No Inherent Power of Review: Bombay High Court Clarifies that Labour Courts Cannot Entertain Delay-Condonation Applications for Non-Maintainable Reviews

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Bombay High Court’s judgment in JSW Steel Coated Products Ltd. & Anr. v. Amarlal P. Sharma, WRIT PETITION No. 1017 of 2025 (Nagpur Bench, 18 Aug 2025, per Prafulla S. Khubalkar J.). At issue was whether the First Labour Court, Nagpur, could condone a delay of 333 days in filing a review application against its earlier award when the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (IDA) does not expressly confer any power of review on Labour Courts.

The Petitioners—(1) JSW Steel Coated Products Ltd. and (2) its contractor M/s O.P. Engineering—challenged the Labour Court’s order dated 07 Dec 2024 that (i) entertained the employee’s review application and (ii) condoned the delay. The Respondent-employee, Mr Amarlal Sharma, had failed in Reference (IDA) No. 02/2017 and sought review on merits.

The High Court quashed the impugned order, holding that:

Labour Courts possess no statutory or implied power to review their own awards; and
Where the substantive proceeding (the review) is itself non-maintainable, a question of condoning the delay does not arise.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court allowed the writ petition, set aside the Labour Court’s order condoning delay, and dismissed Review Application No. 02/2023 outright.
Reliance was placed on earlier Bombay High Court precedents, notably Sudhir Janardhan Desai v. Hyphosphite & Co. (2004) and Nivruti G. Ahire v. State Of Maharashtra (2007), which establish that (a) power of review is not inherent and (b) if the main proceeding is not maintainable, delay-condonation cannot be considered.
The Court reaffirmed that Section 11 of the IDA delineates Labour Court powers; none include review (save the limited power to set aside ex parte awards recognised in Grindlays Bank).

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Sudhir Janardhan Desai v. Hyphosphite & Co., 2004 (4) Mh.L.J. 223 • Held that Labour Courts, as statutory creatures, have only those powers expressly or impliedly conferred by the IDA. No provision grants a power of review. Justice Khubalkar quoted para 6 verbatim, treating it as binding precedent.
Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844 • Supreme Court authority (referred via Sudhir Desai) for the proposition that review is not an inherent power; it must stem from statute.
Nivruti G. Ahire v. State Of Maharashtra, 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 492 • Division Bench ruling that courts cannot condone delay for a proceeding that is itself non-maintainable. Para 15 was extracted to emphasize that condonation presupposes maintainability.
Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, (1980) 2 SCC 420 (not cited but implicitly relevant) • Recognises a narrow power to set aside ex parte awards; distinguished because the instant review sought re-opening on merits, not removal of an ex parte default.

3.2 Legal Reasoning Adopted by the Court

Statutory Construction: Section 11 of the IDA enumerates Labour Court powers. Review is absent; hence, expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the express mention of some powers excludes others.
Nature of Review: A review entails reconsideration on merits; it is not procedural but substantive. Such authority cannot be inferred merely from the court’s existence (Patel Narshi). Therefore, Labour Courts lack jurisdiction to entertain Review Application No. 02/2023.
Sequitur on Delay-Condonation: Limitation Act §5 applies only to “appeals or applications” competent in law. Following Nivruti Ahire, an incompetent proceeding renders any connected delay plea redundant.
Severability of Social-Welfare Considerations: Although IDA is remedial and courts are generally lenient toward employees, benevolence cannot override jurisdictional limits. The High Court balanced social-justice concerns against statutory boundaries.

3.3 Potential Impact on Future Litigation

Clarity on Jurisdiction: Labour Courts in Maharashtra (and arguably nationwide) are now on firm notice that they cannot entertain substantive review petitions, nor even decide preliminary condonation issues attached to such petitions.
Strategic Shift for Litigants: Aggrieved workmen must avail appellate or writ remedies (Section 11-A challenge, industrial court appeal where available, or Article 226/227 writs) rather than seek review.
Docket Management: Labour Courts may summarily reject review petitions at the threshold, reducing procedural delays.
Uniformity with Administrative-Law Principles: The ruling harmonises labour jurisprudence with general administrative-law doctrine on limited statutory tribunals lacking inherent review power.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Review vs. Appeal: A review is a re-look by the same court/tribunal at its own decision, permissible only when statute allows. An appeal is scrutiny by a higher forum and exists if the statute creates such a right.
Ex Parte Award: A decision rendered when one party (usually the employer) is absent. Labour Courts do have limited power to set these aside (Grindlays Bank). This is distinct from a full-scale review.
Condonation of Delay: Under Limitation Act §5, courts may forgive late filings if “sufficient cause” is shown—but only where the underlying filing is legally maintainable.
Jurisdictional Error: A court acts without jurisdiction when it exercises a power not granted by law; such orders are nullities and susceptible to writ interference.

5. Conclusion

The Bombay High Court’s ruling in JSW Steel Coated Products Ltd. v. Amarlal Sharma reinforces a foundational tenet of administrative and labour jurisprudence: statutory tribunals must act strictly within the four corners of their enabling legislation. Because the IDA does not confer any power of review (beyond setting aside ex parte awards), Labour Courts cannot entertain review petitions—let alone condone delay in presenting them. The decision enhances procedural certainty, guides future litigants toward appropriate remedies, and underscores that social-welfare legislation, though remedial, cannot be stretched to create powers that the legislature never granted.