No Deemed Guilt for SHOs on Illicit Liquor Seizures: Commentary on Bhola Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar

No Deemed Guilt for SHOs Merely from Illicit Liquor Seizures in Their Jurisdiction: Commentary on Bhola Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, Patna High Court (10.12.2025)

I. Introduction

The Patna High Court’s decision in Bhola Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (C.W.J.C. No. 7478 of 2023, judgment dated 10.12.2025, per Sandeep Kumar, J.) is the latest in a line of cases scrutinising the Bihar Police’s practice of treating Station House Officers (SHOs) as automatically guilty whenever illicit liquor is seized within their police station limits.

The judgment reinforces and applies the principles laid down in two recent coordinate Bench rulings:

At the centre of the controversy is paragraph 3 of the Director General of Police’s Letter No. 63 (01-Implementation) 2019-20-1296/Excise dated 24.11.2020, which in practice created a regime of “deemed guilt” for SHOs and chowkidars whenever illicit liquor was recovered by special teams in their jurisdictions.

In Bhola Kumar Singh, the Court was asked to examine:

  • Whether an SHO can be punished solely because illicit liquor was seized within the jurisdiction of his police station, without any evidence of his connivance or negligence.
  • Whether departmental punishment and its enhancement in revision can stand when based on such a “deemed guilt” policy.

The Court’s answer is a clear reaffirmation of fundamental service law and constitutional principles: territorial responsibility does not translate into strict liability or automatic guilt, and disciplinary findings must rest on cogent evidence of actual misconduct.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Parties and Context

  • Petitioner: Bhola Kumar Singh, a Police Sub-Inspector serving as Station House Officer (SHO), Sursand Police Station, District Sitamarhi, Bihar.
  • Respondents: State of Bihar, represented by the Director General of Police (DGP) and other senior police officials.

The case arises in the context of Bihar’s stringent prohibition regime and administrative directions issued to enforce a “complete ban” on liquor, particularly the DGP’s circular dated 24.11.2020 (Letter No. 63).

B. The Incident and Criminal Case

On 12.12.2020, the Excise Department’s A.L.T.F. (Anti Liquor Task Force) and Excise team conducted a raid near Sursand Police Station and seized approximately 4767.22 litres of illicit foreign liquor from:

  • a medical shop at Fojkha village,
  • a house at village Chaukoli, and
  • the house of one Iddat Bhagat.

Based on the seizure, Sursand P.S. Case No. 390 of 2020 dated 13.12.2020 was registered under sections 414, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and sections 30(a), 36 and 41 of the Bihar Excise Act. Notably, the FIR was itself lodged by the petitioner as SHO.

C. Departmental Proceedings and Initial Punishment

  1. Suspension: On 29.12.2020, the petitioner was suspended (District Order No. 1547 of 2020) for alleged dereliction of duty in enforcing prohibition and failure to gather intelligence about illicit liquor operations in his jurisdiction.
  2. Charge Memo: A departmental proceeding was initiated. A memo of charge (with list of documents and witnesses) was served on 05.01.2021. The core allegation: the petitioner failed in:
    • implementing the Bihar Excise Act in his area, and
    • collecting intelligence to prevent illicit liquor trade,
    as evidenced by the large seizure near the police station.
  3. Defence and Enquiry:
    • First written defence: 01.03.2021.
    • “Last defence”: 06.04.2021, on being called upon again.
    • Enquiry Officer: City Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarpur.
    • Crucially, only two formal witnesses were examined: they merely proved signatures on official documents; they were not present at the raid.
  4. Enquiry Report and Second Show Cause: The Enquiry Officer concluded that there was grave negligence in intelligence gathering and enforcement of prohibition. The Inspector General of Police (IG), Tirhut Range, as Disciplinary Authority, issued a second show cause notice based on this report. The petitioner replied on 07.05.2021.

    The petitioner’s specific grievance: a copy of the enquiry report was not supplied with the second show cause, impairing his ability to respond.
  5. Initial Punishment (Minor Penalty): By Memo No. 731 dated 16.06.2021, the IG, Tirhut Range imposed:
    Stoppage of increment of salary for two years with non-cumulative effect
    under Rule 14, Part V of the Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 2005 (CCA Rules).

D. Appeal and Suo Motu Revision

  1. Departmental Appeal: The petitioner filed an appeal on 24.08.2021 before the Additional DGP (Budget, Appeal & Welfare). No decision was taken for a considerable time.
  2. Writ over Suspension & Delay: Owing to continued suspension and non-disposal of his appeal, he filed C.W.J.C. No. 5601 of 2022 before the Patna High Court.
  3. DGP’s Suo Motu Revision under Rule 853A(a): During pendency of appeal and the writ petition, the DGP invoked his revisional powers under Rule 853A(a) of the Bihar Police Manual, 1978, and:
    • issued a show cause notice for enhancement of punishment, and
    • eventually passed order dated 08.09.2022 (Memo No. 558) enhancing the penalty.
  4. Enhanced Punishment (Major Penalties): The DGP:
    • quashed the earlier minor penalty (Memo No. 731 dated 16.06.2021), and
    • imposed the following enhanced penalties:
      • Reversion to basic pay scale of Police Sub-Inspector for 5 years.
      • Debarment from posting as SHO for 10 years from the date of order.
      • No additional benefits for the suspension period beyond subsistence allowance already paid (i.e. denial of full back wages).
      • Formal revocation of suspension from date of order (with subsistence allowance only for intervening period).
    The DGP justified the enhancement on the ground that the earlier penalty was not commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct.

E. Present Writ Petition

In C.W.J.C. No. 7478 of 2023, the petitioner challenged:

  1. Memo No. 731 dated 16.06.2021 (IG, Tirhut Range) imposing stoppage of increments, and
  2. Memo No. 558 dated 08.09.2022 (DGP, Bihar) enhancing the punishment under Rule 853A(a).

He also sought restoration of his previous position with all consequential benefits.

III. Issues Before the Court

From the judgment, the core legal issues can be framed as:
  1. Whether departmental findings of “grave dereliction of duty” can be sustained when:
    • the only substantive basis is that illicit liquor was seized within the territorial jurisdiction of the SHO, and
    • there is no independent evidence of connivance, complicity, negligence or failure to collect intelligence.
  2. Whether the concept of “deemed guilt” of an SHO (as reflected in DGP’s Letter No. 63 dated 24.11.2020) is compatible with service jurisprudence and constitutional guarantees, especially Articles 14 and 21.
  3. Whether the DGP’s exercise of suo motu revisional power under Rule 853A(a) of the Bihar Police Manual to enhance punishment is valid when:
    • no additional incriminating material is on record, and
    • the foundational presumption of guilt itself is illegal.
  4. Ancillary procedural issues: Though argued by counsel, the Court ultimately resolved the case on more fundamental grounds and did not need to give detailed rulings on:
    • non-supply of enquiry report with second show cause,
    • limitation under Rule 28 of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005 for revision, and
    • specific details of cross-examination opportunities.

IV. Summary of the Judgment

The Court allowed the writ petition and:

  • Quashed Memo No. 731 dated 16.06.2021 (minor penalty of stoppage of increments), and
  • Quashed Memo No. 558 dated 08.09.2022 (enhanced punishment order passed by the DGP in revision).

The Court’s key conclusions were:

  • “Deemed guilt” is impermissible: SHOs cannot be treated as ipso facto guilty merely because illicit liquor is seized within their jurisdiction. The concept of strict liability or deemed guilt is alien to service jurisprudence.
  • Lack of evidence: The only evidence in the departmental proceedings consisted of:
    • two formal witnesses proving signatures on documents, and
    • documents such as the FIR lodged by the petitioner himself and orders of suspension.
    No material established the petitioner’s connivance, complicity, deliberate negligence, or actual failure of intelligence gathering. Thus, the finding of guilt was unsustainable.
  • Revisional enhancement unsustainable: Since the foundational findings of guilt lacked evidentiary basis, the DGP’s revisional order enhancing punishment under Rule 853A(a) could not be justified.
  • Application of existing precedents: Following Ajay Kumar and Mukesh Kumar Paswan, the Court reiterated that paragraph 3 of DGP’s Letter No. 63 dated 24.11.2020 (which effectively presumes guilt of SHO and chowkidar) has no statutory sanction and offends principles of natural justice and Article 21.

V. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. Precedents and the “Deemed Guilt” Circular (Letter No. 63)

1. Contents and Effect of Letter No. 63 dated 24.11.2020

Paragraph 3 of Letter No. 63 (01 fdz;kUo;u) 2019-20-1296/Excise dated 24.11.2020 (translated in essence) states:

If, in any police station area, illicit liquor is seized by a special enforcement team based on information received at the State or District level, then in such cases the concerned SHO and chowkidar shall be considered guilty for not collecting intelligence and not taking necessary action. Strict legal and departmental action shall be taken against them.

In practical terms, this directive:

  • pre-judges the guilt of the SHO and chowkidar whenever liquor is recovered by external teams (e.g. Excise ALTF), and
  • requires disciplinary action on that basis alone, without individualised examination of evidence.

This policy had been repeatedly used as the sole basis for suspensions and departmental proceedings against SHOs under the prohibition regime.

2. Ajay Kumar v. State Of Bihar & Ors. (C.W.J.C. No. 737 of 2023)

In Ajay Kumar, a coordinate Bench considered departmental proceedings against the SHO of Kankarbagh Police Station where illicit liquor (about 25 litres) was seized by the Excise team from within his jurisdiction. The charge memo was explicitly based on DGP’s Letter No. 63.

Key findings extracted and relied upon in Bhola Kumar Singh include:

  • On the nature of the charge: The Court found an “inherent defect” in the framing of the charge because:
    “it has been framed on the direction of the Director General of Police… where paragraph '3' pre-judges the guilt of the S.H.O. and the Chowkidar in case of recovery of illicit liquor from the area of the police station. This has no statutory sanction…”
  • On the concept of ‘deemed guilt’ and Article 21:
    “paragraph '3' raises a presumption of guilt even before framing of charge… the guilt of the employee has been assumed and presumed even before giving him an opportunity of hearing. Such presumption of guilt has no sanction of law and the same is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is contrary to the principles of fair play in action.”
  • On evidence in departmental enquiry: Only two departmental witnesses, who merely proved signatures, were examined. The Court held:
    “There is not a single witness to say as to how the petitioner may be said to have acted negligently… Not a single example has been cited… that during the period of service of the petitioner, repeated recoveries were made from the same area.”
  • Direction to DGP: The Court directed the DGP to:
    “revisit paragraph '3' of the letter no. 63… which assumes and pre-judges the guilt against the Station House Officer and Chowkidar even before framing of charge and conduct of an independent enquiry. This has no sanction of law.”

Thus, Ajay Kumar firmly declared that automatic presumption of guilt from mere seizure in a jurisdiction is constitutionally and legally impermissible.

3. Mukesh Kumar Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors. (C.W.J.C. No. 8071 of 2023)

In Mukesh Kumar Paswan, a similar disciplinary action against another SHO was examined. The suspension order and subsequent punishment again explicitly relied on Letter No. 63 and the notion that recovery of liquor within the police station area automatically established guilt of the SHO.

The coordinate Bench, referring to Ajay Kumar and several Supreme Court decisions, held:

  • Pre-determined mind and post-decisional hearing: The Director General of Police, acting with a pre-determined mind under Letter No. 63, had directed strict action. The disciplinary authority then proceeded with an enquiry whose outcome was effectively foreordained.
    “Post decisional hearing is one with close mind… granting post decisional hearing will only be held to be an empty formality… contrary to the principle of fair play.”
    The Court relied inter alia on:
  • On evidence and manner of enquiry:
    • The enquiry officer had not recorded witness statements in the manner prescribed.
    • Relying on Union of India v. P. Thayagarajan, (1999) SCC 733, the Court reiterated that the enquiry officer must personally record statements in the presence of parties.
  • On parity among co-delinquents: A chowkidar, suspended on similar charges, had been exonerated, while the SHO was punished. Citing Man Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 12 SCC 331 and Rajendra Yadav v. State of M.P. (2013) 3 SCC 73, the Court emphasised that:
    “The doctrine of equality applies to all who are equally placed… Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is being imposed.”
  • On illegality of foundational action: Relying on State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 770 and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 664, the Court held that when the very foundation of departmental proceedings is illegal, sublato fundamento cadit opus (remove the foundation and the structure falls).
  • Ultimate conclusion: The disciplinary process, though formally following CCA Rules, was tainted because it was driven by a pre-determined decision under Letter No. 63. The so-called hearing was post-decisional and illusory.

Bhola Kumar Singh directly relies on and follows these two decisions.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning in Bhola Kumar Singh

1. Rejection of “Strict Liability” for SHOs

The most important doctrinal clarification in the present judgment appears in paragraph 20, where the Court synthesises the earlier case-law:

“the administrative authority acting in the capacity of a quasi-judicial authority can not enter and undertake a disciplinary proceeding imposing punishment, much less, revise and substitute it with a much harsher punishment with a pre-determined mindset. The concept of strict liability by virtue of 'deemed guilt' of a public servant in absence of any cogent material establishing direct connivance, complicity, negligence or involvement is totally alien to the service jurisprudence.

A public servant, no doubt, has to act and perform the duties of his office diligently and to the best of his abilities, but territorial responsibility can not be ipso facto equated with strict liability or deemed guilt, in absence of negligence or laxity being deliberate, which is evidenced based on cogent materials available on record.”

This is a clear and categorical rejection of the idea that SHOs can be automatically punished simply because offences occur or are detected within their territorial jurisdiction.

2. Assessment of Evidence in the Petitioner’s Case

The Court carefully examined the actual material forming the basis of the disciplinary findings (para 21):

  • Only two formal witnesses were examined in the departmental enquiry.
  • They merely proved signatures of senior officers on:
    • FIR lodged by the petitioner himself, and
    • orders of suspension and related communications.
  • There was no witness to speak:
    • to any instance of connivance, bribery, or complicity by the petitioner,
    • to any actionable intelligence having been ignored, or
    • to repeated seizures from the same location indicating a pattern of neglect.

The Court concluded:

“It is not discernible as to how these documents establish the guilt of the petitioner so far as his involvement/connivance or his failure to gather police intelligence is concerned.”

Thus, even if one leaves aside the illegality of “deemed guilt”, the enquiry was fundamentally deficient for want of substantive evidence.

3. Application of Ajay Kumar and Mukesh Kumar Paswan

In paragraphs 17–22, the Court explicitly quotes and relies upon the earlier coordinate Bench decisions:

  • Ajay Kumar – for the proposition that Letter No. 63’s paragraph 3 is:
    • without statutory sanction,
    • raises a presumption of guilt prior to framing of charge, and
    • violative of Article 21 and principles of fair play.
  • Mukesh Kumar Paswan – for:
    • the doctrine that post-decisional hearing with a pre-determined mind is illusory,
    • the need for proper recording of evidence by the enquiry officer,
    • the requirement of parity among co-delinquents, and
    • the principle that an illegal foundation vitiates the entire disciplinary structure (sublato fundamento cadit opus).

The Court summarised the “conspectus” (para 20) as follows:

  • Administrative/quasi-judicial authorities cannot embark on disciplinary proceedings with a pre-fixed conclusion dictated by a superior administrative circular.
  • The concept of automatic or “deemed” guilt of a public servant without evidence of actual misconduct is unacceptable.

4. DGP’s Revisional Power under Rule 853A(a)

The State justified the enhanced punishment on the strength of Rule 853A(a) of the Bihar Police Manual, which empowers the DGP to review proceedings against policemen at any stage and pass appropriate orders.

The Court did not deny the existence of such power. Rather, it emphasised its limits:

  • Revisional powers cannot turn a legally unsustainable finding into a valid one.
  • There must still be cogent evidence on record justifying punishment and any enhancement.

In paragraph 23, the Court held:

“Even from the perusal of the aforesaid [revisional] order dated 08.09.2022, it becomes clear that there are no materials on record that could have justified the imposition of the punishment, much less, enhancement of the punishment.”

Thus, irrespective of procedural limitation arguments (such as those under Rule 28 of the CCA Rules), the Court quashed the revisional order on the more fundamental ground of absence of a legal and evidentiary foundation.

5. Implicit Natural Justice Concerns

While the judgment does not dwell extensively on some specific procedural defects (e.g. supply of enquiry report, timing under Rule 28), its reasoning is informed by a concern for fair process. When:

  • charges are framed under a circular that presumes guilt, and
  • the evidence is purely formal and non-substantive,

the entire enquiry is seen as a mere formality, echoing the concerns articulated in H.L. Trehan and Municipal Council, Neemuch.

C. Interaction with Constitutional Principles

1. Article 21 – Fair, Just and Reasonable Procedure

As reaffirmed in Ajay Kumar and relied upon here, Article 21 does not permit a presumption of guilt and punitive action without a fair process. A blanket instruction that an SHO is always to be treated as guilty when liquor is found in his jurisdiction:

  • displaces the presumption of innocence,
  • short-circuits an honest appraisal of individual responsibility, and
  • reduces the departmental enquiry to a ritualistic confirmation of a pre-decided outcome.

Such “fairness deficit” renders the process unconstitutional under Article 21.

2. Article 14 – Equality, Non-Arbitrariness and Parity

Article 14’s guarantee of equality before law also encompasses non-arbitrary disciplinary action. As explained in Man Singh and Rajendra Yadav (cited in Mukesh Kumar Paswan):

  • Equals must be treated equally, even in the matter of punishment.
  • There must be parity among co-delinquents similarly placed.

Although Bhola Kumar Singh does not itself involve a direct co-delinquent parity issue (unlike Mukesh), the Court’s reasoning sits squarely within the framework that:

  • sanctions cannot be motivated by policy-driven scapegoating of SHOs, and
  • punishment must be individually justified by evidence, not by blanket administrative directives.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Departmental (Disciplinary) Proceedings

A departmental proceeding is an internal inquiry conducted by the employer (here, the State/police department) to determine whether a government servant has committed misconduct under service rules. It is different from a criminal trial:

  • Standard of proof is usually preponderance of probabilities, not “beyond reasonable doubt”.
  • However, the process must still be fair, unbiased, and evidence-based.

2. Disciplinary Authority and Enquiry Officer

  • Disciplinary Authority: The officer legally empowered to impose penalties (e.g., the IG, Tirhut Range in this case).
  • Enquiry Officer (EO): An officer appointed to conduct a fact-finding enquiry — record witness statements, examine documents, and submit a report with findings.

The EO’s report is recommendatory; the final decision rests with the Disciplinary Authority, who must independently apply his mind.

3. Minor vs Major Penalties

Service rules (like the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005) classify penalties as:

  • Minor: e.g., censure, stoppage of increments (with or without cumulative effect), withholding of promotion.
  • Major: e.g., reduction in rank, compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal from service.

The initial penalty of stoppage of increments for two years was a minor penalty. The later reversion to the basic pay scale and 10-year debarment from SHO posts amounts, in substance, to major penalties.

4. “Deemed Guilt” and Strict Liability

  • “Deemed” in law often means that the law treats a person or thing as having a quality or status, whether or not it actually does, typically based on a considered legislative judgement.
  • “Strict liability” means liability without proof of fault — for example, where someone is held responsible simply because something happens in their area or under their control, regardless of intent or negligence.

In this context, the DGP’s Letter No. 63 effectively created a regime of strict liability / deemed guilt for SHOs and chowkidars when liquor was seized within their jurisdiction. The High Court has held this impermissible in service jurisprudence, which requires at least some evidence of:

  • connivance,
  • complicity, or
  • deliberate or gross negligence.

5. Suo Motu Revision and Rule 853A(a)

  • Suo motu means “on its own motion” — an authority acts without a formal application by any party.
  • Revision is a supervisory power to:
    • review orders passed by subordinate authorities, and
    • correct errors or enhance/reduce punishment.

Rule 853A(a) of the Bihar Police Manual allows the DGP to review proceedings against police personnel at any stage. However:

  • it does not allow the DGP to bypass requirements of fairness, evidence and reasoned decision-making, and
  • cannot be used to enforce pre-determined outcomes derived from unlawful circulars.

6. Natural Justice: Pre-Decisional vs Post-Decisional Hearing

Two core principles of natural justice are:

  • Audi alteram partem – “hear the other side”; the person affected must have a reasonable opportunity to present their case before a decision is made.
  • Nemo judex in causa sua – no one should be a judge in their own cause; the decision-maker must be impartial.

A pre-decisional hearing is the norm — the authority must hear the employee before deciding guilt or punishment. A post-decisional hearing (hearing after the decision is already effectively taken) is often considered a mere formality, particularly when:

  • the authority has already pre-judged the matter, or
  • there is an express policy directive to impose punishment.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that such post-decisional hearings do not satisfy the requirements of natural justice when the mind is already closed.

7. Subsistence Allowance

When a government servant is under suspension, they are typically paid a reduced amount known as subsistence allowance, meant to provide minimal financial support. It is not full salary and carries no presumption of guilt. In the present case:

  • The DGP’s order stated that the petitioner would get only subsistence allowance for the suspension period.
  • By quashing the punishment orders, the basis for denying full pay for the suspension period is also undermined, which generally entitles the employee to consequential service benefits, subject to separate determination by the employer in light of the judgment.

VII. Impact and Implications

A. On Prohibition Enforcement and Police Administration in Bihar

This judgment, coupled with Ajay Kumar and Mukesh Kumar Paswan, significantly affects how the State can enforce its prohibition policy through internal police discipline:

  • No automatic scapegoating: SHOs can no longer be treated as automatic scapegoats whenever illicit liquor is seized in their area. The State must:
    • prove specific acts of omission or commission, such as ignoring credible intelligence, recurring offences at the same location, or complicity with bootleggers.
  • Need for individualised assessment: Each case must be examined on its own facts. A blanket rule that “liquor found = SHO guilty” is no longer tenable.
  • Recalibration of supervision mechanisms: Senior police leadership will need to:
    • revise or withdraw paragraph 3 of Letter No. 63 (as repeatedly suggested by the High Court), and
    • devise lawful methods of ensuring accountability, such as performance audits, intelligence reviews, and case-based disciplinary actions grounded in evidence.

B. On Service Jurisprudence and Disciplinary Law

The decision reinforces several core tenets of service law:

  • Evidentiary basis for punishment: Disciplinary findings must rest on some legal evidence that reasonably supports the conclusion of guilt. Formal documents proving that an incident occurred are not, by themselves, proof that the officer was negligent or complicit.
  • Independence of disciplinary authority: A disciplinary authority must apply an independent mind. It cannot simply execute a superior’s directive that prescribes guilt and punishment in advance.
  • Limits on circulars and executive instructions: Administrative circulars (like Letter No. 63) cannot override statutory rules, constitutional guarantees, or principles of natural justice. Where there is conflict, the circular must yield.

C. On Exercise of Revisional Powers

Although the Court did not primarily rely on limitation under Rule 28 of the CCA Rules, it has sent a clear message regarding revisional powers under Rule 853A(a) of the Bihar Police Manual:

  • Revisional power cannot cure foundational illegality: If the original finding of guilt is tainted by lack of evidence or illegality (such as reliance on deemed guilt), revisional enhancement of punishment cannot stand.
  • Requirement of cogent reasons: Enhancement of punishment must be supported by specific reasons and material; mere invocation of “gravity of allegations” is insufficient when the evidence is skeletal.

D. On Future Litigation

For future cases involving:

  • disciplinary proceedings under the Bihar Excise Act enforcement regime, or
  • any other “strict liability” type administrative circulars imposing automatic guilt,

this judgment provides a strong precedent to:

  • challenge punishments based solely on territorial responsibility, and
  • insist on meaningful, evidence-based enquiries that comply with natural justice.

It also offers doctrinal support against any attempt by administrative heads to direct subordinate disciplinary authorities to impose fixed consequences without case-by-case evaluation.

VIII. Key Takeaways

  1. No Deemed Guilt for SHOs: The High Court unequivocally rejects any policy that treats SHOs as automatically guilty solely because illicit liquor is found within their jurisdiction.
  2. Evidence is Essential: Disciplinary punishment must be supported by substantive evidence of connivance, complicity, or deliberate negligence, not just by the fact of seizure and formal documents.
  3. Letter No. 63’s Paragraph 3 Is Legally Unsustainable: Following Ajay Kumar and Mukesh Kumar Paswan, the judgment reinforces that the DGP’s directive that pre-judges guilt has no statutory backing and violates Articles 14 and 21.
  4. Revisional Enhancement Limited by Fairness and Evidence: DGP’s revisional power under Rule 853A(a) cannot be used to enhance punishment when the foundational finding itself is legally flawed and unsupported by evidence.
  5. Territorial Responsibility ≠ Strict Liability: While SHOs have a duty to enforce law in their jurisdiction, territorial responsibility does not, by itself, justify strict liability or deemed guilt.
  6. Quashing of Both Orders: Both the initial minor penalty and the enhanced major penalty were quashed, entitling the petitioner to restoration of his service status subject to consequential decisions on benefits consistent with the judgment.

IX. Conclusion

Bhola Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar is a significant reaffirmation of fundamental principles in service jurisprudence, particularly in the sensitive context of Bihar’s prohibition enforcement. The judgment crystallises a crucial rule:

A public servant, including an SHO, cannot be condemned or punished on the basis of “deemed guilt” derived from policy directives or territorial responsibility alone. Disciplinary liability requires individualised, evidence-based assessment and compliance with natural justice.

By aligning itself with the earlier decisions in Ajay Kumar and Mukesh Kumar Paswan, the Patna High Court sends a clear institutional message: administrative convenience or policy zeal cannot override constitutional guarantees of fairness, non-arbitrariness, and due process. Circulars that effectively predetermine guilt, and revisional powers wielded to enforce them, must give way to the rule of law.

Going forward, this judgment is likely to serve as a cornerstone precedent in Bihar — and a persuasive authority elsewhere — for:

  • curbing arbitrary disciplinary actions premised on strict liability theories, and
  • strengthening the requirement that public power, even in internal disciplinary matters, must always be exercised with fairness, reason and an open mind.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Patna High Court

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