No Fundamental Right to a Particular Place of Worship: MP High Court Denies Devotee Locus for Mosque Reconstruction After Lawful Acquisition

Case: Mohammed Taiyab and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others

Citation: 2025 MPHC-IND 29259

Court: High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench

Bench: Justice Vivek Rusia and Justice Binod Kumar Dwivedi

Date: 7 October 2025

Procedural Posture: Intra-court writ appeal under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaya Peeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 against the Single Judge’s order dated 04.09.2025 dismissing W.P. No. 1515 of 2025.

Introduction

This writ appeal arose from the demolition of Takiya Masjid in Ujjain following land acquisition for expansion of the parking area of the Mahakal Lok Parishar. The appellants, local residents and devotees who offered namaz at the mosque, sought mandamus for reconstruction of the mosque and an inquiry against officials. The State contended that the acquisition had attained finality; compensation had been paid to persons in possession; and the property had vested in the State. The Madhya Pradesh Waqf Board had separately instituted proceedings before the State Waqf Tribunal regarding title and compensation.

Central legal questions included:

Whether devotees have locus standi under Article 226 to seek reconstruction of a mosque demolished following lawful acquisition, particularly when the Waqf Board is already litigating title and compensation before the Waqf Tribunal.
Whether demolition of a mosque pursuant to acquisition infringes Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution by denying the right to practice religion at that specific site.
Whether a writ court can grant restoration/reconstruction without a substantive prayer to quash the acquisition proceedings and the award.

Summary of the Judgment

The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal and affirmed the Single Judge’s order. The core holdings are:

Locus standi: Devotees do not have locus to seek reconstruction of a mosque after the land has been lawfully acquired and vested in the State, particularly where the Waqf Board has already approached the Waqf Tribunal regarding title and compensation.
Maintainability of relief: Relief for restoration/reconstruction cannot be granted without a specific challenge to, and prayer for quashing of, the land acquisition proceedings and the award. In the absence of such a prayer, the writ petition is untenable.
Article 25 dimension: Relying on the Allahabad High Court decision in Mohammad Ali Khan v. SLAO (1978 SCC OnLine All 948), the Court reiterated that the right to freely practice religion under Article 25 is a personal right not tied to any particular place; acquisition of land on which a mosque stands does not, by itself, infringe Article 25.
Pending Waqf litigation: Since the M.P. Waqf Board has already invoked the Waqf Tribunal’s jurisdiction under Section 83(2) of the Waqf Act, 1995 for title and compensation, the devotee-petitioners cannot, by a parallel writ, compel reconstruction.

Factual and Procedural Background

The mosque (Takiya Masjid), said to be about two centuries old and notified as Waqf (Gazette Notification dated 13.12.1985), stood on Survey Nos. 2324–2329 in Revenue Circle 3, Ujjain.
For expansion of the Mahakal Lok Parishar parking, the State initiated acquisition; awards were passed on 12.03.2024 and 10.06.2024; compensation was distributed to persons in possession; the mosque was demolished on 11.01.2025.
Multiple writ petitions challenging the acquisition were dismissed by a common order on 09.12.2024, and Writ Appeal No. 117 of 2025 was also dismissed. Additional writ petitions (W.P. Nos. 24591/2024, 24668/2024, 24713/2024, 34440/2024) met the same fate.
The Waqf Board filed a proceeding under Section 83(2) of the Waqf Act before the M.P. State Waqf Tribunal, Bhopal, claiming title over the land and entitlement to compensation.
In W.P. No. 1515 of 2025, devotees sought directions for reconstruction and inquiry against officials. The Single Judge dismissed the petition on 04.09.2025, holding that the acquisition had attained finality and the Waqf Board’s independent claim to compensation was sub judice before the Tribunal.
Devotees appealed under Section 2(1) of the 2005 Adhiniyam; the Division Bench dismissed the appeal on 07.10.2025.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1) Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan (2003) 7 SCC 546

Relied upon by appellants: The appellants invoked Guruvayoor to contend that devotees have standing to approach the High Court for protection of their religious rights and for directions concerning religious institutions.

Court’s position: While the judgment does not elaborate on Guruvayoor, the outcome indicates that the Bench confined that precedent to its sphere—devotee standing in matters of administration/mismanagement of religious institutions and enforcement of statutory duties. Guruvayoor does not authorize devotees to bypass finalized acquisition or to demand reconstruction absent a challenge to the acquisition/award. In short, Guruvayoor does not convert a devotee’s interest into a proprietary or possessory claim against the State after lawful vesting.

2) Mohammad Ali Khan v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika (1978 SCC OnLine All 948)

Relied upon by the State and adopted by the Court: The Division Bench quoted extensively from this decision. Its key propositions:

Article 25 confers a personal right to profess, practice, and propagate religion; it is not intrinsically tied to a particular site or structure.
Acquisition of land on which a mosque stands does not per se infringe Article 25; a believer may practice religion elsewhere, including at another mosque or at home.
The statutory power to acquire property (then discussed with reference to Article 31; today governed by Article 300A and acquisition statutes) can lawfully extinguish use rights over land, subject to the law.

Transposition to current constitutional framework: Although the Allahabad decision referenced Article 31 (since repealed by the 44th Amendment), the underlying proposition remains valid under Article 300A: deprivation of property is permissible by authority of law. The core constitutional insight—that Article 25 is a personal right not guaranteeing preservation of a specific religious place—is the ratio the Division Bench embraces.

Related Supreme Court Jurisprudence (contextual, not cited)

Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 360: The Supreme Court held that a mosque is not an essential part of the practice of Islam for the purpose of protection of a specific site under Article 25 and that property belonging to a religious institution can be acquired by the State. While aspects of Faruqui were later discussed in the Ayodhya title judgment (2019), the acquisition-related rationale—that valid acquisition does not violate Article 25—remains a consistent thread in constitutional jurisprudence.

Placed against this backdrop, the MP High Court’s reliance on Mohammad Ali Khan aligns with the broader constitutional understanding that religious freedom does not confer a right to insist upon a specific property as a site of worship once that property has been lawfully acquired.

Legal Reasoning Applied

1) Locus Standi of Devotees

The Court held that the devotees lack locus to seek reconstruction of a mosque post-acquisition, especially when:

The property has vested in the State after due process;
The Waqf Board—the statutory guardian of waqf interests—has already approached the competent forum (Waqf Tribunal) on title and compensation;
Any proprietary or compensatory claims are to be pursued by the Waqf Board, not individual worshippers, and certainly not by seeking reconstruction via writ absent a challenge to the acquisition.

This refines the limits of devotee standing under Article 226: while devotees can seek judicial review for mismanagement or statutory violations affecting a religious institution’s administration, they cannot reconfigure or undo completed acquisition processes indirectly through reconstruction demands.

2) Maintainability and Relief Framing

The Court emphasized a foundational pleading principle: relief must be anchored in an appropriate challenge. The appellants did not seek quashing of the acquisition or the awards. Without such a challenge, the Court could not grant restoration or reconstruction because:

Post-award and vesting, the State holds title;
Reconstruction implies negation of acquisition effects without setting aside the acquisition itself; and
Article 226 is not a vehicle to circumvent the statutory framework of acquisition and vesting.

3) Article 25 and the “Place” of Worship

Echoing Mohammad Ali Khan, the Bench underscored that Article 25 guarantees a personal right to practice religion and does not constitutionalize the permanence of a particular site. The judgment therefore rejects the claim that demolition following lawful acquisition infringes Article 25. The devotee’s right to worship remains intact, albeit exercisable at other places.

4) The Waqf Argument: “Once Waqf, Always Waqf”

The appellants argued that declared waqf property remains waqf forever and cannot be acquired. The Court did not directly adjudicate this proposition, noting instead that the Waqf Board has already seized the Waqf Tribunal’s jurisdiction over title and compensation. As a matter of general principle, courts have recognized that waqf property may be acquired for a public purpose under valid acquisition laws, subject to payment of compensation to the waqf; the sanctity of waqf does not trump lawful acquisition, though it affects entitlement and apportionment of compensation. The Division Bench’s restraint respects the institutional role of the Tribunal on waqf-specific determinations while maintaining that acquisition finality forecloses reconstruction relief in writ.

Impact and Prospective Significance

On Writ Strategy and Locus

Devotee-led reconstruction petitions are non-maintainable where acquisition has reached finality and vesting has occurred. Future litigants must directly challenge acquisition and awards if they seek to restore possession or prevent demolition.
Waqf Boards as primary claimants: The ruling underscores that statutory waqf bodies are the proper actors to pursue title/compensation claims before the Waqf Tribunal or other competent fora. Devotees cannot parallel-track those claims via writ to seek reconstruction.

On Constitutional Rights and Urban Development

The Court’s articulation that Article 25 is not site-specific reinforces state capacity to pursue infrastructure and urban planning projects that necessitate acquisition of religious properties, subject to legal process and compensation.
Authorities can expect that, absent procedural infirmities in acquisition, reconstruction mandates will not be judicially compelled on the basis of Article 25 alone.

On Waqf Litigation

Where a notified waqf is acquired, litigation will likely pivot to the Waqf Tribunal on title and compensation apportionment. This judgment encourages channeling such disputes into the specialized statutory forum.

Normative Considerations and Limits

The judgment does not comment on the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, likely because the issue is not conversion of religious character but acquisition for a public purpose. The ruling should not be read to permit conversion of religious identity of a site; it addresses state acquisition powers and the non-site-specific nature of Article 25.
The Court’s reliance on the personal-right understanding of Article 25 is consistent with established jurisprudence but does not denude communities or waqf institutions of property-based remedies; it clarifies that such remedies lie within the acquisition and waqf statutory frameworks, not in a freestanding fundamental-right claim to a specific location.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Locus standi: The legal capacity to bring a case. Here, the Court held that devotees lack standing to demand reconstruction of a mosque after lawful acquisition, especially when the Waqf Board is litigating title/compensation.
Writ petition and writ appeal: A writ petition seeks judicial review under Article 226. An intra-court writ appeal (here under the 2005 Adhiniyam) challenges a Single Judge’s order before a Division Bench.
Quashment: A request to invalidate or set aside an official act (e.g., acquisition notifications or awards). Without seeking quashment, a court generally cannot grant restoration or reconstruction.
Land acquisition “vesting”: Once acquisition is completed and compensation awarded, title to the land vests in the State, extinguishing prior rights, subject to statutory remedies.
Article 25 (Freedom of religion): Guarantees personal rights to profess, practice, and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, health, and other fundamental rights. It does not guarantee the right to worship at a particular property once that property has been lawfully acquired.
Article 300A (Right to property): Property can be taken by authority of law; acquisition statutes govern the process and compensation (replacing the earlier Article 31 framework).
Waqf and Waqf Tribunal: A waqf is an inalienable charitable/religious endowment under Muslim law. Disputes relating to waqf property—including title and compensation apportionment—can be brought before the Waqf Tribunal under Section 83 of the Waqf Act, 1995.

Conclusion

The Madhya Pradesh High Court’s decision establishes a clear, twofold principle in the State’s jurisprudence: first, devotees cannot compel reconstruction of a mosque demolished pursuant to lawful acquisition, particularly in the absence of a pleaded challenge to the acquisition and the award; and second, Article 25 protects the personal liberty to practice religion but does not constitutionalize a right to worship at a specific site once that site has been validly acquired and vested in the State. The Court’s adoption of the Allahabad High Court’s reasoning in Mohammad Ali Khan, alongside its emphasis on the Waqf Board’s parallel proceedings before the Tribunal, channels future disputes into the appropriate statutory mechanisms and forestalls collateral reconstruction claims in writ. As urban development intersects with religious properties, this judgment supplies a structured roadmap: challenge the acquisition if grounds exist; otherwise, pursue compensation and waqf-related questions before the designated forum. It thus preserves the coherence of acquisition law, respects religious freedoms as personal rights, and clarifies the contours of devotee standing under Article 226.