No Ownership from Long Possession or Tax Payments: Standing of Encroachers to Challenge Housing Board Eviction

Commentary on Ranjana Mulchandbhai Shitlani v. Gujarat Housing Board & Ors.
Gujarat High Court, Special Civil Application No. 16501 of 2025 (Order dated 08.12.2025)

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1. Introduction

1.1 Case Overview

In Ranjana Mulchandbhai Shitlani v. Gujarat Housing Board & Ors., the Gujarat High Court (per Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Mauna M. Bhatt) was called upon to examine the validity of an eviction / removal notice issued for alleged encroachment on a public footpath in Krushnanagar, Naroda, Ahmedabad.

The case sits at the intersection of:

• Property law (ownership, possession, power of attorney),
• Administrative and constitutional law (writ jurisdiction under Article 226, principles of natural justice), and
• Urban/public law (removal of encroachments from public land and statutory powers under the Gujarat Housing Board Act, 1961).

The order is brief but significant. It reinforces several important propositions:

• Long possession and payment of municipal taxes do not create ownership rights.
• Title disputes are generally not adjudicated in writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
• An encroacher on a public footpath has no legally protected right to continue such occupation.
• A person to whom an eviction notice is not addressed ordinarily lacks locus standi (standing) to challenge that notice in a writ petition.
• A power of attorney, especially from a third party (not the original allottee/owner), does not itself confer title.

1.2 Parties

• Petitioner: Ranjana Mulchandbhai Shitlani, claiming to be in possession of the property in question and asserting ownership through a Power of Attorney.
• Respondent No. 1: Gujarat Housing Board (“the Board”), a statutory housing authority under the Gujarat Housing Board Act, 1961.
• Respondent No. 2: Another respondent represented separately (likely a relevant governmental or allied authority), represented by counsel.

1.3 Factual Background in Brief

The material facts emerging from the order are:

• The property in question is located in Krushnanagar, Naroda, Ahmedabad.
• The Gujarat Housing Board issued a notice dated 20.11.2025 directing removal of alleged encroachment on a public footpath within 15 days.
• The petitioner:
  • Described herself as a Power of Attorney holder for the property.
  • Claimed to be the “owner” by virtue of this Power of Attorney from the “original holder” (though this was later factually disputed).
  • Relied on long possession and payment of municipal taxes and other bills in relation to the premises.
  • Filed a reply to the notice and alleged that procedural requirements under the Gujarat Housing Board Act, 1961 and principles of natural justice were not followed.
• The respondents contended that:
  • The notice was not issued to the petitioner at all; it was addressed to the original allottee.
  • The petitioner’s name appeared only as a handwritten addition on the notice.
  • The original allottee had agreed to redevelopment under the Gujarat Housing Board Act, 1961.
  • The alleged Power of Attorney relied upon by the petitioner was not executed by the original allottee but by a third party.
  • There was clear encroachment on the public footpath, as evidenced by photographs.

1.4 Key Legal Issues

From the short order, the central issues can be distilled as:

1. Locus standi / standing: Does the petitioner have standing to challenge the notice when it is not addressed to her?
2. Nature of rights claimed: Does long possession, payment of taxes, and holding a Power of Attorney (from a non-allottee) confer any ownership or enforceable right?
3. Scope of writ jurisdiction: Can questions of title or ownership be adjudicated in a writ petition under Article 226?
4. Legality of eviction/encroachment notice: Is the notice dated 20.11.2025 illegal or violative of natural justice or the Gujarat Housing Board Act, 1961?

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2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court rejected the writ petition and upheld the impugned notice for removal of encroachment on the public footpath. The essential holdings are:

1. No ownership from long possession: The Court explicitly held that “long possession will not create any ownership right” in favour of the petitioner.
2. Petitioner failed to establish ownership: The petitioner did not establish that she was the owner of the subject premises. The Court did not accept the claim of ownership based on:
   • a Power of Attorney, and
   • payment of taxes and other bills.
3. Title disputes not for writ jurisdiction: The Court reiterated that in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, title to the property cannot be decided.
4. Notice not issued to petitioner – locus lacking: The Court accepted the respondents’ submission that the notice was not issued to the petitioner, and her name was only handwritten. This “merits acceptance”, implying that:
   • the notice is legally addressed to the original allottee, and
   • the petitioner’s standing to challenge the notice is highly questionable.
5. Petitioner is an encroacher on public footpath: The Court described the petitioner as an encroacher and held that she was “rightly directed to remove the encroachment” on the footpath.
6. No illegality in the notice: The Court found no illegality in the notice dated 20.11.2025 and therefore rejected the plea to quash it.

Consequently, the Special Civil Application was dismissed, and the petitioner’s challenge to the eviction/encroachment notice failed.

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3. Detailed Legal Analysis

3.1 Locus Standi: Can the Petitioner Challenge the Notice?

A critical strand of the Court’s reasoning concerns locus standi—whether the petitioner is the right person to challenge this notice.

The respondents argued that:

• The notice dated 20.11.2025 was addressed to the original allottee, not to the petitioner.
• The petitioner’s name was only handwritten on the notice, suggesting no formal legal recognition of her as an addressee.

The Court accepted this submission:

“Moreover, the submission that the notice dated 20.11.2025 of eviction is not issued to the petitioner merits acceptance.”

This has two implications:

1. Procedural standing: Because the notice is not addressed to the petitioner, her capacity to maintain a writ petition directly challenging that notice is dubious. Normally, a writ petition challenging an administrative order should be filed by the person to whom the order is addressed or who is directly affected in law.
2. No recognized legal relationship: By stressing that the notice is to the original allottee, the Court implicitly recognizes the Board’s relationship with the original allottee, not with the petitioner. Any grievance about redevelopment or eviction ought to be raised by the allottee or a person deriving recognized title from them.

At the same time, the Court does not dismiss the petition solely on lack of standing. It proceeds to examine:

• whether the petitioner has any substantive rights (ownership/title), and
• the nature of the alleged encroachment itself.

3.2 Long Possession and Tax Payments: No Substitute for Ownership

The petitioner based her claim largely on:

• long-standing possession of the premises, and
• regular payment of municipal taxes and bills in relation to the property.

The Court firmly rejected any inference of ownership from these facts:

“It is noticed that long possession will not create any ownership right in favour of the petitioner.”

This affirms a well-settled proposition in Indian property law:

• Possession is evidence of factual control, not necessarily of legal title.
• Municipal tax receipts or utility bills show that the occupant is recognized for purposes of taxation or services, but they do not, by themselves, confer or prove ownership.

The Court thus refuses to treat:

• long possession + tax receipts + Power of Attorney

as amounting to or evidencing valid ownership.

3.3 Power of Attorney: Nature and Limits of Rights

The petitioner claimed to be a Power of Attorney holder of the property and, on that basis, asserted ownership. The respondents countered that:

• The Power of Attorney was executed not by the original allottee, but by a third party.

The Court accepts this factual assertion, and on that basis finds:

• The petitioner failed to establish ownership of the subject premises.

The broader legal principle is:

• A Power of Attorney (PoA) is primarily an instrument of agency. It authorizes the holder to act on behalf of the principal; it does not, by itself, transfer ownership in immovable property.
• Moreover, if the PoA is from someone who is not the true owner or allottee, it carries even less legal weight. The PoA holder cannot assert a better right than the person who executed the PoA.

Thus, the petitioner’s PoA, being from a third party and not the original allottee, fails as a basis for asserting any legally cognizable ownership interest against the Housing Board.

3.4 Encroachment on Public Footpath: Nature of the Right Involved

The Court records that the encroachment is:

• on a public footpath,
• and that from the photographs, the encroachment is evident.

In Indian public law, a public footpath is part of the public street or road, meant for use by the public at large. No private individual has a right to appropriate it for personal construction. Therefore:

• An encroachment on a public footpath is a continuing illegality.
• The encroacher’s occupation is not protected; it is at best a tolerated or neglected illegality that the authority is legally entitled—and indeed duty-bound—to remove.

The Court’s conclusion:

“The petitioner being the encroacher is rightly directed to remove the encroachment…”

gives a clear signal: an encroacher on public land has no enforceable right to insist on continuation of that encroachment, even if they have been in possession for many years and even if some authorities have accepted taxes from them.

3.5 Article 226 and the Non-Adjudication of Title

The Court states:

“In the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the title of the property cannot be decided.”

This reaffirms a crucial doctrinal limit on the writ jurisdiction:

• Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of fundamental rights and “for any other purpose”.
• However, it is primarily designed to address:
  • public law disputes,
  • questions of legality and procedural fairness of administrative or quasi-judicial actions, and
  • jurisdictional errors.
• Complex, disputed questions of fact, particularly involving title to immovable property, are ordinarily not adjudicated in writ proceedings.

Here:

• The petitioner attempted to convert the writ petition into a forum for recognition of her claimed ownership based on PoA, possession and tax payments.
• The Court refused to use Article 226 for such a purpose, indicating that if title is disputed, the proper remedy is typically a civil suit, where evidence can be fully led and tested.

This approach:

• protects the summary nature of writ proceedings, and
• prevents administrative disputes from being bogged down in intricate civil law quarrels.

3.6 Natural Justice and Procedural Arguments

The petitioner contended that:

• the procedure under the Gujarat Housing Board Act, 1961 was not followed before issuing the notice, and
• there was a breach of the principles of natural justice.

Two points emerge from the order:

1. Reply to notice was filed: The petitioner herself stated that she had filed a reply to the notice dated 20.11.2025, and sought protection from dispossession. This indicates that:
   • some level of opportunity to respond was in fact afforded,
   • reducing the strength of the argument that there was an outright denial of natural justice.
2. Court’s conclusion on legality: Despite the procedural objections, the Court held that there was no illegality in the notice and described the petitioner as an encroacher rightly directed to remove encroachment. The Court does not find any fatal procedural defect warranting interference under Article 226.

Given the brevity of the order, it does not elaborate in detail on the exact procedural steps required by the Gujarat Housing Board Act. However, the underlying stance is clear:

• Where a person is found to be an encroacher on public land, courts are reluctant to grant relief merely on technical procedural objections, unless there is a clear violation that has caused real prejudice.

3.7 Interplay with Redevelopment under the Gujarat Housing Board Act, 1961

The respondents submitted that:

• The original allottee had agreed to redevelopment under the Gujarat Housing Board Act, 1961.

This suggests:

• The Board is engaged in a redevelopment scheme of the housing estate/project.
• The Board’s relationship is with the original allottee, who is participating in the redevelopment.
• The petitioner’s asserted interests are not derived from this allottee, but from a third party; hence the Board does not recognize her as a beneficiary or stakeholder under the scheme.

By refusing relief to the petitioner, the Court indirectly:

• supports the Board’s ability to proceed with redevelopment free from unauthorized constructions and encroachments, and
• discourages persons without clear title from stalling such projects through writ petitions.

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4. Precedential and Doctrinal Context

4.1 Absence of Explicit Case Law Citations in the Order

The oral order, as extracted, does not cite any previous judicial decisions by name. It relies directly on well-established principles without referring to particular authorities.

Nonetheless, the principles applied are deeply rooted in Indian constitutional and property jurisprudence. While the following cases are not mentioned in the order, they form part of the broader doctrinal background that aligns with the Court’s approach:

• Writ jurisdiction and title disputes: Indian courts have consistently resisted adjudicating complex property title disputes under Article 226, directing parties to ordinary civil suits instead.
• Encroachment on public land: Courts, including the Supreme Court, have treated encroachments on public roads, footpaths, and open spaces as illegal uses of public property that can be removed in the public interest.
• Power of Attorney not conveying title: Long-standing jurisprudence holds that a mere PoA does not effect a transfer of immovable property; a properly executed and registered conveyance deed is generally required.

The Gujarat High Court’s reasoning in the present case is thus consistent with settled higher court jurisprudence, even though it does not expressly invoke those decisions.

4.2 Reinforcement of Existing Legal Principles

The order can be seen as reinforcing—rather than creating for the first time—the following legal rules:

1. No title adjudication in writ petitions: Where ownership is disputed, parties should ordinarily file a civil suit. Article 226 is not a substitute for civil trial.
2. Encroachers have no right to continue encroachment: Encroachment on public land is inherently illegal; payment of taxes or duration of possession does not legalize it.
3. PoA is not title: A PoA-holder, especially deriving agency from a third party with no lawful title, cannot assert ownership or better rights than the true owner/allottee.
4. Standing depends on legal relationship: A person who is not the addressee of an eviction notice and who has no demonstrable legal interest recognized by the issuing authority may lack standing to challenge such notice by writ.

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5. Impact and Implications

5.1 For Power-of-Attorney Holders and Informal Purchasers

In many urban areas, property dealings take place through:

• unregistered agreements,
• General Powers of Attorney, and
• long, informal possession coupled with payment of municipal taxes.

This judgment sends a clear message:

• Such arrangements do not create legally secure ownership rights.
• When challenged by statutory authorities (e.g., Housing Board, municipal corporations) particularly in the context of:
  • encroachment, or
  • redevelopment projects,
  persons relying only on PoAs and tax receipts will be in a legally fragile position.

5.2 For Encroachments on Public Footpaths and Public Land

Municipal and housing authorities frequently face resistance when removing encroachments from:

• footpaths,
• public streets, and
• common/public spaces.

This decision strengthens the hand of authorities by:

• upholding removal directions where photographic or other evidence shows encroachment on a footpath;
• denying relief to occupants who are not lawful owners but are in unauthorized occupation of public land;
• signaling that courts will not readily interfere via writs where the encroachment is clear and the public character of land is established.

5.3 For Statutory Housing Authorities and Redevelopment Projects

Housing boards and similar agencies often undertake redevelopment schemes and face obstruction from:

• persons claiming through unregistered transactions,
• PoAs from third parties, or
• informal “purchasers” without clear title.

The judgment:

• endorses the primacy of the original allottee’s relationship with the housing authority.
• allows the Board to disregard unrecognized derivative claims unless supported by demonstrable, lawful title.
• reduces the risk of redevelopment being stalled by writ petitions from persons with weak or dubious title claims.

5.4 For Writ Practice under Article 226

From the perspective of constitutional litigation, the order:

• reiterates that Article 226 is not a forum to adjudicate property title or validate informal property arrangements;
• encourages High Courts to summarily reject writ petitions where:
  • title is disputed, and
  • the petitioner is effectively asking the court to recognize ownership in a summary proceeding.
• emphasizes the importance of locus standi—the petitioner must be the person directly and legally affected by the impugned action.

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6. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

6.1 Article 226 of the Constitution of India

Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue writs (like mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, etc.) for:

• enforcement of fundamental rights, and
• “for any other purpose”, which includes ensuring legality and fairness of administrative actions.

However, it is:

• not designed to hold full-fledged civil trials,
• not usually used to resolve intense factual disputes over title, and
• generally confined to examining whether the public authority:
  • acted within its powers,
  • followed basic procedures and natural justice, and
  • did not act arbitrarily or illegally.

6.2 Locus Standi (Standing)

“Locus standi” means the right of a person to appear before a court and seek relief. To have standing, a person usually must:

• be directly affected by the action or decision challenged, and
• have a legally recognized interest (not just a remote or indirect one).

In this case, because the notice was addressed to the original allottee, and not to the petitioner, her standing to challenge that notice was inherently weak.

6.3 Power of Attorney (PoA)

A Power of Attorney is a legal document whereby one person (the principal) authorizes another (the agent/attorney) to act on their behalf. Importantly:

• It gives the authority to act, not ownership of property.
• To transfer ownership in immovable property, one generally needs a registered sale deed, gift deed, or other recognized conveyance—not merely a PoA.
• If the PoA is executed by someone who is not the true owner, the PoA-holder can claim even less.

6.4 Encroachment

“Encroachment” refers to unauthorized occupation or construction on land not legally belonging to the occupant, especially public land such as:

• roads,
• footpaths,
• parks, or
• other public areas.

An encroacher has no legal right to continue such occupation and can ordinarily be asked to vacate/ remove the construction under law.

6.5 Principles of Natural Justice

The principles of natural justice primarily require:

• Audi alteram partem – the right to be heard before an adverse decision is taken; and
• Nemo judex in causa sua – no one should be a judge in his or her own cause (impartial decision-making).

In removal of encroachment cases, this usually means:

• giving notice to the alleged encroacher, and
• allowing a reasonable opportunity to respond or object.

In this case, the petitioner herself admitted having filed a reply to the notice, indicating that some opportunity was in fact given.

6.6 Gujarat Housing Board Act, 1961 (Contextual)

While the order does not reproduce the statutory provisions, the Gujarat Housing Board Act, 1961:

• creates the Gujarat Housing Board as a statutory body,
• empowers it to develop, allot, and redevelop housing schemes, and
• typically grants statutory powers for:
  • eviction of unauthorized occupants,
  • removal of encroachments, and
  • implementation of redevelopment schemes.

The Court’s order indicates that the Board was acting within this statutory framework, particularly in the context of redevelopment.

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7. Conclusion

The Gujarat High Court’s decision in Ranjana Mulchandbhai Shitlani v. Gujarat Housing Board & Ors. is an important reaffirmation of established but frequently contested principles in urban property and public law.

The key takeaways are:

1. Long possession and payment of taxes do not create ownership. These factors cannot, by themselves, defeat the rights of a statutory authority or original allottee, nor can they legitimize encroachment on public land.
2. Power of Attorney is not ownership, especially if granted by a third party. A PoA-holder cannot claim better title than the principal, and where the principal has no allotted or lawful interest, the PoA-holder’s position is even weaker.
3. Encroachers on public footpaths have no enforceable right to continue the encroachment. Courts will support statutory authorities in clearing such encroachments, especially when public interest in free and safe use of footpaths is at stake.
4. Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not meant for title adjudication. Disputes over ownership belong in civil courts, not in summary constitutional proceedings, particularly where facts are contested.
5. Locus standi is essential. A person who is not the formal addressee of an eviction/encroachment notice, and who lacks recognized legal title, will find it difficult to maintain a writ petition challenging such notice.

Overall, this judgment sends a strong message to:

• individuals relying on informal property arrangements and PoAs, and
• encroachers on public land,

that the courts will not use writ jurisdiction to shield them from lawful eviction or removal actions by statutory authorities, particularly where public land and redevelopment projects are involved.

In the broader legal context, the decision does not innovate radically, but it provides a concise and clear reaffirmation of existing doctrine, thereby strengthening the legal framework available to public authorities to address unauthorized constructions and encroachments in urban areas.