Non-Implementation of Earlier Government Schemes Is No Ground to Restrain New Public Utility Projects: Commentary on Mahesh Garg v. State of Madhya Pradesh

1. Introduction

The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Indore in Mahesh Garg v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (W.P. No. 38893 of 2025, decided on 28 November 2025) addresses an increasingly common tension in public law: citizens invoking public interest litigation (PIL) to challenge large-scale infrastructure schemes, versus the State’s need to undertake long‑term planning based on expert inputs and evolving demographic realities.

The petitioner, claiming to be a social worker, approached the Court under the PIL jurisdiction seeking quashing of:

• Resolution dated 07.10.2023 of the Indore Municipal Corporation; and
• Resolution dated 14.09.2023 of the Mayor-in-Council,

by which a Detailed Project Report (DPR) under the Central Government’s AMRUT 2.0 scheme had been approved for the supply of fresh water to the city of Indore.

The core grievance was:

• AMRUT 1.0 (formulated in 2011) had allegedly not been fully implemented; and therefore
• launching AMRUT 2.0, and incurring further financial burden on the public exchequer, was said to be unwarranted and illegal.

A Division Bench comprising the Hon’ble Chief Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva and Hon’ble Justice Vinay Saraf dismissed the petition at the threshold, refusing to interfere with the policy decision to implement AMRUT 2.0 in Indore.

While the order is concise, it crystallizes and reaffirms an important legal principle: the non‑implementation or incomplete implementation of an earlier governmental scheme is, by itself, no legal bar to formulating and implementing a new or improved public utility scheme, especially when driven by expert assessment of present and future needs.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Parties and Relief Sought:

The petitioner, Mahesh Garg, filed a PIL seeking quashing of municipal and Mayor-in-Council resolutions approving a DPR under AMRUT 2.0 for augmentation of fresh water supply in Indore. The respondents were the State of Madhya Pradesh and its authorities, including the Indore Municipal Corporation.

Petitioner’s Case:

• AMRUT 1.0, formulated in 2011, had not yet been completely implemented.
• Despite incomplete implementation of AMRUT 1.0, the authorities had initiated AMRUT 2.0, leading to an additional burden on the public exchequer.
• On this basis, the petitioner sought to halt the new scheme (AMRUT 2.0) and its DPR.

Key Factual Foundations Acknowledged by the Court:

• In 2011, the population of Indore was about 19.64 lakhs.
• Subsequently, 29 villages were added to Indore Municipal Corporation limits, increasing population to nearly 22 lakhs and expanding the city’s area by about 280 sq. km.
• The DPR under AMRUT 2.0 projected that by 2050, the population could exceed 82 lakhs, necessitating substantial enhancement in drinking water supply.
• Existing water supply was 323 million litres per day (MLD) with a deficit of 97.67 MLD.
• The proposed project aimed to ultimately increase water supply to 1650 MLD.
• Counsel for the petitioner “fairly conceded” that water supply in the city was inadequate.

Court’s Core Findings:

1. No bar on formulating new schemes despite incomplete earlier scheme:
   The Court held that the fact that AMRUT 1.0 had not been fully implemented is not a valid ground to restrain the State Government or Municipal Corporation from formulating a subsequent or improved scheme, especially after a passage of 14 years and significant demographic and spatial changes.
2. Deference to expert bodies and policy-making:
   The Court emphasized that schemes like AMRUT 2.0 are conceived and prepared by expert bodies comprising town planners, engineers, and other technical experts. Decisions taken on such expert assessments and projections, especially to meet essential needs like drinking water, are entitled to judicial deference.
3. Financial burden on exchequer not a standalone ground:
   The Court rejected the contention that mere financial burden on the exchequer can be a reason to refuse or prevent implementation of a scheme that is designed to provide adequate drinking water to residents, both for present and future needs.
4. PIL not to be used to obstruct beneficial infrastructure projects:
   Without any allegation of illegality, mala fides, arbitrariness, or violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, a PIL cannot be used to stall infrastructure schemes which are aimed at addressing genuine scarcity and future demand.

On these bases, the Court declined to entertain the PIL and dismissed the writ petition.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents and Jurisprudential Background

The order itself does not expressly cite any earlier judicial decisions. Nonetheless, its reasoning sits squarely within a well‑developed body of Indian constitutional and administrative jurisprudence. The following strands are particularly relevant:

(a) Limited Judicial Review of Policy and Economic Decisions

The Supreme Court of India has repeatedly held that courts will not sit in appeal over the wisdom or technical merits of policy and economic decisions, unless such decisions are:

• arbitrary, irrational, or mala fide;
• in violation of constitutional provisions; or
• in contravention of statutory mandates.

Key authorities include:

• BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333 – where the Supreme Court held that economic policies are best left to the wisdom of the executive; courts will not interfere unless the policy is patently arbitrary or unconstitutional.
• Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664 – concerning a large dam project, the Court emphasized that complex technical matters involving ecological, economic and engineering considerations are primarily for experts and policy-makers, and judicial review is limited to examining legality, not merits.

Although not cited in the judgment, the High Court’s approach — recognizing that AMRUT 2.0 was formulated by “town planners and other engineers and experts” and refusing to supplant their assessment — is fully consistent with this line of authority.

(b) PIL and its Proper Limits

Public Interest Litigation has evolved as a powerful tool for vindicating collective rights and enforcing constitutional and statutory duties. However, the Supreme Court has also warned against:

• “Publicity interest” or “private interest” litigations masquerading as PILs;
• Using PIL to obstruct legitimate development projects without substantive legal grounds; and
• Courts acting as super-administrators or supralegislatures in policy matters.

In cases such as State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal, (2010) 3 SCC 402, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines that PILs should be entertained only where there is a genuine public cause and clear legal basis. Although Mahesh Garg does not quote these guidelines, the very brevity of the order and its refusal to embark on an elaborate inquiry into policy merits reflect judicial restraint consistent with the modern, disciplined approach to PIL.

(c) Judicial Deference to Technical Expertise

The Court’s reference to “expert bodies comprising of the town planners and other engineers and experts” echoes a long-standing recognition that judges should be cautious in substituting their views for those of technical experts. The Supreme Court in A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu, (1999) 2 SCC 718, for instance, highlighted the limits of judicial expertise in scientific and technical matters and emphasized the importance of expert bodies in decision-making.

By emphasizing that the scheme itself “stipulates that there is a requirement of enhanced water supply” based on population and area growth, the Bench signals that courts will defer to such expert-based projections unless there is clear evidence of illegality or arbitrariness.

(d) Right to Water and State’s Positive Obligations

While the order does not explicitly invoke constitutional provisions, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized access to safe drinking water as part of the fundamental right to life under Article 21. Notable decisions include:

• Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 598 – which held that the right to life includes the right to enjoyment of pollution‑free water and air.
• A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu (supra) – which underscored the importance of protecting water resources and ensuring safe water supplies.

Against this constitutional backdrop, the High Court’s observation that a scheme meant to provide “adequate drinking water supply to the residents of the city keeping in view the present as well as future requirement” cannot be stopped merely on account of financial burden aligns with the understanding of drinking water as a core public necessity tied to fundamental rights.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

The Court’s reasoning, though succinct, may be unpacked under several key themes.

(a) Temporal Context and Evolving Needs

A crucial factual feature is the passage of time:

• AMRUT 1.0 was formulated in 2011.
• The impugned resolutions under AMRUT 2.0 were passed in 2023.
• By the time of the judgment (2025), 14 years had elapsed from the initial scheme.

The Bench highlights:

“Admittedly, the earlier scheme was formulated in the year 2011, however, 14 years have been passed since then. The experience of the State Government as well as Municipal Corporation in the last 14 years have necessitated formulation of a fresh scheme to elevate [read: alleviate] the problem of shortage of water supply in the city.”

This underscores a key administrative law principle: policy must be allowed to evolve with time, in response to practical experience and changing ground realities. A scheme designed for the circumstances of 2011 cannot be frozen as the only blueprint in 2025, particularly where:

• Population has increased significantly (from 19.64 lakhs to ~22 lakhs, with further growth projected to 82+ lakhs by 2050);
• The municipal area has expanded substantially (+280 sq. km); and
• Existing water supply is already inadequate with a recognized deficit.

Thus, the argument that “AMRUT 1.0 is not fully implemented, hence no new scheme can be launched” is rejected as conceptually flawed and inconsistent with rational planning.

(b) Incomplete Implementation ≠ Legal Embargo

The central doctrinal takeaway is encapsulated in the following passage:

“Merely because an earlier scheme has not been fully implemented is no ground to prevent the State Government and the Municipal Corporation from formulating better schemes keeping in view the future requirement.”

In other words:

• There is no legal principle that mandates full or perfect implementation of an earlier scheme as a precondition to adopting a new one.
• On the contrary, governments are obliged to adapt, upgrade, or even replace existing policies where experience shows that the earlier design was inadequate or that needs have changed.
• A PIL cannot insist that the State be “locked into” an older scheme to the exclusion of new, more comprehensive or updated projects.

This is especially significant in infrastructure and urban planning, where:

• Population growth;
• Urban expansion; and
• Technological and financial factors

are all in flux. The judgment therefore articulates a clear presumption in favour of allowing policy evolution in such sectors, barring evidence of legal infirmity.

(c) Deference to Expert Assessment

The Court stresses:

“The schemes which are proposed are formulated by expert bodies comprising of the town planners and other engineers and experts. The scheme itself stipulates that there is a requirement of enhanced water supply keeping in view the increase in population as well as the municipal area of the city of Indore.”

This embodies two propositions:

1. Presumption of rationality: Expert‑driven schemes, especially those based on empirical projections and demand‑supply analyses, carry a presumption of rationality. Courts will not substitute their own views on what is technically optimal or fiscally ideal.
2. Judicial self‑restraint in technical matters: The Court acknowledges institutional limitations: judges are not planners or engineers and must defer to the specialized knowledge of these disciplines unless there is a clear breach of law.

In the absence of any allegation that the projections in the DPR are false, mala fide, or arbitrary, the petitioner’s generalized grievance about “extra burden” cannot overcome this presumption.

(d) Concession of Inadequate Water Supply

The fact that the petitioner’s counsel “fairly concedes that the water supply in the city is inadequate” is crucial. Once this factual concession is recorded:

• the basic predicate of the scheme (that there is water scarcity and a current deficit) stands admitted;
• the Court’s focus naturally shifts to whether there is any legal infirmity in the State’s attempt to address that deficit.

In such circumstances, it becomes even more untenable to argue that a relief‑oriented scheme, aimed at alleviating an admitted deficiency in an essential service, should be quashed merely because it follows an earlier, partly implemented scheme.

(e) Financial Burden Argument Rejected

The Court squarely addresses the contention that AMRUT 2.0 would impose an “extra burden” on the public exchequer:

“Merely because the scheme is going to place a financial burden on the exchequer, is no ground to refuse implementation of a new scheme particularly when it pertains to providing adequate drinking water supply…”

This reflects a nuanced understanding:

• Every large public infrastructure project entails substantial expenditure; financial burden is intrinsic to such schemes.
• The Constitution entrusts budgetary prioritization and allocation of funds to the elected branches and their financial experts, not to courts.
• Courts may intervene where public money is being squandered through fraud, corruption, arbitrariness, or ultra vires actions, but not merely because a project is “expensive.”

In embracing this stance, the Bench reaffirms a core tenet of separation of powers: judicial review scrutinizes legality, not the economic wisdom of State expenditure.

3.3 Impact and Future Implications

(a) Clarifying the Law on Successive Schemes

This decision adds clarity to an often‑raised argument in public law challenges: that a government is restrained from introducing a new scheme until an earlier scheme is fully, perfectly, or uniformly implemented. The High Court firmly rejects such a proposition:

• It recognizes that schemes can coexist, overlap, or be phased out in favour of better designed initiatives.
• It implicitly accepts that long‑term development programs will often require recalibration as data and projections change.

For future litigation, this judgment will serve as a persuasive precedent (at least within the jurisdiction of the Madhya Pradesh High Court) that:

“Incomplete implementation of an earlier scheme, without more, cannot be a standalone ground for invalidating or restraining a subsequent, enhanced public utility scheme.”

(b) PILs Challenging Infrastructure and Urban Planning Projects

The case will likely influence how courts treat PILs targeting:

• Urban planning initiatives;
• Water supply and sanitation projects;
• Transport, housing, and similar large-scale schemes.

Petitioners will now find it more difficult to secure relief if:

• They rely solely on cost arguments (“too expensive”, “burden on exchequer”); or
• They rely solely on the alleged non‑implementation of prior schemes; and
• They do not demonstrate:
  • violation of statutory or constitutional provisions;
  • procedural illegality (e.g., absence of mandatory clearances);
  • mala fides or manifest arbitrariness; or
  • serious environmental or fundamental rights violations.

Courts may increasingly adopt the Mahesh Garg template: take note of expert projections, confirm the existence of genuine public need (e.g., acknowledged water scarcity), and decline to engage in second‑guessing technical or fiscal decisions absent clear illegality.

(c) Strengthening Executive Space for Long-Term Planning

Urbanization in India has accelerated, with medium and large cities, such as Indore, facing intense pressure on:

• water supply;
• sewerage and sanitation;
• public transport; and
• housing and civic amenities.

By recognizing the State’s prerogative to design and redesign schemes in response to population growth and territorial expansion, this judgment:

• gives municipal bodies and State governments greater confidence in undertaking revised or expanded projects;
• signals that courts are unlikely to halt such projects solely because a previous plan is pending or incomplete;
• emphasizes that long-term planning up to 2050 and beyond is a legitimate exercise of executive and municipal functions.

(d) Substantive Right to Water and Policy Support

The acknowledgement that residents’ water needs, both present and projected, justify major investments reinforces the substantive importance of the right to water. Legislatures and executives can rely on this jurisprudence to justify prioritization of water supply infrastructure in budgetary and policy decisions, even if these entail significant capital expenditures and long gestation periods.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

For readers without a legal background, the following concepts are central to understanding the judgment:

4.1 Public Interest Litigation (PIL)

A Public Interest Litigation is a special type of court case where a person (often a public‑spirited individual or organization) approaches the court not for personal benefit, but to protect a larger public interest. In India, PILs have been instrumental in:

• environmental protection;
• rights of marginalized communities;
• ensuring government accountability.

However, courts have imposed limits to ensure PIL is not misused to:

• settle private scores;
• gain publicity; or
• obstruct legitimate governance and development without solid legal grounds.

4.2 AMRUT 1.0 and AMRUT 2.0

AMRUT stands for Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation, a national programme aimed at improving urban infrastructure, especially:

• water supply;
• sewerage and septage management;
• storm water drainage;
• urban transport and green spaces.

AMRUT 1.0 was an initial phase; AMRUT 2.0 is a subsequent phase/iteration, often broader and more ambitious, intended to:

• strengthen earlier efforts;
• cover new areas or populations; and
• incorporate lessons learned from the first phase.

4.3 Detailed Project Report (DPR)

A Detailed Project Report is a technical and financial blueprint of a proposed project. For a water supply project, a DPR typically includes:

• current and projected population;
• existing water sources and supply capacities;
• current deficit and future demand forecasts;
• proposed infrastructure (treatment plants, pipelines, reservoirs etc.); and
• estimated cost, funding patterns and implementation timelines.

Municipal and mayoral resolutions approving a DPR signify formal adoption of that project concept and authorization to move forward, often to secure funding and commence execution.

4.4 “Burden on the Exchequer”

The exchequer refers to the public treasury — essentially, the government’s financial resources. A burden on the exchequer means that a project will require significant public funding, whether through:

• tax revenues;
• grants from higher levels of government; or
• loans and other financial instruments.

Courts will intervene in financial matters only where:

• the expenditure is unauthorized by law;
• there is clear evidence of corruption or blatant waste; or
• constitutional or statutory limits (like fiscal responsibility laws) are breached.

4.5 Separation of Powers and Judicial Deference

India follows the principle of separation of powers among the:

• Legislature – which makes laws and budgets;
• Executive – which implements laws and policies; and
• Judiciary – which interprets laws and reviews executive and legislative actions for legality.

When the Court talks about schemes being formulated by “experts” and refuses to interfere, it is practicing judicial deference — recognizing that certain decisions (especially technical and policy decisions) are best taken by the executive and its experts, provided they act within the bounds of law.

5. Conclusion

The judgment in Mahesh Garg v. State of Madhya Pradesh is a short but significant reaffirmation of fundamental principles of Indian public law:

• Dynamic Policy-Making Permissible: Governments are not legally bound to complete earlier schemes as a precondition to conceiving new or improved ones. In sectors like water supply, where needs grow and data evolves, successive and overlapping schemes are legitimate.
• Expert-Driven Schemes Entitled to Deference: Courts will generally not second‑guess the technical judgments of planners and engineers regarding population projections, water demand, or infrastructure design, absent clear illegality.
• PIL Has Limits: PIL cannot be used as a blunt instrument to block large public utility projects based purely on cost concerns or incomplete earlier schemes, especially when the project aims to remedy an acknowledged deficiency in essential services.
• Financial Burden Alone is Insufficient Ground: The mere fact that a scheme is expensive or imposes a burden on the exchequer does not, by itself, justify judicial intervention, particularly where the scheme serves core public necessities like drinking water.

In the broader landscape of Indian administrative and constitutional law, this decision reinforces a balanced approach: it protects the space for informed executive decision‑making in infrastructure and urban planning, while implicitly affirming the importance of essential services like water supply as matters of high public priority. Future litigants challenging similar schemes will need to show more than generalized skepticism about cost or timing; they will have to establish concrete legal infirmities to persuade courts to intervene.