No Vested Right to Succession or Transfer of Fair Price Shop Authorizations under Rule 13 of the Karnataka PDS Control Order

1. Introduction

The decision in Lakshmamma v. State of Karnataka, WP No. 31337 of 2025, decided on 18 November 2025 by the Karnataka High Court (Bengaluru Bench), addresses a recurring and socially sensitive question: can the authorization to run a fair price shop (FPS) under the Public Distribution System (PDS) be treated as a transferable or inheritable right in favour of the dealer’s family members?

The petitioner, Lakshmamma, a 78-year-old widow of late Narayanappa, approached the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. She challenged an administrative endorsement rejecting her request for transfer of a fair price shop authorization and sought a direction (mandamus) to consider her representation.

The Court, per Justice Suraj Govindaraj, dismissed the writ petition at the preliminary hearing stage, holding that:

Rule 13 of the Karnataka Essential Commodities (Public Distribution System) Control Order, 1992 (PDS Control Order) prohibits transfer of authorization, and
the petitioner had no vested legal right to seek transfer of the authorization and, therefore, no mandamus could be issued.

This ruling reaffirms and sharpens a key principle: PDS fair price shop authorizations are non-transferable regulatory privileges, not inheritable property rights, and heirs have no enforceable right to seek transfer except within the narrow parameters of the statutory proviso.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Parties

Petitioner: Lakshmamma, widow of late Narayanappa, aged about 78 years, resident of Tumkur District, Karnataka.
Respondents:
- State of Karnataka, represented by its Principal Secretary, Department of Food and Civil Supplies.
- Joint Director (Food), Food and Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs Department, Tumkur District.

2.2 Reliefs Sought

The petitioner sought three principal reliefs:

Certiorari to quash the endorsement dated 20.03.2025 bearing No. FSD/FPD/PRA/CR108/2001-02 issued by Respondent No. 2 (Joint Director, Food), produced as Annexure C.
Mandamus directing Respondent No. 2 to consider the representation dated 19.02.2025 (Annexure B) allegedly seeking transfer of the fair price shop authorization to her.
Such other orders as deemed fit by the Court.

2.3 Nature of the Dispute

Although the order is brief, its core controversy is clear: the petitioner wanted the authorization to run a fair price shop to be transferred to her, presumably as the widow of the original authorized dealer. The competent authority refused such transfer (as per the impugned endorsement), likely relying on Rule 13 of the PDS Control Order, which bars transfer of authorizations.

The petitioner therefore invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court to:

invalidate the rejecting endorsement; and
compel consideration or grant of her request for transfer of the FPS authorization.

The matter came up for preliminary hearing, at which stage the Court chose to dispose it by a short oral order, indicating that in the Court’s view, the petition was legally untenable on the face of the record.

3. Statutory Framework: Rule 13 of the Karnataka PDS Control Order, 1992

3.1 The General Rule of Non-Transferability

The judgment reproduces Rule 13 of the Karnataka Essential Commodities (Public Distribution System) Control Order, 1992:

“13. Prohibition of Transfer of Authorization:

No authorized dealer shall assign or transfer his authorization to any other person by and no person shall carry on business as a transferee or otherwise on behalf of any such authorized dealer.

This is a blanket prohibition on:

The authorized dealer assigning or transferring his authorization to any other person; and
Any third person carrying on business as a transferee or “on behalf of” such authorized dealer.

Thus, the default legal position is: a PDS authorization is personal, non-transferable, and cannot be traded, assigned, or informally ‘handed over’.

3.2 The Original Proviso (Pre-Amendment)

Immediately following the main body of Rule 13, the Control Order contained a proviso (as recited in the judgment):

“Provided that the authorized authority may order for such transfer in the event of the death of the authorized dealer to the spouse or son or unmarried daughter with the prior approval of the Government”.

This proviso carves out an exception to the general rule of non-transferability:

In the event of the death of the authorized dealer,
the authorized authority may order a transfer,
in favour of the spouse, son, or unmarried daughter,
subject to prior Government approval.

Notably, even here:

The language is permissive (“may order”), not mandatory (“shall order”).
No absolute right is created in favour of legal heirs; it only creates a limited statutory discretion in specified circumstances.

3.3 The 2021 Amendment: Tightening the Exception

In paragraph 3, the Court notes that Rule 13 was amended on 16.01.2021, introducing a more elaborate proviso:

“Provided that the authorized authority may order for such transfer in the event of the death of the authorized dealer before 65 years of age, to the spouse or son or unmarried daughter in case he or she is above 18 years of age and less than 30 years (40 years in case of unmarried daughter and 65 years in case of spouse) having passed SSLC, both as on the date of the death of the authorized dealer. The application for such transfer should be made within 90 days of the death of the authorized dealer. Such transfer shall be made only after obtaining prior approval of Commissioner, Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs Department and only for a maximum period of 3 years i.e., the period of validity of a fresh authorization. No further renewal is allowed for such transfers.”

This amended proviso significantly narrows and structures the earlier discretionary exception. The key features are:

Condition as to age of deceased dealer: He or she must have died before 65 years of age.
Condition as to age of proposed transferee:
- Spouse: not more than 65 years at the time of death.
- Son/unmarried daughter: above 18 and below 30 years (unmarried daughter: up to 40 years).
Educational qualification: The transferee must have passed SSLC, and this condition must be satisfied as on the date of death of the dealer.
Time limit to apply: Application must be made within 90 days of the dealer’s death.
Authority and approval: Transfer can be ordered only after obtaining prior approval of the Commissioner, Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs Department.
Limited duration: Transfer is only for a maximum period of 3 years, equivalent to the validity of a fresh authorization.
No renewal: No further renewal is permitted for such transferred authorizations.

This transformation of the proviso underscores that:

The State intends fair price shop authorizations not to be treated as hereditary professions or permanent entitlements; and
Even the compassionate transfer option has become strictly confined, temporary, and conditional.

4. Summary of the Judgment

4.1 Key Findings

From paragraphs 2–6, the Court’s reasoning can be summarized as follows:

The petitioner’s core request is for transfer of authorization to run a fair price shop in her favour.
Rule 13 of the 1992 Control Order explicitly lays down a prohibition against transfer of authorizations, with only a narrow statutory exception.
The Rule, as amended in 2021, further regulates and restricts even that limited exception.
Given this express statutory prohibition, the petitioner’s request for transfer cannot be accepted (para 4).
The petitioner has no vested right to the transfer of authorization; in the absence of such a right, the Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to compel transfer or reconsideration (para 5).
Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed (para 6).

4.2 Operative Conclusion

The Court does not grant any relief; it neither quashes the endorsement nor directs reconsideration. The rejection of the transfer request stands, and the petitioner cannot succeed in securing the fair price shop authorization through writ proceedings.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Precedents Cited (or Not Cited) in the Judgment

The order is concise and does not cite any prior judicial decisions by name. It proceeds by directly applying the statutory text of Rule 13 and its proviso.

However, the reasoning aligns with well-established principles in Indian administrative and constitutional law which, although not expressly referred to, form the doctrinal backdrop:

Licensing in regulated sectors (like essential commodities, liquor, mining, etc.) has repeatedly been held to not create a fundamental or vested right to renewal or transfer. Licenses are privileges, not property rights.
Mandamus can only be issued where a legal right of the petitioner and a corresponding public duty of the authority exist. Purely discretionary powers, especially where the statute does not create a right, are generally not enforceable through mandamus.

While the Court chose brevity, its conclusion is solidly grounded in these larger principles.

5.2 Interpretation of Rule 13: Prohibition and Proviso

5.2.1 Core Prohibition is the Norm

The Court emphasizes in paragraph 4:

“A perusal of Rule 13 and the Proviso would indicate that no authorized dealer shall assign or transfer his authorization to any other person and no person shall carry on business as a transferee or otherwise on behalf of such authorized dealer. There being a specific prohibition in terms of Rule 13, the request made by the petitioner cannot be accepted.”

Legally, this reflects a standard approach to interpretation:

The main clause lays down the general rule — no transfer.
The proviso is an exception narrowly carving out special circumstances (death of dealer + qualifying family members).
Courts are slow to let a proviso override or negate the main provision; the exception must be read strictly and not expanded on equitable considerations alone.

Hence, even though the proviso allows a certain margin for compassionate transfer, it does not transform the non-transferable character of the authorization into a general rule of hereditary succession.

5.2.2 Effect of the 2021 Amendment

The 2021 amendment makes the exception even more contingent and time-bound. The Court notes the amendment but does not explicitly analyze its temporal application (i.e., whether it applies to deaths before 2021, or to long-pending claims).

However, for the petitioner, two layers of difficulty likely existed (even if not spelled out):

Under the original proviso: There was never a right, only a discretion in the authority. Thus, at most, the petitioner could request the authority to consider her case, but could not insist upon transfer as of right.
Under the amended proviso (2021): The strict conditions (age limits, SSLC qualification, 90-day time limit, etc.) would likely bar a claim made long after the dealer’s death or by a person not fitting the criteria.

The Court sidesteps detailed examination of whether the petitioner satisfies any of these conditions. Instead, it approaches the matter at a more fundamental level: no one, including the petitioner, possesses a vested right to transfer; the provision only gives a regulated window for possible compassionate appointment.

5.3 The Concept of “Vested Right” and its Absence

In paragraph 5, the Court states:

“There being no vested right in the petitioner for a transfer, a mandamus cannot also be issued.”

This sentence is crucial. It encapsulates the core doctrinal stance:

A “vested right” is a legal right which is definite, accrued, and enforceable, often protected from being taken away arbitrarily or retrospectively.
Here, the petitioner, as a widow of the deceased dealer, may have a moral or sympathetic claim, but that does not equate to an enforceable legal right under Rule 13.
The proviso only gives the authority a power (“may order”), not the heirs a corresponding right (“shall grant”).

Thus, even if the facts invoke sympathy, the Court cannot reshape statutory policy to create a new category of rights. The authorization remains:

a product of statutory discretion under delegated legislation; and
not akin to property or employment service that automatically devolves on heirs.

5.4 Mandamus: When Will the Court Interfere?

Since the petitioner sought mandamus to compel consideration/transfer, it was necessary for the Court to test whether:

the petitioner has a legal right; and
the respondents have a public duty enforceable by the Court to transfer the authorization to her.

By concluding that no vested right exists, the Court implicitly holds:

The respondents are under no duty to grant transfer, and even their duty to consider is circumscribed by the express terms of Rule 13 and its proviso.
The writ of mandamus cannot be used to create a right where the statute withholds one, or to convert a discretionary power into a mandatory obligation.

From a constitutional perspective, this respects the boundary between:

Judicial review (ensuring legality and rationality of decisions), and
Policy-making and discretion (which lie primarily with the executive and legislature).

5.5 The Impugned Endorsement: Why Not Quashed?

The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to quash the endorsement rejecting her request. For certiorari to succeed, typically one of the following must be shown:

Lack of jurisdiction.
Violation of natural justice.
Error apparent on the face of the record.
Arbitrariness or malafides, contrary to statutory provisions.

Here, the Court notes that Rule 13 supports the decision embodied in the endorsement. As the request for transfer itself was contrary to the main provision (and likely beyond the strict proviso), the endorsement cannot be said to be illegal. Hence:

No jurisdictional error or statutory violation is made out.
Therefore, quashing the endorsement was not justified.

Again, the Court adheres to a restrained model of judicial review: it does not substitute its own view of what is compassionate or desirable for the express statutory scheme.

5.6 Equitable Considerations vs. Statutory Limits

The order does not dwell on humanitarian or equitable aspects (age, dependency, livelihood concerns of the petitioner), likely because:

The writ jurisdiction, especially in matters governed by detailed policy (like PDS), cannot diverge from the statutory text merely on compassionate grounds.
Once the statutory scheme is clear and unambiguous, equity must operate within its limits, not against it.

In effect, the Court emphasizes that: policy choices about whether and how far to accommodate heirs of FPS dealers are matters for the executive/government, not for judicial innovation in the face of a clear statutory bar.

6. Impact and Future Implications

6.1 Reinforcement of Non-inheritable Nature of FPS Authorizations

The principal impact of this ruling is to reinforce that:

PDS fair price shop authorizations are a form of regulatory authorization, not a transferable asset or inheritable employment.
Heirs of a deceased dealer cannot claim automatic succession to the authorization.

Future litigants seeking transfer to family members will face this barrier unless they can firmly demonstrate that:

They fall squarely within the strict conditions of the current proviso (post-2021), and
The authority has acted arbitrarily or contrary to policy in rejecting a legally sustainable claim.

6.2 Procedural Strategy for Future Cases

This judgment acts as a cautionary precedent in at least three ways:

Delay in Applying: The 90-day time limit under the amended proviso will bar stale claims made years after the death of the dealer.
Failure to Meet Criteria: Petitioners unable to satisfy age or educational requirements will find virtually no room for relief in writ jurisdiction.
Scope of Writ Jurisdiction: Courts will likely decline to intervene where the statute clearly bars transfer and grants only narrow, conditional discretion.

6.3 Policy Rationale: Transparency and Non-hereditary Distribution

Beyond individual hardship, the PDS system aims to ensure:

Fair selection of dealers.
Transparency and accountability.
Prevention of monopolies or hereditary control over public distribution outlets.

By upholding the non-transferability principle and narrowly reading the exception, the Court’s decision supports a move toward:

Fresh selection through open processes when a dealership falls vacant; and
Reduction of informal or family-based succession patterns that may compromise fairness or efficiency.

6.4 Likely Litigation Pattern Post-2021 Amendment

The 2021 amendment itself is likely to generate litigation, including questions such as:

Whether it applies to deaths occurring before 16.01.2021.
Whether strict enforcement of age and educational criteria is constitutionally valid.
Whether the 90-day window can be relaxed in exceptional cases.

While this specific order does not address those broader constitutional questions, it sets a baseline: courts will begin with a presumption in favour of the statutory bar and narrow exception, and will require strong justification before interfering.

7. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

7.1 Writ of Certiorari

A writ of certiorari is a remedy by which the High Court:

Quashes an order or decision of a lower authority or tribunal,
On grounds such as lack of jurisdiction, error apparent on the face of the record, or clear illegality.

In this case, the petitioner wanted the Court to quash the endorsement rejecting her request. But since that endorsement was consistent with Rule 13’s prohibition, there was no legal error to justify certiorari.

7.2 Writ of Mandamus

A writ of mandamus is a direction from a Court to a public authority to:

Perform a specific duty imposed by law,
Where the petitioner has a corresponding legal right to such performance.

Mandamus cannot be issued:

To compel the exercise of a purely discretionary power in a particular way.
Where no legal right exists in the petitioner.

Here, because the authorization is non-transferable and the proviso is only discretionary, the petitioner lacked a legal right to transfer. Thus, mandamus was unavailable.

7.3 “Vested Right”

A vested right is:

An already-accrued legal right,
Which cannot be taken away without due process or clear statutory authority,
Often protected against retroactive legislative changes.

In this case, the petitioner did not have a vested right to the authorization or to its transfer, because:

The authorization belonged to her late husband and was personal to him.
The statute does not say that upon death, the authorization shall devolve on the family.
At most, it allows the authority to consider transfer to certain heirs.

7.4 “Authorization” vs. “Property”

An authorization (or license) is:

Permission granted by the State to do what would otherwise be unlawful (e.g., distribution of essential commodities under PDS).
Usually subject to policy, conditions, and revocation.

It is different from property in that:

It does not automatically pass to heirs.
Its continuation or transfer depends on policy and law, not solely on private arrangements.

The Court’s approach in this case emphasizes this distinction.

7.5 “Endorsement”

In Karnataka administrative practice, an “endorsement” is:

An official communication or note from a department,
Conveying the acceptance or rejection of a request, often with brief reasons.

Such endorsements can be challenged in writ proceedings if they are contrary to law or arbitrary. But since the endorsement here was in line with Rule 13, there was no ground to set it aside.

8. Conclusion: Significance of the Judgment

The decision in Lakshmamma v. State of Karnataka may be brief, but it clearly reinforces important legal principles in the context of the Public Distribution System:

Fair price shop authorizations are non-transferable by default.
Rule 13 creates a strong presumption against transfer. Any exceptions are narrow and must be strictly applied.
Heirs have no vested or automatic right to succeed to an FPS authorization.
Even as spouse, son, or unmarried daughter, one does not acquire a legal entitlement; at best, one may seek consideration under a constrained proviso.
The 2021 amendment significantly tightens the compassionate transfer window.
Age caps, educational requirements, time limits, limited duration, and no-renewal provisions indicate a policy shift away from hereditary operation of PDS outlets.
Writ remedies are unavailable where no enforceable right exists.
Without a vested right, the Court will not issue mandamus to compel transfer or quash a rejection that is consistent with the statute.
Judicial restraint in policy-laden domains.
The Court confines itself to enforcing the statutory text and leaves policy debates (such as whether widows should be more broadly accommodated) to the executive and legislature.

In the broader legal context, this judgment strengthens the view that benefits flowing from State-regulated schemes, especially licenses and authorizations, cannot be treated as quasi-hereditary entitlements. Instead, they remain subject to evolving policy, statutory conditions, and competitive selection, with the judiciary ensuring only that these are implemented lawfully and non-arbitrarily.