No Appellate Jurisdiction of the High Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982: Appeals Held Not Maintainable; Liberty to Invoke Writ Jurisdiction with Interim Protection

Court: High Court of Andhra Pradesh

Bench: RNT, J and MRK, J

Date: 28 August 2025

Main Case Title: Shaik Masthan Vali, Guntur Dist v. Kummaru Durga, Guntur Dist & Three Others

Connected Matters: Land Grabbing Appeal Nos. 20, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31 of 2016; 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 24, 25, 28, 30, 32 of 2017; and 1 & 2 of 2024

Introduction

This common judgment addresses a cluster of Land Grabbing Appeals (LGAs) arising under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (the 1982 Act). The central issue was jurisdictional: whether appeals filed against orders of the Special Tribunal under the 1982 Act are maintainable before the High Court, either directly or by way of cases previously filed before the then Special Court and later transferred to the High Court to be decided as an appellate court.

The Bench, speaking through a separate common judgment, confined itself strictly to the threshold question of maintainability. The parties included individual appellants and respondents drawn largely from Guntur District, with the lead matter styled as Shaik Masthan Vali, Guntur Dist v. Kummaru Durga, Guntur Dist & Three Others. The controversy sits at the intersection of special statutory procedure under the 1982 Act and the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227.

With numerous appeals pending for several years, the Court’s determination carries systemic consequences for how challenges to Special Tribunal orders must be structured and pursued in Andhra Pradesh going forward.

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court held that it does not possess appellate jurisdiction under the 1982 Act to entertain appeals arising from orders of the Special Tribunal.
All the listed Land Grabbing Appeals are therefore dismissed as not maintainable in this Court, whether filed here directly or transferred here from the erstwhile Special Court to be decided as an appellate court under the 1982 Act.
Recognizing the long pendency and to protect parties’ interests, the Court granted liberty to the appellants to file writ petitions within a reasonable period of three months from the date of the judgment.
To prevent prejudice during this transition, any interim orders earlier granted in the appeals will continue to operate for a period of three months.
The Court expressly clarified that it adjudicated only the maintainability of the appeals and did not enter into the merits of the impugned orders.
No order as to costs.

In short, the Court reaffirms the principle that an appeal is a creature of statute. As the 1982 Act does not vest the High Court with appellate power over Special Tribunal orders, the proper route for judicial scrutiny is by invoking the High Court’s writ supervisory jurisdiction.

Analysis

1) Statutory Architecture and Context

The Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 establishes a special adjudicatory framework to address land grabbing, including:

Special Tribunal: The primary forum to inquire into and decide cases of alleged land grabbing.
Special Court: A higher forum with powers distinct from ordinary civil courts and typically the appellate body under the Act’s scheme. Orders of the Special Court are ordinarily accorded finality under the special statute.

The appeals before the High Court fell into two broad categories:

Direct appeals filed in the High Court purporting to challenge orders of the Special Tribunal under the 1982 Act.
Appeals earlier filed before the then Special Court that came to be transferred to the High Court “to decide as Appellate Court under the Act 1982.”

The Court’s ruling turns on whether the 1982 Act confers appellate jurisdiction on the High Court in either scenario. The answer given is a categorical “No.” The availability of an appeal depends upon explicit statutory conferment; absent such conferment, the High Court cannot assume appellate authority. The proper path of challenge is through its constitutional writ jurisdiction, which remains untouched and paramount.

2) Legal Reasoning: Why the Appeals Are Not Maintainable

The Court’s reasoning, as reflected in the “Result” portion of the common judgment, is anchored in the following propositions:

Appeal is a statutory right, not inherent: The right to appeal exists only when expressly provided by statute. The 1982 Act does not make the High Court an appellate forum over Special Tribunal orders; hence, no such appeal can be entertained by the High Court.
Transfer does not create jurisdiction: Merely because appeals were transferred from the then Special Court to the High Court (for any administrative or structural reasons) does not ipso facto confer appellate jurisdiction on the High Court under the 1982 Act.
Constitutional writ supervision remains: While appellate jurisdiction is absent, the High Court’s powers of judicial review under Articles 226/227 over decisions of tribunals/special courts persist. The Court therefore provided liberty to re-approach it via writ petitions.
Fairness during transition: Appreciating the long pendency and potential prejudice, the Court extended existing interim orders for three months to allow parties time to file writ petitions.
No ruling on merits: The dismissal is purely on maintainability; it does not affirm or disapprove the underlying Special Tribunal decisions. Merits can be canvassed, to the extent permissible, in writ proceedings.

3) Precedents and Principles Informing the Decision

Although the excerpt provided contains only the dispositive portion and does not list specific authorities cited, the Court’s conclusion aligns with several well-settled principles of Indian public law and appellate practice:

Right of Appeal Is a Creature of Statute: Indian courts have consistently held that appeals do not exist as a matter of inherent right; they must be conferred by statute and within the bounds set by the statute. Classic Supreme Court formulations include:
- Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar, (1974) 2 SCC 393: There is no inherent right of appeal apart from statute.
- Vijay Prakash D. Mehta v. Collector of Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 402: The right of appeal is a statutory right and can be circumscribed by conditions.
- State of Haryana v. Maruti Udyog Ltd., (2000) 7 SCC 348: No appeal lies unless specifically provided by law.
Judicial Review Over Tribunals Is Preserved: L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261, firmly establishes that decisions of tribunals are subject to the High Courts’ writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227, notwithstanding any finality clauses in special statutes. Thus, even where no appeal lies, supervisory/writ review endures.
Jurisdiction Cannot Be Created by Transfer, Consent, or Practice: The principle that jurisdiction must be conferred by law and cannot be assumed or enlarged by transfer orders or party conduct is long-standing. See, e.g., Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 (a decree without jurisdiction is a nullity); Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, (1990) 1 SCC 193 (jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent).
Vested Right of Appeal and Change of Forum: While Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, 1957 SCR 488 recognizes a vested right of appeal as on the date of institution, it also accepts that the forum is a matter of procedure. Where the legislature does not provide a successor appellate forum or confer appellate functions on the High Court, the High Court cannot assume that appellate role in the absence of statutory mandate. The present judgment appears to apply this boundary: no legislative conferment, no appellate jurisdiction in the High Court.

Collectively, these principles explain why the High Court rejected appellate maintainability while simultaneously pointing litigants to the constitutionally guaranteed pathway of writ review.

4) Impact and Prospective Effects

The judgment has immediate and systemic implications:

Clarifies Forum Selection: Parties aggrieved by Special Tribunal orders under the 1982 Act should not file appeals in the High Court. The correct recourse is to invoke writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227.
Pending Appeals to Be Dismissed: Existing LGAs of similar complexion in the High Court will, following this ratio, be non-maintainable as appeals. This may streamline the docket by preventing jurisdictionally improper filings.
Shift in Standard of Review: Writ proceedings entail a more limited and supervisory scrutiny (jurisdictional errors, perversity, violation of natural justice, error of law apparent, etc.) rather than a full-blown reappraisal of facts typical of appellate review. Litigants must recalibrate their pleadings and strategy accordingly.
Transitional Protection: Extending existing interim orders for three months cushions parties from abrupt adverse consequences and ensures continuity while writ petitions are prepared and instituted.
No Prejudice on Merits: Because the dismissal is only on maintainability, it does not trigger res judicata on substantive issues. Merits remain open for consideration, to the extent permissible, in writ proceedings.
Legislative Signal: If a policy choice exists to preserve an appellate layer over Special Tribunal orders, the legislature would need to enact a clear conferment of appellate jurisdiction on a specified forum. Absent such enactment, the High Court’s role remains limited to constitutional supervision.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Maintainability: A case is “maintainable” if the court has legal authority to entertain it in the manner presented. The Court here said: the High Court has no statutory appellate jurisdiction under the 1982 Act, so these appeals are not maintainable.
Appeal vs. Writ Petition:
- Appeal: A statutory remedy allowing a higher forum to review, and often re-examine, findings of fact and law. It exists only if a statute provides it.
- Writ Petition (Art. 226/227): A constitutional remedy enabling the High Court to supervise and correct jurisdictional errors, legal errors apparent on the face of the record, breaches of natural justice, and perversity. Not an appeal on facts but a supervisory check on legality and fairness.
Transferred Appeals: Cases that began in a different forum and were later moved to the High Court. Transfer is an administrative/judicial mechanism; it cannot create new powers. If the High Court lacks appellate jurisdiction under the statute, transfer cannot vest it with such jurisdiction.
Finality Clauses: Special statutes often say certain orders are “final.” Courts interpret such clauses to not exclude constitutional judicial review, though they may exclude statutory appeals unless provided. Hence, writ jurisdiction remains available despite finality clauses.
Interim Orders Continued: Temporary orders (e.g., stay of dispossession) granted in appeals will continue for three months post-judgment. This prevents irreparable harm while litigants shift to the correct remedy (writ petitions).

Conclusion

The Andhra Pradesh High Court’s common judgment establishes a clear and consequential procedural rule: the High Court does not exercise appellate jurisdiction over orders of the Special Tribunal under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982. Appeals filed directly in the High Court, or those transferred from the erstwhile Special Court for decision as an appellate court, are not maintainable. The ruling reaffirms foundational doctrines—that appeals are purely statutory, that jurisdiction cannot be assumed absent conferment, and that constitutional writ oversight remains the proper avenue for correcting legal and jurisdictional errors by special tribunals.

Importantly, the Bench coupled this jurisdictional discipline with procedural fairness: parties have been granted a three-month window to approach the Court via writ petitions, and the continuity of interim protections has been ensured for the same period. The judgment thus harmonizes the rule of law with equitable transition, guiding litigants onto the correct procedural track without precipitating undue hardship.

Going forward, challenges to Special Tribunal orders under the 1982 Act should be structured as petitions invoking Articles 226/227, tailored to the narrower scope of supervisory review. Unless and until the legislature creates a statutory appellate route, the High Court’s appellate doors remain closed in this class of cases, even as its constitutional portals stay open for the correction of jurisdictional and legal wrongs.