part of Natural Justice and Rule of Law

The High Court synthesizes the cited precedents into a clear doctrinal stance:

• Reasons are an essential attribute of judicial decision-making.
• They:
  • show that the court has applied its mind,
  • enable the parties to understand the basis of the decision,
  • make the right of appeal effective, and
  • permit higher courts to exercise oversight.
• Absence of reasons:
  • undermines transparency and fairness,
  • may amount to a denial of justice, and
  • renders the order susceptible to being struck down as arbitrary or perverse.

Even if the law does not always expressly require reasons in each statutory provision, judge-made law and judicial practice have elevated the requirement to a component of the rule of law and natural justice.

4.3.3 Application to the Impugned Appellate Judgment

Comparing the law with the facts:

• The trial court’s judgment was reasoned—it discussed evidence and factual aspects, and concluded that the respondent was guilty under Section 323 IPC.
• The appellate court’s judgment:
  • merely states that both parties were heard and the record was seen;
  • declares the appeal “fit to be accepted” without explaining why;
  • sets aside the conviction and acquits the accused in a single line of conclusion; and
  • contains no discussion of evidence, no identification of any error in the trial court’s reasoning, and no legal analysis.

The High Court finds this approach clearly contrary to the settled legal principles. In a strongly worded passage, it observes that:

• it is “not expected from a Judicial Officer of the appellate Court” to pass such an order; and
• the appellate court’s approach is “condemnable”.

Thus, the High Court concludes that the impugned appellate judgment:

• is not tenable in law;
• cannot be said to be lawful for want of reasons; and
• must be set aside, with the matter remitted to the appellate court for fresh decision in accordance with law.

4.3.4 Choice of Remedy: Remand Instead of Substituting Its Own View

An important aspect is the High Court’s choice not to itself reappreciate the evidence and decide guilt or innocence, but instead to:

• set aside the unreasoned appellate judgment, and
• remand the matter to the same level of appellate court to decide afresh.

This choice reflects:

• respect for the hierarchical role of the first appellate court;
• a recognition that the deficiency was procedural (non-speaking order) rather than a specific error of substantive assessment that the High Court chose to correct directly; and
• adherence to the pattern in Saroj Maurya and similar cases, where unreasoned orders are set aside and remitted.

4.4 Impact and Prospective Significance

4.4.1 Strengthening the Culture of Reasoned Decision-Making

This judgment sends a firm message to subordinate courts, especially first appellate courts in criminal matters:

• Non-speaking or cryptic judgments will not be tolerated.
• Even in relatively minor or routine cases (such as under Section 323 IPC), the requirement of reasons remains fully applicable.
• Judicial officers must:
  • record at least brief but intelligible reasons,
  • engage with the trial court’s reasoning, and
  • demonstrate application of mind to the evidence.

4.4.2 Implications for Criminal Appeals and Acquittals

In the broader criminal law context:

• The decision underscores that the “benefit of doubt” or presumption of innocence does not justify unreasoned acquittals. The presumption must be applied through reasoned analysis.
• Where trial courts have convicted on the basis of evidence, any appellate acquittal must:
  • pinpoint specific flaws or infirmities in the evidence or reasoning, and
  • explain why the conviction cannot stand.
• The judgment may embolden the State (and victims where statutorily entitled) to challenge unreasoned or perfunctory acquittals more vigorously.

4.4.3 Practical Impact on Judicial Workload and Drafting Standards

On the practical side:

• Judges may feel pressed to devote sufficient time to drafting even in seemingly straightforward appeals.
• However, the courts and precedents cited acknowledge that reasons can be brief but must be present; what is condemned is not brevity but complete absence of reasons.
• Standardized templates or structured formats for judgment-writing in appellate courts may evolve or be reinforced, ensuring that:
  • facts are briefly noted,
  • issues are framed,
  • evidence is discussed in outline, and
  • conclusions are reasoned.

4.4.4 Alignment with Constitutional and Administrative Law Principles

Though this is a criminal case, the decision aligns criminal adjudication with the broader constitutional requirement of non-arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution. An unreasoned order is inherently suspect from the standpoint of:

• transparency,
• fairness, and
• non-arbitrariness.

The High Court’s insistence on reasons resonates with:

• administrative law principles, where reasoned orders are integral to “speaking orders” culture; and
• constitutional jurisprudence which treats reasoned decisions as part of the basic framework of the rule of law.

5. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

5.1 “Reasoned Judgment” and “Non-Speaking Order”

• Reasoned Judgment:
  A judgment that:
  • sets out the relevant facts,
  • identifies the issues,
  • summarizes the evidence and arguments, and
  • explains why the court reaches its conclusion.
  The reasons may be concise but must be clear and show application of mind.
• Non-Speaking (or Unreasoned) Order:
  An order that just states the conclusion (e.g., “appeal allowed” / “petition dismissed”) without disclosing the reasoning or basis. Such orders are generally disfavoured, and in many contexts, held to be illegal or unsustainable.

5.2 “Perverse” or “Perversity” in Judicial Review

When courts describe a judgment as “perverse,” they typically mean:

• it is so unreasonable that no sensible person acting judicially could have reached that conclusion on the evidence; or
• material evidence has been ignored, or irrelevant factors taken into account; or
• findings are not supported by any reasoning or evidence.

In Babulal Malviya, the High Court uses terms like “perversity and illegality” to describe the non-speaking nature of the appellate judgment, not necessarily the substantive outcome of acquittal, which still awaits proper reconsideration.

5.3 “Natural Justice” and the Right to Reasons

“Natural justice” refers to basic procedural fairness, which usually includes:

• Audi alteram partem – the right to be heard; and
• Nemo judex in causa sua – no one should be a judge in their own cause (impartial decision-maker).

Modern jurisprudence increasingly treats the right to a reasoned decision as a component of natural justice because:

• without reasons, a party cannot know whether they have truly been heard;
• they cannot effectively challenge the decision on appeal or review; and
• lack of reasons increases the risk of arbitrariness.

5.4 “Remand”

To “remand” a case means:

• the superior court sends the case back to the lower court for:
  • fresh decision, or
  • further proceedings,
• usually after setting aside the defective or illegal order.

In this case, the High Court does not decide the criminal appeal itself but remands the matter to the appellate court to:

• re-hear the appeal,
• reappreciate the evidence, and
• pass a fresh, reasoned judgment.

6. Overall Assessment and Commentary

From a doctrinal perspective, State of M.P. v. Babulal Malviya does not break new ground. Instead, it operates as a strong reaffirmation and local reinforcement of settled Supreme Court jurisprudence on the necessity of reasoned judgments and the duty of appellate courts.

What makes the decision noteworthy is:

• the unequivocal language in which the High Court condemns the non-speaking acquittal;
• its insistence that even minor criminal cases warrant proper judicial reasoning; and
• its role as a binding precedent for trial and appellate courts within Madhya Pradesh, reinforcing national standards at the state level.

The judgment indirectly protects not only the interests of the State and victims but also the integrity of the criminal justice process. Reasoned judgments:

• help ensure that convictions are not arbitrarily overturned, and
• simultaneously protect accused persons by requiring courts to justify any conviction with reference to legally admissible evidence and correct principles.

7. Conclusion

The decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Babulal Malviya can be encapsulated in one core proposition:

An appellate court cannot lawfully set aside a reasoned conviction and acquit an accused by a short, cryptic, non-speaking order; such an acquittal is unsustainable and liable to be set aside, with the matter remanded for fresh decision on merits with proper reasons.

The High Court leverages an impressive line of authorities—Bani Singh, Sohan Lal, Shukla & Bros., Rajendra Prasad Jain, Saroj Maurya, Namo Narayan Singh, and Aman Sinha—to reaffirm that:

• reasons are the “heartbeat” and “life of law” behind every judicial conclusion;
• their absence can amount to a denial of justice; and
• the recording of reasons is an indispensable feature of the rule of law and the administration of justice.

In doing so, the judgment fortifies the obligation of criminal appellate courts in Madhya Pradesh to engage seriously and transparently with the evidence and reasoning of trial courts and to produce judgments that are not only correct in result but also justifiable in process. It will likely serve as a frequently cited authority whenever non-speaking or perfunctory appellate orders are challenged, thereby contributing to a more robust and reasoned criminal justice system.