Non-Consummation, Denial of Conjugal Relations and Post-Decree Remarriage: Mental Cruelty and Appellate Restraint in Shikha Kumari v. Ravikant Ravi

I. Introduction

The Delhi High Court’s decision in Shikha Kumari v. Ravikant Ravi, 2025 DHC 10908-DB (decided on 06.12.2025), is a significant addition to Indian matrimonial jurisprudence, particularly on three interlinked themes:

The treatment of non-consummation and wilful, persistent denial of conjugal relations as mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”);
The limited scope of appellate interference with Family Court findings in matrimonial disputes; and
The irrelevance of post-decree remarriage to the legality of a divorce decree, in the light of Section 15 HMA and Supreme Court precedents.

The appeal was filed by the wife (Appellant) challenging a decree of divorce granted in favour of the husband (Respondent) by the Family Court on the ground of cruelty. The High Court (Division Bench of Anil Kshetarpal, J. and Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, J.) dismissed the appeal, endorsed the Family Court’s reasoning, and clarified several legal propositions relevant to future matrimonial litigation.

II. Background and Factual Matrix

The essential facts, largely undisputed in terms of chronology though heavily contested in terms of characterization, are as follows:

The parties married on 06.05.2017 in District Rohtas, Bihar, according to Hindu rites.
They cohabited only for a very short period — about 40 days — and have been living separately since 26.06.2017.
The husband’s case:
- The marriage remained unconsummated from inception.
- The wife showed a reluctance towards physical intimacy and household responsibilities, repeatedly refusing sexual relations on the pretext of illness, tiredness or depression.
- She allegedly threatened to file false criminal cases (including allegations of rape or abetment to suicide) if he insisted on conjugal relations or her return to the matrimonial home.
- She insulted him and his parents, made monetary demands, and on 26.06.2017 left the matrimonial home, ostensibly to meet her father, never to return despite repeated efforts.
- A legal notice dated 22.04.2018 seeking annulment/divorce elicited no response, and he then filed a divorce petition (HMA No. 1684/2018) on 17.07.2018.
The wife’s case:
- She was willing to cohabit and discharge her marital and conjugal duties.
- The husband and his family allegedly treated her with neglect and indifference, creating an unsafe, humiliating environment.
- They allegedly made dowry and monetary demands, and ill-treated her when she did not comply.
- The allegations of non-consummation, refusal of cohabitation, and threats of false cases were termed as fabrications to avoid the husband’s own obligations.

The Family Court framed issues including whether the wife had subjected the husband to cruelty within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) HMA. On appreciation of oral testimony, documentary and electronic evidence, and keeping in view the parties’ separation since June 2017, the Court found mental cruelty proved and dissolved the marriage.

III. Issues Before the High Court

On appeal, the Delhi High Court had to determine, primarily:

Whether the Family Court’s finding that the marriage was not consummated and that the wife’s conduct amounted to mental cruelty was legally and factually sustainable.
Whether the Family Court had over-relied on the wife’s use of the expression “almost consummated” in her written statement, thereby misconstruing her pleadings.
Whether the electronic evidence (emails, WhatsApp chats, CD) was unreliable because:
- Only partial chats were filed;
- No transcription or playing of the audio/video took place; and
- The husband allegedly cherry-picked favourable material.
Whether, in view of Section 23(1)(a) HMA, the husband was trying to “take advantage of his own wrong”, so as to be disentitled to relief, especially in light of alleged reconciliation attempts by the wife.
Whether the wife’s allegations of dowry demands and the initiation of separate criminal and protective proceedings (Section 125 CrPC, DV Act complaint, FIR under Section 498A IPC) undermined the husband’s claim of cruelty.
Whether the decree suffered from non-application of mind because the operative portion inadvertently named unrelated parties (“Umesh Batra and Shruti Batra”).
Whether the decree was vitiated because the divorce petition was allegedly filed before the statutory period of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) HMA had fully elapsed.
Whether the husband’s alleged remarriage during the pendency of the appeal, supposedly in violation of Section 15 HMA, affected the legality or equities of the decree under challenge.

IV. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Family Court’s decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty, holding inter alia:

The scope of interference under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act is narrow. Appellate courts should not disturb factual findings of the trial court unless perverse, unsupported by evidence, or based on misapplication of law. No such infirmity was demonstrated.
The Family Court’s conclusion that the marriage remained unconsummated owing to the wife’s reluctance to engage in sexual relations was supported by pleadings, testimony, and electronic communications.
The phrase “almost consummated” in the wife’s written statement was not read in isolation but in the broader evidentiary context; the Family Court’s inference of non-consummation was not perverse.
The admitted long and continuous separation since June 2017, following barely forty days of cohabitation, coupled with refusal of conjugal relations and threats of false criminal accusations, constituted mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA.
The allegations of dowry demand were vague and uncorroborated, whereas the husband’s case of refusal to cohabit, insults, and threats was consistent and supported by evidence.
Subsequent proceedings by the wife (under Section 125 CrPC, the DV Act, and Section 498A IPC) did not negate or explain away her conduct during the crucial initial period of cohabitation.
The misnaming of parties in the decree was a clerical error, curable under Section 152 CPC, and did not indicate substantive non-application of mind. The Family Court was directed to correct the decree.
The divorce was granted purely on the ground of cruelty, not desertion. Hence, the statutory period under Section 13(1)(ib) HMA was irrelevant.
The husband’s alleged remarriage during the pendency of the appeal was a post-decree event and, even if assumed true, had no impact on the legality or sustainability of the divorce decree. Relying on Lila Gupta v. Laxmi Narain and Anurag Mittal v. Shaily Mishra Mittal, the Court reiterated that a marriage contracted in violation of Section 15 HMA is not void and does not vitiate a validly passed decree.

V. Detailed Analysis

A. Scope of Appellate Interference in Matrimonial Appeals

The Court began by emphasising that Section 19 of the Family Courts Act limits appellate interference largely to cases where:

Findings are perverse (i.e., against the weight of evidence or based on no evidence);
There is a misconstruction of law; or
There is clear non-application of mind.

In matrimonial matters, much turns on the credibility of oral testimony and the overall appreciation of conduct and circumstances. Family Courts see the witnesses first-hand, observe demeanour, manage counselling, and attempt settlement. Consequently, unless a party shows that the trial court’s appreciation of evidence is plainly unsustainable, appellate courts are slow to substitute their own view.

In Shikha Kumari, the Division Bench found that the Family Court:

Considered both parties’ testimonies;
Examined emails and WhatsApp chats (albeit partial);
Noted multiple failed counselling efforts; and
Recorded detailed reasons in paras 22.2, 22.4, 22.8, 22.13 of its judgment.

The High Court expressly held that the Appellant had not demonstrated any perversity or misapplication of law. This reaffirms that matrimonial appeals are not a forum for a de novo re-trial, but rather for correction of clear errors.

B. Non-Consummation and Denial of Conjugal Relations as Mental Cruelty

A central plank of the husband’s case was that the marriage was never consummated due to the wife’s persistent refusal to engage in sexual relations, accompanied by repeated excuses (illness, depression, tiredness) and threats of false criminal complaints if he insisted on conjugal rights.

The Family Court, whose findings the High Court endorsed, concluded that:

The refusal of sexual relations was deliberate and continuous, not a temporary or medically explainable phase.
The conduct led to complete non-consummation from the inception of the marriage.
Such conduct, viewed in the light of the brief cohabitation and sudden permanent separation, amounted to mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA.

This reasoning is anchored in the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511, which enumerates illustrative instances of mental cruelty, including:

Long periods of physical separation without just cause;
Persistent refusal to have sexual intercourse without reasonable explanation;
Threats of false criminal accusations or conduct causing deep anguish and frustration to the other spouse.

The High Court highlighted that the totality of circumstances must be examined. Here, the facts were stark:

Only about 40 days of cohabitation after the wedding;
Alleged non-consummation throughout this period;
Early and persistent denial of conjugal relations as evidenced by chats and emails;
Threats to allege rape or commit suicide if the husband pressed for conjugal intimacy;
Continuous separation since June 2017 despite efforts and a legal notice in April 2018.

On these facts, the Bench found it entirely permissible — and consistent with Samar Ghosh — to infer that the wife had treated the husband with such mental cruelty that the marriage had effectively broken down from inception.

C. Pleadings and the Expression “Almost Consummated”

A key appellate grievance was that the Family Court treated the wife’s use of the phrase “almost consummated” in her written statement as a near-conclusive admission of non-consummation.

The High Court’s approach was nuanced:

It acknowledged the wife’s argument that this phrase was used in a “pleading context” and that her affidavits and oral evidence elsewhere asserted cohabitation and performance of marital obligations.
However, it underscored that the Family Court did not rely on this phrase in isolation. Instead, it:
- Read the phrase together with the husband’s consistent narrative of refusal of physical intimacy;
- Considered the WhatsApp and email communications that suggested reluctance and hesitation towards sexual relations shortly after marriage; and
- Evaluated the overall conduct of the parties during the brief cohabitation period.

In doing so, the Court effectively treated “almost consummated” as a telling ambiguity that, when juxtaposed with other evidence, supported the inference that full, voluntary and repeated sexual relations never took place. The wife’s later, more categorical assertions of consummation were held insufficient to “neutralise” her own earlier pleading when the surrounding facts corroborated non-consummation.

This illustrates an important principle of pleading practice: ambiguous or poorly chosen language can have substantive evidentiary consequences, especially when it fits a broader factual pattern demonstrated by the opposite party.

D. Electronic Evidence and Alleged “Cherry-Picking”

The wife attempted to discredit the electronic evidence (WhatsApp chats, emails, CD) on the grounds that:

The husband admitted that he had not produced all chats;
No transcription or formal playing of the CD was undertaken during trial; and
The material on record represented a selective, “pick-and-choose” compilation.

The High Court, however, upheld the Family Court’s use of this material for several reasons:

The electronic evidence was exhibited without any contemporaneous objection from the wife during trial.
The wife did not produce alternate or full chats to contradict the portions relied upon by the husband, nor did she move for the production or discovery of complete data.
The trial court was therefore entitled to weigh the probative value of the material placed before it, albeit cautiously.
The exhibited communications consistently indicated the wife’s reluctance towards conjugal relations, particularly during the crucial initial days of marriage.

In effect, the Court adopted a pragmatic stance: even if the record was not exhaustive, the undisputed parts could legitimately inform the assessment of conduct, especially when the opposing party neither refuted their authenticity nor supplied contrary context.

This has a practical message for litigants: if one side asserts that electronic evidence is selective, it is not enough to merely allege this; countervailing material or at least timely objections and applications for complete production are needed to substantially weaken its evidentiary value.

E. Clean Hands and Section 23(1)(a) HMA: “Taking Advantage of One’s Own Wrong”

The wife invoked Section 23(1)(a) HMA, which requires that the court be “satisfied that the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability” in seeking matrimonial relief. She relied on authorities such as:

Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar v. Sunanda (2001) 4 SCC 125;
Mahendra Manilal Nanavati v. Sushila Mahendra Nanavati (1964) 7 SCR 267;
M. Ajith Kumar v. V. K. Jeeja, AIR 2009 Ker 100;
Rajneesh v. Savita, AIR 2003 Raj 280;
T. Srinivasan v. T. Varalakshmi, AIR 1999 SC 595;
Renu Bala v. Jagdeep Chillar, Delhi High Court (18.08.2010).

These decisions, broadly, caution that a spouse cannot:

First create the very situation that becomes the ground of divorce, and then
Claim relief by taking advantage of that self-created wrong.

In Shikha Kumari, however, the High Court found that:

The wife’s alleged reconciliation attempts (visits to Dhanbad, Noida, the respondent’s sister’s house, and a mall) were not substantiated by credible evidence and were specifically denied by the husband.
By contrast, the husband’s narrative of her abrupt departure, refusal to resume cohabitation, and threats of false criminal complaints was consistent and accepted by the Family Court.
There was no material suggesting that the husband had engineered or invited the cruelty alleged; rather, the conduct found to be cruel was attributable to the wife.

Thus, Section 23(1)(a) did not bar relief. The cited authorities continue to hold the field, but on the High Court’s factual findings, they were simply inapplicable. The decision is therefore not a departure from, but an application and factual distinction of, the “clean hands” jurisprudence.

F. Dowry Allegations, Counter-Litigation and Their Relevance to Cruelty

The wife alleged that the husband and his family demanded dowry and monetary contributions, and that her refusal led to ill-treatment. She further relied on her later institution of:

A petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC);
A complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005; and
FIR No. 233/2024 under Section 498A IPC, for which a charge-sheet had been filed.

The High Court upheld the Family Court’s rejection of these materials as exculpatory for several reasons:

The dowry allegations were conclusory and unspecific — lacking dates, occasions, witnesses, or concrete particulars.
There was no corroborative evidence to support these allegations.
The subsequent legal proceedings:
- Were initiated long after the brief cohabitation period (May–June 2017); and
- Did not explain or rebut the husband’s case about the wife’s conduct during that short but critical period.

Importantly, the Court clarified that the mere existence of cross-litigation does not automatically:

Establish that the husband was the wrongdoer; or
Erase the acts of cruelty found to have occurred at an earlier point in time.

This is doctrinally sound: whether criminal or protective proceedings constitute cruelty (or rebut a cruelty claim) depends on their truthfulness, motive, and context. The High Court found no basis to infer that these proceedings retroactively negated the cruelty the husband had suffered.

G. Desertion vs. Cruelty: The Irrelevance of Section 13(1)(ib) in This Case

The wife argued that the divorce petition was filed “prematurely” because the statutory period of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) HMA (ordinarily two years’ continuous desertion) had not fully run.

The High Court dismissed this argument as misconceived because:

The Family Court had not granted divorce on the ground of desertion at all.
It had proceeded exclusively on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia).
The limitation period specific to desertion was, therefore, irrelevant to the validity of the decree.

This clarification is doctrinally important. Parties often conflate or cumulatively plead “cruelty” and “desertion”, but:

Cruelty is concerned with conduct causing mental or physical suffering, and has no fixed minimum period, though the court will consider duration among other factors.
Desertion requires factum of separation plus animus deserendi (intention to permanently forsake the marital relationship) for the statutory period.

Where a decree is clearly founded on cruelty alone, the desertion timeline does not affect its legality.

H. Clerical Mistakes in Decrees: Section 152 CPC

The wife highlighted that the operative decree erroneously mentioned the names of other persons (“Umesh Batra and Shruti Batra”) instead of the actual parties, and argued that this revealed non-application of mind.

The High Court agreed that the error was “regrettable” but categorised it as a clerical mistake, squarely falling under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which permits correction of:

“clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission.”

The Court directed the Family Court to issue a corrected decree within four weeks but refused to treat the mistake as a basis to attack:

The substantive appreciation of evidence; or
The correctness of the findings on cruelty.

The ruling draws a clear line between:

Clerical / typographical errors, which are curable and do not affect the merits; and
Substantive legal or factual errors, which may justify appellate interference.

I. Remarriage During Pendency of Appeal and Section 15 HMA

One notable aspect of the case was the allegation that the husband had remarried during the pendency of the appeal, allegedly in violation of Section 15 of the HMA, which governs the timing of remarriage after a divorce decree.

The wife placed on record:

Screenshots of social media profiles and photographs; and
An Affidavit of Assets & Liabilities dated 06.03.2025 filed by the husband in Section 125 CrPC proceedings, allegedly indicating remarriage.

The High Court:

Assumed for argument’s sake that the remarriage had occurred; but
Held that this was a post-decree event having no bearing on the legality or correctness of the Impugned Judgment.

Crucially, the Court relied on two Supreme Court precedents:

Lila Gupta v. Laxmi Narain (1978) 3 SCC 258; and
Anurag Mittal v. Shaily Mishra Mittal (2018) 9 SCC 691.

These cases clarify that:

Section 15 HMA does not declare void a marriage contracted in breach of its waiting period or during pendency of an appeal, unless there is express statutory language to that effect (which there is not).
A marriage solemnised in contravention of Section 15 may have other legal implications or consequences — but nullity is not automatic.

The High Court therefore concluded:

Any alleged remarriage, even if established, could not render the original divorce decree invalid or void.
Questions about the ramifications of such remarriage must be addressed, if at all, in separate appropriate proceedings, not by using it as a ground to set aside a previously valid decree.

The Court thus firmly insulated the correctness of the original decree from subsequent personal choices of the successful party, reinforcing a clean doctrinal separation between:

Review of the legality of the trial court’s judgment; and
Consequences of alleged post-decree conduct.

J. Reliance on Samar Ghosh and the Mental Cruelty Framework

The High Court explicitly noted that the Family Court had applied the “illustrative parameters” of mental cruelty laid down in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511.

Key principles from Samar Ghosh include:

Mental cruelty can be subtle and cumulative, often inferred from the overall course of conduct rather than a single incident.
Prolonged, unjustified denial of sexual intercourse, particularly where it causes frustration and anguish, can amount to mental cruelty.
Long separation with no real prospect of resumption of cohabitation may also be a strong indicator.

In Shikha Kumari, the following elements aligned with this framework:

Persistent refusal of conjugal relations leading to non-consummation;
Threats of false criminal accusations (rape, abetment to suicide) if the husband insisted on marital intimacy;
Early abandonment of the matrimonial home and refusal to return despite persuasion and legal notice;
Continuous separation from June 2017 onwards, including failure of counselling and settlement attempts during trial.

The High Court endorsed the conclusion that, taken together, these constituted mental cruelty on the preponderance of probabilities.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

For easier understanding by non-specialists, some key legal concepts in this judgment can be briefly explained:

Consummation of marriage:
Refers to the spouses having had voluntary sexual intercourse after marriage. A marriage may be legally valid even if unconsummated, but non-consummation can be relevant to grounds like cruelty, impotence, or nullity in certain contexts.
Mental cruelty (Section 13(1)(ia) HMA):
Conduct that causes such mental pain, suffering, or humiliation that it becomes impossible or extremely difficult for a spouse to continue living with the other. It can be established through patterns of behaviour, not just physical violence.
Preponderance of probabilities:
The standard of proof in civil cases: the court decides in favour of the party whose version appears more likely than not. It is a lower threshold than “beyond reasonable doubt” used in criminal law.
Perversity of finding:
A finding is “perverse” if no reasonable person, properly instructed in the law, could have arrived at it given the evidence. Appellate courts will not interfere merely because they might have taken a different view; they intervene only when the trial court’s view is clearly unreasonable.
Section 23(1)(a) HMA — taking advantage of one’s own wrong:
The court must ensure that a petitioner is not seeking divorce on the basis of a situation he or she deliberately created. For example, a spouse cannot drive the other out of the home and then claim desertion by that other spouse.
Desertion vs. cruelty:
Desertion involves abandoning the marital relationship without reasonable cause and without consent, for a prescribed period. Cruelty involves harmful conduct that makes continued cohabitation intolerable, and is not bound to a fixed period.
Clerical error under Section 152 CPC:
Simple mistakes like typos, incorrect names, miscalculations, which are clearly accidental and do not change the substance of the court’s decision. Courts can correct these even after judgment, without reopening the case.
Void vs. valid (but irregular) remarriage under Section 15 HMA:
A “void” marriage has no legal effect from the beginning. The Supreme Court has clarified that a divorcee’s remarriage in violation of the waiting period or during the pendency of an appeal is not void under Section 15 because the statute does not say so. It may be irregular or have other consequences, but it does not nullify the earlier divorce decree.

VII. Impact and Significance

1. Reinforcement of Non-Consummation as Mental Cruelty

The decision reinforces the principle that non-consummation resulting from a spouse’s persistent, unjustified refusal of sexual relations can by itself amount to mental cruelty, especially when accompanied by threats and early breakdown of cohabitation.

While this is not a novel proposition in Indian law, the judgment:

Applies it in a scenario where the marriage broke down within weeks of solemnization;
Gives weight to contemporaneous electronic communications indicating reluctance; and
Clarifies that even phrases like “almost consummated”, construed contextually, can support findings of non-consummation.

2. Evidentiary Guidance in the Age of Electronic Communication

The handling of WhatsApp and email evidence is particularly instructive:

Parties who do not raise timely objections, or fail to produce counter-material, cannot later argue that reliance on such evidence is wholly illegitimate.
Partially produced chats can still be useful if they appear authentic, are not rebutted, and are consistent with other evidence.

This encourages parties to be more diligent both in:

Preserving and presenting relevant electronic records; and
Challenging or supplementing adverse material at the trial stage, rather than waiting for appeal.

3. Appellate Restraint and Deference to Family Court Fact-Finding

By explicitly reiterating the limited scope of appellate interference, the judgment:

Underscores the central role of Family Courts as primary fact-finders in matrimonial disputes;
Warns litigants that an appeal is not an opportunity to simply “re-argue the entire case”; and
Reassures that appellate courts will usually defer to the trial court’s holistic evaluation of witness credibility and conduct unless glaring errors are shown.

4. Practical Clarification on Section 15 HMA and Post-Decree Remarriage

The Court’s treatment of the alleged remarriage, anchored in Lila Gupta and Anurag Mittal, has practical importance:

It makes clear that a spouse’s remarriage during appeal cannot be used to invalidate an otherwise lawful divorce decree.
It channels any grievance about such remarriage into separate appropriate proceedings, rather than allowing it to retroactively unsettle prior judgments.

This approach provides greater finality and stability to matrimonial decrees, while still recognising the possibility of consequences for a spouse who remarries in contravention of statutory norms.

5. Cautionary Note on Vague Dowry Allegations

The judgment also sends a clear signal that unparticularised, uncorroborated dowry allegations will not, by themselves, neutralise a well-proved case of cruelty. Courts expect:

Specific incidents, dates, and context;
Some corroborative material or testimony; and
Consistency across pleadings and evidence.

Vague, broad-brush allegations are unlikely to succeed, particularly when raised as a defensive strategy in response to a detailed cruelty case.

6. Professional Caution on Drafting and Decree Preparation

Two drafting lapses in this case — the “almost consummated” phrase in pleadings and the misnaming of parties in the decree — highlight:

For litigants and lawyers: the importance of precise, carefully vetted language in pleadings, especially on sensitive factual issues like consummation and conduct.
For courts: the need for care in decree preparation, though the judgment also assures that genuine clerical slips can be corrected without undermining substantive justice.

VIII. Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s ruling in Shikha Kumari v. Ravikant Ravi, 2025 DHC 10908-DB, stands as a comprehensive reaffirmation of key matrimonial law principles:

Wilful non-consummation and persistent denial of conjugal relations, particularly at the very inception of the marriage and coupled with threats of false criminal allegations, can constitute mental cruelty warranting divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA.
Appellate courts will be slow to disturb Family Courts’ factual findings absent clear perversity, misreading, or legal error, especially where the trial court has engaged with the evidence in detail.
Vague dowry allegations and later cross-litigation do not, without more, neutralise a well-supported cruelty finding.
Clerical mistakes in decrees are curable under Section 152 CPC and do not imply non-application of mind or vitiate the judgment.
Post-decree remarriage, even if in breach of Section 15 HMA, is not void and cannot be invoked to undermine a valid divorce decree; any consequences of such remarriage must be addressed separately.

In doctrinal terms, the judgment does not revolutionise the law but consolidates and applies existing Supreme Court precedents — especially Samar Ghosh, Lila Gupta, and Anurag Mittal — to a factual matrix involving a very short, unconsummated marriage and early, total breakdown of cohabitation. Its enduring value lies in its clear articulation of how courts should approach non-consummation, electronic evidence, post-decree events, and appellate scrutiny in matrimonial disputes.